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FOREWORD
OBSERVATIONS ON THE FIFTIETH ANNIVERSARY OF
THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD:
REFLECTIONS ON ITS PAST AND PROJECTIONS
ON ITS FUTURE*
Hon. Howard Jenkins, Jr. * *
This year marks the fiftieth anniversary of the enactment of legisla-
tion which created the National Labor Relations Board. It is appropriate
that many educational institutions, law schools, and labor relations
groups are conducting seminars marking the occasion and I am de-
lighted that the College of Law of the University of Denver has chosen
to conduct a labor seminar at this time. I am proud both of my relation-
ship with the National Labor Relations Board and my association with
this law school.
I have chosen today to speak both to the past and to the future role
and function of the National Labor Relations Board. You will notice
that I do not address the present. Some years ago I noticed that many,
or perhaps some, officials who had served the agency left and undertook
to criticize and to have comments about their former colleagues which I
thought inappropriate. As a consequence I shall not comment on what
the current Board is doing. Indeed since leaving the NLRB in August of
1983, I have not read any of the Board decisions, I have avoided any
public comment on the work of the agency and this has been a deliber-
ate and studied choice on my part.
Some years ago I had the pleasure of listening to an address by the
HonorableJ. Warren Madden, whom many of you will recall was the first
Chairman of the NLRB, having been appointed by President Franklin
Deleno Roosevelt shortly after the Wagner Act was passed. Years later,
when he served as a Judge on the U.S. Court of Claims, Judge Madden
addressed the labor law section of the American Bar Association in
Montreal in 1966. On that occasion Judge Madden said some things
which I think bear repeating. He observed that it is important for peo-
ple to think about and talk about the origins of their institutions, for
only by thinking about and talking about the origins of their institutions
* Remarks prepared for delivery at the Denver University Law Review Symposium
Speakers Conference held May 2 and 3, 1985, at the Lowell Thomas Law Building,
University of Denver College of Law, Denver, Colorado.
** Former Member, National Labor Relations Board, 1963-1983; LL.B., A.B., Uni-
versity of Denver. Mr. Jenkins is the Recipient of the honorary degree of Doctor of Laws
from the University of Denver, and is the honored guest of the Symposium Speakers
Conference.
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can they recall why they were created and what their role and function
was intended to be.
A convenient starting point is the Great Depression when the bleak
picture of our national economy compelled close examination of the
harsh realities of the economic facts. Unemployment soared to an un-
precedented peak, production of consumer goods dropped to new lows,
union membership dwindled and was virtually nonexistent in mass pro-
duction industries such as steel, automobile and rubber. Wage rates
spiraled downward as the unemployed competed fiercely for the inade-
quate number of available jobs. The downward spiral of prices quickly
followed the loss ofjobs and limited purchasing power.
As is frequently the case in times of stress, there were those who
preferred to prescribe nostrums for our economic ills rather than tackle
the more complex problem of diagnosis. They were content to treat
symptoms rather than search for basic causes. Fortunately, there was a
man of great depth perception in the United States Senate, Robert F.
Wagner of New York, who understood the root problem and was willing
to attack it. The Senator recognized that the nation's deep economic
trouble was due to the lack of mass purchasing power to buy the prod-
ucts which our factories and farms could and would produce if the pro-
duce could be sold.
Senator Wagner, as Chairman of the Board which functioned briefly
under the National Industrial Recovery Act of 1933, learned several im-
portant lessons, not the least of which had to do with the ineffectiveness
of bringing about social and economic change without enforcement ma-
chinery. That experience also helped formulate the belief that down-
ward pressure on wage rates could not effectively be resisted unless
labor achieved bargaining power. If we were to preserve our free enter-
prise system, the only source from which that power could be derived
was self-organization by employees. (A possible alternative of course,
never seriously considered, was to create unions by federal charter much
as banks or utilities have been chartered and assign jurisdiction and re-
sponsibility. In recent years some governments have followed this path
with the economic consequences that could be predicted).
Thus, in adopting the Wagner Act, Congress accepted as national
labor policy the Senator's hope that his law would make American work-
ing men free, by permitting them to join forces with their fellow work-
men and thus increase their power to prevent cut-throat job
competition; and that it would in time make them and their country
more affluent by creating a great mass of purchasing power for the prod-
ucts of American industry. I venture the opinion that the intervening
decades have proven him to be correct on both counts.
Though the point tends to be obscured by overriding concern with
detail, there can be no doubt that one of the most potent bulwarks
against governmental wage and price controls has been the develop-
ment of the system of establishing wage levels privately through bar-
gaining between private industry and free labor unions. Those whose
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concern is most deeply committed to preservation of management's
right to be free from governmental price fixing would do well to reflect
on the role of the trade union movement in preserving a free economy.
Industrial relations, like politics, make strange bedfellows.
In a very real sense, the problems of the industrial community are a
reflection in miniature of the problems of our nation. The socio-eco-
nomic problems that beset us in the human relations field which are the
concern of all Americans are not unlike the socio-economic problems
that constitute grist for the industrial relations mill. Underlying both
sets of problems are the major political and legal tasks of testing and
readjusting doctrine so as to harmonize two fundamental democratic
principles, namely: preservation of the rights of the individual, and pres-
ervation of free democratic institutions. Upon reflection it should not
be surprising to find that neither set of problems can be solved in isola-
tion. Whatever judgments form the base from which doctrine emerges
in the one area will also by logic and necessity dictate doctrine in the
other. Those whose primary concern is with the strengthening and ex-
panding of our economy as well as those whose efforts are directed to-
ward elimination of social and economic inequities in the broader sense
need clearly to recognize the fact that neither group can achieve its goals
if it disregards the other.
Most observers tend to concentrate on the sharp conflicts and the
deeply divisive positions in the labor-management arena. Not simply to
be different, but because of their relative importance I would emphasize
the similarities and draw attention to the parallel objectives shared by
management and by organized labor.
At the risk of oversimplification, let us first look at the true funda-
mentals stripping away the less important facade and protective colora-
tion with which they are surrounded. Management, as a category
descriptive of owners and managers of business organizations, is com-
mitted to the development and growth of economically sound, finan-
cially profitable business enterprises. Spokesmen for management
remind us again and again that such institutions can flourish only if free
from governmental intrusion and independent of governmental controls
over the internal decision making processes.
In much the same way, and for many of the same reasons, organized
labor espouses the view that if our economy is to grow there must exist a
strong, independent, free trade union movement composed of autono-
mous, separate organizations likewise free from governmental intrusion
and governmental control of its internal decision making processes.
Both management and labor then approach the industrial relations
problems in our economy basically in agreement at least as regards the
role properly to be exercised by government and, more importantly, as
regards the necessity that private organizations, be they business or la-
bor, must be privately controlled and their choices dictated by their own
self-interest.
Both labor and management taken generically speak as one in es-
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pousing the principle that central to sound labor-manangement rela-
tions is employee freedom of choice. There is no ideological dispute
between mature spokesmen of unions or employers over whether em-
ployees have the right to act in concert or singly as they choose. Per-
haps the less sophisticated are even more obviously dedicated to the
principle of free employee choice-if one can judge by the campaign
materials in representation cases.
We also find evidence that unions and employers on the whole are
together in acceptance of the view that if a bargaining relationship has
been established (voluntarily or involuntarily), the obligation to deal
with each other is real.
Thus it is clear that in creating the NLRB Congress described its
role and function as two-fold. The first was to permit and assure em-
ployees private freedom of choice free from outside interference and
coercion when deciding whether to engage in collective bargaining,
along with the right to choose their representative freely without coer-
cion. In the words of Chief Justice Hughes, speaking for the Court in
Jones and Laughlin' in 1937, "the statute goes no further than to safe-
guard the right of employees to self organization and to select repre-
sentatives of their own choosing for collective bargaining . . . without
restraint or coercion by their employer. ' 2 This, said the Chief Justice is
a fundamental right. "Employees have as clear a right to organize and
select their representatives for lawful purposes as the (employer) has to
organize its business and select its own officers and agents."
'3
The second function was to encourage the process of collective bar-
gaining as an alternative to governmental involvement in the industrial
process. Let the terms and conditions of employment be determined by
the parties themselves without governmental intrusion; and in order to
accomplish that make certain that collective action was called for to en-
force both the duty to bargain and to bargain in good faith.
Whatever may have been the primary thrust of the Wagner Act
when the Taft-Hartley Amendments were adopted twelve years later,
Congress did not repeal 'the Wagner Act, but engrafted Taft-Hartley
upon it. Similarly, twelve years after Taft-Hartley, when the Landrum-
Griffin Amendments were adopted, there was no coalescing of the previ-
ous legislation. There was simply an engrafting of the Landrum-Griffin
Amendments on the Taft-Hartley Amendments on the Wagner Act.
These three pieces of legislation are of equal dignity and though one
follows the other-all are law and there are those who know the gospel
only according to Wagner as well as those who are apostles of Taft-Hart-
ley. The Labor Board must, of necessity, be ecumenical.
During my twenty years of service as a Member of the Labor Board I
held firmly to the view that it was not the proper function for Board
1. National Labor Relations Board v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1
(1937).




Members to be about the business of telling Congress how to write leg-
islation. I made no recommendations for amendments or changes in the
law and indeed refused invitations from both the House and Senate to
comment on legislative proposals then pending before the Congress. I
felt it to be inappropriate for a person with decisional responsibilities
under a federal statute to undertake to describe how the statutes ought
to be written;just as I would have thought it inappropriate had Members
of the Congress undertaken to advise me on how to decide cases. Inci-
dentally, at no time during my service on the Board did any Member of
the Congress or any President undertake to influence any Board case or
the manner in which that case would be decided.
Now that I am free from those constraints I am willing to share my
views on ways in which I think the work of the Board could be improved
by some changes in the statutes.
With that comment I move with some trepedation into the political
arena: an area where I have been more of an observer than a
participant.
Experience teaches that achieving changes in the labor statutes is
extremely difficult. No change comes easily. For example, the last sub-
stantive change in the law occurred in 1974 and a major effort to over-
haul the statute in large part in 1978 completely failed. In my view there
are several basic reasons for this difficulty. The first is that the National
Labor Relations Board has no constituency. It is unlike some regulatory
agencies whose impact is felt through its direct power to regulate a given
industry or as with other agencies, the power to award franchises, to
grant licenses, and take action that will benefit people subject to the reg-
ulation of that agency. In the course of events, most people who come
before the NLRB lose and those who don't, feel they should not have
been there in the first place. Of course, I should quickly add that the
Labor Board should not have a constituency and it is appropriate that it
not have one, primarily because of the nature of the Board's responsibil-
ities. Nevertheless, the plain political fact is that the Board lacks clout in
the legislative process and has no one to speak for it either in the appro-
priations process or in the legislative process itself. One could hardly
expect disappointed litigants to go on to the Hill and urge the Congress
to help this agency and provide it with more resources and funds or to
take action that would be beneficial to the agency. Both labor and man-
agement have their own partisan positions for which they lobby and
their own separate legislative goals.
A second basic reason for the difficulty lies in the fact that both la-
bor and management have their own partisan positions for which they
lobby, and their own separate legislative goals. Thus concensus among
those most directly affected does not come easily. Moreover, there is
wide diversity within both groups. Contrary to what some political car-
toonists would have us believe, organized labor is not a monolith.
Neither is management monolithic in its views. Leadership positions in
both groups are held by persons of differing political philosophies, party
1984]
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affiliations, organizational goals and personal ambitions, to say nothing
of the size and character of the constituent organizations.
A further complicating factor is the legislative system itself. It has
been suggested that the genius of our system lies in the fact that the
legislative process is a process of accommodation to competing points of
view and that seldom does any one point of view prevail to the exclusion
of all others. It has been described in terms of a horse race with the
suggestion that in the socio-economic area, there is never a clear victory,
but rather always a photo finish with the debate going on for years as to
who won. Nothing said here is intended either in word or spirit to be
critical of the legislative process. I think Congress is doing exactly what
it should do in reacting to the kinds of problems facing it. Rather the
thrust of my observation is that the likelihood of significant substantive
change in our labor laws is slight.
Despite that rather negative and dismal forecast concerning sub-
stantive changes, there are some procedural changes that I think could
be made if they obtain the support and backing of the organized bar. I
recognize at the outset that the line between what is procedural and
what is substantive is not always clear. To me, however, the differences
are real. I will briefly outline the proposals and my reasons for sug-
gesting the changes.
The first has to do with a little known provision which makes it im-
possible for the Board to employ economists. For many years there has
been a rider on the NLRB appropriation bill which forbids the Board to
expend any of its funds to employ economists. Without going into de-
tail, this dates back to a time when some felt that there were employed
by the Board economists who also were either communists or fellow
travelers. The consequence of this rider is that the Board's knowledge
of economic matters comes through happenstance, briefs filed by par-
ties, or whatever incidental reading Board members happen to do.
Since much of what the Board does is in the area of determining appro-
priate units and handling the problems of collective bargaining gener-
ally, knowledge of the industrial economy is key. For example, when the
health care amendments were passed and for the first time the Board
started looking at hospitals, nursing homes and other health care institu-
tions on a broad basis, we needed to know what the industry was like
and we needed information about employment in the industry. If we
had had economists capable of doing research and gathering data for us,
the information would have made our task a great deal easier and per-
haps the results in some cases might well have been more useful and
more acceptable to the parties. In any event, it is almost ludicrous for
the National Labor Relations Board to be flying blind in dealing with the
industrial economy of our nation.
A second area in which change would be beneficial, in my view,
deals with the existence of Board vacancies. As you know when a Board
Member's term expires, at midnight of that day his authority ends and
until a new Member is appointed and confirmed or brought into office
[Vol. 62:2
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through a recess appointment, that seat remains vacant and the staff
which reported to the Member whose term expired is taken over by the
Chairman or a senior Member and that person must operate and direct
two staffs. I have experienced that situation and know that it is an un-
necessary burden on the senior Member in my case, or the Chairman in
another case, to have the burden of giving direction to two staffs while
trying to carry on his normal duty.
Since there obviously is no way in which a President of the United
States can be compelled to act quickly in filling vacancies, and I certainly
don't suggest any criticism of any President for delay in the appointment
process, that is his prerogative and I make no suggestion with regard to
it. I do, however, feel that if the Board is to function effectively there
should be five Members, and one way to encourage the prompt filling of
vacancies is to provide in the law that a Member whose term has expired
shall remain in office until a successor is appointed. Most other agencies
have such a provision. The Labor Board is almost alone in this regard.
The law currently requires that all lawyers employed by the Board
work for a specific Board Member. They are not employed to work gen-
erally for the Board and this too needs modification so as to permit gen-
eral employment by attorneys of the Board and not require that each
Board Member hire a staff independently.
This change would enable the Board Members to restructure their
staffs so as to retain the right to employ senior members of the staff for
themselves independently and to have a pool of attorneys who could do
the research and reading records and preparing memoranda, analyzing
the cases for the use of the entire Board. As matters stand there is a
great deal of duplicative effort expended by Board Member staffs and
each Board Member currently has about twenty or so attorneys on his
staff. I would think that this could be restructured so as to permit each
Board Member to have four or five senior attorneys who report to him
individually and the remainder of the lawyers would be working for the
Board as a whole. This could be done quite easily.
I might add that the holdover provision should also be changed
with regard to the General Counsel. You may not realize that on the day
a General Counsel's term expires, if no new General Counsel has been
appointed the work of the field offices grinds to a halt. No complaints
can issue, no briefs can be filed, no enforcement actions are taken be-
cause they are taken by the authority of the General Counsel, and it is
necessary, therefore, for the President to appoint an Acting General
Counsel which is usually done very quickly. A Regional Director or
some senior member on the General Counsel staff is named as Acting
General Counsel. But that is a caretaker function and the occupant un-
derstands that the Acting General Counsel is just a caretaker. It would
be useful, I think to change the law at the same time as the Board law is
changed and apply it also to the General Counsel.
The final two proposals for change are somewhat more controver-
sial, I would think, than the others. These have to do with the appeals to
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the Board from decisions by Administrative Law Judges and appeals or
enforcment of.Board decisions in the courts.
The problems. to be addressed in the first proposal are time delays
in case processing and Board case load. The fact that these problems
exist needs no documentation. Neither is there any doubt that these
problems continue -to frustrate those who seek to use the Board's
processes. Under current law governing unfair labor practice cases, any
party has an automatic right of appeal to the Board and the Board has
no discretion with respect to these appeals. It must accept all of them
no matter how frivolous. I would urge legislative action designed to
provide greater finality to Administrative Law Judge decisions and dis-
cretionary review by the Board. I am well aware that proposals of this
type have been considered in the past and rejected for a variety of rea-
sons. I bring them up again, because I think that the need is clear and
the possibility that minds have changed, may warrant a reconsideration
of these proposals. I shall not, at this time, attempt to outline in detail
how the proposal should be drafted. I shall only state what I believe to
be the desired goal of balancing full Board consideration of cases and
expeditious processing of the case load.
Based on experience it is my firm belief that Board time can be bet-
ter spent on important issues and problem areas in which clarification is
needed along with careful craftsmanship of decisions that will ultimately
go before the courts.
This, rather then devote as much time as we have to frivolous
problems and problems which the ligitants are certain at the time they
file the appeal that there will be no reversal of the Administrative Law
Judge's -decision.
Moving on to the last. of these proposals dealing with court enforce-
ment of Board decisions, it is my view that there is need for clarification
of the role of the General Counsel and the role of the Board in the en-
forcement area.
When Congress separated the prosecutorial and the decisional re-
sponsibilities, it gave an independent General Counsel the prosecutorial
function and reposed in the Board the decisional function. It properly
made it impossible for the Board to usurp or interfere in any manner
with the role and function of the General Counsel. At that time, insuffi-
cient thought was given to the question of where the enforcement func-
tion should be carried out. As a consequence, internal accommodation
had to be sought and thus the function was exercised by the General
Counsel. So long as the relationship between the Board and the Gen-
eral Counsel is amiable and cooperative, the problems can be resolved
without controversy. However, the General Counsel is in an awkward
position. He is a prosecutor before the Board, urging positions which
the Board may reject in its decision. The General Counsel then puts on
his enforcement hat and goes to court seeking to enforce the very deci-
sion he may have opposed in litigation.
It is a tribute to the many persons who have served as General
[Vol. 62:2
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Counsel and Board Member, that seldom has controversy arisen. But
the fact that it has arisen from time to time is reason enough for Con-
gress to clarify the role of each: the General Counsel and the Board, so
that it is not left to good men and women to do good, but let the law
specify how the function should be carried out. Having served as a
Board Member during peaceful times and when controversy arose, I am
firmly of the view that this is a problem which is best solved by the Con-
gress rather than by accommodation between the Board and the Gen-
eral Counsel.
The decisions rendered by the Board are the Board's decisions, and
what happens to them in court is a matter of concern to the Board. The
General Counsel, all that I have known, have undertaken to keep sepa-
rate their role as prosecutor and their role as enforcer of Board deci-
sions so that it is not to impugn the integrity of the occupant of the
office, neither is it to assert that the Board knows better how its deci-
sions should be handled. It is simply a question of the propriety and
right of the Board to supervise the enforcement of its decisions, if that is
what Congress wants. On the other hand if Congress is more comforta-
ble with the function being exercised under the supervision and control
of the General Counsel, and desires to have the Board excluded from
that role, then it behooves Congress to clarify its intention. Here again I
outline no specific detailed proposal. I state merely the obvious; that
lack of clarity has lead to controversy from time to time, and since the
lack of clarity originates with the legislation, the corrective step is to
clarify the legislation in some manner so that the work of the agency will
not be disruptive or dependent upon good will.
I conclude these comments by repeating a point made earlier that
the preservation of the rights of the individual and the preservation of
free democratic institutions are linked in their goals and that those
whose primary concern is with the strengthening and expanding of our
economy as well as those whose efforts are directed toward elimination
of social and economic inequities in a broader sense, need clearly recog-
nize the fact that neither group can achieve its goals if it disregards the
other. The discussions at this seminar will be helpful in further analyz-
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The University of Denver deserves great credit for its effort to focus
attention on our nation's federal labor laws, for they have suffered from
neglect during the past decade and have lost much of their force and
vitality. In particular, the most fundamental of our labor laws, the Na-
tional Labor Relations Act, has proved to be ineffective when applied in
the new labor relations environment of the 1970s and 1980s. Congress
will have to enact major reforms of the NLRA if the Act's goals of indus-
trial democracy and industrial peace are to be achieved, and the debate
which must precede such reform needs to begin immediately. I am
pleased that my alma mater is helping to initiate that debate.
For many years I have been a member of the Subcommittee on La-
bor-Management Relations, the principal labor subcommittee in the
House of Representatives. In October 1984, the Subcommittee pub-
lished a report which briefly outlines some of the major failings of the
Act. The most serious among them are its inability to deter or effec-
tively remedy employer resistance to collective bargaining; its failure to
protect employees from discriminatory discharge or to make them
whole for the injury they suffer; the NLRB's scandalous delays in adjudi-
cating cases; administratively and judicially created limitations on the
scope of bargaining and the type of employee protected by the Act; and
the emasculation of labor's economic weapons, the strike and the
boycott.
The results of these failings are serious. Collective bargaining in
the private sector, which Congress intended to be a nationwide system
for adjusting industrial disputes and giving working people an effective
voice in economic life, is on the wane. Fewer than twenty percent of
American workers are protected by collective bargaining agreements,
and the number falls each year.
Employer resistance to collective bargaining is widespread and vi-
cious. As Professor Paul Weiler testified at the Subcommittee's hear-
ings, the number of employer unfair labor practices has increased
astronomically; since 1960 the number of charges against employers has
increased five-fold while the proportion found meritorious has increased
by more than thirty percent. Between 1970 and 1980, the number of
certification elections dropped, but the number of meritorious charges
against employers more than doubled.
I believe that the illegal activity of employers and their agents is the
* Member of Congress (D-MI); Chairman, Post Office and Civil Service Committee
and Second Ranking Member, Education and Labor Committee; J.D., B.S. University of
Denver.
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principal cause of the decline in unionization. When one out of every
twenty workers who votes for a union is fired by his employer, the chil-
ling effect on unionization cannot be overestimated. This chilling effect
is aggravated by the lack of any meaningful governmental response to
the employer's illegal action until years later, long after the employer's
power has been confirmed and the organizing campaign has failed.
Illegal employer resistance to collective bargaining, and the NLRB's
ineffectiveness in preventing or remedying it, are not new phenomena.
In 1977, Congressional hearings on the need for labor law reform
presented a detailed picture of the problem, illustrated most notably by
the examples of Monroe Auto Equipment, Darlington Manufacturing
Company, Florida Steel, and J.P. Stevens. These infamous labor law vi-
olators were pioneers in a now common strategy of abusing the legal
processes of the Board and the courts to delay adjudication of their vio-
lations for so many years that justice would ultimately be denied to their
victims. Darlington, for example, avoided liability for its ruthless termi-
nation of 550 employees for more than two decades and succeeded in
deterring the organization of its four dozen sister plants. They pio-
neered the strategy counseled by a growing, cynical element of the legal
profession to flout the law openly, relying on the calculation that any
damages awarded under the NLRA would be less than the costs to the
company of an organized workforce.
Economists, legal scholars, and recently, the GAO, have proven be-
yond a reasonable doubt that the Act's remedies do not deter illegal
discharges and other anti-union acts by employers. It was already well
established at the time of the 1977 Congressional debate on labor law
reform that the Act's remedies are little more than a license fee for
union busting.
In recent years, however, the Act's weaknesses have been exploited
on a far wider scale than ever before. An entire industry of lawyers and
consultants has grown up, not to counsel employers on how to make
collective bargaining work for them, but on how to avoid collective bar-
gaining work for them, but on how to avoid collective bargaining alto-
gether and to defeat the aspiration of their employees for a meaningful
voice in determining the terms and conditions of their employment.
Respected law firms and universities in every part of the country present
seminars that teach employers how to prevent unionization and how to
decertify existing unions, seminars that undermine our national labor
policy's encouragement of collective bargaining as the means to settle
industrial disputes. As a lawyer and an ardent defender of higher educa-
tion, I have been ashamed to see my profession and many great universi-
ties helping to promote the spirit of lawlessness that characterizes much
of industrial relations today.
I am even more concerned, however, by the increasingly anti-union
and anti-collective bargaining bias of the National Labor Relations
Board. Despite its failings, the NLRB in the past could be expected to
fight Darlington, J. P. Stevens and Florida Steel. It could be expected to
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defend collective bargaining and the right of workers to resort to it.
Such expectations can no longer be taken for granted.
The current Chairman of the NLRB has expressed his hostility to
collective bargaining in word and deed. In Congressional hearings,
Chairman Dotson refused to retract his statements that, "Unionized la-
bor relations, shortsighted demands, greed, and debilitating work rules
have been the major contributions to the decline and failure of once
healthy industries," and that "collective bargaining frequently means la-
bor monopoly, the destruction of individual freedom, and the destruc-
tion of the marketplace as the mechanism for determining the value of
labor." Mr. Dotson's anti-union animus and that of his like-minded col-
leagues on the Board is apparent in their many opinions narrowing the
scope of bargaining, limiting the Act's protection of concerted activity,
approving the interrogation of open and active union supporters, con-
demning threats made by strikers while condoning threats made by em-
ployers, and restricting the right of unions to discipline members who
cross picket lines.
There is every reason to doubt whether a Dotson Board would have
prosecutedJ. P. Stevens with any vigor and to question whether the Ste-
vens employees' partial organizing success would have been possible if
they had had to rely on the Dotson Board to protect their rights.
Regardless of the Board's composition, however, it is clear that
changes in the National Labor Relations Act are needed if collective bar-
gaining in the private sector is to survive, let alone to grow. But in any
case, the needs and demands of workers will not disappear. If employer
hostility to reform is not moderated; if Congress cannot summon the
will and the courage to reaffirm its commitment to collective bargaining,
other solutions will arise. As Professor Clyde Summers testified at the
Labor Management Relations Subcommittee's recent hearings:
In the absence of collective bargaining, employees need to
be protected by law from unjust dismissal, they need to be enti-
tled by law to refuse excessive overtime, they need statutory
rights to sick leave, paid vacations, and severance pay. Beyond
this, the law must create some form of employee participation
structure, such as works councils, to provide a measure of in-
dustrial democracy. The law cannot be indifferent to the needs
of workers; the responsibility of the law is to aid the weaker
party, if not through establishing collective bargaining, then
through direct legislation.
We must never forget that the Wagner Act was passed in response to
years of violence and industrial unrest that shook the nation's economy
in the early part of this century. If the law does not treat the great ma-
jority of working people fairly, they will resort to means outside of the
law to obtain economic justice.
I hope therefore, that the labor relations bar will dedicate itself to a
reaflirmation of the value of collective bargaining. It is time for our pro-
fession to become part of the solution instead of part of the problem.
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"Comparable worth" has been described as a legal theory, an eco-
nomic theory, the looniest idea since "Looney Tunes," as difficult to
define as love, creeping socialism, certain communism, and as a lively
topic for discussion at a dinner party. The most frustrating element in
any discussion of "comparable worth" is that there seems to be as many
definitions of "comparable worth" as there are people discussing it.
Thus confusion has become the rule of the day. The debate began in
1962-63 when Congress was considering the passage of what is now
known as the Equal Pay Act' which, as originally proposed, included a
provision mandating payment of equal pay for comparable worth.
When Congress decided that there was no way to define "comparable
worth" the legislation was amended to read "equal pay for equal work."
In 1979, Professor Ruth G. Blumrosen, a consultant to the U.S. Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission and a professor at Rutgers Uni-
versity, published an article in which she contended that men and wo-
men often do different jobs and that the wage marketplace is infected
with sex discrimination resulting in lower earings for women. 2 The
remedy she proposed was to have the court appraise the "worth" ofjobs
and then compel employers to pay wages comparable to such "worth."
This article is an attempt to describe the "comparable worth" or
pay equity" debate as it has evolved over the past twenty-three years
both in the courts and in the legislatures, both state and federal, as they
responded to disparity between the wages of men and the wages of
women.
The presence of wage disparities, on average, between male and
female employees in the United States is an indisputable fact. 3 Propo-
* Partner, Epstein Becker Borsody & Green, Los Angeles Office; formerly Vice
Chairman and Commissioner, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Washington,
D.C., 1981-84. The author gratefully acknowledges the research and writing assistance of
Gerald P. Cunningham, an associate with Epstein Becker Borsody & Green.
1. Equal Pay Act of 1963, enacted as § 6(d) of the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29
U.S.C. § 206(d) (1982).
2. Blumrosen, Wage Discrimination, Job Segregation, and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, 12 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 399 (1979).
3. The type of statistics most often cited by proponents of comparable worth is:
"full-time working women earn 61 cents for every dollar earned by males." See, e.g., NA-
TIONAL COMMITTEE ON PAY EQUITY, THE WAGE GAP: MYTHS AND FACTS (1983). This figure
varies depending upon the source used. For example, the Equal Employment Opportu-
nity Commission ("EEOC") commissioned a study by the National Academy of Sciences
which stated that women of "all races" earned 55.3% of the earnings of white men in
1978. This figure included full-time civilian workers 18 years old and over. NATIONAL
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nents of the theory of "pay equity" or "comparable worth" believe, in
essence, that men and women must be paid equally for jobs of "compa-
rable worth" to the employer. 4 Despite the failure of comparable worth
theorists to consistently and rationally define the concept which they vo-
ciferously propound, 5 their objectives have been: expansion of Title
V116 and Equal Pay Act concepts to include intentional sex discrimina-
tion based upon an employer's failure to pay equal rates forjobs of com-
parable worth to the employer's operation, 7 and introduction of
legislative initiatives 8 which mandate the application of comparable
worth to the operations of public and private employers.
The linchpin of comparable worth theory is the oft-cited earnings
gap between the wages of men and women. The theory is based on the
existence of discrimination which underlies this earning gap.9 Propo-
nents of "comparable worth" or "pay equity" argue that wage dispari-
ties should be eliminated through enforcement or adoption of
antidiscriminating legislation. 10 It is, however, not necessarily true that
all wage disparities within an employer's workforce are the result of sex-
RESEARCH COUNCIL, WOMEN, WORK AND WAGES: EQUAL PAY FOR JOBS OF EQUAL VALUE 13
(1981) [hereinafter cited as WOMEN, WORK AND WAGES]. For the final quarter of 1983, the
average female worker earned approximately 66.2% of the earnings of the average male.
R. WILLIAMS AND L. KESSLER, A CLOSER LOOK AT COMPARABLE WORTH 6 (1984). See discus-
sion infra notes 14-22.
4. The Supreme Court expressly declined to consider comparable worth in County
of Washington v. Gunther, 452 U.S. 161 (1981). The Court did, however, describe com-
parable worth as the "controversial concept . . .under which plaintiffs might claim in-
creased compensation on the basis of a comparison of the intrinsic worth or difficulty of
their job with that of other jobs in the same organization or community." Id. at 166
(footnote omitted).
5. This shortcoming has been criticized in many quarters. See LIVERNASH, AN OVER-
VIEW, IN COMPARABLE WORTH: ISSUES AND ALTERNATIVES 8 (ed. 1980) [hereinafter cited as
COMPARABLE WORTH: ISSUES AND ALIENATIONS] ("comparable worth has not been opera-
tionally defined by its supporters").
6. Title VII of the Civil Rights Action 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1982). The Civil
Rights Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982), is available for suits against governmental
agencies. See Stathos v. Bowden, 728 F.2d 15 (1st Cir. 1984) (Municipal Lighting Commis-
sion failed to upgrade salary of female manager and her assistant despite adoption of a
report rating plaintiffs position as either equal or similar to managerial positions held by
men).
7. This approach has been consistently rejected by the courts. For a complete dis-
cussion of the applicability of Title VII to cases involving comparisons of dissimilar jobs,
see infra notes 76-128 and accompanying text.
8. See discussion of current legislation initiatives infra notes 63-75 and accompany-
ing text.
9. The conclusion of the National Academy of Sciences study commissioned by the
EEOC, see supra note 3, was: " . . . [D]iscrimination, as the term is used in this report,
does not imply intent but refers only to outcome. Wage discrimination exists insofar as
workers of one sex, race, or ethnic group are paid less than workers of another sex, race or
ethnic group for doing work that is of 'comparable,' that is, equal, worth to their em-
ployer." WOMEN, WORK AND WAGES, supra note 3, at 91. See also Blumrosen, supra note 2,
at 400. ("[Tlhe low rates of pay associated with such segregated jobs constitute the major
explanation for the 'earnings gap' between minority and female workers on the one hand
and white males on the other. This gap has long been considered a major benchmark as to
the extent of employment discrimination"). Id. at 400 (footnote omitted).
10. Statements on Pay Equity: Hearings Before the Joint Economic Committee, 98th Cong., 2d
Sess. I reprinted in DAILY LAB. REPORT. (BNA) No. 70, at G-4, 6-9 (May 11, 1984) [hereinaf-
ter cited as Hearings] (statement of Brian Turner on behalf of National Committee on Pay
Equity) ("[w]ithout Congressional insistence on the appointment of officials strongly com-
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based discrimination in compensation or in personnel policies. If the
relative and established values of employee positions are reflected in a
nondiscriminatory fashion, by an employer's pay structure, then the al-
teration of that pay structure under the guise of "equal pay for compara-
ble worth" would be merely a pretext for other objectives. Under
present law, a strictly legal analysis would not conclude that an employer
must alter its pay structure to equalize pay rates,'' Employers are not
legally responsible for historical discrimination against women in em-
ployment, nor are they responsible for societal attitudes which may have
resulted in a devaluation of occupations traditionally dominated by wo-
men. Indeed, it is widely held, the comparison of dissimilar jobs cannot
form a basis for a successful suit for discrimination based on sex.
The supporters of comparable worth, however, do not rely upon a
strictly legal analysis, but also propound an economic approach: a sys-
tem of values must be applied to each of an employer's job functions so
as to establish a ranking ofjobs on an "objective" basis. Such a ranking
system is purported to be a more equitable manner of establishing pay
rates and would result in the elimination or reduction of the wage dis-
parities between men and women. 12 In understanding this economic
approach, it is necessary to realize that the legal aspects of comparable
worth center upon employer discrimination while the economic aspects
center upon the elimination of wage disparities. It is also necessary to
realize that the vehicles used by proponents of comparable worth, for
the elimination of wage disparities, are the current and proposed em-
ployment antidiscrimination laws.
This article does not suggest that the narrowing and ultimate disap-
pearance of the wage gap between men and women is not an appropri-
ate goal but, rather, that employment discrimination laws are an
inappropriate vehicle for the achievement of that goal. Federal and
state employment discrimination laws are designed to eliminate discrim-
ination on the basis of race, color, national origin, religion, sex, age,
handicap, and veteran status. The laws mandate equality of treatment of
all employees through the elimination of nonmerit criteria from the per-
sonnel and compensation decision-making process. The emphasis advo-
cated under a system of comparable worth, in the application of
employment anti-discrimination laws, would shift the focus from the in-
dividual and the equal treatment of individuals' 3 to a focus upon equal
mitted to upholding the law, the wage gap will continue to exist, and, in fact, may worsen")
(emphasis added).
11. A prima facie violation of Title VII does not exist where men and women receive
different compensation for different skills when these skills do not command an equal rate
in the labor market but may be, at least subjectively, of equal value to the employer. Chris-
tensen v. Iowa, 563 F.2d 353, 356 (8th Cir. 1977). For a full discussion of Title VII and
comparable worth theory, see infra notes 76-130 and accompanying text.
12. The NRC Study concluded, "[i]n our judgment job evaluation plans provide
measures of job worth that, under certain circumstances, may be used to discover and
reduce wage discrimination for persons covered by a given plan." WOMEN, WORK AND
WAGES, supra note 3, at 95.
13. The Supreme Court has reiterated that the emphasis in Title VII is upon the indi-
vidual. See Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440, 453-54 (1982) ("The principal focus of the
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rates for all classes. When equality of opportunity for individuals is re-
placed with equality of achievement for groups, employers are no longer
being enjoined from discriminatory practices, but become instruments
through which social change is implemented. This is precisely the posi-
tion in which the acceptance of the comparable worth theory would
place employers: the wage rates of jobs in which women predominate
would be raised where the employer is paying men a higher rate for
doing work of "comparable value." Eradicating sex discrimination will
be replaced with the social goal of eradicating widespread pay
disparities.
This article analyzes the proposed use of the comparable worth the-
ory, within the framework of federal employment discrimination law, as
the basis for eliminating pay disparities between men and women. First,
the various economic and sociological arguments propounded by both
comparable worth proponents and opponents are summarized. Second,
the proposed legislative initiatives, on both the state and federal levels,
are set forth. Third, the eradication of sex-based wage discrimination
through utilization of current law is discussed, along with the viability of
comparable worth under Title VII and availability of a marketplace de-
fense. Finally, some practical steps for employers are outlined which
could help to avoid potential liability under the expansion of anti-dis-
crimination laws.
I. ECONOMIC AND SOCIOLOGICAL ARGUMENTS
A. Job Segregation and Differentials in Pay
The labor force in the United States is in large part still segregated
by race and by sex. Women predominate the clerical and service occu-
pations and men predominate the craft and laboring occupations.1 4 Ac-
cording to 1970 Census Bureau figures, of 553 occupations, 310 have at
least 80% male incumbents, and 50 have at least 80% female incum-
bents. 15 Over half (54%) of working women are in occupations domi-
nated by women; 70% of working men are in occupations dominated by
men. 16 Sex segregation by occupation has decreased over the past sev-
eral decades. 17 The increases of the number of women in certain jobs
has been dramatic: female lawyers and judges (124% increase)18 , physi-
statute is on the protection of the individual employee, rather than the protection of the
...group as a whole.")
14. WOMEN, WORK AND WAGES, supra note 3, at 25.
15. Id. at 28.
16. Id. The National Committee on Pay Equity has cited more recent figures. "In
1982, more than half of all employed women worked in occupations which are 75% fe-
male, and 22% of employed women were in jobs that are more than 85% female." Hear-
ings, supra note 10, DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA) No. 70, at G-4 (May 11, 1984).
17. See generally Lloyd, The Division of Labor Between the Sexes: A Review, in SEX, DISCRIMI-
NATION, AND THE DIVISION OF LABOR 1 (C. Lloyd ed. 1975); Cohen, Sex Differences in Compen-
sation, 6 J. HUMAN RESOURCES 434 (1971). See also Hedges & Bemis, Sex Stereotyping: Its
Decline in Skilled Trades, MONTHLY LAB. REV. (BNA), at 14 (May 1974).
18. Nelson, Opton and Wilson, Wage Discrimination and the "Comparable Worth" Theory in
Perspective, 13 U. MicH.J.L. REF. 233 n.2 (1980). The number of female lawyers and judges
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cians and osteopaths (97% increase), 19 and bank officials and financial
managers (111% increase). 20 Between 1970 and 1979, for each increase
of ten in the number of females in clerical positions, the number of wo-
men in managerial positions increased by four. 2 1 Occupational segrega-
tion by sex, however, has "barely decreased at all among whites over the
past several decades.
' 22
The indisputable facts remains that occupational segregation by sex
remains a steady, albeit shifting, trend in the United States. Further-
more, women tend to work in occupations which pay less on the average
than occupations dominated by men.
A recent Rand Corporation study concluded that the average wage
of all women has increased much faster than the average wage of men
during the last 60 years. 2 3 Since 1980, women's hourly wages have risen,
on average, from 60% to 64% of those of men: the largest gain in this
century.24 Between 1980 and 1984, the average hourly wages of wo-
men, adjusted for inflation, rose 3.3 percent whereas the wages of men
declined by three percent. 25 The average wage gains of younger women
during this short period are more striking: in 1980, women 20 to 24
years old earned 78% as much as men in the same age category and by
1983 this proportion had risen to 86%.26 Additionally, the hourly
wages of black women have increased 47% more rapidly than those of
white men, narrowing the proportion of wages earned from one-third to
57%.27 For the remainder of the century, wages of women will acceler-
ate relative to those of men-by the year 2000, relative wages of women
who entered the labor market in the 1970's should rise roughly 15%
faster than those of similarly situated male workers. 28 The Rand Corpo-
ration study conservatively estimates that the overall average wages of
working women will be at least 74% of the overall wages of working men
by the year 2000.29
Proponents of comparable worth argue that the presence of job
segregation based on sex and the concomitant wage differentials are the
result of discrimination. 30 The wage gap, however, has never been
proved to be the result of discrimination. This debate continues, and
rose from 13,000 1982 in 1970 to over 60,000 in 1979. COMPARABLE WORTH: ISSUES AND
ALTERNATIVES, supra note 5, at 20.
19. Nelson, Opton & Wilson, supra note 18, at 233 n.2.
20. Id.
21. COMPARABLE WORTH: ISSUES AND ALTERNATIVES, supra note 5, at 20.
22. WOMEN, WORK AND WAGES, supra note 3, at 25.
23. J. SMITH & M. WARD, WOMEN'S WAGES AND WORK IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY Vi
(1984).
24. Id. at ix.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 26.
27. Id. at ix.
28. Id. at 75. This estimate is probably too conservative insofar as it assumes a con-
stant commitment to the labor market which is expected to expand for that group over the
next several decades. Id. at 75-76.
29. Id. at 82.
30. "Jobs traditionally held by women-in so-called women's work-pay less, regardless
of the skills and expertise required." Hearings, supra note 10, reprinted in DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA)
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the studies cited vary in conclusions depending upon the which side of
the "comparable worth debate" the source stands. Wage differentials
between men and women are not clearly related to segregation patterns,
and thus the question can be put more precisely: are the lower wages
paid for jobs dominated by women lower because women occupy the
positions? The studies are inconclusive. It is clear, however, that nu-
merous factors must be taken into account when an attempt is made to
determine the origins of the pay disparities between men and women.
Critical considerations include: employee qualifications (seniority and
experience, skills and abilities, education and training); employee work
behaviors (performance, absenteeism, turnover, hours worked, i.e., part-
time or full-time and hours per week); union membership; specific tasks
and behaviors required as part of an occupational category; the size,
profitability and wage policy of particular employers and industries; de-
tailed aspects of labor market conditions and regional differentials; mar-
ital status, family background, history of relocation and age. 3 1 Such
considerations are not generally taken into account by most studies of
the origins and causes of the "wage gap."
Another often neglected factor is that of the risk of accident or in-
jury within a particular job classification. The element of risk is taken
into account in the establishment of pay rates, and men, to a much
greater extent than women, are in jobs which have a higher risk of acci-
dent or injury. This risk factor alone may account for as much as six
percent of the "wage gap."
3 2
It is an elementary statistical observation that "statistical correla-
tions, such as that between salary and sex, do not imply causal infer-
ences, such as the inference of discrimination."'3 3 Indeed, although
comparable worth proponents often cite studies comparing segregated
job groups, this may not be a valid approach to measuring discrimina-
tion. Discrimination should be studied by comparing similarly situated
men and women, rather than attempting to devise an analysis of discrim-
ination practices by comparing segregated occupations and pay levels.
34
Since most statistical studies attempt to compare "segregated" oc-
cupations, it should be noted that such studies never have been able to
isolate the extent to which wage disparities are the result of discrimina-
No. 70, at G-5 (statement of Brian Turner on behalf of the National Committee on Pay
Equity).
31. See Milkovich, The Emerging Debate, in COMPARABLE WORTH: ISSUES AND ALTERNA-
TIVES, supra note 5, at 45. (In his paper, the Emerging Debate, Professor Milkovich assem-
bled the possible determinants of pay differences between men and women into a table in
order to discuss the complexities of wage comparison.).
32. Finn, The Earnings Gap and Economic Choices, in EQUAL PAY FOR UNEQUAL WORK 101,
110 (P. Schafly ed. 1984).
33. Roberts, Statistical Biases in the Measurement of Employment Discrimination, in COMPARA-
BLE WORTH: ISSUES AND ALTERNATIVES, supra note 5, at 178.
34. Id. at 195. See also R. WILLIAMS & L. KESSLER, Looking Behind the Day Gap Statistics,
in A CLOSER LOOK AT COMPARABLE WORTH 15-25 (1984) (documenting deficiencies in vari-
ous statistical studies of the (pay gap)); Blumrosen, supra note 2, at 445 ("[O]ne's choice of
variables, in fact, can eliminate discrimination completely.").
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tion or of other factors. 35 Although the extent of the "pay gap" cited by
commentators varies widely, 36 much of the "pay gap" can be accounted
for on the basis of nondiscriminatory factors.
Studies have not significantly taken into account a central and
hardly quantifiable factor: employee choice. Certainly women will tend
to be over-represented in lower paying jobs as a result of choices made
within numerous societal constraints; however, employers are not le-
gally responsible under anti-discrimination laws for those constraints.
Advocates of comparable worth have noted the difficulty in assessing
"the relative importance of the choices women make in the labor market
and of the factors affecting their choices."'3 7 Although it would be spuri-
35. Nelson, Opton and Wilson, supra note 18, at 253 ("[T]he most that multiple re-
gression analysis can tell us is that some of the gross earnings differences between the
sexes are accounted for legitimately, while the remainder must result from unmeasured
legitimate sources, and/or job separation, and/or from wage discrimination."); Hearings,
supra note 10, DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA) No. 70, at G-2 (wages of single men compared with
wages of single women demonstrated a wage disparity but the disparity was justified) (tes-
timony of Cotton M. Lindsay).
36. Indeed, the studies of the wage gap have reached different conclusions. As one
commentator summarized: "[e]ven the gross wage gap-the hourly earnings differential
before adjusting for diverse characteristics-varies from study to study, ranging from 45 to
47 percent depending on the type of population considered. Studies based upon national
samples covering the full age range tend to show a gross wage gap of 35 to 40 percent.
Studies based on more homogenous groups, such as holders of advanced degrees or those
in specific professions, have found considerably smaller gross wage gaps." O'Neill, An
Argument Against Comparable Worth, in JUDICIAL WAGE DETERMINATION . . . A VOLATILE
SPECTRE 29 (1984).
37. WOMEN, WORK AND WAGES, supra note 3, at 53. The description contained in this
study of the determinants of female choice in the decision to take a type of job is
noteworthy:
It is sometimes asserted that women choose to work at certain types of jobs de-
spite the fact that such jobs have relatively low pay rates. A variety of reasons has
been offered. First, women may be socialized to believe that some types ofjobs
are appropriate and that others are inappropriate for women; socialization may
be so effective for some women that it never even occurs to them to consider
other types of jobs. Second, women may have pursued courses of study they
thought particularly appropriate to women and in consequence may not have the
education or training that would suit them for other available jobs. Third, wo-
men may lack information about other available jobs, their pay rates, working
conditions, and access to them. Fourth, women may be aware of alternatives, but
because of actual or expected family obligations may structure their labor force
participation in particular ways. For example, they may be unwilling to invest a
great deal of time, effort, or money in preparing for jobs because they do not
expect to remain in the labor force after marriage or childbearing. They may be
willing to accept low paying jobs, or jobs with limited opportunities for advance-
ment, and hold them until they marry and begin to raise children. Or, in expecta-
tion of returning to work after their children are in school or grown, they may
choose jobs that are easy to leave and re-enter, jobs that do not require the con-
tinuous accumulation of skills and consequently do not lead to significant in-
creases in earnings with experience (citation omitted). To accommodate the dual
demands of work and family responsibilities, women may choose jobs with lim-
ited demands-restricted hours, no overtime work, no travel requirements, etc.
Or they may defer to the demands of their husbands' career advancement, mov-
ing with their husbands from place to place, etc. (citations omitted). Some of
these family related factors may influence women's willingness to pursue ad-
vancement in their jobs. Fifth, women may be aware of alternative types ofjobs
but believe them to be unavailable or unpleasant because of discrimination; their
labor market preparation and behavior may be affected in many ways by this per-
ception: the course of study they take; the time, money and effort invested in
training; their willingness to accept promotion, etc.
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ous to argue that the factor of employee choice is the determinant factor
in the creation and maintenance of a work force which contains segre-
gated job patterns, it represents a major factor unaccounted for in the
comparable worth proponents' presumption that the much heralded
"wage gap" is predominantely a result of discrimination by employers in
the setting of wages.
In sum, supporters of comparable worth have not proved an under-
lying and basic premise of their argument, viz, that the wage gap is a
product of employer discrimination in the setting of wages and must
therefore be remedied by anti-discrimination laws.
38
B. The Role of the Marketplace
Proponents of comparable worth would replace marketplace deter-
minations of wages with job evaluation studies which evaluate different
jobs according to an "objective" set of standards. A standard for job
evaluation studies will necessarily have to be created so that there will be
uniformity in the results of those studies. One of the underlying
problems with the comparable worth theory is the enormous practical
problem it creates in terms of implementation. An equitable pay setting
system, according to proponents of the theory, would exist if a mecha-
nism is utilized which would evaluate the "worth" of jobs to employers
without regard to sex or the marketplace. Indeed, the market place is
seen as perpetuating the effects of past discrimination and therefore as
an invalid measure of job worth. 39 Another rationale for ignoring the
marketplace function for the setting of wage rates is the observation that
market forces are not "pure" in wage setting, particularly in the area of
collectively-bargained wage rates. 40 Proponents of comparable worth
by definition assume that either the marketplace is perpetuating the ef-
fects of past discrimination 4 or that all wage differentials derived from
Id.
38. The district court in Briggs v. City of Madison, 536 F. Supp. 435 (W.D. Wis. 1982)
summarized the above argument as follows:
I find unpersuasive the basic premise that Blumrosen [supra note 2] or any one
possesses the intellectual tools and data base that would enable them to identify
the extent to which the factor of discrimination has contributed to, or created,
sex-segregated jobs, and to separate that factor from the myriad of nondiscrimi-
natory factors that may have contributed to the same result.
Id. at 444. The court noted:
Among others, these contributory factors would include familial and peer expec-
tations, desire for part-time work or work with flexible hours, reluctance to pio-
neer in non-traditional fields, the absence of'role models' in non-traditional jobs,
and lack of information about higher paying jobs.
Id. at 444 n.6. See O'Neill, An Argument Against Comparable Worth, in COMPARABLE WORTH:
IssuEs FOR THE 80's (A Consultation for the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights) 179-83
(1984).
39. See Hearings, supra note 10, reprinted in DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA) No. 70, at G-7 (pay-
ing market rates "does not reflect the value of the job relative to other jobs in the same
firm and may well reflect prior discrimination by other employers or by society as a





the market arise from wage discrimination. 42
Implicit in the proponent's theory is the assumption that the mar-
ketplace determines wage rates based on noncompetitive factors, 43 or
that even if competition is present, the wages of women in predomi-
nantly female job classifications will be kept at a lower level precisely
because of the sex of the incumbents, i.e., women have been and con-
tinue to be discriminatorily barred from other positions and therefore
there is an oversupply of labor for female dominated job classifica-
tions.4 4 It is further assumed that wage differentials become customary
and are reproduced throughout a given labor market (whether regional
or national).45
One basic problem with any theory which emphasizes that the
"worth" of ajob classification should be set by an evaluation system and
not by market rates is that the market system already recognizes the rela-
tive worth of various job classifications. Indeed, proponents of compa-
rable worth assume that there is an objective hierarchy ofjob worth, but
that women in female dominated job classifications are not paid on the
basis of this objective hierarchy. 4 6 Clearly "institutional" factors influ-
ence wage rates without a direct connection to the labor market. Such
factors include policies of promoting from within and collective bargain-
ing agreements. 4 7 The present market system determines wages by re-
lating particular talents of employees and potential employees to the
demands of business and consumers. 4 8 Although the market system is
inperfect according to classical economic theory, the valuation of job
"worth" (defined basically by the assigned wage) clearly takes into ac-
count the basic values which a comparable worth system would, such as
skills, education, experience and working conditions. The present wage
system has the additional advantage of flexibility in changed conditions,
whether in the supply of, or the demand for, particular skills. An admin-
istrative approach, such as that envisioned by proponents of comparable
worth, would lack such flexibility, aside from the issue of whether it is
42. G. Hildebrand, The Market System, in COMPARABLE WORTH: ISSUES AND ALTERNA-
TIVES, supra note 5, at 101.
43. Id. at 82.
44. Id. at 87. The "exclusion" theory is further amplified in WOMEN, WORK AND
WAGES, supra note 3, at 55.
45. WOMEN, WORK AND WAGES, supra note 3, at 61. "By use of the 'going wage' as a
standard to set pay rates, the wages of a (nondiscriminating) firm will be biased by the
discrimination of other firms in the market."
46. WOMEN, WORK AND WAGES, supra note 3, at 118 (minority report by Ernest J.
McCormick).
47. The writers of the National Research Council study added "the segmentation of
labor markets into noncompeting groups, largely on the basis of the sex, race and ethnicity
of workers" is an additional institutional constraint. WOMEN, WORK AND WAGES, supra note
3, at 45.
48. See O'Neill, supra note 36, at 28-29. The labor market has been defined as "the
generic term for a value system rooted in the hierarchy of skills, effort, responsibility, and
work activities (and to some extent working conditions) that comprise jobs, and the supply
and demand forces that operate as organizations and workers compete in our economy."
WOMEN, WORK AND \VAt;S. supra note 3, at 118 (minority report). The labor market al-
ready takes into consideration the "objective" factors purported to be the basis of the
grand job evaluation scheme envisioned by comparable worth proponents.
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proper for the government to administer a wage-rate setting program
designed to ignore market forces.
4 9
C. Job Evaluation Studies
A serious problem involved with the implementation ofjob evalua-
tion studies on a grand scale is that any company which does not set pay
levels which are closely aligned with the prevailing conditions in the ex-
ternal labor market and the product market is going to be unable to
compete. 50 Job evaluation studies if performed under a comparable
worth mandate would ignore such considerations.
The orientation of job evaluations is internal by definition and
under a comparable worth approach would deliberately avoid the mar-
ket as a determinant of wages. Basically, job evaluation is "a procedure
that makes judgments about jobs based on content or the demands
made on job incumbents." '5 1 Afterjob descriptions are produced pursu-
ant to a job analysis, a list of "compensable factors" is chosen which
represents values which an organization chooses to reward. The job de-
scriptions are evaluated in terms of the extent of compensable factors
present within that job classification, and a pecuniary hierarchy ofjobs is
established. 52  As this description demonstrates, the employer con-
ducting ajob evaluation presently has a scale of values which it wishes to
implement and uses ajob evaluation study to establish a pecuniary hier-
archy in terms of those values. Adjustments are then made according to
external labor market rates.53 The values underlying the job evaluation sys-
tem are dictated by the particular business needs of the employer, and
are therefore also subject to change. 54 Presently these value scales are
set by the employer if comparable worth is mandated, then such values
must be legislatively derived and applied to different types of employers
with different strategies with respect to recruitment and retention of em-
ployees. Even proponents of comparable worth admit that the values
are subjectively derived. 5 5 In practice, the comparable worth theory
would require that "worth" be established to a legal certainty5 6 and
would require either a comprehensive legislative mandate establishing
the national economic importance of a value or an ad hoc judicial deter-
mination of this value.
49. See Williams and Kessler, supra note 34, at 40-41.
50. G. Hildebrand, The Market System, in COMPARABLE WORTH: ISSUES AND ALTERNA-
TIVES, supra note 5, at 95.
51. Schwab, Job Evaluation and Pay Setting: Concepts and Practices, in COMPARABLE
WORTH: ISSUES AND ALTERNATIVES, supra note 5, at 57.
52. Id. at 58.
53. Address by Robert E. Williams to the American Arbitration Association (Jan. 23,
1984), reprinted in DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA) No. 16, at F-I Uan. 25, 1984).
54. Id.
55. See WOMEN, WORK AND WAGES, supra note 3, at 96. ("[Tlhere are no definitive tests
of the 'fairness' of the choice of compensable factors and the relative weights given to
them. The process is inherently judgmental and its success in generating a wage structure
that is deemed equitable depends on achieving a consensus about factors and their weights
among employers and employees").
56. See supra note 53, at F-2.
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Additionally, job evaluations are inherently subjective procedures
requiring discretion and judgment in their implementation. 5 7 This
raises the problem of the reliability of the job evaluations with respect to
two areas. First, the job description which forms the basis of the job
evaluation varies depending on the person conducting the analysis, in
part because most job analyses are narrative verbal descriptions. 58 Sec-
ond, the actual numerical rating process is so inherently subjective that
different raters will often produce different evaluations. 59 The subjectiv-
ity of the job evaluations system militates against its application by way
of a legal mandate. Again, the worth of a job would have to be estab-
lished to a legal certainty and under current methods of job evaluation
this cannot be achieved. 60 Corporate consultants who are charged with
the task of performing corporation-wide job evaluation studies have
stated that such studies emphasize the differences among jobs, and that
no job evaluation system has been established which could implement a
comparable worth mandate, which emphasizes the similarities between
disparate jobs.
6 1
The adoption of such a subjective system of wage setting would
necessarily fail to meet the purported purpose of a system of compara-
ble worth. It may narrow or even eliminate the wage gap existing in an
individual employer's workforce but it would not establish the same
rates of pay between different employers because the economic condi-
tion of each employer must, by necessity, dictate how much capital is
available for payment of wages.
II. LEGISLATION: CURRENT AND PROPOSED
A. State Developments
The concept of comparable worth as a legislative mandate is not
new: twenty states62 currently have statutes prohibiting unequal com-
57. Schwab, Job Evaluation and Pay Setting: Concepts and Practices, in COMPARABLE
WORTH: ISSUES AND ALTERNATIVES, supra note 5, at 59-60.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 60-61.
60. See Nelson, Opton and Wilson, supra note 18, at 255. ("Job evaluation systems are
basically methods for systematizing and recording subjective judgment, and at each stage
in the process-job analysis, job description, selection of compensable factors, weighting
of compensable factors, and the selection of the breadth ofjobs to which a particular sys-
tem will be applied-the necessarily subjective judgments inevitably incorporate individual
and societal biases.").
61. See, e.g., BUREAU OF NAT'L AFFAIRS, PAY EQurrY AND COMPARABLE WORTH 82-83
(1984) (description ofjob evaluation program utilized by Control Data Business Advisors,
Inc.) [hereinafter cited as PAY EQUITY AND COMPARABLE WORTH].
62. These states include Alaska, Arkansas, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Iowa, Kentucky,
Maine, Minnesota, Maryland, Massachusetts, Montana, Nebraska, North Dakota,
Oklahoma, Oregon, South Dakota, Tennessee, Washington and West Virginia. PAY EQ-
UITY AND COMPARABLE WORTH, supra note 61, at 55-56. For example, the Idaho statute
provides: "No employer shall discriminate between or among employees in the same es-
tablishment on the basis of sex, by paying wages to any employee in any occupation in this
state at a rate less than the rate at which he pays any employee of the opposite sex for
comparable work on jobs which have comparable requirements relating to skill, effort and
responsibility." IDAHO CODE § 44-1702(1) (1977).
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pensation for "comparable work" or work of "comparable character"
which cover employees both in the private and public sectors, 63 or man-
date studies of the feasibility of comparable worth in government jobs.
64
Indeed, approximately thirty states have set up task forces, special com-
missions or other procedures to evaluate jobs or recommend specific
actions to state governments. 6 5 For example, a 1982 Minnesota statute
provides for "equitable compensation relationships between female-
dominated, male-dominated, and balanced classes of employees in the
executive branch."'6 6 The Commissioner of Employee Relations is
charged with biannually compiling a list of those state civil service units
within the different municipalities where compensation inequities exist
based on comparability of the value of the work. An estimate of the
appropriation necessary for providing comparability adjustments will
also be prepared and a commission on employee relations shall review
and submit a list of comparability adjustment areas and a recommended
appropriation. 6 7 In Minnesota, 9000 employees were determined to
have been eligible for comparability adjustments totaling $26 million, or
approximately 4 percent of the state payroll.
6 8
Twenty-one state legislatures considered some form of comparable




Numerous comparable worth initiatives were propsed in the House
and Senate in 1983-1984, and although none were enacted, it is certain
that these proposals foreshadow statutes on the legislative horizon.
Therefore, a brief look at some of these proposals is necessary.
Senate Bill 1900 ("The Pay Equity Act of 1983") was introduced in
1983 by Senator Alan Cranston of California. The EEOC would have
been charged with the task of publishing guidelines aimed at "discrimi-
natory wage setting practices," i.e., compensation practices where fe-
male dominated jobs are paid less than male dominated jobs "although
the work performed requires comparable education, training, skills, ex-
perience, effort and responsibility, and is performed under comparable
working conditions. . .. ." The EEOC would also have had to study
"equitable job evaluation techniques and aid employers" in utilizing
63. PAY EQurrY AND COMPARABLE WORTH, supra note 61, at 55.
64. The California statute, for example, states that: "it is the intent of the legislature
• ..to establish a state policy of setting salaries for female-dominated jobs on the basis of
comparability of the value of the work." The Department of Personnel Administration is
charged with reviewing and analyzing "existing information, including those studies from
other jurisdictions relevant to the setting of salaries, for female-dominated jobs." CAL.
GOV'T. CODE § 19827.2(b) (West Supp. 1984).
65. Chi, Comparable Worth in State Governments, 27 STATE GOVERNMENT NEWS 4 (Novem-
ber, 1984).
66. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 43A.01(3) (West Supp. 1984).
67. Id.
68. PAY EQuITY AND COMPARABLE WORTH, supra note 61, at 59.
69. Id. at 61-68.
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such techniques. The EEOC would also have had to study the federal
employment system to determine whether it is equitable. Furthermore,
federal contractors would have been required to identify "discrimina-
tory wage-setting practices and differentials" and include proposals for
their elimination in the contractor's affirmative action plan. Compliance
review would have be undertaken where a contract had not utilized "eq-
uitable job evaluation techniques."
The Federal Pay Equity and Management Improvement Act of 1984
passed the House of Representatives in June of 1984, but was not acted
upon in the Senate before the end of the 98th Congress. This proposal
would apply comparable worth theory to federal employees. 70 The Bill
defines a "discriminatory wage-setting practice" as one where the pay
rates for predominantly female positions are lower than those for
predominantly male positions, although "the work performed . . . in-
volves comparable duties, responsibilities, and qualification require-
ments and is performed under comparable working conditions. ' 7 1 The
elimination of "discriminatory wage differentials" would occur through
"equitable job evaluation techniques," i.e., a job evaluation system
which establishes a numerical point value for each job.7
2
The president of the Marine Engineer's Beneficial Association 73 op-
posed this proposal, saying it would replace collectively bargained wage
rates for blue collar workers with a combination white collar-blue collar
evaluation. He opposed any system which would ultimately have the
effect of lowering blue collar wages.
74
III. CURRENT LAW
A. County of Washington v. Gunther
In County of Washington v. Gunther,75 the Supreme Court held that the
standard of "equal or substantially equal" work as set forth in the Equal
Pay Act 76 need not be met where a claim of sex-based wage discrimina-
tion is brought under Title VII. 7 7 The case involved direct proof of in-
70. H.R. 5680, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984), reprinted in PAY EQUITY AND COMPARABLE
WORTH, supra note 61, at 139.
71. H.R. 5680, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. § 101(4) (1984).
72. H.R. 5680, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. § 101(6) (1984).
73. jesse M. Calhoon, President, Marine Engineers Beneficial Association, AFL-CIO.
74. See Calhoon, Comparable l1'orth and the Role of Collective Bargaining, in JUDICIAL WAGE
DETERMINATION. . .A VOLATILE SPECTRE, supra note 36, at 42. ("What this all boils down
to is that collective bargaining in the Federal sector will soon cease to have any meaning.
Once comparable worth policies are implemented, and Federal employees are all covered
under a so-called 'objective' system, there will be no room for negotiation over salaries.
One way, and only one way, will be the 'right' way to compensate employees. We will be
substituting the opinion of 'expert' evaluators for the hard-won victories of collective
bargaining.").
75. 452 U.S. 161 (1981).
76. Equal Pay Act of 1963, Pub. L. No. 88-38, 77 Stat. 56 (1963) (codified at 29 U.S.C.
§ 206(d) (1982)).
77. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, U.S.C. § 2000(e) (1982). Section 703(h)
of Fitle VII (the Bennett Amendment), provides that it not unlawful to differentiate upon
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tentional sex discriminations. The County of Washington, Oregon had
paid substantially lower wages to female correction officers in the female
section of the county jail than it had paid to male correction officers in
the male section of the jail. Four female correction officers brought suit
alleging that the County had intentionally discriminated against the fe-
male officers by setting the pay scale for female officers, but not for male
officers, at a lower rate than was warranted by the County's own survey
of outside markets and the worth of the jobs. The Court specifically
stated that the claim by the female guards was "not based on the contro-
versial concept of 'comparable worth.' "78 The study conducted by the
County had determined that the female officers should be paid approxi-
mately 95 percent as much as the male officers, whereas the female of-
ficers were thereafter paid 70 percent. This intentional discrimination
suit, the Court stated, "does not require a court to make its own subjec-
tive assessment of the value of the male and female guard jobs, or to
attempt by statistical technique or other method to quantify the effect of
sex discrimination on the wage rates." 79 In Gunther, therefore, the door
was opened for sex-based wage discrimination suits which compared the
compensation levels of dissimilar jobs; however, the Court by no means
endorsed comparable worth as a viable theory under Title VII.
B. Reliance Upon the Marketplace as a Title VII Defense
Employers, when faced with a Title VII sex-based wage discrimina-
tion suit, may assert the defense established by the Equal Pay Act that
the pay differentials are based "on any factor other than sex."8 0 A criti-
cal issue is whether reliance upon the marketplace in the setting of
wages constitutes a defense under Title VII. 8 1 In Spaulding v. University
of Washington,8 2 members of a predominantly female nursing faculty al-
leged sex discrimination in the setting of salaries for the various aca-
demic departments.8 3 At the outset, the Ninth Circuit considered the
plaintiff's claims under the disparate treatment model of sex discrimina-
the basis of sex in determining wages if such differentiation is "authorized" by the Equal
Pay Act. The employer's position in Gunther was that the Bennett Amendment incorpo-
rates into Title VII only the affirmative defenses of the Equal Pay Act, and not the equal
pay for equal work standard.
78. 452 U.S. at 166.
79. Id. at 181. Seealso Heagney v. University ofWashington, 642 F.2d 1157, 1165 (9th
Cir. 1981) (an in-depth analysis of salaries paid to exempt employees indicating that more
female than male exempt employees were underpaid should have been admitted into evi-
dence by district court).
80. See 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(i) (1982).
81. See generally Brief Amicus Curiae of the Eagle Forum Education and Legal Defense
Fund at 15-22, AFSCME v. Washington, No. 84-3569 (9th Cir.) (extensive discussion of
marketplace defense).
82. 740 F.2d 686 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 511 (1984).
83. Plaintiffs in Spaulding asserted claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the Equal Pay Act,
and Title VII. The Ninth Circuit found the district court lacking in jurisdiction over
§ 1983 since the University of Washington is a state agency. With respect to the Equal Pay
Act claims, the Ninth Circuit upheld the lower court's findings as to the lack of substantial
equality ofjob content. Id. at 694, 699.
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tion.8 4 Recognizing that under this model plaintiffs must ultimately
prove intent to discriminate, the court stated that Gunther did not require
an inference of such intent where wage differences exist between similar
jobs.8 5 But the court did find that the comparibility of jobs can be rele-
vant in determining whether a court can infer discriminatory animus.
8 6
The court rejected plaintiffs' attempt to support a prima facie case of
disparate treatment by an asserted failure by the University to cooperate
in the investigation of the initial discrimination charge, its asserted fail-
ure to appoint experienced women's rights advocates, the all-male com-
position of the budget committee,8 7 an alleged disdain for women's
issues,8 8 and faulty gross comparisons of wages in other departments.8 9
The plaintiffs also claimed that the disparate impact model applies to
sex-based wage discrimination claims,9 0 and that the University could
not rely upon a "competitive marketplace" defense.9 '
The Ninth Circuit, following two circuit court opinions discussed
below, Lemons v. City and County of Denver9 2 and Christensen v. State of
Iowa,9 3 held that disparate impact analysis is not appliable to a compara-
ble worth claim,9 4 and, therefore a prima facie violation of Title VII may
not be made out by utilizing disparate impact analysis. 95 The disparate
impact model "was developed to handle specific employment practices
not obviously job-related" 9 6 and is not "the appropriate vehicle from
which to launch a wide ranging attack on the cumulative effect of a com-
pany's employment practices." 9 7 The plaintiffs sought to establish the
University's policy of relying on the market to set its wages as the facially
neutral policy which had a discriminationory impact upon the nursing
faculty. The court found however that the University's reliance upon
the market was not the type of employer policy which is appropriate for
disparate impact analysis. 98 Employers "deal with the market as a
'given,' and do not meaningfully have a 'policy' about it in the relevant
84. 740 F.2d at 700.
85. The "nursing faculty must show 'proof of actions taken by the employer from
which we infer discriminatory animus ....' " 740 F.2d at 700 (quoting Furnco Constr. Co.
v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 579-80 (1978)).
86. 740 F.2d at 700-01.
87. Id. at 701-02.
88. Id. at 702.
89. Id. at 704.
90. The applicabiliiy of disparate impact theory to sex-based wage discrimination
claims is discussed more fully in notes 92-99 in&ra.
91. 740 F.2d at 692.
92. 620 F.2d 228 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 888 (1980).
93. 563 F.2d 353 (8th Cir. 1977).
94. 740 F.2d at 708. ("We cannot manageably apply the impact model when the ker-
nel of the plaintiff's theory is comparable worth.").
95. 740 F.2d at 707.
96. Id. Namely, employer's intelligence tests and height and weight tests. See, e.g.,
Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 (1977), Gerdom v. Continental Airlines, 692 F.2d 602
(9th Cir. 1982) (en banc), cert. dismissed, 460 U.S. 1074 (1983).
97. Id. (quoting Pouncy v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 668 F.2d 795, 800 (5th Cir.
1982)).
98. 740 F.2d at 708.
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Title VII sense." 99
An earlier Eighth Circuit case cited by the Ninth Circuit in Spaulding,
Christen v. State of Iowa, 100 involved a class of female clerical employees at
the University of Northern Iowa who contended that clerical workers, all
of whom were female, were discriminated against on the basis of sex
since the predominantly male physical plant workers were paid more.
Wages were determined at the University under ajob evaluation scheme
which referred to the market only after a point-rating system had placed
jobs in particular "labor grades." The local job market paid higher
wages for physical plant jobs than starting pay under the job evaluation
scheme, so starting pay for physical plant employees had been adjusted
upwards.' 0 1 Plaintiffs argued that the University's reliance upon local
wage rates to establish the higher starting pay perpetuated sex discrimi-
nation in the marketplace. 10 2 The court logically rejected this finding
and held that Title VII does not require employers to "ignore the mar-
ket in setting wage rates for genuinely different work classifications."10 3
In Lemons v. City and County of Denver,10 4 the Tenth Circuit was faced
with a comparable worth claim brought by nurses employed by the City
of Denver. Wage rates were set according to a method which placed city
nurses on a pay parity with other nurses in the community. 10 5 Plaintiffs
argued that the City should not mirror the prevailing market condition
of underpaying nurses. The nurses sought wage comparison with other
jobs alleged to be of equal worth to the employer. The Tenth Circuit,
following Christensen, stated that current law did not require the City to
"reassess the worth of services in each position in relation to all others
.... 106 The court added that such a reassessment would not be tol-
erated when made in total disregard of conditions in the community. 10 7
In essense, employers are not required under Title VII to ignore the
marketplace in the establishment of wage rates.
In Briggs v. City of Madison,'0 8 plaintiffs were female public health
99. Id. See also Note, Sex-Based tVage Discrimination Under the Title 1/I Disparate Impact
Doctrine, 34 STAN. L. REV. 1083 (1982) (discussion of comparable worth and disparate im-
pact analysis).
100. 563 F.2d 353, 354 (8th Cir. 1977).
101. Id.
102. Id. at 356.
103. Id. See also Wilkins v. University of Houston, 654 F.2d 388 (5th Cir. 1981), cert.
denied, 459 U.S. 822 (1982) (recognizing legitimacy of marketplace-based differentials in
the context of comparisons of salaries of faculty members in different professional
schools); Keyes v. Lenoir Rhyne College, 15 Fair. Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 914 (W.D.N.C.
1976), ayfd, 552 F.2d 579 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 904 (1977) (marketplace consid-
erations constitute "legitimate factors"); County Employees Ass'n. v. Health Dep't., 18
Fair. Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1538 (Wash. Ct. App. 1978) (pattern of historical discrimina-
tion does not justify comparable worth claim under state anti-discrimination law where
employer adopted the wage scales of the marketplace).
104. 620 F.2d 228 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 888 (1980).
105. Id. at 229.
106. Id. The Tenth Circuit's rationale was buttressed by the Ninth Circuit's emphasis
in Spaulding that "[clourts are not competent to engage in a sweeping revision of market
wage rates." 740 F.2d 686, 706 n. 11.
107. 620 F.2d at 229.
108. 536 F. Supp. 435 (W.D. Wis. 1982).
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nurses employed by the City of Madison who claimed sex discrimination
under the disparate treatment theory. The plaintiffs alleged that they
were discriminated against by the City's practice of paying lower salaries
to female public health nurses than to male public health sanitarians.
Plaintiffs contended that much of the pay disparity could be traced to an
historical devaluation of the worth of female dominated jobs. 10 9 Plain-
tiffs further contended that the worth of nurses and sanitarians was sub-
stantially similar in skill, effort, and responsibility. The plaintiffs sought
a wage comparison even though the two jobs did not involve perform-
ance of the same or equal work.' 0 In finding that the plaintiffs failed to
demonstrate intentional illegal discrimination, the court stated that
nothing in Title VII "indicates that the employer's liability extends to
conditions of the marketplace which it did not create."l I I
In sum, the courts recognize that an employer's reliance upon the
marketplace in the setting of wage rates is not indicative of an intent to
discriminate on the basis of sex and is a factor "other than sex," consti-
tuting a defense to a disparate treatment claim. Furthermore, it is inap-
propriate to use disparate impact theory to establish a prima facie Title
VII case by wholesale assaults on employer wage-setting policies.
C. AFSCME v. State of Washington
In AFSCME v. State of Washington,' 12 the State of Washington con-
ducted job evaluation studies with the intent of examining, on the basis
ofjob worth, the salary differences between predominantly male and fe-
male job classes. Four such studies were conducted between 1974 and
1980. Job classes were assessed on the basis of the four components of
"knowledge and skills," "mental demands," "accountability," and
"working conditions." The final point value of each class was the total
of the value of these four components.' 13 The studies did not, there-
fore, reflect market forces, although a state statute provides that wages
of public employees are to reflect prevailing rates in the public and pri-
vate sectors. 1 14 The district court found that the State of Washington
had discriminated against females on the basis of sex under disparate
109. Id. at 437.
110. Id. at 442.
111. Id. at 447. "That there may be an abundance of applicants qualified for some jobs
and a dearth of skilled applicants for other jobs is not a condition for which a particular
employer bears responsibility." Id. See Horner v. Mary Institute, 613 F.2d 706, 714 (8th
Cir. 1980) (part of differential in pay between male and female physical education instruc-
tors due to marketplace considerations constituting a factor other than sex under the
Equal Pay Act). See also Craik v. Minnesota State Univ. Bd., 731 F.2d 465, 480 (8th Cir.
1984) (upholding finding that market factor increases given by University to faculty mem-
bers in five traditionally all male disciplines was necessary to maintain a strong faculty in
those disciplines despite discriminatory impact of the awards); Schulte v. State of New
York, 533 F. Supp. 31 (E.D.N.Y. 1981) (same); Mosely v. Kellwood Co., 27 Empl. Prac.
Dec. (CCH) 32, 348 (E.D. Mo. 1981) (recognizing importance of the role of the market
in setting of wages).
112. 578 F. Supp. 846 (W.D. Wash. 1983).
113. Id. at 865 n.9.
114. WASH. REV. CODE §§ 28B.16.110, 41.06.160 (1982).
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impact theory, by utilizing its present system, and under disparate treat-
ment theory by implementing and perpetuating the present system." 15
The case, according to the district court, concerned with implementa-
tion of a comparable worth compensation system, but did not require
the court to make its own subjective assessment of the worth of particu-
lar jobs,' 16 and therefore could be "more accurately characterized as a
straightforward 'failure to pay' case."'' 17
The district court analogized its "failure to pay" characterization of
the case before it to County of Washington v. Gunther.'1 8 The differences
however between the two cases were not recognized by the court. In
Gunther, the narrow issue before the court was whether a claim of inten-
tional discrimination could be brought and proved by direct evidence
which proved that the wages of female correction officers, but not male
officers, were intentionally set at a lower level than the State's own job
survey warranted.' 19 In Gunther, the Supreme Court decided that such
an intentional failure to pay case could be brought under Title VII, but
the Court provided that no standards were set forth for such cases.
120
The district court in State of Washington erred by relying upon Gunther for
the proposition that a failure to implement a job evaluation study is it-
self a Title VII violation. Furthermore, the Gunther study took into ac-
count market factors, whereas the State of Washington study did not.
Therefore, the defendant in State of Washington should have been able to
assert reliance upon the marketplace as a defense. The district court,
however, found that plaintiffs had established a prima facie case and pre-
cluded the State from demonstrating that no discrimination occurred,
limiting defendants to such proof as would justify the discrimination
"established" by the prima facie case.' 2 ' The district court would not
allow defendants to introduce evidence demonstrating the state's reli-
ance on prevailing market wages. 122 Since reliance upon the market-
place constitutes "a factor other than sex" and therefore a defense to a
sex-based wage discrimination claim,' 2 3 the state was clearly prejudiced
by the district court's refusal to admit such evidence.
124
115. 578 F. Supp. at 864.
116. Id. at 862.
117. Id. at 865.
118. 452 U.S. 161 (1981). See supra notes 76-82 and accompanying text.
119. Id. at 181 ("[W]e do not decide in this case the precise contours of lawsuits chal-
lenging sex discrimination in compensation under Title VII."). Courts have noted the
limited holding in Gunther. The Fifth Circuit has stated that the Supreme Court in Gunther
"was concerned with blatant cases of sex discrimination in which the only stumbling block
to underpaid females' causes of action was the fact that the victimized women did not hold
jobs similar to those held by men." Plemer v. Parsons-Gilbane, 713 F.2d 1127, 1133 (5th
Cir. 1983).
120. See Brief Amicus Curiae of the Equal Employment Advisory Council at 34-38,
Spaulding v. University of Washington, 740 F.2d 686 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 511
(1984).
121. 578 F.2d at 857.
122. Id. at 863.
123. See supra notes 81-110 and accompanying text.
124. The district court refusal to allow defendants to demonstrate that no discrimina-
tion had occurred, rather than merely to justify the discrimination "proved" by the prima
facie case, led the court to exclude relevant evidence. "Included among the evidence not
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The district court concluded that plaintiffs had established a prima
facie case of disparate treatment by showing that the state had intention-
ally implemented and perpetuated a compensation system which re-
sulted in unfavorable treatment of employees in predominantly female
job classifications. 12 5 The "failure to pay," was only one factor relied
upon by the court in finding the intentional discrimination necessary to
establish disparate treatment. The factors cited by the court included
the perpetuation of the disparity in salaries between female and male job
classifications rated as having the same point value; statistical evidence,
including an inverse correlation between the percentage of women in a
classification and salary; subjective standards with a "disparate impact"
on predominantly female jobs; admissions by the state officials of dis-
criminatory wage setting practices; and the failure to pay the evaluated
worth as established by the job evaluations.' 2 6 In reaching a finding of
disparate treatment, the court relied upon factors inextricably tied to the
concept that discrimination exists in the failure to pay particular job
classification wages commensurate with the job evaluation point values
assigned to a particular job.' 2 7 The "admissions" of state officials of
disparate treatment 12 8 were actually recognitions of the disparity in pay
between predominantly female and male jobs;' 29 such a disparity, how-
ever, must be shown to be the result of intentional employer discrimina-
tion to be part of a cognizable legal claim under Title VII. Ultimately,
the court held the State of Washington bound by the findings of the job
evaluation studies that disparities existed between predominantly fe-
male and male wage rates. The court implicitly held that the state was
bound for Title VII to implement the results of the job evaluation stud-
ies and to ignore the marketplace, although the setting of the wage rates
in itself was not proved to have been motivated by discriminatory
intent. 
3 0
allowed were testimony and exhibits as to why the State did not implement the internal
comparability studies; why the State felt it necessary and appropriate to rely on prevailing
market rates; and the extensive affirmative action efforts undertaken by the State." Brief
Amicus Curiae of the Equal Employment Advisory Council at 37, AFSCME v. Washington,
578 F. Supp. 846 (W.D. Wash. 1983), appeal docketed No. 84-3569 (9th Cir.). Despite these
evidentiary rulings, the district court concluded: "Defendants failed to produce credible,
admissible evidence raising a genuine issue of fact as to whether it discriminated against
the Plaintiffs herein." Id. at 863. The court later stated: "[In fact, there is no credible
evidence in the record that would support a finding that the State's practices and proce-
dures were based on any factor other than sex." Id. at 866. But for the court's evidentiary
rulings, the record would have reflected the State's reliance on several factors other than
sex, including the arguably complete defense of reliance upon the marketplace.
125. 578 F. Supp. at 864.
126. Id.
127. "The evidence in the instant case is clear ... that the State was on notice of the
legal implications of conducting comparable worth studies without implementing a salary
structure commensurate with the evaluated worth of jobs." Id. at 870.
128. "[Rlecognition of disparate treatment by responsible State officials" constitutes
"perhaps [the] most telling" circumstantial evidence of intentional discrimination. Id. at
858.
129. Statements included: "There are clear indications of pay differences between
classes predominately held by men and those predominately held by women within the
State svsteis. Such differences are not due solely to job 'worth.' " Id. at 860-61.
130. ' 'hie State was entitled to conduct as many advisory studies as it wanted, but it
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D. Summary
Intentional sex-based wage discrimination may be remedied cur-
rently under either Title VII or the Equal Pay Act. 13 1 Under neither
statute may a claim of sex-based wage discrimination be brought, how-
ever, where plaintiffs assert than an employer is not paying the employ-
ees in a job classification the intrinsic "worth" of their jobs.
132
Moreover, employees should not be held to be legally bound to imple-
ment the results of a job evaluation study, as the employer would be
under no duty to conduct such a study in the first place. Certainly, no
employer should be held liable for a failure to implement a job evalua-
tion scheme unless substantial evidence supports a finding of discrimi-
natory intent.
IV. UNION LIABILITY FOR SEX-BASED WAGE DISCRIMINATION
Several unions in the public and private sectors support the compa-
rable worth theory and intend to pursue "equity" increases at the bar-
gaining table. Although the future of comparable worth rests in large
part on the success of public and private sector unions at the bargaining
table, 13 3 the potential liability of unions for successful claims against
employers is barely acknowledged. Unions may be liable if it is found
that a collective bargaining agreement contained discriminatorily set
wage rates for predominantly female job classifications under present
anti-discrimination laws and may also share responsibility with employ-
ers should comparable worth theory be legislatively mandated in the
future.
Union liability stems from three federal statutes: Title VII, the Na-
tional Labor Relations Act ("NLRA"),
134 and under section 1981.135
Under Title VII and section 1981, the union may be held jointly liable
for negotiating a collective bargaining agreement which contains dis-
had no legal obligation to abandon its existing market-based pay system simply because
some studies of internal comparability showed that a different method of valuing jobs
would be more favorable to employees in predominantly female classifications. This is not
a 'failure to pay' case, because the State had no obligation to pay employees in accordance
with the (job evaluation] studies and there is no evidence that the State ever failed to pay women
based on the same criteria that it used in paying men." Brief Amicus Curiae of the Equal Employ-
ment Advisory Council at 9-10, AFSCME v. Washington, 578 F. Supp. 846 (W.D. Wash.
1983), appeal docketed, No. 84-3569 (9th Cir.) (emphasis supplied).
131. See, e.g., International Union of Elec. Workers v. Westinghouse Elec., 631 F.2d
1094 (3d. Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 967 (1981) (employer allegedly set wage rates
lower for any classification if the group covered within that category was predominantly
female although jobs were evaluated as equivalent under employer's evaluation study).
132. Comparable worth theory has been rejected as a cognizable claim under Title VII
by several district courts. See e.g., Connecticut State Employees Ass'n v. Connecticut, 31
Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 33, 528 (D. Conn. 1983); Power v. Barry County, 539 F. Supp.
721, 726-27 (W.D. Mich. 1982); Martin v. Frontier Federal Savings and Loan Ass'n, 510 F.
Supp. 1062, 1067-68 (W.D. Okla. 1981); Gerlach v. Michigan Bell Tel. Co., 501 F. Supp.
1300, 1320 (E.D. Mich. 1980).
133. See PAY EQUITY AND COMPARABLE WORTH, supra note 61, at 91 (statement of Ron-
ald Green).
134. 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1982).
135. Civil Rights Act of 1866, 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1982).
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criminatory wage rates or other policies and practices. 136 Under the
NLRA, the union may have breached its of the duty of fair representa-
tion by invidiously discriminating against its members.
137
A union may clearly be held to have violated Title VII by negotiat-
ing for, or acquiescing in, the setting of discriminatory wage rates. 138
Indeed, Title VII imposes an affirmative obligation on the part of inter-
national unions and other umbrella organizations to take reasonable
steps to end discrimination, and an International may be held jointly
liable with its Local for discriminatory practices. 139 In light of a union's
potential liability under Title VII for sex-based wage discrimination
claims, either under a "joint negotiator" theory or a "failure to take af-
firmative steps" theory, it is clear that the acceptance of the comparable
worth doctrine either under present law or as a modification of present
law has substantial negative economic implications for unions, thus mili-
tating against the acceptance of any broad-ranging support for compara-
ble worth by the labor movement.
In addition, an aggrieved plaintiff asserting sex-based wage discrim-
ination under Title VII or section 1981 could also simultaneously seek
relief under the NLRA.1 40 Such an aggrieved plaintiff could assert that
the union has breached its duty of fair representation, ajudically-created
obligation under the NLRA prohibiting arbitrary, discriminatory or bad
faith conduct by a union towards a member of the collective bargaining
unit. 14 1 A charge could be brought to the National Labor Relations
Board, or a suit instituted against the union, asserting a combination of
theories, including breach of the duty of fair representation under the
NLRA and causes of action under Title VII and section 1981.142
Although several unions, particularly in the public sector, are
strong advocates of comparable worth theory, two important factors
may tend to diminish broad-ranging support in the labor movement.
First, unions would be potentially liable for any discrimination found.
Second, if comparable worth theory were legislatively mandated, the
freedom of unions to negotiate would be severely restricted and a major
role in the wage-setting process now performed by unions would be-
136. See Note, Union Liability For Employer Discrimination, 93 HARV. L. REv. 702 (1980).
137. Id. See also Macklin v. Spector Freight Systems, Inc., 478 F.2d 979 (D.C. Cir. 1973)
(union has duty to protect employees from employer discrimination by bargaining).
138. See Taylor v. Charley Bros. Co., 25 Fair. Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 602 (W.D. Pa.
i981), wherein the union was held to have violated Title VII by agreeing to, and encourag-
ing, the setting of discriminatory wage rates in negotiations in 1974 and 1977, and by
acquiescing to the employer's proposals in 1980. Id. at 614.
139. Wheeler v. American Home Products Corp., 19 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 143,
146 (N.D. Ga. 1979) (restriction of females to single job classification and failure to allow
females to "bump" males with less senority during lay-off pursuant to provisions of collec-
tive bargaining agreement). See also Denicola v. G.C. Murphy Co., 562 F.2d 889 (3d Cir.
1977) (union local violated Title VII by refusing employer's offer to retroactively eliminate
discriminatory pay dilferentials); Macklin v. Spector Freight Systems, In-., 478 F.2d 979,
988-99 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
140. Cf Alcantar v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36 (1974).
141. Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171 (1967).
142. See generally United Rubber Workers Local 12 v. NI.RB, 368 F.2d 12, 24 (5th Cir.
1966), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 837 (1967).
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come redundant due to extensive government involvement in the wage-
setting process.
V. CONCLUSION-METHODS OF AVOIDING LIABILITY
Employers, both in the public and private sectors, are well-advised
to implement policies and programs designed to avoid liability under
comparable worth theory. Despite the fact that courts have not been
receptive towards acceptance of the doctrine under current anti-discrim-
ination laws, state and federal legislative developments indicate that
those employers not presently subject to comparable worth statutes will
be in the future.
A. Self-Analysis
Comparable worth statutes, in order to be implemented, are and
will be administered by governmental fair employment agencies. Much
as current equal employment opportunity laws depend upon employer
self-analysis, (e.g. affirmative action programs), so too will employer
self-analysis be the basis for governmental comparable worth efforts.
Predominantly-female job classifications, (generally, where seventy-per-
cent or more of the incumbents are female), are the targets of compara-
ble worth advocates. Employers must establish whether predominantly
female job classifications are present in the workforce. If such classifica-
tions exist, transfer and promotion procedures must be examined to de-
termine whether female employees are encountering illegal barriers.
Employers should actively encourage women in such job classifications
to move into other positions. Any steps taken towards this end should
be documented, including offers of transfer or promotion, so that a rec-
ord of the employer's good faith efforts to remove obstacles to the trans-
fer and promotion of women is established. Hiring procedures and
recruitment methods must be examined to determine why the workforce
has developed female or male dominated job classifications. To the ex-
tent the employer has the ability to discourage sex-based hiring pat-
terns, it should do so. This may take the form, for example, of active
recruitment of females for male-dominated job classifications.
B. Jlage-setting Policy
The employer's wage-setting policy must be uniform and non-dis-
criminatory. Ad hoc increases, either to individuals or for employees
within a given job classification, should be carefully reviewed and docu-
mented. Certain inconsistencies in wage-setting policies will be una-
voidable, such as where a portion of the workforce is part of a collective
bargaining unit or where a true "merit" system applies. One of the most
significant problems employers have in defining a "merit" system is




If there is any evidence of intentional discrimination either in set-
ting wages by classifications or among individuals, the employee should
consider appropriate action to remedy the bias. Such evidence may in-
clude a practice of basing starting salaries on the amount earned by ap-
plicants in prior employment instead of the entry salary set by company
policy.
C. Surveys
The ultimate burden as to the conduct and implementation of any
marketplace survey or job evaluation survey rests with the employer.
Because of the very nature of such surveys there will be portions which
will be subjective rather than objective. In constructing such a survey,
the employer should take all steps possible to assure that the study is not
affected by intentional employment discrimination. This can be done by
selecting for review jobs which include both male and female employees
wherever possible and in which the lines for job progression are such
that movement to and from such jobs is not affected by factors which
might indicate employment discrimination. One of the most crucial du-
ties of employers is to closely monitor the conduct of the job evaluation
or wage survey. It is folly to presume that those conducting such a sur-
vey do not make mistakes or are without bias. The role of counsel in this
process is a crucial one in that the employers should be advised before,
during and upon completion of a salary survey of the legal ramifications
of the conduct of the survey and any decisions made as to implementa-
tion or non-implementation of any findings. The decision-making pro-
cess as to any salary adjustments should be as extensively documented
as possible both with respect to marketplace factors which would affect
the salary levels paid for various positions as well as the economic condi-
tion of the company vis-a-vis its ability to pay increased salaries.
The above recommendations apply with equal force to job classifi-
cations dominated by any protected class. The comparable worth de-
bate currently centers on women, although in practice, application of
the theory will not be so limited in scope.
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COMPARABLE WORTH: THE NEXT STEP TOWARD PAY EquITY
UNDER TITLE VII
INTRODUCTION
Twenty years ago, Congress took the first steps toward pay equity
between the sexes by enacting the Equal Pay Act' and Title VII. 2 Simply
requiring equal pay for equal work, as the Equal Pay Act provides, has
not remedied past economic wage disparities. In fact, current United
States Labor Department statistics reveal that women who held full-time
jobs in 1983 received only about two-thirds as much as their male coun-
terparts. 3 Judicial recognition of comparable worth claims is the next
step toward pay equity under Title VII.
There is no controversy that a wage gap exists; there is controversy
as to the reasons for its existence. Critics of comparable worth attribute
the wage gap to a number of non-discriminatory factors including age,
education and training, the type of work performed, job history, and
absenteeism. 4 However, after taking these factors into consideration,
there is still an unexplained differential between the wages paid to men
and those paid to women. This differential results from society's his-
toric devaluation of "women's work" and segregation of women into
specific occupations.
Although women work in a greater variety of professional fields
than in the past, women remain concentrated in predominantly female
occupations. In 1982, 99% of all secretaries, 96% of all nurses, and
82% of all elementary school teachers were women. 5 In 1983, women
accounted for 80% of all administrative support workers but only 8% of
precision production, craft and repair workers; 70% of retail and per-
sonal sales workers but only 32% of managers, administrators, and
executives .6
Advocates of comparable worth have called for judicial or legislative
intervention to redress the pay inequity resulting from job segregation.
The comparable worth doctrine requires equal pay for jobs that are
equal or comparable in value to an employer. The focus is on a single
employer and whether women, in predominantly female positions, are
being paid the same wage rate as men, in predominantly male positions,
when both types ofjobs are of equal value to their employer.
1. 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1) (1982). See infra notes 26-36 and accompanying text.
2. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1982). See infra notes 37-40 and accompanying text.
3. U.S. DEP'T OF LAB. BUREAU OF LAB. STATISTICS, WOMEN AT WORK: A CHARTBOOK
28-29 (April 1983) [hereinafter cited as WOMEN AT WORK].
4. See generally F. MORRIS,J. O'NEILL,J. CALHOON,J. SLOAN, S. MITCHELL, T. FAHNER,
JUDICIAL WAGE DETERMINATION . . . A VOLATILE SPECTRE: PERSPECTIVES ON COMPARABLE
WORTH (1984) (discussing legal, economic, labor, independent business, corporate, and
state government perspectives on comparable worth).
5. WOMEN AT WORK, supra note 3, at 8-10.
6. U.S. DEP'T OF LAB., WOMEN'S BUREAU, FACTS ON WOMEN WORKERS (1984).
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The comparable worth doctrine under Title VII mandates that sex,
like race, color, religion, or national origin, cannot be used by employ-
ers as a factor to discriminate in setting wages for employees. Employ-
ers violate Title VII whenever they pay women lower wages than men
because of sex. The issue of comparable worth is one of sex-based wage
discrimination, a traditional Title VII claim.
I. HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
Comparable worth is not a new or untested idea. The issue first
surfaced in the United States 7 during World War I as women began
moving into jobs predominantly held by men.8 The needs of war pro-
duction created a drastic increase in the demand for workers both in the
military and in industry. As a result, a National War Labor Board was
created by executive order of the President for both World War I and
World War II. 9 The First War Labor Board established governmental
support for pay equity by issuing General Order 13, which prohibited
the lowering of wages for women doing work equal to men within a sin-
gle plant.1 0 However, at the end of the war, most women left the
workforce voluntarily, to assume the domestic role, or involuntarily,
either to be displaced by returning veterans or laid off as war production
slowed. " I
In January 1942, the Board was reestablished by Executive Order
9017 as a wartime measure.1 2 Although originally the War Labor Board
established the policy of equal pay for equal, or substantially equal, work
during World War II, the Board soon realized that sex-based disparities
existed between men and women holding different jobs. 13 Conse-
quently, the Second War Labor Board was used to ensure equal pay for
7. Comparable worth claims have been recognized in other countries. For example,
Canada and Great Britain have moved beyond the equal pay for equal work standard. In
order to combat sex-based wage discrimination, Great Britain prohibits pay disparity be-
tween men and women not only for equal work, but for work of equal value as well. Simi-
larly, Canada prohibits pay disparity between men and women for work of equal value.
Great Britain adopted its standard in 1970 and Canada adopted its standard in 1977.
While the judiciary and the legislatures in the United States struggle with the merits of
comparable worth claims, Great Britain and Canada have long since enforced the idea. See
generally Note, Beyond Equal Pay for Equal Work: Recent Developments in the United States, Great
Britain, and Canada, 7 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 179 (1984) (discussion of the develop-
ments of comparable worth in the United States, Canada, and Great Britain).
8. A. COOK, COMPARABLE WORTH: THE PROBLEM AND STATES' APPROACHES TO WAGE
Equrr 1 (1983).
9. Bellace, Comparable Worth: Proving Sex-Based lWage Discrimination, 69 IOWA L. REV.
655, 658 (1984). The Boards were established at the request of unions and management
in order to carry out the no strike/no lockout commitments and as a means of resolving
conflicts that could not be settled through bargaining. Id. at 658. See also Williams & Mc-
Dowell, The Legal Framework, in COMPARABLE WORTH: ISSUES AND ALTERNATIVES 195, 205
(R. Livernash ed. 1980).
10. A. CooK, supra note 8, at 1.
1I. Bellace, supra note 9, at 659.
12. Newman & Vonhof, "Separate But Equal "--Job Segregation and Pay Equity in the Wake
of Gunther, 1981 U. ILL. L. REV. 269, 269.
13. Id. at 270.
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jobs of comparable value. 14 The Board authorized "adjustments which
equalize[d] the wage or salary rates paid to females with the rates paid to
males for comparable quality and quantity of work on the same or simi-
lar operation."1 5 Trade unions supported the wage-setting principles of
the National War Labor Board, not out of a commitment to pay equity,
but because women and minorities had historically been a source of
cheap labor, and the unions feared the hard-won gains of union men
would be jeopardized. 
1 6
Several equal pay cases were brought before the War Board, 1 7 the
most famous being General Electric Co. and Westinghouse Electric Co. 18 The
union in that case argued that General Electric's job evaluation system
was arbitrarily applied and resulted in women not receiving the same
pay rate as men for work of comparable quality and quantity. In support
of that position the union cited a 1937 job manual, which stated that
"[f]or female operators, the value shall be two-thirds of the value for
adult male workers." 19 The company argued that since there was no
interchangeability ofjobs, women did not perform work equal to men.
20
The union also protested Westinghouse Electric's dual job evaluation
system where jobs were evaluated according to which sex performed
them.
2 '
In its decision the Board stated, first, that where women hold jobs
which are also performed by men, women are to receive equal pay with
men.2 2 It claimed that indirect costs of employing women, such as
higher rates of absenteeism and turnover, and lack of training in the
industry, would not be recognized as justifications for reducing wage
rates where no comparison of job content is made.2 3 Second, with re-
spect to adjustment of wage rates for women's jobs, wage differentiation
was presumed to be correct for jobs performed historically by women.
24
However, this presumption could be overcome by affirmative evidence
of unequal wage rates derived from a comparison of the content ofjobs
14. Williams & McDowell, supra note 9, at 205.
15. Thomas, Pay Equity and Comparable Worth, 34 LAB. L.J. 4 (1983) (quoting General
Order 16, adopted Nov. 24, 1942).
16. R. STEINBERG, WAGES AND HOURS: LABOR AND REFORM IN 20TH CENTURY AMERICA
116-17 (1982). See also A. COOK, supra note 8, at 1.
17. The War Board did not act as a judicial or administrative body and it did not
implement legislative enactments. The Board had power to arbitrate and mediate disputes
only. For a discussion on the power and composition of the War Board, see Williams &
McDowell, supra note 9, at 206-07.
18. 28 WAR LAB. REP. 666 (1945). For a summary of the decision, see 17 L.R.R.M.
(BNA) 1667 (1945).
19. 28 WAR LAB. REP. 666.
20. Id.
21. Id. "We line women's jobs up with other women's jobs. We line men's jobs up
with men's jobs. We do not line women's jobs up against men's jobs." Id.
22. Id.
23. Id. See also General Motors Co., 16 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1601 (1945) (wage differential
of 21 q per hour lowered to 6q per hour where the only decisional criterion could be the
difference in job content).
24. 28 WAR LAB. REP. 666.
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performed by men with the content of jobs performed by women. 25
The Board's decision clarified that the worth of a job must be based on
the job's content and not on the sex of the person performing that job.
A. The Equal Pay Act
Despite the early success of the equal pay and comparable worth
concepts during World War I and World War II, many years passed
before the federal government formally accepted wage equity for wo-
men. In 1963, section 6 of the Fair Labor Standards Act 2 6 was amended
to include one additional fair labor standard-equal pay for equal work
regardless of sex. 2 7 Under this amended provision, now known as the
Equal Pay Act, the plaintiff carries the burden of proof and must estab-
lish that the employer is paying workers of one sex more than workers of
the opposite sex in a situation where both sexes are performing the
same or similar work. The similarity of the work is established by dem-
onstrating that the skill, effort, and responsibility of both jobs are equal
and performed under similar working conditions.2 8
25. Id. For a discussion of this case, see Bellace, supra note 9, at 660; M. GOLD, A
DIALOGUE ON COMPARABLE WORTH 67 (1983); Newman & Vonhof, supra note 12, at 292-96.
26. 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1) (1982); see also U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS, 88th Cong.,
1st Sess. 1963, 688-89. The Equal Pay Act provides in pertinent part:
No employer . . . shall discriminate . . .between employees on the basis of sex
by paying wages to employees of such establishment at a rate less than the rate at
which he pays wages to employees of the opposite sex in such establishment for
equal work onjobs the performance of which requires equal skill, effort, responsi-
bility, and which are performed under similar working conditions, except where
such payment is made pursuant to (i) a seniority system; (ii) a merit system; (iii) a
system which measures earnings by quantity or quality of production; or (iv) a
differential based on any other factor other than sex.
For legislative history of the provision, see U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS, 88th Cong., Ist
Sess. 687-92 (1963).
27. "Equal pay for equal work" was not the standard initially proposed by the Ken-
nedy Administration in 1962. That proposal prohibited paying a lower wage to "any em-
ployee of the opposite sex for work of comparable character on a job the performance of
which requires comparable skills." Hearings on H.R. 8898 Before Selected Subcommittees.
Although support for the original language was strong among the Unions, arguments
against the bill presented by business representatives prevailed. The language was
changed to the equal work standard because it was constructed more narrowly. See H.R.
8898, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963); H.R. 10226, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. (1963). See also Note,
supra note 7, at 184.
28. The EEOC regulations define equal skill, effort, and responsibility as follows:
"'Skill" involves such factors as experience, training, education, and ability
and must be measured in terms of the performance requirements of the job. If
two jobs require essentially the same skill, both the jobs would be equal under the
Act even if the employee in one of the jobs is not required to exercise that skill as
frequently or during as much of the work period as the other. An employee's
possession of a skill not needed in the job cannot make two employees' jobs
unequal.
"Effort" relates to the physical or mental exertion needed for the perform-
ance of the job. Differences only in the kind of effort required will not justify
wage differentials. Although there are circumstances in which a differential may
be based on the fact that one employee has to perform lifting functions and
others do not, serious questions of good faith arise if the men on ajob receive the
differential regardless of their actual lifting activities.
"Responsibility" relates to the degree of accountability required in the per-
formance of the job, with emphasis on the importance of the job obligation. Ex-
amples of differences in responsibility that may justify pay differentials include
the following: one employee of a group serves as relief supervisor whenever the
[Vol. 62:2
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If the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case under the Equal Pay
Act, the burden shifts to the employer to justify wage differentials under
one of four affirmative defenses. These defenses include payment made
pursuant to a seniority system, a merit system, a system measuring qual-
ity or quantity of production, or where the wage differential is based on
"any factor other than sex." 2 9 The first three defenses are very specific;
it is the fourth defense, the catch-all defense, which has created confu-
sion. Although questions remain as to what constitutes a "factor other
than sex," the Supreme Court has at least determined that market justifi-
cations, such as supply and demand, do not fall within it.
The only case under the Equal Pay Act to reach the Supreme Court,
Coming Glass Works v. Brennan,3 0 is most noted for its rejection of the
defense that market conditions are a factor other than sex. In Corning
Glass, male quality control inspectors on the night shift were paid more
than female quality control inspectors on the day shift, even though
both groups performed identical tasks. 3 1 Company officials claimed the
pay differential was intended to compensate for night work and was,
therefore, a factor other than sex. However, before this time, there was
no difference in pay between day and night shifts at Corning Glass
Works. This was the first time a plant-wide shift differential had been
established. 32 The Court held that non-discriminatory shift differentials
could exist, but that in this instance, Corning Glass had failed to prove
that the higher rate paid to night workers was intended solely as com-
pensation for night work rather than as additional payment based on
sex. 3 3 The Court found that the employer paid the higher wages as an
encouragement for men to perform work they perceived as women's
work, and therefore, demeaning. 34 The Court refused to accept market
justifications for differing the base pay rates between men and women
supervisor is absent and during these periods the relief supervisor is in training
for a supervisory position; one of several sales clerks is designated as responsible
for determining whether to accept payment by personal check. Some types of
additional responsibility are not sufficiently important to justify higher pay; for
example, turning off lights at the end of the day would not be enough.
See 29 C.F.R. § 800.122-129 (1984). See also COMMERCE CLEARING HOUSE, HARASSMENT
AND COMPENSATIONS-TODAYS SEX DISCRIMINATION ISSUES 12-13 (1981). "Working con-
ditions" are explained in COMMERCE CLEARING HOUSE, supra at 13, as follows:
According to the United States Supreme Court, industrial relations' definition of
"working conditions" at the time the Act was under consideration encompassed
two subfactors: surroundings and hazards. "Surroundings" refers to the ele-
ments, such as toxic chemicals or fumes, that are regularly encountered by the
worker and takes into account the intensity and frequency of such encounters.
"Hazards" includes the physical hazards regularly encountered, their frequency,
and the severity of injury they can cause. Time of day is not a factor included
within the term "working conditions."
29. 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(iv).
30. 417 U.S. 188 (1974).
31. Id. Originally, New York and Pennsylvania had laws prohibiting women from
working at night. The inspection work was performed during the day until automatic pro-
duction equipment made it possible to also do the work at night. Male inspectors were
subsequently hired to perform the evening inspections. Id. at 191.
32. Id. at 192.
33. Id. at 204.
34. Id. at 191-92 n.3.
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for identical jobs. 3 5 Thus, the Supreme Court rejected market condi-
tions as a factor other than sex where equal work is performed.
36
B. Title VII
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 3 7 forbids discrimination in
all aspects of employment on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin. 38 It is far broader and more comprehensive than the
Equal Pay Act, which applies only to wages and wage differentials be-
35. Id. at 205. "The differential arose simply because men would not work at the low
rates paid women inspectors, and it reflected a job market in which Corning could pay
women less than men for the same work. That the company took advantage of such a
situation may be understandable as a matter of economics, but its differential nevertheless
became illegal .. " Id.
36. Other courts have continued to reject the marketplace defense. See, e.g., Brennan
v. Victoria Bank & Trust Co., 493 F.2d 896 (5th Cir. 1974); Hodgson v. Brookhaven Gen.
Hosp., 436 F.2d 719 (5th Cir. 1970); Shulte v. Wilson Indus., Inc., 547 F. Supp. 324 (S.D.
Tex. 1982). For a discussion of these cases, see Pauley, The Exception Swallows the Rule:
Market Conditions as a "Factor Other Then Sex" in Title VII Disparate Impact Litigation, 86 W. VA.
L. REV. 165, 170-72 (1983).
37. Title VII provides:
It shall be unlawful employment for an employer-
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to
discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, con-
ditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, reli-
gion, sex, or national origin; or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees in any way which would
deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or other-
wise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of such individual's race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a).
38. Originally, Title VII was intended to eliminate employment discrimination among
blacks and ethnic minorities. The original bill prohibited discrimination based on race,
creed, or color. During a discussion regarding the inclusion of the word "age" in Title
VII, Rep. Ryan of New York stated: "We have failed repeatedly to face the crucial issue,
and that is whether or not it is time for us to declare as a matter of national policy that
there shall be no discrimination on the basis of race, creed, or color." 110 CONG. REC.
2603 (1964).
Rep. Howard Smith of Virginia offered the Amendment including "sex" on February
8, 1964. 110 CONG. REC. 2577 (1964). Smith, in support of the amendment, read a letter
from a constituent who was concerned about the "imbalance" of men to women as re-
corded by the 1960 census. The letter stated, "[J]ust why the Creator would set up such
an imbalance of spinsters, shutting off their [sic] 'right' of every female to have a husband
of her own is, of course, known only to nature." Id. Smith agreed with the injustice and
read the letter "just to illustrate that women have some real grievances and some real
rights to protect." Id.
Some critics claim the word "sex" was inserted hastily by Smith in an effort to prevent
the passage of Title VII. See Miller, Sex Discrimination and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, 51 MINN. L. REV. 877, 880-82 (1967). This claim is supported by legislative history,
in particular, remarks made by Rep. Green during House debates. In addressing the
House, Rep. Green stated: "[The amendment] will clutter up the bill and it may-very
well-be used to help destroy this section of the bill by some of the people who today
support it." 110 CONG. REc. 2581 (1964).
Ultimately, a comparison of the black employed women's and the white employed
women's remedies for wage discrimination was the source of most of the discussion. The
fact that black women would have a cause of action for discrimination in employment
based on race but white women would have no such redress for employment discrimina-
tion caused concern. Clearly, it was the argument that white women would be at the "bot-
tom of the barrel," below black women in particular, with respect to equal employment




tween men and women. In order to achieve equal employment opportu-
nities, Title VII proscribes overt discriminatory practices as well as
facially neutral practices that are discriminatory in effect. 39 Title VII fol-
lowed so closely on the heels of the Equal Pay Act that concern about
conformity between the two laws, and about preserving the efficacy of
the Equal Pay Act, led to the Senate's introduction of an amendment to
the bill.
40
C. The Bennett Amendment
The purpose of the Bennett Amendment was to resolve the antici-
pated conflict between Title VII and the Equal Pay Act. 4 1 The Amend-
ment became a contested issue that sharply divided the lower courts in
their resolution of sex-based wage discrimination claims.
The text of the Bennett Amendment provides:
It shall not be an unlawful practice under this title for any em-
ployer to differentiate upon the basis of sex in determining the
amount of wages or compensation paid or to be paid to em-
ployees of such employer if such differentiation is authorized by
the (Equal Pay Act).
4 2
The meaning of the word "authorized" created the controversy in the
lower courts. One theory interpreted the phrase "authorized by the
(Equal Pay Act)" as incorporating only the four defenses of the Equal
Pay Act into Title VII, 4 3 while the other theory incorporated the four
defenses and, in addition, restricted Title VII's coverage to the equal
pay for equal work standard.
4 4
The controversy over the Bennett Amendment was resolved by the
Supreme Court in County of Washington v. Gunther.4 5 Gunther held that the
Bennett Amendment did not limit Title VII's protections against sex-
based wage discrimination to claims of equal pay for equal work as pre-
scribed by the Equal Pay Act. 46 In reaching this decision, the Court re-
39. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 430-31 (1971). "The Act proscribes not
only overt discrimination but also practices fair in form, but discriminatory in operation."
Id. at 431.
40. The House approved the incorporation of the word "sex" and sent the bill to the
full Senate for consideration. It was at this level that concern for the conformity of the
Equal Pay Act and Title VII grew. Senator Bennett proposed an amendment in response
to this concern. 110 CONG. REC. 13647 (1964).
41. "The purpose of [this] amendment is to provide that in the event of conflicts, the
provisions of the Equal Pay Act shall not be nullified." Id. For a discussion of the limited
legislative history of the Bennett Amendment, see Newman & Vonhof, supra note 12, at
277-79.
42. 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e)-2(h) (emphasis added).
43. See, e.g., International Union of Elec. Workers v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 631
F.2d 1094, 1099-1107 (3d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 967 (1981).
44. See, e.g., Lemons v. City and Cty. of Denver, 620 F.2d 228 (10th Cir), cert. denied,
449 U.S. 888 (1980).
45. 452 U.S. 161 (1981) (female prison guards paid less than male prison guards for
substantially equal work could raise claims under Title VII). For a discussion of the facts,
procedural history, and Supreme Court decision in Gunther, see Newman & Vonhof, supra
note 12, at 274-77.
46. 452 U.S. at 181.
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lied on the language of the amendment itself and upon its recognition
that the denial of Title VII protection is appropriate only to the extent
that the Equal Pay Act has "authorized" pay differentials. By determin-
ing that the word "authorized" normally denotes an affirmative enabling
action, the Court was able to focus upon the wage practices that were
affirmatively authorized by the Equal Pay Act. 4 7 Thus, the Court held
that only the four defenses of the Equal Pay Act "authorized" pay differ-
entials unprotected by Title VII, while the rest of Title VII remained
intact.
4 8
Although the Gunther Court did not discuss the issue of comparable
worth, 49 it left open the possibility that Title VII protection is available
in comparable worth claims. Claims under the Equal Pay Act must be
based on pay differentials between men and women for the same job.50
Comparable worth is properly focused upon the disparity in the earn-
ings gap which is left unprotected by the Equal Pay Act.
5 1
II. PROVING THE WAGE GAP
The existence of a wage gap is not in dispute. The statistics illus-
trate that women earn, on the average, approximately 60% of what men
earn. 52 What is in dispute is the cause of the wage gap. In theory, the
argument against comparable worth seems plausible; the wage gap is
attributed to factors other than sex-based discrimination. However,
data regarding the existence and cause of the wage gap is available to
counter the critics.
Not all of the wage gap may be attributed to wage discrimination;
some non-discriminatory factors contribute to wage disparity between
men and women. Non-discriminatory factors include, among others,
age, education, job training, job history and seniority, type of work per-
formed, risks involved, wage conditions, and absenteeism. Taking these
factors into consideration, available data still leave a large portion of the
47. Id. at 169.
48. Id. at 168-69. "We therefore conclude that only differentials attributable to the
four affirmative defenses of the Equal Pay Act are authorized by that Act within the mean-
ing of. . .Title VII." Id. at 171.
49. The Court cautioned that it was not deciding "the precise contours of lawsuits
challenging sex discrimination in compensation under Title VII" and that because the
comparable worth issue was not raised under the facts of the case it was not required to
"make its own subjective assessment of the value of the male and female guard jobs.
Id. at 181.
50. See supra notes 26-36 and accompanying text.
51. See Newman & Vonhof, supra note 12, at 300, where the authors comment that the
Equal Pay Act may have exacerbated occupational segregation by encouraging employers
to segregate women so as to keep their wages down and be able to avoid equal pay claims.
"If an employer wants to keep labor costs low, therefore, it can do so with less fear of
detection by isolating a group of workers, assigning them to different jobs, and devaluing
their wages, than it can by paying them lower wages for equal work." Id.
52. The earnings differential has fluctuated over the past thirty years. In 1956, fully
employed women's earnings were 63% of men's earnings. Fourteen years later, in 1970,
they had decreased to 59% of men's earnings. U.S. DEP'T OF LAB., TIME OF CHANGE: 1983




In a study commissioned by the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission, the National Academy of Sciences (NAS) was asked to de-
termine if wage differentials, for work of comparable value, vary as to
the sex of the worker.54 The study summarized the findings from sev-
eral other studies and examines two explanations for the wage gap:
1) characteristics of workers; 2) characteristics of jobs.
5 5
The first explanation, characteristics of workers, considers the dif-
ferences that affect the productivity, education and training, work expe-
rience, continuity of work history, and health. 56 The NAS determined
that the empirical data consistently found a substantial part of the wage
gap could not be explained by non-discriminatory factors measuring
productivity differences. 5 7 The committee concluded that such results
created a presumption of additional factors, including discrimination, af-
fecting pay disparity between men and women.
58
The second explanation scrutinized by the committee concluded
that the pay disparity between men and women resulted from the char-
acteristics of the jobs they hold.5 9 Included within these characteristics
are prestige of job, authority exercised, and percent female. 60 Citing a
1974 study, the Committee stated "[n]ot only do women do different
work than [sic] men, but also the work women do is paid less, and the
more an occupation is dominated by women the less it pays." 6 1 The
Committee concluded that the sex composition ofjobs, independent of
the personal or job characteristics, strongly influences the earnings of a
worker within an occupation.
6 2
Finding that only a small part of pay disparity may be attributed to
the differences in education, experience, commitment or other personal
characteristics of employees, 6 3 and that the level of job segregation by
sex may be, in part, a result of discriminatory practices, the committee
53. Id. at 87.
54. See WOMEN, WORK, AND WAGES: EQUAL PAY FORJOBS OF EQUAL VALUE 61 (D. Trie-
man & H. Hartman, eds. 1981) [hereinafter cited as WOMEN, WORK, AND WAGES] (The
study addressed discrimination within the single firm and not a systematic solution to un-
intentional discrimination. The study focused on the inequalities between men and wo-
men rather than between whites and non-whites because the pay disparity is greater
between the sexes. Moreover, the pay disparity between men and women has increased
while the pay disparity between whites and non-whites has decreased over the years.).
55. Id at 16-17.
56. Id. at 18.
57. Id. at 17-24.
58. Id. at 24. The Committee did, however, recognize that the studies surveyed may
have contained flaws, and consequently, stated that they were to be suggestive of the find-
ing rather than definitive. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 31.
61. Id. at 28 (citing Sommers, Occupational Rankings for mn and Women By Earnings, 97
MONTHLY LAB. REV. 34-51 (Aug. 1974)).
62. WOMEN, WORK, AND WAGES, supra note 54, at 30-31.
63. "The findings from studies attempting to explain the differences in earnings be-
tween men and women on the basis of such factors usually account for less than a quarter
and never more than half of the observed earnings differences," Id. at 42.
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concluded that substantial discrimination in pay exists. 64 The Commit-
tee suggested that job evaluation plans be used to identify and eliminate
discriminatory effects of pay disparity among jobs within a firm.
6 5
Other data concerning the wage gap are available in the findings of
the Panel Study of Income Dynamics conducted by the University of
Michigan's Institute for Social Research (1978).66 Five thousand house-
holds were the subjects of the study which focused specifically upon per-
sons in the workforce who were between the ages of 18 and 34. The
panel analyzed the impact of formal education, labor force attachment,
work history, and years of training in the current job on four groups:
white men, white women, black men, and black women. These four
groups included married and unmarried men, married women, and un-
married women who were heads of households.
The findings revealed several important facts. First, formal educa-
tion had little impact on wages for white women, moderate impact for
black women, and substantial impact for black men.6 7 The study indi-
cated that only 2% of the wage gap between white men and white wo-
men could be attributed to the difference in education. The factor of
education explained 11% of the gap between white men and black wo-
men and 39% of the gap between white men and black men. 68 The fact
still remains that fulltime working women earn substantially less than
similarly employed men with equivalent educations. 69
The attachment of an employee to the workforce has been cited by
critics of comparable worth as one of the major factors causing the wage
gap. 70 Tested factors of labor force attachment are: absenteeism as a
result of one's own illness or the illness of another; self-imposed restric-
tions on hours of work a day and on location of work; and plans to
quit.7 1 Although women have a lower attachment to the workforce than
men, this difference accounts for very little, if any, of the earnings gap. 72
Even though the level of labor force attachment may fluctuate between
women, the pay remains substantially the same.7 3 Consequently, wo-
64. Id. at 91. "[Ilt is ... true in many instances that jobs held mainly by women and
minorities pay less at least in part because they are held mainly by women and minorities."
Id. at 93 (emphasis in the original).
65. Although the Committee admitted that job evaluation plans contain built-in bi-
ases, it still encouraged their use as the only acceptable method of achieving pay equity.
Id. at 95-96. See also infra notes 98-100 and accompanying text.
66. UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN INSTITUTE FOR SOCIAL RESEARCH, PANEL STUDY OF IN-
COME DYNAMICS, FIVE THOUSAND FAMILIES: PATrERNS OF ECONOMIC PROGRESS (1978), re-
viewed by TIME FOR CHANGE, supra note 52, at 88-90.
67. Id. at 88.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 98. In 1981, over half the women with a college degree had incomes slightly
higher than the median for men completing the eighth grade. Id.
70. See, e.g., M. GOLD, supra note 25, at 3-19.
71. Time for Change, supra note 52, at 88.
72. Labor force attachment explains only 2% of the differences between white men
and white women and negatively influences the difference between white men and black




men with a high labor force attachment earn about as much as women
with lower attachment levels.
The panel found the single factor with the largest impact on the
wage gap was work history. Work history, along with the closely related
factor of years of training on the current job, accounted for 38% of the
wage gap for white women, 22% for black women, and 18% for black
men.74 Two elements in the work history category explained the largest
part of the gap: length of employment with the present employer and
years of training completed at the present job.
75
In theory, much of the wage gap may be explained by the fact that
women have less continuous employment than men. Women lose sen-
iority and acquisition of important skills by interrupting their work.
However, the study concluded that in reality, staying out of the work
force has little significant or direct impact on women's wages. 76 In fact,
white women with frequent work interruptions (two or more) earned
practically the same hourly wage as those women with similar work ex-
perience and fewer interruptions in employment.
77
Both the NAS study and the Michigan study enumerate several neu-
tral factors, such as age, education, training, job tenure, seniority, and
amount and location of work done, that affect the wage gap. Relevant
data acknowledge that a higher percentage of women work in part-time
jobs, 78 a lower percentage of women are union members, and that
men's work weeks are usually longer. 79 Even so, taking all these factors
into consideration, there is still an unexplained proportion of the wage
gap between men and women.8 0 The United States Labor Department
concluded that "[t]his unexplained difference can be attributed to sex
discrimination." 8' The NAS acknowledged the argument that the high
74. Id.
75. Id. at 90. On-the-job training explained 10% of the wage gap between white wo-
men and white men, and 15% for black men and white men. Years of continuous employ-
ment explained 12% of the gap for white women and 9% for black women. This is due to




78. Although it is true that women in the work force are more likely to work part-time
than men, it is important to note that there is no overall pay disparity with respect to part-
time work between men and women. Most men who work part-time are either between the
ages of 16 and 19 years old or over 55 years old. Whereas a large number of women
employed part-time are between the ages of 25 and 54. Labor statistics published by the
United States Department of Labor in 1982 indicated that women who work part-time
have achieved pay equity with men working part-time; both groups receiving about the
minimum wage. The difference in median hourly wages between full-time working men
and part-time working men was large-$6.25 and $3.20 respectively. Women's wages, on
the other hand, showed very little difference between full-time and part-time median
wages-$3.98 and $3.21 respectively. Unlike men, women receive approximately the min-
imum wage for the work they perform, regardless of whether it is full-time or part-time.
TIME FOR CHANGE, supra note 52, at 92-93 (citing U.S. DEP'T OF LAB., BUREAU OF LAB.
STATISTICS, EMPLOYMENT EARNINGS (March 1982)).
79. TIME FOR CHANGE, supra note 52, at 88.
80. Id. See also Pauley, supra note 36, at 167 (Neutral factors reduce the wage gap but
there is still a 34% unexplained differential between men and women in the work force).
81. TIME: FOR CHANGE, supra note 52, at 87.
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concentration of women in lower-paying jobs often results, in part, be-
cause women choose these jobs for a variety of reasons usually related to
family obligations.8 2 However, the NAS concluded that the high con-
centration of women in lower-paying jobs also results from "the exclu-
sionary practices of employers and from the systematic underpayment of
jobs held mainly by women."
8 3
The findings of the NAS and the United States Labor Department
not only support the actual existence of the wage gap but also bolster
the conclusion that sex-based discrimination is one of the primary
causes of the wage gap.
III. PROVING A TITLE VII WAGE DISCRIMINATION CLAIM
The Supreme Court's decision in Gunther affirmatively settled the
issue of whether Title VII applies to wage discrimination claims when
male and female jobs are dissimilar, but left unanswered how such
claims were to be proved.8 4 In order to promote Title VII's broad pro-
hibition of discriminatory employment practices,8 5 the standard Title
VII burdens and modes of proof should apply in the wage discrimina-
tion context as well.
8 6
There are two theories available to a plaintiff to prove a Title VII
case, disparate treatment and disparate impact.8 7 A disparate treatment
case involves a situation where an employer treats an individual pro-
tected by Title VII differently simply because of the person's minority
status, religion, or sex. A treatment case, unlike an impact case, necessi-
tates proving the employer's intent to discriminate. Such intent, how-
ever, can be inferred from circumstantial evidence.8 8 Once a plaintiff
has introduced evidence from which it appears more likely than not that
the defendant had an intent to discriminate, a prima facie treatment case
is established.8 9 An employer will be liable unless it can "articulate"
reasons which justify disparate treatment. 90 If an employer does articu-
late legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for disparate treatment, the
employee can then show that these reasons were merely a pretext to
82. WOMEN, WORK, AND WAGES, supra note 54, at 53-54.
83. Id. at 65.
84. The Gunther Court declined to determine what may constitute a prima facie case or
to lay down standards for litigation of the case on remand. On remand, the case settled
prior to trial for a $3,250 payment to four former jail matrons and $26,000 in attorney's
fees. See 954 GOV'T EMPL. REL. REP. (BNA) 33 (March 15, 1982).
85. As Congress itself has indicated, a "broad approach" to the definition of equal
employment opportunity is essential to overcoming and undoing the effect of discrimina-
tion. S. REP. No. 867, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 12 (1964).
86. Cf Note, Sex-Based Wage Discrimination Under Title VII Disparate Impact Doctrine, 34
STAN. L. REV. 1083 (1982) (disparate impact analysis should not be used in comparable
worth claims).
87. International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n.15 (1977).
88. Id. A pattern of treatment supports an inference of intentional discrimination
such as substantial disparaties in the rates of hire of minority as compared with nonmi-
nority groups. United States v. Hazlewood School Dist., 433 U.S. 299 (1977).
89. Mc1)onnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973).
90. Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981); McDon-
nell Douglas Corp., 411 U.S. at 802.
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hide bias. 9 '
In a disparate impact case, the plaintiff must show that some facially
neutral employment practice has a substantially disproportionate impact
upon a group protected by Title VII. 9 2 Under this theory, "practice,
procedures, or tests neutral in terms of intent, cannot be maintained if
they operate to 'freeze' the status quo of prior discriminatory employ-
ment practices." '9 3 Examples of such outwardly neutral employment
practices include height and weight requirements, 94 or certain types of
employment tests adversely affecting the job opportunities of those of
certain ethnic or cultural backgrounds. 95 Once a plaintiff has shown the
existence and impact of such a practice, the employer will be held liable
unless the practice can be justified by "business necessity."
96
A. Disparate Treatment Wage Discrimination Claims
The majority of wage discrimination cases decided to date have pro-
ceeded under a Title VII disparate treatment theory. In these cases, the
degree of similarity between men's and women's jobs is not considered
relevant; what is relevant is the fact that an employer intentionally set
women's wages lower than men's wages for jobs which are of equal
value to the employer. The courts have held that discriminatory intent,
in the wage discrimination setting, can be inferred from proof of sex-
based deviation from job evaluation studies and other traditional means
of proving Title VII discrimination.
9 7
1. Job evaluation studies as proof of disparate treatment
Job evaluation studies have been utilized in the employment setting
to compare, rank, and set wages for jobs, from as early as the 1940's by
the War Labor Board and consistently by courts and employers through
implementation of the Equal Pay Act.98 In a study ofjob evaluation sys-
91. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 411 U.S. at 804.
92. This theory was first articulated by ChiefJustice Burger in Griggs, 401 U.S. at 431.
93. Id. at 430.
94. See Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 (1977) (height and weight requirements
for prison guard positions disproportionately excluded 50% of the women from consider-
ation for employment, compared to 1% of the male population).
95. Griggs, 401 U.S. 424 (effect of non-job related testing and educational require-
ments was to deny employment opportunities to otherwise qualified blacks who, through-
out their lives, had been the victims of discriminatory educational systems).
96. id. at 43i.
97. Testimony by Winn Newman and Christine Owens before the United States Com-
mission on Civil Rights Consultation on Comparable Worth Panel on Legislative Perspec-
tive and Precedents, (June 6-7, 1984) [hereinafter cited as Testimony by Newman and
Owens]. Newman and Owens contended that a showing of sex discrimination in the ad-
ministration of various aspects of the employment relationship, such as discriminatory job
assignments and classifications, is evidence of sex-based wage discrimination. They also
supported the use of statistical evidence by itself or in conjunction with other types of
evidence to prove sex-based wage discrimination.
98. Under the Equal Pay Act, jobs are evaluated to determine if they are "substantially
similar" based on factors of skill, effort, responsibility, and similar working conditions. See
29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1).
The Supreme Court noted the importance ofjob evaluations in employment discrimi-
nation suits in Coming Glass, emphasizing that Congress' intent was "to incorporate into
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tems in the United States, the EEOC found four major types: 1) a rank-
ing system; 2) a classification system; 3) a factor comparison system; and
4) a point method approach. 99 Although there are several types of job
evaluation systems, almost all show a similar methodology: the first step
involves a careful description of each job within the unit being evaluated
(the entire firm, a particular plant, or a division within the plant); the
second step evaluates each job with respect to its "worth" to the organi-
zation, and ranks all the jobs accordingly; the third step uses the results
of the job evaluation in the setting of wage or salary rates. 100
Job evaluation results are useful, competent, and relevant evidence
in employment discrimination cases. 10 1 Sex-based deviation from job
evaluation studies in the establishment of wage rates is especially proba-
tive of intentional discrimination. Gunther,10 2 the only Supreme Court
decision which has mentioned the comparable worth theory, made it
clear that proof of intentional discrimination in violation of Title VII
could be inferred from an employer's deviation from job evaluation re-
sults.' 0 3 The case involved a dispute regarding a county's evaluation of
the worth of the jobs of female matrons and male guards at the county
jail. The county determined that female matrons should be paid 95% of
what male guards earned. Notwithstanding that determination, the fe-
males were compensated only at 70% of the male wage. The males, on
the other hand, were paid the full evaluated worth of their jobs.'0 4 The
Court recognized that a claim of discriminatory undercompensation
under Title VII could be proved by the failure of the county to pay the
female matrons their full evaluated wage rate.
10 5
The Third Circuit in International Union of Electrical Workers v. Westing-
house Electric Corp. ,106 has held that sex-based wage differentials would
violate Title VII where the employer deviated from job evaluation re-
sults along pronounced sex-based lines for jobs involving comparable,
rather than equal, work. Wage rates for jobs filled predominantly by
females were set lower than jobs filled predominantly by males despite
the fact that the jobs had been rated equally with respect to the knowl-
edge and training required, and the specific demands and responsibili-
ties of the job.'0 7 The court held that Westinghouse could not create
[the Equal Pay Act] the well-defined and well-accepted principles ofjob evaluation so as to
ensure that wage differentials based upon bona fide job evaluation plans would be outside
the purview of the Act." 417 U.S. at 201.
99. See NAT'L ACAD. OF Sci., JOB EVALUATION: AN ANALYTICAL REVIEW, INTERIM RE-
PORT TO THE EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, 39-48 (June 1979).
100. Id. See also A. COOK, supra note 8, at 13-14; D. THOMPSEN, Principlesfor Design and
Audit of Job Evaluation Plans in MANUAL ON PAY EQUITY 109 (J. Grune ed. 1980).
101. Cf Bellace, supra note 9, at 671-79 (a difficulty with litigating comparable worth
cases is judicial unfamiliarity with job evaluation and wage setting).
102. 452 U.S. 161. See also supra notes 45-49 and accompanying text.
103. 452 U.S. at 181.
104. Id. at 180-81.
105. Id. at 181.
106. 631 F.2d 1094 (3d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 967 (1981).
107. Id. at 1097. The particular wage structure challenged embodied a deliberately
discriminatory policy of an earlier plan which maintained sex-segregated wage scales. Id.
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job classifications whereby wages were paid to one group solely because
of considerations of religion, race, national origin or sex.
10 8
Two other cases demonstrate the propriety of using job evaluation
results as a test for comparing dissimilar jobs and setting wages. In
Briggs v. City of Madison, 10 9 the court set forth a prima facie case of Title
VII wage discrimination which comprised, inter alia, a job evaluation
study. The Court held that a plaintiff must show (1) she is a member of
a protected class, (2) occupying a sex-segregated job classification,
(3) that is paid less than, (4) a sex-segregated job classification occupied
by men, and (5) that the two job classifications at issue are so similar in
their requirements of skill, effort, and responsibility and in their working
conditions that it can reasonably be inferred that they are of comparable
value to an employer.' 10 And, in Connecticut Employees Association v. Con-
necticut,''' the court held that the state intentionally discriminates
against female employees in violation of Title VII when it pays female
employees at lower rates of compensation for work the state has deter-
mined to be of comparable or equal value to the work performed by
men.
The cases which have found job evaluations to be useful in wage
discrimination cases demonstrate that job evaluation studies have been
and can continue to be manageable in the courts. Furthermore, when
the employer has deviated from its own self-evaluation, the evidence of
intentional discrimination in setting wages is particularly compelling. If
the premise of these cases is that an employer is liable because it con-
ductedjob evaluations that compared job worth and found wage dispari-
ties based on sex, the question arises whether an employer can avoid
liability by simply not conducting any evaluations. 112 Such a practice
would run counter to Title VII's broad remedial purposes and should be
curbed. Commentators have raised two proposals which would en-
courage judicial use ofjob evaluation studies to ascertain Title VII viola-
tions in the absence of an employer conducted study.'13
First, a standard methodology for conducting job evaluations
should be established so that courts could takejudicial notice of the pro-
108. Id. The court stated the issue in the case was "whether Congress intended to per-
mit Westinghouse to willfully discriminate against women in a way in which it could not
discriminate against blacks or whites, Jews or Gentiles, Protestants or Catholics. Italians or
Irish, or any other group protected by [Title VIII." Id.
109. 536 F. Supp. 435 (1982).
110. Id. at 455. Although the plaintiffs, public health nurses, all of whom were women,
proved a prima facie case of discriminatory undercompensation in comparison to male
sanitarian workers, the court found that the defendants rebutted such proof and the plain-
tiffs failed to prove pretext.
111. 31 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 191 (D.C. Conn. 1983).
112. Some commentators state that "an increasing number of attorneys are advising
employer-clients, with some good reason, not to study their compensation systems at all or
to do so in utmost secrecy." Siniscalco & Remmers, Comparable WIorth in the Aftermath of
AFSCME v. State of Wash., 10-1 EMPLOYEE REL. L.J 6, 22 (1984).
113. See Failure to Adopt Comparable Worth Pay Plan After State Was on Notice of Discrimina-
tion, 115 LAB. REL. REP. ANALYSIS 1, 4 (January 2, 1984).
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cess; 114 courts would be less reluctant to adopt a comparable worth pol-
icy based on sophisticated well-tested job evaluation studies.
l 15
Although the research and methodology for a bias-free job evaluation
system are in the infant stage, 1 6 a common methodology can be devel-
oped from synthesizing a number of existing or proposed methodolo-
gies. Job evaluations have been used by practically every large employer
to evaluate the worth or grade level of job classifications.' 17 Some
eighty-five state and local governments either have studied or have actu-
ally implemented pay equity."18 The federal government requires a uni-
form classification system for all government employees. 119
Comparable worth legislation has been proposed in Congress which en-
courages the development and use of equitable job evaluation tech-
niques.12 0 These efforts to provide workable, independent, bias-free job
114. Id. at 4 (citing United Steelworkers of Amer. v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 198-99 n.l
(1979) ("Judicial findings of exclusion from crafts on racial grounds are so numerous as to
make such exclusion a proper subject for judicial notice.")).
115. It is recognized that courts are reluctant to assume the task of evaluating jobs and
setting wage rates. See Plemer v. Parsons-Gilbane, 713 F.2d 1127 (5th Cir. 1983) (court
refused to make an "essentially subjective" assessment of the value of the differing duties
of males and females in comparable jobs); Lemons, 620 F.2d at 229 ("[T]his would be a
whole new world for the courts, and until some better signal from Congress is received we
cannot venture into it."); Power v. Barry Cty., 539 F. Supp. 721, 726 (W.D. Mich. 1982)
("This court cannot, and will not, evaluate different jobs and determine their worth to an
employer or to society and then, on that basis alone, determine whether Title VII or the
Equal Pay Act as been violated.").
116. See Valez & Buitenbeck, Comparable Worth and the Union's Duty of Fair Representation,
10-1 EMPLOYEE REL. L.J. 31, 32-35 (1984).
117. Winn Newman, Statement to the Equal Pay Joint Committee of Iowa 6 (Nov. 17, 1982).
See also T. PATrERSON, JOB EVALUATION Xi (1972) ("Almost two thirds of the adult popula-
tion in the United States are pay graded by job evaluation schemes.").
118. To date, twenty states have adopted legislation defining pay equity in terms of
"comparable worth" or "equal value." Sixteen states apply comparable worth legislation
to all employees and four states apply it only to state employees.
The states with comparable worth legislation for all employees are: Alaska, Arkansas,
Georgia, Idaho, Kentucky, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Nebraska, North Dakota,
Oklahoma, Oregon, South Dakota, Tennessee, and West Virginia. See ALA. STAT. § 18-
80.220 (1981); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 81-624 (1976); GA. CODE §§ 34-5-1, 34-2-3 (1981);
IDAHO CODE § 44.1702 (1977); Ky. REV. STAT. § 337.423 (1979); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit.
28, § 628 (1964); MD. ANN. CODE art. 100, § 55A (1979); MASS. ANN. LAws ch. 149,
§ 105A (Michie/Law. Coop. 1976 & Supp. 1984); NEB. REV. STAT. § 48-1219 (1978); N.D.
CENT. CODE §§ 34-06.1-01, 34-06.1-03 (1980); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, § 198.1 (West.
Supp. 1983-84); OR. REV. STAT. § 652.220 (1983) (all employees), § 240.190 (1983) (state
employees); S.D. CODIFIED LAws ANN. § 60-12-15 (1978); TENN. CODE ANN. § 50-2-202
(1983); W. VA. CODE § 21-513-3 (1981). Four states, California, Minnesota, Montana, and
Washington, have comparable worth legislation for state employees only. See CAL. Gov.
CODE § 19827.2 (West Supp. 1984); MoNr. CODE ANN. §§ 2-18-208, -209, 39-3-104
(1983); WASH. REV. CODE §§ 41.06.150, 41.06.155 (Supp. 1984-85). For discussion of the
status of comparable worth in eight states, see A. CooK, supra note 8, at 32-66.
119. See Siniscalco & Remmers, Nonjudicial Developments in Comparable Worth, 10-2 EM-
PLOYEE REL. L.J. 222, 235 (1984) (citing Beyond Equal Payfor Equal Work, Bus. WK.,July 18,
1983, at 169).
Such studies of public employees have found a consistent wage disparity between
predominantly male and predominantly female jobs ranging from fifteen to
thirty-five percent. Studies in Connecticut, Washington, and Wisconsin prove a
twenty percent wage disparity based upon sex segregation in jobs requiring
equivalent skill, effort, and responsibility.
120. See S.1900, 98th Cong., Ist Sess. (1983). Senator Alan Cranston introduced the
Pay Equity Act of 1983 which would "require the executive branch to enforce applicable
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evaluation studies should be beneficial to the courts. Judicial notice of a
national standard for job evaluation studies would allow courts to infer
wage discrimination from an employer's situation with respect to an ob-
jective standard. 12'
A second proposal for judicial action when an employer decides not
to voluntarily conduct a job evaluation study urges that the courts treat
the employer's failure to conduct such a study as an indication of the
employer's belief that such a study would reveal that wage discrimina-
tion does in fact exist. 12 2 The courts could infer discriminatory intent
from the employer's failure to conduct a study and prima facie liability
under Title VII could be established. 12 3 Employers would therefore be
liable in two ways: first, if the result of a voluntarily conducted study
showed women were underpaid; and second, if the employer refused to
carry out such a study.' 24 Once a prima facie case of underpayment is
shown, an employer could avoid liability only by conducting a study
which shows that wages are properly adjusted for certain job
classifications. 1
25
equal employment opportunity laws and directives so as to promote pay equity and elimi-
nate wage-setting practices which discriminate on the basis of sex, race, or ethnicity and
result in discriminatory wage differentials." A provision of the Act discusses job evalua-
tion studies as follows:
Sec. 2(a) The Congress finds that-
(8) objective job evaluation techniques now exist which are utilized by
many public and private employers to determine the comparative value
of different jobs through a system which numerically rates the basic fea-
tures and requirements of a particularjob, and additional efforts should
be made to develop, improve, and implement these techniques so as to
help eliminate discriminatory wage-setting practices and wage
differentials.
129 CONG. REC. S13,095-101 (daily ed. September 28, 1983). See also H.R. 5092, 98th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1984), introduced by Rep. Mary Rose Oaker, which was designed to effec-
tuate pay equity for employees in the private and public sector alike. 130 CONG. REC.
H1426-27 (daily ed. March 8, 1984).
121. Testimony by Newman and Owens, supra note 97, at 23-24, explained how courts
could use job evaluation results in proving wage discrimination:
Analytically, the role of job evaluations in proving wage discrimination claims is
similar to the role of seniority or employee selection devices in other Title VII
contexts. All three form an objective backdrop against which employment related
decisions may be assessed to determine whether prohibited discrimination has
occurred. By way of example: if more senior blacks are routinely passed over for
advancement, while less senior whites obtain promotions, courts infer race dis-
crimination because on the basis of objective criterion, i.e.. seniority, blacks are
treated less favorably than whites. Similarly, if blacks who satisfy certain em-
ployee selection criteria are denied employment opportunities while whites do
not satisfy those criteria (or do not fare as well on them) obtain those opportuni-
ties, courts again infer discrimination. By the same token, where on the basis of
an objective job measure-i.e., skill, effort and responsibility-women's jobs
which are consistently rated equal to or higher than those of men nonetheless
carry a lower pay rate, it is reasonable to infer wage discrimination thereby shift-
ing to the employer the burden of justifying that differential.
122. See LAB. REL. REP., supra note 113, at 4.
123. Id. See, e.g., Taylor v. Charley Bros. Co., 25 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 602
(1981) (intent to discriminate inferred from failure to evaluate value of jobs).
124. LAB. REL. REP., supra note 113, at 4.
125. Id.
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B. Traditional Means of Proving Title VII Wage Discrimination Claims
Aside from the theory that job evaluation studies can provide pow-
erful evidence of wage discrimination, traditional means of proving dis-
crimination are equally effective in proving sex-based wage
discrimination. A showing of discriminatory job assignments, classifica-
tions or other practices in the administration of an employment relation-
ship provides circumstantial evidence of an intent to discriminate.
12 6
For example, in Taylor v. Charley Brothers Co.,127 the court inferred the
existence of the employer's discriminatory intent in setting women's
wage rates lower than men's, from proof that the employer maintained a
pattern and practice of classifying jobs by sex, hired and assigned jobs in
a segregated fashion, deprived women of full-time wages and seniority
rights by employing them on a "part-time" or "temporary basis," and
failed to undertake ajob evaluation study for determining values ofjobs.
The fact that the employer also did not pay men and women equal pay
for equal work was an additional demonstration of discriminatory
intent. 128
Similarly, in Fanegan-Grimms v. Library Association of Portland,129 a
prima facie case of disparate treatment in setting compensation was
proved by evidence of sex-based job segregation where female bookmo-
bile drivers were historically paid less than male delivery truck drivers.
Although the jobs were similar, a female bookmobile driver demon-
strated that even if she were "to achieve the highest pay scale in her
classification, she would still receive less pay than delivery truck drivers,
no matter how many years of seniority she achieved."'
3 0
Discriminatory intent, resulting in Title VII violations, has also been
inferred from the extremely low number of women who held manage-
ment positions in a corporation;' 3 ' from initial assignment discrimina-
tion and thereafter discrimination in promotions, transfers, and pay;'
3 2
and from maintaining sex-based classifications resulting in lower wages
for women. 1
33
Finally, statistical evidence of a pattern of treatment in an employ-
ment relationship should lead toward an inference of sex-based wage
discrimination. 134 In AFSCME v. State of Washington, 13 5 the district court
126. See Testimony by Newman and Owens, supra note 97, at Iba.
127. 25 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 602 (1981).
128. See Testimony by Newman and Owens, supra note 97, at 17 n.22, "Evidence of
Equal Pay violations is extremely compelling evidence of wage discrimination in other wo-
men's jobs. . . . [I]f an employer pays women less than men when they are performing
precisely the same job, then surely he will pay women less, because of their sex when jobs
differ."
129. 560 F. Supp. 486 (D. Or. 1983).
130. Id. at 494.
131. See Fitzgerald v. Sirloin Stockade, Inc., 624 F.2d 945 (10th Cir. 1980).
132. See Carpenter v. Stephen F. Justin State Univ., 706 F.2d 608 (5th Cir. 1983), reh'g
denied, 712 F.2d 1416 (5th Cir. 1983). Contra Brooks v. Ashtabula Cty. Welfare Dept., 717
F.2d 263 (6th Cir. 1983); Cox v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co., 585 F. Supp. 1143 (N.D.
Ala. 1984).
133. See Gerlach v. Michigan Bell Tel. Co., 501 F. Supp. 1300 (E.D. Mich. 1980).
134. See Testimony by Newman and Owens, supra note 97, at 10. Statistics are particu-
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found that the state had intentionally engaged in "institutional" and sys-
tematic discrimination in pay against state employees working in
predominantly or traditionally female jobs.' 36 The expert evidence in-
troduced by the plaintiffs showed a statistically significant inverse corre-
lation between sex and salary. 13 7 When jobs were controlled for skill,
effort, responsibility, and working conditions, so that only jobs of sub-
stantially equal value were compared, the monthly salary of the classifi-
cation decreased by $4.51 for every one percent increase in the female
population of the classification. 13 8 A one hundred percent female job
was paid, on average, $5,400 a year less than a one hundred percent
male job of equivalent value.139 Since the probability of such a relation-
ship occurring by chance is less than one in ten thousand, the court at-
tributed the difference in pay to discrimination.
140
The plaintiffs in AFSCME bolstered these showings with additional
discriminatory evidence based on occupational segregation and classifi-
cation of employees,' 4 ' Equal Pay Act violations, 14 2 wage disparities in
jobs requiring comparable skill levels, 14 3 sex-based deviations from job
evaluation measures in setting wage rates, 144 and admissions by state
officials of discriminatory practices.'
4 5
larly significant under the Title VII principles set forth by the Supreme Court in Teamsters:
"Statistics showing racial . . . imbalance are probative . . . because such imbalance is
often a telltale sign of purposeful discrimination, absent explanation, it is ordinarily to be
expected that nondiscriminatory . . . practices will in time result in more or less represen-
tative . . . evidence of long-lasting and gross disparity between them may be signifi-
cant. . . . In many cases the only available avenue of proof is the use of racial statistics to
uncover clandestine and covert discrimination." 431 U.S. at 339-40 n.20.
135. 578 F. Supp. 846 (W.D. Wash. 1983), appeal docketed, No. 84-3569 (9th Cir.).
136. 598 F. Supp. at 864.
137. Id. at 863.
138. Brief or Plaintiff of Proposed Findings of Fact and Law at 30, AFSCME v. State of
Wash., 578 F. Supp. 846 (W.D. Wash. 1983).
139. Brief, supra note 138, at 30.
140. Id. at 33.
141. The state placed classified advertisements in "male only" and "female only" col-
umns in the newspapers. Classification specifications indicated a preference for male or
female employees. 578 F. Supp. at 862-63.
142. Predominantly male jobs were consistently paid more than predominantly female
jobs requiring similar duties, i.e., barber and beautician, institution counselor and classifi-
cation counselor, and duplication service supervisor and data processing supervisor.
Brief, supra note 138, at 12.
!43. Regardless of entry-level requirements for jobs, male jobs at all levels paid more
than female jobs with the same requirements. Male entry-level jobs were paid 16% more
than female entry-level jobs requiring no high school education, 22% more for high
school graduates, 19% more for one year of college, and 13% more for two years of busi-
ness college. Brief, supra note 138, at 31.
144. A series of job evaluation studies updated yearly reflected an increasing across-
the-board disparity (20%-32%) between predominantly male and predominantly female
jobs which required an equivalent composite of skill, effort, responsibility, and working
conditions. No action was taken to correct the situation and only on the eve of trial did the
state pass legislation calling for a 10-year phase-in to correct its discriminatory wage situa-
tion. 578 F. Supp. at 862-63.
145. Successive state governors, personnel boards, and the Governor's Affirmative Ac-
tion Committee admitted that job evaluation studies showed discrimination in compensa-
tion. Id. at 860-62.
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B. Disparate Impact Wage Discrimination Claims
A second means of proving a sex-based wage discrimination claim is
through application of the traditional Title VII disparate impact doc-
trine. Although some comparable worth advocates discourage the use
of the disparate impact principle for comparable worth litigation,
14 6
foresaking this judicial vehicle would work the demise of the comparable
worth doctrine.
One of the problems perceived with implementing a disparate im-
pact theory for Title VII wage discrimination claims is that this theory of
discrimination focuses on the effect of, and not motivation for, an em-
ployer's policy. 14 7 The reasons why an employer has pursued a given
policy are irrelevant; use of the challenged practice is unlawful unless its
continued use is necessary to the employer's legitimate interest and no
less discriminatory alternatives would meet the employer's needs.14 8 A
literal interpretation of the Equal Pay Act's fourth affirmative defense,
incorporated into Title VII by the Bennett Amendment, 14 9 departs from
this approach. If an employer's practice of setting women'g wages lower
than men's is based on any "factor other than sex," the practice with-
stands an Equal Pay Act or Title VII challenge. It has been argued that
this literal interpretation provides an absolute defense to claims of sex-
based wage discrimination under a disparate impact approach.
150
Notwithstanding this argument, claims of comparable worth should
be brought under the disparate impact theory' 5 1 because the majority of
female workers suffering from covert wage discrimination are unable to
146. See Note, supra note 86, at 1101 ("Although comparable worth impact claims ad-
vance the Title VII policies which the judicially created disparate impact doctrine serves,
they intrude further into employer prerogative and labor-management relations than Con-
gress intended."); Gould, The Supreme Court's Labor and Employment Docket in the 1980 Term:
Justice Brennan 's Term, 53 U. Colo. L. Rev. 1, 66 (1981) (Gunther conclusively denies a wage-
impact claim under either Title VII or the Equal Pay Act); cf. Blumrosen, Wage Discrimina-
tion, Job Segregation, and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 12 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 397,
428-57 (1979) (proof of sex-based job segregation establishes a prima facie Title VII
claim); Comment, Equal Pay for Comparable Work, 15 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 475 (1980)
(proof of unequal average salaries of male and female workers establishes a disparate im-
pact claim).
147. Bellace, supra note 9, at 686.
148. See supra notes 92-96 and accompanying text.
149. 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1). See supra notes 41-48 and accompanying text.
150. See Gould, supra note 70, at 63-74.
151. The following are proposed as the essential elements to a prima facie case of com-
parable worth using the disparate impact approach:
(i) the plaintiff represents workers in a job category which is predominantly
female;
(ii) the employer also employs workers in a job category which is not dominated
by female workers and which requires
(a) comparable work or
(b) substantially similar minimum qualifications of applicants for employ-
ment; and
(iii) workers of plaintiff's job category receive less pay pursuant to the em-
ployer's pay scale.
See Johnson, The Prima Facie Case of Comparable Worth, II OHio N.U.L. REv. 37, 52 (1984).
See also Bellace, supra note 9, at 687 (suggesting a modified disparate impact litigation
model which would require the plaintiff to prove that an evaluation or wage-setting pro-
cess, which is sex neutral on its face, operates to depress the wage rate for women's jobs).
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prove their claims under the disparate treatment theory. 152 Outlawing
only those wages factors openly labeled "sex-based" would allow em-
ployers to segregate jobs by sex and discriminatorily assign values to
those held by women, taking precautions only to avoid explicit use of
sex in assigning those values. Moreover, employers could use market
conditions to establish wages. This practice would fall short of mean-
ingful intent, but would perpetuate the devaluation of female jobs in the
market which results, to some extent, from past discrimination. 153 To
effectuate the remedial scheme of Title VII, no showing of intentional
discrimination should be necessary for women to challenge a purport-
edly neutral practice which discriminatorily determines their wages.
The use of market conditions to set wages is an example of a pur-
portedly "neutral" policy which could be challenged under a Title VII
disparate impact claim. 154 It is argued, however, that Title VII's reme-
dial purpose is not so broad as to make a present employer liable for
employment practices of others or for existing market conditions.
155
For example, in Christensen v. Iowa,15 6 the Eighth Circuit stated it did not
interpret "Title VII as requiring an employer to ignore the market in
setting wage rates for genuinely different work classifications."1 5 7 A dis-
parate impact claim was rejected and the employer was allowed to main-
tain a practice of paying clerical workers, who were exclusively female,
less than the amount it paid physical plant workers, who were predomi-
nantly male. The jobs were of equal value to that employer, but did not
command an equal price in the labor market.
158
In Lemons v. City and County of Denver, 15 9 several city-employed
nurses sued in a class action to require the city to pay them the same as
other employees with jobs of comparable value. The city had set its pay
scale according to the market wages of nurses in the community.160 The
nurses argued that their depressed wages were a product of past atti-
tudes and practices; historically nurses were underpaid because their
work was undervalued and because they were almost exclusively wo-
men.161 A market-based pay scale for nurses would perpetuate these
imbalances. Although the gross disparity between wages of nurses and
wages of employees in different jobs of comparable worth evidenced a
152. See Pauley, supra note 36, at 176. Only if the definition of "intent" were given a
more expansive construction to include those acts that are prompted by subconscious be-
liefs regarding the value of women's work, could a disparate treatment theory embrace
such covert discrimination. Id.
153. See infra notes 179-85 and accompanying text.
154. See, e.g., AFSCME v. State of Wash., 578 F. Supp. 846 (W.D. Wash. 1983).
155. See Briggs v. City of Madison, 536 F. Supp. 435, 445 (W.D. Wis. 1982).
156. 563 F.2d 353 (8th Cir. 1977).
157. Id. at 356.
158. The plaintiffs argued that reliance upon prevailing wage rates in determining pay
scales served to carry over the effects of long-standing discriminatory practices in the local
job market, which channeled women workers into a small number of jobs, resulted in an
over-supply of workers and depressed wages in those jobs. Id. at 355-56.
159. 620 F.2d 228 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 888 (1980).
160. Id. at 229.
161. Id.
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disparate impact which affected women, the Tenth Circuit summarily
disposed of the claim.1
62
A similar approach to a wage discrimination claim under a disparate
impact doctrine was recently rejected by the Ninth Circuit in Spaulding v.
University of Washington.16 s The court first rejected the predominantly
female nursing faculty's claim of discriminatory underpayment under
the Equal Pay Act and under a Title VII disparate treatment claim. Re-
fusing to infer intent "merely from the existence of wage differences
between jobs that are only similar,"164 the court also rejected a "compa-
rability plus" test which would determine whether discriminatory ani-
mus existed. 1
65
In addition to rejecting the disparate treatment claim, the court de-
nied the nursing faculty's disparate impact claim. The plaintiffs showed
a wage disparity between comparable jobs and showed that the disparate
impact on women was caused by the university's facially neutral policy
or practice of setting wages according to market rates. The court stated
that the disparate impact model was not available to establish a wide-
ranging claim of wage disparity between only comparable jobs. 166 Find-
ing that an employer's reliance on competitive market prices to set
wages does not qualify as a facially neutral policy or practice, the court
noted that employers "deal with the market as a given, and do not mean-
ingfully have a 'policy' about it in the relevant Title VII sense.167
The rationale employed by the courts which have accepted a market
defense and which have rejected a disparate impact theory of liability for
Title VII wage discrimination claims exemplifies the attitude which the
disparate impact doctrine seeks to remedy. 16 8 The social purposes fur-
thered by the disparate impact doctrine should be recognized by the
courts in wage discrimination cases.
First, disparate impact checks covert intentional discrimination. 16 9
Once the Equal Pay Act came into effect, it was evident that overt, sex-
based wage discrimination would subside. As one commentator stated,
"[b]ut whether such practices would be eradicated or merely driven un-
162. Id
163. 740 F.2d 686 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 511 (1984).
164. Id. at 700.
165. Id. The "comparability plus" test required only some degree ofjob comparability
plus some combination of factors including direct and circumstantial evidence of discrimi-
natory conduct and pay disparities. The nursing faculty argued that it would be a sliding
scale where the "plus" factors vary in inverse proportion to the degree of comparability
shown.
166. Id. at 706.
167. Id. at 708. Although the majority disposes of a disparate impact claim, Judge
Schroeder, in a concurring opinion, points out that the nursing faculty never attempted to
show that any of the facially neutral practices of which it complained had a disparate im-
pact on women. She criticizes the majority's analysis as "confusingly mesh[ing] adverse
impact with varying concepts of comparable worth." Thus, she asserts, it is not possible
for the majority "to render any definitive ruling on the validity of comparable worth." Id.
at 710.
168. See generally Lerner, Employment Discrimination: Adverse Impact, Validity and Equality,
1979 Sup. CT. REV. 17 (discussing Griggs and Dothard).
169. See Note, supra note 86, at 1089.
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derground is another question."' 70 Using disparate impact doctrine as
a means to eliminate covert discrimination is especially important in the
setting of wages because, as the Supreme Court has noted, "more often
than not people do not act in a totally arbitrary manner, without any
underlying reasons, especially in a business setting."'
Second, the disparate impact doctrine alleviates present harm
caused by historical discrimination which cannot be traced to a single
purposeful discriminatory act. 172 Traditionally, society has underval-
ued women's work; the present wage situation aggravates the already
disadvantaged social position of women.1 73 To correct present pay dis-
parities which reflect past discrimination, the impact doctrine would al-
low a plaintiff to demonstrate that she represents workers in a sex-
segregated job who receive lower wages than workers performing work
which is comparable, 174 without having to establish the original "blame-
worthy" act. 1
75
Finally, recognizing a disparate impact claim for sex-based wage
discrimination cases will prevent future remote discrimination.1 76 This
rationale has been discussed primarily in the context cf remedying the
effects of past race discrimination. Specifically, it is recognized that the
injury inflicted by historical discrimination "can place its victims at a dis-
advantage in a variety of future endeavors, and discrimination can also
perpetuate itself by altering the social environment to harm new genera-
tions of victims.' 7 7 Bold enforcement of Title VII will reduce the gap
in job prestige for women and will reduce future prejudice.1
7 8
In order to implement the social policies furthered by the disparate
impact doctrine, the market defense used in Title VII wage discrimina-
tion claims should be rejected. The use of market conditions to estab-
lish wages is not an inherently bad practice, but it must be prohibited
170. Bellace, supra note 9, at 688.
171. Furnco Constr. Co. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 577 (1978).
172. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 430 (citing inferior education in segregated schools as one rea-
son why blacks were less likely to pass the employer's tests).
173. See Perry, The Disproportionate Impact Theory of Racial Discrimination, 125 U. PA. L.
REV. 540, 558 n.99 (1977). See also M. Griffiths, Can We Still Afford Occupational Segregation?
Some Remarks in WOMEN AND THE WORKPLACE 7-14 (M. Blaxall, B. Reagan eds. 1976) for a
discussion of the argument which men have used to claim the best jobs and the most pay:
men are breadwinners and women are wives or widows; men provide necessary incomes
for their families, but women do not; women and families are supported by men, not wo-
men. The author points out that the supposition is not true, women work because of
economic need, just as men do. Two-thirds of all women workers are either single, di-
vorced, widowed, or separated, or have husbands who earn less than $7,000 per year. Id.
at 7-9.
174. See supra note 151.
175. See Note, supra note 86, at 1090.
176. Brest, supra note 173, at 43.
177. Brest, The Supreme Court 1975 Term-Forward: In Defense of the Antidiscriminative Prin-
ciple, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1, 31 (1976); see also Quarles v. Philip Morris, Inc., 279 F. Supp. 505
(D.C. Va. 1968) (differences in compensation which result from earlier hiring discrimina-
tion against a protected group for protected jobs are prohibited by Title VII).
178. See generally J. Bernard, The Historical Roots of Occupational Segregation in WOMEN AND
THE WORKPLACE (M. Blaxall, B. Reagan eds. 1976) 87, 93 (suggestions for occupational
nonsegregation and a sex-fair distribution of work).
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when market conditions do not reflect the true value of thejob.17 9 Title
VII does not require employees to ignore the interaction of supply and
demand, it simply prohibits the use of the market as justification for per-
petuating sex-based wage discrimination. For example, Title VII and
public policy prohibit employers from using the high unemployment
rate of blacks to justify paying black workers less than white workers. 180
The oversupply of black workers is no defense to discrimination. Con-
sequently, employers must also be prohibited from using the same mar-
ket argument to exploit women workers.' 8 ' The argument that fails in
race discrimination cases cannot succeed in sex discrimination cases.
Setting wage rates as a result of market conditions, in effect, means
that each employer will pay only what other employers are willing to
pay. 18 2 When the market rate reflects discriminatory factors, then the
market defense will only perpetuate discrimination by transferring it
from one employer to another.' 83 Market wages should not be the only
standard used to judge the relative worth of jobs. 184 In order to end
wage discrimination, be it sex or race, policy intervention is necessary to
alter the market outcome.' 8 5
An employer's reliance on the market rate to determine wage rates
for women workers was rejected as a defense to Equal Pay Act violations
by the Supreme Court over a decade ago. 186 In Coming Glass, the
Supreme Court explicitly established that the market is not a factor
other than sex. Courts have continued to find that the market is not a
defense to sex-based wage discrimination under the Equal Pay Act.' 8 7
Because the Equal Pay Act's affirmative defenses are incorporated into
Title VII, Coming Glass and the case law addressing the market defense
should have equal vitality in Title VII litigation. There is no legal justifi-
cation for denying the market defense in Equal Pay Act cases while ac-
cepting it in Title VII cases.
Although pre-Gunther cases accepted market conditions as a factor
179. Pauley, supra note 36, at 186.
180. Testimony by Newman and Owens, supra note 97, at 36.
181. Id.
182. Statements on Pay Equity Before the Joint Econ. Comm., 98th Cong. 2d Sess. (1984)
(statement by Brian Turner, Nat'l Comm. on Pay Equity at G-7 [hereinafter cited as State-
ments on Pay Equity].
183. Id. See also WOMEN, WORK, AND WAGES, supra note 54, at 60 ("By use of the 'going
wage' as a standard to set pay rates the wages of a (non-discriminating) firm will be biased
by the discrimination of other firms in the market.").
184. WOMEN, WORK, AND WAGES, supra note 54, at 65.
185. Id.
186. Corning Glass, 417 U.S. 188. See also supra notes 30-36 and accompanying text.
187. See Laffey v. Northwest Airlines, 567 F.2d 429 (D.C. Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 434
U.S. 1086 (1978), where the Court of Appeals stated: "This evidence leads convincingly
to the conclusion that the contrast in pay is a consequence of the historical willingness of
women to accept inferior financial awards for equivalent work-precisely the outmoded
practice which the Equal Pay Act sought to eradicate." See also Hodgson v. Brookhaven
Gen. Hosp., 436 F.2d 719, 726 (5th Cir. 1970) ("Clearly the fact that the employer's bar-
gaining power is greater with respect to women than with respect to men is not the kind of
factor . . . Congress had in mind.").
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other than sex in Title VII disparate impact cases, 188 recent cases have
rejected it. 189 In Norris v. Arizona Governing Committee,190 the Ninth Cir-
cuit rejected sex-segregated actuarial tables in deferred compensation
plans and ordered the state to pay female retirees benefits equal to those
paid to similarly situated male retirees. The state argued that such plans
reflect limits in the marketplace and constituted a restriction not of the
state's making.191 The court, in rejecting this argument, stated: "Title
VII has never been construed to allow an employer to maintain a dis-
criminatory practice merely because it reflects the marketplace ... .1192
The Supreme Court affirmed the Ninth Circuit decision 19 3 holding
that it would be inconsistent with Title VII to find that an employer, who
adopts a discriminatory fringe benefit plan, can avoid liability on the
ground that all plans in the open market are discriminatory. The Court
stated that an employer who confronts such a situation must either sup-
ply the fringe benefit himself, free from market discrimination, or not
provide it at all.
194
In cases other than where the market is used as a defense, purport-
edly "neutral" employer policies affecting wages have been successfully
challenged under a Title VII disparate impact theory. In a race-based
wage discrimination claim, a disparate impact theory was used to chal-
lenge an employer's classification and pay scheme. Black employees in
Kirby v. Colony Furniture Co.,195 claimed that an employer's use of a
"leadman" classification resulted in wage discrimination against them
since leadmen were predominantly white. Approximately 60% of the
higher paid leadmen positions were held by white employees; the work
force from which they were chosen was 80% black. Recognizing that the
additional duties required of leadmen were insignificant, 196 the plaintiffs
argued that the employer classified the leadman position as a manage-
ment position to enable the employer to pay white employees more than
black employees for comparable work. The Eighth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals recognized that the challenge to the classification scheme stated a
cause of action for wage discrimination under the disparate impact
theory.
Similarly, the disparate impact analysis has been used to challenge
purportedly "neutral" employment policies causing sex-based wage dis-
188. Sep Lemons v. City and Cty. of Denver. 620 F.2d 228 (10th Cir. 1980): Christensen
v. Iowa, 563 F.2d 353 (8th Cir. 1977).
189. Contra Briggs v. City of Madison, 536 F. Supp. 435 (W.D. Wis. 1982).
190. 671 F.2d 330 (9th Cir. 1982).
191. Id. at 335.
192. Id.
193. 463 U.S. 1073 (1983). The Court affirmed the judgment of the Court of Appeals
with regard to the violation of Title VII, but reversed, in part. the holding applying retro-
active relief.
194. Id. at 1083.
195. 613 F.2d 696 (8th Cir. 1980).
196. As the evidence in the record about the supervisory nature of the leadman posi-
tion was highly contradictory, the Eighth Circuit remanded the case to the district court to
determine the extent of the leadman's responsibilities. Id. at 701.
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crimination. In Kouba v. Allstate Insurance Co., 1 9 7 a Title VII equal pay
case, it was argued that a company's method of computing wages consti-
tuted unlawful sex discrimination where a minimum salary guaranteed
to starting employees was based, in part, on the employee's prior salary.
A result of the practice was that, on the average, the female employees
made less than their male counterparts. The court expressed concern
that using a factor such as prior salary to set wages could easily be
manipulated by employers to capitalize on the unfairly low salaries his-
torically paid to women. 198 It held that "an employer thus cannot use a
factor which causes a wage differential between male and female em-
ployees absent an acceptable business reason." 199
In Wambheim v. J. C. Penney Co. ,200 the Court held that the disparate
impact analysis was appropriate in an action alleging that an employer's
medical insurance policy discriminated against women with respect to
compensation. The court found that the employer's "head-of-house-
hold" rule allowing dependent coverage for a spouse only if the em-
ployee earned more than half of the couple's combined income, had a
disparate impact on women, most of whom were in low-paying
positions.
Finally, in AFSCME, a disparate impact claim was allowed to chal-
lenge the state's policy of paying female job classifications twenty per-
cent less than employees in predominantly male job classifications that
required an equivalent or lesser composite of skill, effort, responsibility,
and working conditions.
20 1
Allowing the Title VII disparate impact doctrine in wage discrimina-
tion cases does not call for a novel approach to Title VII. Rather, em-
ployers merely are held liable for acts of overt and covert discrimination.
The eradication of sex-based wage discrimination should involve appli-
cation of traditional Title VII burdens, standards, and means of proof
which have successfully gained a foothold in the elimination of discrimi-
nation in other contexts.
IV. ARGUMENTS AGAINST COMPARABLE WORTH
Comparable worth has received considerable attention lately from
Congress, state legislatures, and labor unions. 20 2 Advocates rest wo-
197. 691 F.2d 873 (9th Cir. 1982).
198. Id. at 876. See also Neely v. MARTA, 641 F.2d 877 (5th Cir. 1981) (disparate im-
pact analysis applied to company rule requiring prior management approval for starting
salaries of employees that exceeded their prior salary by 10%); Futran v. RING Radio Co.,
501 F. Supp. 734 (N.D. Ga. 1980) (expressing concern that the use of prior salary would
perpetuate the traditionally lower salaries paid to women).
199. 691 F.2d at 876.
200. 705 F.2d 1492 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 3544 (1984).
201. 578 F. Supp. 846 (W.D. Wash. 1983). See also supra notes 135-45 and accompany-
ing text.
202. Comparable worth has received very little attention from the EEOC under the
Reagan Administration. This marks a drastic change from action by the EEOC under the
Carter Administration which filed an amicus curiae brief in Gunther, brought many lawsuits,
and commissioned the NAS study on comparable worth. The Reagan Administration has
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men's economic survival on the adoption of a comparable worth
scheme. Opponents charge that nationwide adoption of comparable
worth will be costly and disruptive to the free market system.
A. Market Justifications
Comparable worth opponents argue that the free market system will
be disrupted if a comparable worth system is established because wages
are determined by the interaction of neutral forces of the supply of
workers and the demand for their skills. 20 3 However, it has been argued
that the factors of supply and demand have little, if any, impact on
predominantly female occupations. 20 4 Cited as support for this propo-
sition is the long-term nurse shortage where salaries did not rise to
match the unmet demand for nurses. Rather than pay American nurses
a fair wage, hospitals resorted to recruiting nurses from the Philippines
who would gladly accept depressed wages.
20 5
The claim that new social reforms will destroy the American free
market system has been espoused at various times throughout the his-
tory of labor legislation. For example, in the 1880's Massachusetts em-
ployers testified that a new piece of legislation would destroy the
employer-employee relationship, cause chaos in production, force em-
ployees to relocate their businesses in areas where the legislation was
more favorable, and lead to the spread of socialism.20 6 This portentous
legislation was the Child Labor Law, which prohibited children from
working more than eight hours a day.
Interference in the free market system to achieve important social
goals has been a common congressional practice. This is illustrated by
legislative efforts to protect laborers in a variety of ways through child
labor laws, health laws, minimum wage laws, and equal pay laws. Simi-
larly, unions attempt to circumvent the free market system to achieve
their goals. By engaging in collective bargaining, these organizations
directly influence the wages paid to their members rather than relying
solely on the neutral forces of supply and demand.
The United States does not have an unfettered market system. The
fact that comparable worth opponents cling to market conditions as jus-
tification for denying comparable worth claims merely camouflages sex-
based wage discrimination.
recently taken a strong stand to defeat comparable worth. See Siniscalco & Remmers, supra
note 119, at 223. Recently, the EEOC has been the object of a frontal attack by Congress
for its inaction in sex-based wage discrimination claims other than straight Equal Pay Act
cases. See HOUSE COMM. ON GoV'T OPERATIONS, Pay Equity: EEOC's Handling of Sex-Based
Wage Discrimination Complaints, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984).
203. See, e.g., J. O'NEILL, An Economic Perspective: An Argument Against Comparable Worth,
supra note 4, at 27; Comparable Worth-Part 1: A Theory With No Facts, BACKGROUNDER,
March 2, 1984.
204. Statements on Pay Equity, supra note 186 (citing E. BRANDERS, 4 HISTORY OF LABOR
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B. Cost Justifications
The cost of correcting sex-based wage discrimination cited by em-
ployers20 7 does not justify the cost of discrimination to the individual
and society.20 8 So great are the disparities between men's and women's
current wage rates, that employers are concerned that the establishment
of equity will be too burdensome for the economy to bear.
20 9
Congress has never placed a price tag on the cost of correcting dis-
crimination in employment.2 10 In enacting the Pregnancy Discrimina-
tion Act of 1978 under Title VII, 211 Congress acknowledged that
requiring employers to cover pregnancy on the same terms as other dis-
abilities would raise their total costs by approximately $200 million, but
discussed this factor and determined that the Act was necessary "to clar-
ify [the] original intent" of Title VII.
2 12
Similarly, in Los Angeles Department of Water & Power v. Manhart,
2 13
the Supreme Court stated that the cost of correcting discrimination is no
justification for violating title VII. 214 The Court rejected the city's argu-
ment that the costs of equal treatment in employee retirement plans
would be too great and found that the city was not justified in charging
women more than men for pension premiums. In Newport News Ship-
building & Dry Dock Co. v. EEOC,2 15 the Supreme Court stated that
although the cost of providing complete health insurance coverage for
the dependents of male employees, including pregnant wives, might ex-
207. See, e.g., AFSCME, 578 F. Supp. at 867. The state argued that the tremendous
costs involved, lack of revenue in a depressed economy, and prior state revenue commit-
ments were reasons why injunctive relief to correct wage discrimination should be denied.
208. See generally Sawhill, Discrimination and Poverty Among Women Who Head Families in
WOMEN AND THE WORKPLACE 201 (M. Blaxall, B. Reagan eds. 1976) (labor market discrimi-
nation and occupational segregation are factors which contribute to the poverty level of
families headed by women; the elimination of sex discrimination alone would improve
their economic status and there would be far less poverty and welfare dependency among
these families).
209. See S. MITCHELL, Comparable Worth: Unchartered & Treacherous Waters, supra note 4, at
51-57. The commentator states:
• . . [C]omparable worth is unnecessary, ill-conceived, premature, vague and
unintelligible, and it will impose an enormous burden on employers, taxpayers
and unions with currently productive collective bargaining relationships. One in-
dication of the cost is the federal court judgment [AFSCME] handed down in
December, 1983 against the State of Washington on an intentional sex-discrimi-
nation theory. Commentators have estimated that back pay in that case could
amount to $500 million, while estimates for pay adjustments necessary to comply
with the judge's notion of comparable worth may amount to another $5 million.
In Illinois, a similar judgment would require a 1% increase in the individual State
income tax, or $300.00 more on taxes for a family with an income of $30,000.00.
Applied to private employers, no reliable estimates of costs exist, but they would
be considerably larger.
Id. at 57.
210. Pauley, supra note 36, at 186.
211. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k).
212. H.R. REP. No. 948, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 4, 9 (1978), reprinted in U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEws 4749 (1978).
213. 435 U.S. 702, 716-17 (1978).
214. Id. "That argument might prevail if Title VII contained a cost-justification defense
comparable to the affirmative defense in a price discrimination suit. But neither Congress
nor the courts have recognized such a defense under Title VII." Id.
215. 462 U.S. 669 (1983).
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ceed the cost of preventing such coverage for the dependents of female
employees, no such cost justification is recognized under Title VII once
discrimination has been shown.2 16 And, in Liberles v. County of Cook,
2 17
the Seventh Circuit stated: "The desire, however laudable, of county
and state employers to save money does not bear a manifest relationship
to the . . . compensation of predominantly female job classifications."
The argument that remedying disparate treatment and impact
would impose heavy costs on institutions and individuals was also re-
jected in the race discrimination context with respect to suspension of
voting tests, invalidating employment tests, and massive busing reme-
dies for school segregation. 2  Similarly, the prohibitive costs of elimi-
nating sex-based wage discrimination should not be used to justify
denying female employees their full Title VII rights.
V. CONCLUSION
The time has come to recognize the comparable worth theory as an
appropriate vehicle for proving sex-based wage discrimination under Ti-
tle VII. Comparable worth claims are entitled to the same remedies as
any other Title VII claim and should be analyzed under both disparate
treatment and disparate impact.
The time has come to acknowledge that the wage gap does exist and
results, in part, from the historical devaluation and segregation of wo-
men's work. Although non-discriminatory factors affect the wage gap,
there still remains a significant portion of the gap that cannot be attrib-
uted to any factor. Logic demands the acknowledgment that this unex-
plained differential results from sex-based discrimination. In order to
eradicate sex-based discrimination, job evaluation studies must be used
to determine the size of the unexplained differential within each individ-
ual organization.
The time has come to move forward toward equality for women.
No longer can we continue to have a national policy forbidding employ-
ment discrimination while at the same time protecting employers in
their efforts to pay women unequal wages for work of comparable or
equal value. Women are calling for a uniform policy-one that prohibits
sex-based discrimination in the same breadth as race-based discrimina-
tion and makes no remedial distinctions. We have the tool-Title VII
expressly prohibits employment discrimination based on race and sex
classifications. All that is needed is the courage to take the next step
toward pay equity for all working women.
Diana Fields
Kathryn Morrison
216. See also 29 C.F.R. § 1604.9(e) (1982) ("It shall not be a defense under Title VII to
a charge of sex discrimination in benefits that the cost of such benefits is greater with
respect to one sex than the other.").
217. 709 F.2d 1122 (7th Cir. 1983).
218. See Brest, supra note 173, at 36-43, for a discussion of the benefits and costs of
eliminating racially disproportionate impact.
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In recent years, courts in many states have adopted tort and con-
tract legal theories reversing, in whole or in part, the common law rule
of "at will employment." One theory is the "public policy" doctrine,
under which a terminated employee may obtain legal and equitable re-
lief from a former employer when his discharge violates a precept of
public policy. Courts have-in a few unfortunate cases-accepted such
claims when the public policy involved was employment discrimination
prohibited by federal and state fair employment statutes. In such in-
stances, terminated employees have improperly been afforded both stat-
utory and common law relief. These cases contradict the very rationale
for the "public policy" theory, and seriously interfere with the remedial
processes provided by the statutes. There are strong public policies
militating against the application of the "public policy" theory to em-
ployment discrimination cases. This article will analyze these recent
public policy cases and the countervailing public policies calling for their
renunciation.
I. THE COMMON LAW RULE
Under the traditional "at will employment" rule, it was firmly estab-
lished that, when a private sector employer hired an employee to work
for an indefinite period of time, and the employee did not have a con-
tract limiting the circumstances under which he could be discharged, the
employer was free to terminate the employee at any time, without legal
liability, for good cause, bad cause, or no reason at all, in the absence of
an express statutory prohibition. ' The rule has been applied to "perma-
nent" workers, 2 "lifetime" employees, 3 and workers hired for employ-
ment until retirement election.
4
* Partner, Sherman & Howard, Denver, Colorado; J.D., University of Colorado,
B.S., Boston University.
1. See, e.g., Spivey v. Watkins Motor Lines, Inc., 115 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 3407 (S.D. Ga.
1984); Black v. Standard Oil Co., 115 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 3076 (N.D. Ohio 1983); Maguire v.
American Family Life Ass. Co., 442 So.2d 321 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983); Silver v. Mohasco
Corp., 94 A.D.2d 820, 462 N.Y.S.2d 917, 919 (N.Y. App. Div. 1983).
2. See, e.g., Muller v. Stromberg Carlson Corp., 427 So. 2d 266 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1983).
3. See, e.g., Forrer v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 36 Wis. 2d 388, 153 N.W.2d 587 (1967).
4. See, e.g., Ohio Table Pad Co. v. Hogan, 424 N.E.2d 144 (Ind. Ct. App. 1981).
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Historically, discharged workers have asserted numerous theories
in civil actions against their former employers attempting to circumvent
the at will employment rule. For example, workers protected by statutes
authorizing civil relief have sought redress for wrongful termination.
5
Further, some employees have asserted that the at will employment rule
is inapplicable because they had agreements, written or verbal, with
their employers for work for a fixed period of time, calling for "just
cause" termination. 6 Others have alleged that their employment agree-
ments contained express or implied provisions that they would be em-
ployed so long as they satisfactorily performed the services expected of
them, protecting them from discharge for reasons other than good faith
dissatisfaction by the employer. 7 Some plaintiffs have asserted that their
employers covenanted to discharge the employee only for just cause.
8
Finally, some have contended that they were improperly discharged
without just cause because they provided the employer with considera-
5. Statutory prohibitions include Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as
amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1982) (discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin); Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, as amended, 29 U.S.C.
§§ 621-634 (1982) (discrimination based on age for persons age 40-70); Labor Manage-
ment Relations Act, as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1982) (discrimination to en-
courage or discourage membership in any labor organization); Fair Labor Standards Act,
as amended, 29 U.S.C. §§ 215(a)(3) & 216(b) (1982) (discrimination against any employee
because of assertion of rights under FLSA); Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970,
29 U.S.C. § 660(c)(1) (1982) (discrimination against any employee because of assertion of
rights under OSHA); Vietnam Era Veterans' Readjustment Assistance Act, 38 U.S.C.
§§ 2021, 2022 (1982) (most veterans entitled to restoration of prior employment after
release from military service and cannot be discharged without cause for one year after
reemployment); Employment Retirement Income Security Act, 29 U.S.C. § 1140 (1982)
(discrimination against a participant or beneficiary of employee benefit plan for exercising
any right under ERISA or for purpose of interfering with attainment of employee benefit
plan right); and numerous parallel statutes and ordinances adopted on the state and local
levels.
One commentator subscribes to the unique theory that Title VII eliminated the at will
employment rule because the statute compels employers to have just cause when disciplin-
ing, for example, any minority employee and because Title VII requires that majority and
minority workers receive equal treatment. See Blumrosen, Strangers No More: All Workers
Are Entitled to just Cause' Protection Under Title VII, 2 INDUS. REL. L.J. 519 (1978). The fallacy
of this syllogism is that Title VII, as the other discrimination statutes, simply prohibits
employers from basing employment decisions on specified grounds, but does not attempt
to impose a just cause or business necessity standard on every employment decision. An
employer who fires his workers under the at will employment rule for bad reasons or for
no reason at all does not violate Title VII, so long as his arbitrary discipline is not applied
discriminatorily, is not grounded in a discriminatory motive, and does not have a disparate
impact on any particular minority group. See, e.g., Heath v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 16
Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 8338 (S.D. Ohio 1978); High v. Sabena Belgian World Airlines,
15 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 131 (E.D.N.Y. 1976), aFd, 562 F.2d 38 (2d Cir. 1977).
Discrimination statutes and ordinances such as Title VII compel equal discipline, not just
discipline.
6. See, e.g., Lanier v. Alenco, 459 F.2d 689 (5th Cir. 1972); Eales v. Tanana Valley
Medical-Surgical Group, Inc., 663 P.2d 958 (Alaska 1983); Thomas v. Bourdette, 45 Or.
App. 195, 608 P.2d 178, 180 (1980).
7. See, e.g., Lone Star Gas Co. v. Pippin, 620 S.W.2d 922 (Tex. Civ. App. 1981).
8. See, e.g., Ryan v. Upchurch, 474 F. Supp. 211 (S.D. Ind. 1979), rev'd sub nom., Ryan
v. J.C. Penney Co., 627 F.2d 836 (7th Cir. 1980); Eales v. Tanana Valley Medical-Surgical
Group, Inc., 663 P.2d 958 (Alaska 1983); Comfort & Fleming Ins. Brokers, Inc. v. Hoxsey,
26 Wash. App. 172, 613 P.2d 138 (1980).
448 [Vol. 62:2
1985] PUBLIC POLICY WRONGFUL DISCHARGE CLAIMS 449
tion beyond the performance of services. 9
The traditional legal exceptions to the at will employment rule are
not available to the average American employee who informally agrees
with his employer to work for a specified wage, without engaging in pro-
tracted employment contract negotiations regarding job security.' 0 Be-
cause of the harsh effects from application of the common law rule,
courts in many jurisdictions have recently adopted tort and contract the-
ories protective of such workers.
II. THE PUBLIC POLICY THEORY
Many courts have recently ruled that employers should not be per-
mitted to discipline or discharge employees for reasons violative of pub-
lic policy, and that an employee has a tort action for damages to redress
injuries caused by such discipline or discharge." Although the theory
has been articulated in a wide variety of ways, most courts have accepted
the cause of action on the grounds that an employee-even one hired
for an indefinite period of time-should not be without legal recourse
when fired because of the worker's exercise of a legal right or perform-
ance of a legal duty.
12
One frequently litigated employment-related right is an employee's
right to seek and receive available workmen's compensation benefits. In
a landmark decision, Frampton v. Central Indiana Gas Co., 13 the Supreme
Court of Indiana held that a discharged employee had sufficiently al-
leged a legal claim for relief when she contended that she was dis-
charged by the defendant without reason one month after she obtained
a settlement on a workmen's compensation claim and that she was fired
in retaliation for the claim. Because the legislature had chosen to pro-
vide workmen's compensation benefits to injured workers, thus articu-
lating a public policy in favor of the entitlement of such benefits, the
court held, the alleged retaliatory termination would violate the public
policy expressed by the legislature.
If employers are permitted to penalize employees for filing
workmen's compensation claims, a most important public pol-
icy will be undermined. The fear of being discharged would
have a deleterious effect on the exercise of a statutory right.
9. See, e.g., Moody v. Bogue, 310 N.W.2d 655 (Iowa Ct. App. 1981).
10. It has been estimated that approximately 60 to 65% of all American employees
are hired on an at will basis. See Peck, Unjust Discharges From Employment: A Necessary Change
in the Law, 40 OHIo ST. L.J. 1, 8-10 (1979); Comment, Protecting At Will Employees Against
Wrongful Discharge: The Duty to Terminate Only in Good Faith, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1816, 1816 n.2
(1980).
11. The first reported judicial decision embracing the public policy theory was
Petermann v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 174 Cal. App. 2d 184, 344 P.2d 25 (i959),
to be discussed infra notes 20-33 and accompanying text. Approximately 14 years passed
between the Petermann decision and the next state appellate court decision following public
policy analysis, Frampton v. Central Indiana Gas Co., 260 Ind. 249, 297 N.E.2d 425
(1973), also to be discussed infra notes 13-15 and accompanying text.
12. See, e.g., Campbell v. Eli Lilly & Co., 413 N.E.2d 1054, 1060 (Ind. Ct. App. 1980);
Delaney v. Taco Time Int'l, 297 Or. 10, 681 P.2d 114 (1984).
13. 260 Ind. 249, 297 N.E.2d 425 (1973). See supra note 11.
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Employees will not file claims for justly deserved compensa-
tion-opting, instead, to continue their employment without
incident. The end result, of course, is that the employer is ef-
fectively relieved of his obligation. 14
A large number of courts have followed the Frampton ruling.15
"Rights" protected in public policy cases have included an em-
ployee's freedom to commence a civil action against his employer, ' 6 the
right to be free from polygraph examination, 17 and the right of free
speech. The Third Circuit Court of Appeals held, in Novosel v. Nation-
wide Insurance Co.,' 8 that a plaintiff sufficiently pled causes of action
based on the theory of public policy wrongful discharge when he as-
serted that his employment was terminated by the defendant in retalia-
tion for the worker's refusal to lobby in favor of a no-fault insurance
reform measure before the Pennsylvania House of Representatives.
Sidestepping the question of state action, 19 the court ruled that the
14. Id. at 427.
15. See, e.g., Thomas v. Kroger Co., 583 F. Supp. 1031 (S.D. W. Va. 1984); Bowler v.
Firemens Fund Am. Ins. Co., 558 F. Supp. 724 (ND. Ill. 1983); Rettinger v. American Can
Co., 574 F. Supp. 306 (M.D. Pa. 1983); Meyer v. Byron Jackson, Inc., 174 Cal. Rptr. 428
(Cal. Ct. App. 1981); Smith v. Piezo Technology & Professional Adm'rs, 427 So. 2d 182
(Fla. 1983); Kelsay v. Motorola, Inc., 74 IlI. 2d 172, 384 N.E.2d 353 (1978); Darnell v.
Impact Indus., Inc., 457 N.E.2d 125 (IIl. App. Ct. 1983); Murphy v. City of Topeka-Shaw-
nee County Dep't of Labor Serv., 6 Kan. App. 2d 488, 630 P.2d 186 (1981); Firestone
Textile Co. v. Meadows, 666 S.W.2d 441 (Ky. 1983); Sventko v. Kroger Co., 69 Mich. App.
644, 245 N.W.2d 151 (1976); Arie v. Intertherm, Inc., 648 S.W.2d 142 (Mo. Ct. App.
1983); Hansen v. Harrah's, 675 P.2d 394 (Nev. 1984); Lally v. Copygraphics, 85 N.J. 668,
428 A.2d 1317 (1981); Brown v. Transcon Lines, 284 Or. 597, 588 P.2d 1087 (1978);
Clanton v. Cain-Sloan Co., 687 S.W.2d 441 (Tenn. 1984). Some courts have even ruled
that the discharge of a worker because of the filing of a benefits claim against a previous
employer is actionable. See, e.g., Darnell, 457 N.E.2d 125.
Although the Frampton case and its progeny seem rational, the public policy theory has
been stretched to unreasonable extremes. Some courts have prohibited the termination of
an employee repeatedly absent from work for prolonged periods of time, if the absences
are due to a job-related injury for which workmen's compensation benefits are available.
See, e.g., Clifford v. Cactus Drilling Corp., 109 Mich. App. 776, 312 N.W.2d 380 (1981);
Arie v. Intertherm, Inc., 648 S.W.2d 142 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983). Such a ruling puts an
employer in a difficult position, should a key employee suffer an on-the-job injury. If the
employee's work requires immediate attention, and if market forces dictate the hiring of a
replacement on a permanent basis, the employer will have two workers performing the
functions of one upon the rehabilitation of the first employee. Conversely, if no replace-
ment is hired, business is impaired. Also, one court has held that the discharge of an
employee for submission of false information on an employment application might have
violated public policy because the misrepresented facts involved her filing of a worker's
compensation benefits claim with a former employer. See Darnell v. Impact Indus., Inc.,
457 N.E.2d 125 (Ill. App. Ct. 1983). The lesson to be learned from Darnell may be that, if
one wants to falsify information on an employment application, one should be careful to
select a subject involving an arguable public policy.
16. See, e.g., Smith v. Atlas Off-Shore Boat Serv., Inc., 653 F.2d 1057 (5th Cir. 1981).
17. See, e.g., Perks v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 611 F.2d 1363 (3d Cir. 1979);
Molush v. Orkin Exterminating Co., 547 F. Supp. 54 (E.D. Pa. 1982).
18. 721 F.2d 894 (3d Cir. 1983).
19. All of the cases relied upon by the court involved public, not private sector, em-
ployees. Nevertheless, the court ruled that the public employment free speech cases ex-
pressed a public policy applicable to private sector workers, as well.
Although Novosel is not a government employee, the public employee cases
do not confine themselves to the narrow question of state action. Rather, these
cases suggest that an important public policy is in fact implicated wherever the
power to hire and fire is utilized to dictate the terms of employee political activi-
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political activity and free speech freedoms embodied in the First
Amendment to the United States Constitution created a public policy
protecting the employee from such wrongful termination.
The development of the public policy wrongful discharge theory in-
volving employee "duties" has traveled at breakneck speed, by compari-
son with the evolution of the "rights" public policy theory. In Petermann
v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters,20 the seminal public policy deci-
sion, the plaintiff alleged that the defendant employer terminated him
because he had refused to falsely testify in legislative hearings. The trial
court granted the defendant's motion for judgment on the pleadings be-
cause the plaintiff was an employee hired for an indefinite term. The
California Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the at will employ-
ment rule was restricted by statute and "by considerations of public pol-
icy. '2 1 Because the commission and solicitation of perjury were
criminal acts, the court held that it would violate the public interest to
permit an employer to discharge a worker for refusing to commit per-
jury at the employer's insistence.
To hold that one's continued employment could be made con-
tingent upon his commission of a felonious act at the instance
of his employer would be to encourage criminal conduct upon
the part of both the employee and employer and would serve to
contaminate the honest administration of public affairs.
2 2
The Petermann decision was the springboard for a number of public
policy "duty" cases involving workers allegedly fired for serving on a
jury;2 3 for resisting business practices considered by the employee to be
illegal or improper;24 for attempting to obtain a "reasonably smoke free
ties. . . . The protection of important political freedoms, however, goes well be-
yond the question whether the threat comes from state or private bodies. The
inquiry before us is whether the concern for the rights of political expression and
association which animated the public employee cases is sufficient to state a pub-
lic policy under Pennsylvania law. While there are no Pennsylvania cases squarely
on this point, we believe that the clear direction of the opinions promgulated by
the state's courts suggests that this question be answered in the affirmative.
721 F.2d at 900. Compare Jones v. Memorial Hosp. Sys., 117 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2915 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1984) (nurse allegedly fired for writing newspaper article advocating patients'
"right to die"; no protection under Texas constitution unless state action established).
20. 174 Cal. App. 2d 184, 344 P.2d 25 (1959). See supra note 11.
21. 344 P.2d at 27.
22. Id.
23. See, e.g., Nees v. Hocks, 272 Or. 210, 536 P.2d 512 (1975); Reuther v. Fowler &
Williams, Inc., 255 Pa. Super. 28, 386 A.2d 119 (1978).
24. See, e.g., Buethe v. Britt Airlines, Inc., 118 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2031 (7th Cir. 1984)
(pilot refused to fly defective aircraft); Adler v. American Standard Corp., 538 F. Supp.
572 (D. Md. 1982) (employee ordered cessation of business with customers receiving
bribes from corporation and refused to file illegal tax returns); Sheets v. Teddy's Frosted
Foods, Inc., 179 Conn. 471, 427 A.2d 385 (1980) (employee protested to management
that product labeling violated state law); Palmateer v. International Harvester Co., 85 Ill.
2d 124, 421 N.E.2d 876 (1981) (employee supplied local law enforcement authorities with
information indicating fellow employee had violated criminal laws); Petrik v. Monarch
Printing Corp., I I 1 1ll. App. 3d 502, 444 N.E.2d 588 (1982) (vice president-controller
reported embezzlement to president); Kalman v. Grand Union Co., 183 N.J. Super. 153,
443 A.2d 728 (1982) (pharmacist protested violation of state pharmacy regulations to su-
pervisor); O'Sullivan v. Mallon, 160 N.J. Super. 416, 390 A.2d 149 (1978) (medical techni-
cian refused to perform catheterizations in violation of state law); Hauck v. Sabine Pilots,
DENVER UNIVERSITY L4 W REVIEW
environment" in the workplace;2 5 for controlling health care costs by
rejecting a union's unlawful bargaining demands; 26 and for refusing to
prepare a false, and possibly libelous, statement against a fellow
worker. 2 7 The most dramatic example of the mushrooming "duty" pub-
lic policy wrongful discharge theory is Wiskotoni v. Michigan National
Bank-West,28 in which a branch bank manager was fired on suspicion of
criminal conduct, when an extensive F.B.I. investigation revealed that he
had embezzled bank funds and participated in a numbers racket, and he
was subpoenaed to testify before a federal grand jury. No indictment
was issued. 29 In his public policy wrongful discharge action, the man-
ager won a jury verdict. The verdict was affirmed by the Sixth Circuit
Court of Appeals, which held that the plaintiff had a duty to appear
before the grand jury and was wrongfully terminated for performing this
duty. The court ruled that numerous Michigan statutes regarding the
operation of the grand jury reflected a public policy supportive of the
grand jury system, and that the system "would be affected adversely if an
employer could discharge with impunity an employee for the reason that
the employee had been called to appear and testify before a grand
jury ... "30
Inc., 672 S.W.2d 322 (Tex. Civ. App. 1984) (plaintiff refused to pump bilges of ship at
location prohibited by federal law); Thompson v. St. Regis Paper Co., 102 Wash. 2d 219,
685 P.2d 1081 (1984) (controller instituted accurate accounting procedures in compliance
with Foreign Corrupt Practices Act); Harless v. First Nat'l Bank, 246 S.E.2d 270 (W. Va.
1978), 289 S.E.2d 692 (W. Va. 1982) (credit manager reported violations of state and
federal consumer credit and protection laws to higher management).
A number of courts have specifically recognized public policy claims for relief in cases
involving employees allegedly opposing antitrust violations under the Sherman Act, 15
U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1982). See, e.g., Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 27 Cal. 3d 167, 610 P.2d
1330, 164 Cal. Rptr. 839 (1980); Parnar v. Americana Hotels, Inc., 652 P.2d 625 (Hawaii
1982); Perry v. Hartz Mountain Corp., 537 F. Supp. 1387 (S.D. Ind. 1982). At least one
court has held that such employees have a treble damage action against their former em-
ployer for wrongful discharge because of the treble damage provisions of the Sherman
Act, 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1982). Ostrofe v. H.S. Crocker Co., Inc., 670 F.2d 1378 (9th Cir.
1982), vacated, 460 U.S. 1007 (1983), afjd on rehearing, 740 F.2d 739 (9th Cir. 1984).
25. Hentzel v. Singer Co., 138 Cal. App. 3d 290, 188 Cal. Rptr. 159 (1982).
26. See, e.g., Sherman v. St. Barnabas Hosp., 535 F. Supp. 564 (S.D.N.Y. 1982).
27. See, e.g., Delaney v. Taco Time Int'l, 297 Or. 10, 681 P.2d 114 (1984).
28. 716 F.2d 378 (6th Cir. 1983).
29. Although one might imagine that the criminal law presumption of innocence is a
public policy on which wrongful discharge claims could be based, most courts have ruled
that a discharge based on suspicion of employee crime is lawful, even if the worker was
acquitted of the criminal charges involved. See, e.g., Cisco v. United Parcel Services, 476
A.2d 1340 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1984). Cf. M.B.M. Co. v. Counce, 268 Ark. 269, 596 S.W.2d 681
(1980), discussed infra note 54.
30. 716 F.2d at 383. The Wiskotoni decision is anomalous in at least two respects.
First, the opinion treats the plaintiffas if he-when subpoenaed to testify-was a disinter-
ested witness. Rather, the record was clear that Mr. Wiskotoni was subpoenaed because
he was a target of the grand jury investigation and the investigation involved matters re-
lated directly to his employment. Most persons with savings in a financial institution
would prefer that it not be managed by a thief or a suspected thief, and yet the WViskotoni
opinion disregards the legitimate business reason for terminating the branch manager.
Second, the opinion places much emphasis on the fact that the bank waited approxi-
mately two months, between the F.B.I. investigation and the grand jury hearing, before
terminating the manager. Hence, the message to employers from Wiskotoni is that they
must take disciplinary action against employees suspected of employment-related criminal
activity on the first sign of suspicion, rather than waiting for any corroborative indications.
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In addition to those jurisdictions formally adopting the public pol-
icy theory of wrongful discharge, many state appellate courts have indi-
cated that, when presented with the appropriate set of circumstances,
their respective states will follow the lead of cases such as Petermann,
Frampton, and Wiskotoni.
3
Due to the ethereal nature of "public policy," 3 2 employers must an-
ticipate the further expansion of this wrongful discharge theory.
3 3
III. PUBLIC POLICY CLAIMS BASED ON FAIR EMPLOYMENT STATUTES
In all of the cases discussed above, the courts-by fashioning a
wrongful discharge remedy in substitution for the historic at will em-
ployment doctrine-sought to effectuate existing "public policy." In an
effort to discern public policy, the courts commonly examined statutory
31. See, e.g., Gates v. Life of Montana Ins. Co., 196 Mont. 178, 638 P.2d 1063 (1982);
Brockmeyer v. Dun & Bradstreet, 113 Wis. 2d 561, 335 N.W.2d 834 (1983).
The current status of the public policy theory in Colorado is uncertain. In Lampe v.
Presbyterian Medical Center, 41 Colo. App. 465, 590 P.2d 513 (1978), a charge nurse
contended that she was fired for refusing to reduce the overtime work of her staff, and that
the discharge violated public policy because reduced staffing would have resulted in lower
quality patient care. The Colorado Court of Appeals equivocated on the adoption of the
public policy theory, holding simply that the plaintiff had not asserted a claim invoking a
public policy. Subsequent decisions have reiterated the at will employment doctrine, see,
e.g., Hughes v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co., 686 P.2d 814 (Colo. App. 1984);Johnson
v. Jefferson County Board of Health, 662 P.2d 463 (Colo. 1983); Electrolux Corp. v. Law-
son, 654 P.2d 340 (Colo. App. 1982), but the decision in Corbin v. Sinclair Marketing,
Inc., 684 P.2d 265 (Colo. App. 1984), again threw the matter into confusion. In Corbin, the
plaintiff alleged that he was terminated because he refused to follow the employer's in-
struction to check sensors located in the tank of his gasoline truck, that the instructions
violated OSHA requirements, and that the discharge therefore violated public policy. The
Court of Appeals-without clear explanation of its analysis-affirmed the district court's
dismissal of the plaintiff's claims, holding that the broad statements of policy to which he
referred were "inadequate to justify adoption of an exception to the rule that an indefinite
general hiring is terminable at will by either party to the employment." 684 P.2d at 267.
As of the time this article was written, a "whistle-blowing" wrongful discharge case
was pending before the Colorado Court of Appeals; the plaintiff had prevailed in the court
below. Wuchert v. Great Western Sugar Co., Civil Action No. 82-CV-7152 (Denver Dist.
Ct. 8, February 3, 1984), appeal filed, Case No. 84-CA-1140.
One Colorado federal court has interpreted existing state law as supporting a public
policy wrongful discharge claim. See Rawson v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 530 F. Supp. 776,
781-82 (D. Colo. 1982). Others have equivocated on the question. See, e.g., Ritter v. Colo-
rado Interstate Gas Co., 593 F. Supp. 1279 (D. Colo. 1984); Smith v. Montgomery Ward &
Co., 567 F. Supp. 1331 (D. Colo. 1983). The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals subsequently
ruled that Colorado Law does not recognize the public policy theory. Garcia v. Aetna
Finance Co., Case No. 81-1260 (10th Cir., Dec. 17, 1984).
32. For example, in Petermann, the California Court of Appeals defined public policy
as "the principles under which freedom of contract or private dealing is restricted by law
for the good of the community. . . . [W]hatever contravenes good morals or any estab-
lished interests of society is against public policy." 344 P.2d at 27.
33. Other developing tort and contract theories challenging employment termina-
tions, such as bad faith and malice, see, e.g., Monge v. Beebe Rubber Co., 114 N.H. 130,
316 A.2d 549 (1974), the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, see, e.g., Fortune
v. National Cash Register Co., 373 Mass. 96, 364 N.E.2d 1251 (1977), implied contract, see,
e.g., Pugh v. See's Candies, Inc., 116 Cal. App. 3d 311, 171 Cal. Rptr. 917 (Cal. App.
1981), and negligent failure to warn employee of job performance deficiencies, see, e.g.,
Chamberlain v. Bissell, Inc., 547 F. Supp. 1067 (W.D. Mich. 1982), are beyond the scope
of this article. See generally Olsen, Wrongful Discharge Claims Raised by At Will Employees: A New
Legal Concern for Employers, 32 LAB. LJ. 265 (May 1981).
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law: statutes providing workmen's compensation benefits, statutes
prohibiting perjury, statutes creating a grand jury system, for example.
The statutes relied upon by the courts in those cases (1) did not directly
address the subject of employment termination, and (2) did not ex-
pressly provide remedies to redress the wrongful termination of em-
ployment. By contrast, some recent judicial opinions have recognized
public policy wrongful discharge claims premised on federal and state
employment discrimination statutes, which directly deal with employ-
ment termination, and expressly provide remedies for wrongful termi-
nation. Three of these cases will be analyzed.
3 4
The plaintiff in Holien v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 3 5 asserted that her
supervisor sexually harassed her, gave her derogatory work evaluations,
denied her a pay increase, and ultimately terminated her, because of her
refusal to submit to his advances. Three claims for relief were presented
to the jury: (1) unlawful sex discrimination under the Oregon Fair Em-
ployment Practice Act, 3 6 (2) public policy wrongful discharge, and
(3) extreme and outrageous conduct. Interrogatories submitted to the
jury resulted in findings for the defendants on the first and third claims,
but in favor of the plaintiff on the public policy claim. Defendants
moved for summary judgment, asserting that the only public policy
raised by the plaintiff was sex discrimination in employment, which
(1) was specifically addressed in the Oregon Fair Employment Practice
Act, and (2) had been rejected by the jury. The motion for summary
judgment was granted.
The Oregon Court of Appeals reversed, and the Oregon Supreme
Court affirmed, both courts ruling that the Fair Employment Practice
Act expressed a strong state public policy against sex discrimination
34. These three cases are simply illustrative. See also Cancellier v. Federated Dep't
Stores, 672 F.2d 1312, 1318 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 859 (1982) (facts supportive of
violation of covenant of good faith and fair dealing also support ADEA claim, but causes of
action independent); Wynn v. Boeing Military Airplane Co., 595 F. Supp. 727 (D. Kan.
1984) (racial discrimination against public policy, wrongful discharge claim independent
of civil rights laws); McGinley v. Burroughs Corp., 407 F. Supp. 903, 910 (E.D. Pa. 1975)
(public policy claim based on Pennsylvania Human Relations Act).
35. 298 Or. 76, 689 P.2d 1292 (1984), aff'g 66 Or. App. 911, 677 P.2d 704 (1984).
36. Oregon has a comprehensive administrative and judicial system for redressing
employment discrimination, including discrimination on the basis of sex. OR. REV. STAT.
§§ 659.010-.121 (1983). In order to assert a claim under the Act, an employee may file a
complaint with the Oregon Bureau of Labor & Industries within one year following the
unlawful discrimination. OR. REV. STAT. § 659.040(l) (1983). The Commissioner of the
Bureau of Labor & Industries is responsible for conducting an investigation of the com-
plaint, and will exert effort to conciliate the dispute between the parties. OR. REV. STAT.
§ 659.050(1) (1983). If conciliation efforts are unsuccessful, three alternative proceedings
may result. First, the Commissioner may bring a civil suit against the employer. OR. REV.
STAT. § 659.095 (1983). Second, the complaint may be taken to an administrative hearing
before the Bureau of Labor & Industries. OR. REV. STAT. § 659.060 (1983). A civil action
may be brought to enforce any order resulting from a Bureau hearing. OR. REV. STAT.
§ 659.070 (1983). Third, the employee may bring a civil action against the employer. OR.
REV. STAT. § 659.121 (1983). The back pay recovered in any such civil action is limited to
a two-year period before the filing of the employee's complaint with the Commission, or if
no such complaint has been filed, to a two-year period preceding the commencement of
the civil action. OR. REV. STAT. § 659.121(1) (1983). The plaintiff in Holien prosecuted her
state employment discrimination claim on the basis of this third procedure.
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subject to a wrongful discharge action.3 7 After reviewing the legislative
history of the statutes on which the plaintiffs first claim was based,3 8 the
courts found that the legislature did not intend the fair employment
practice statutes to supersede the public policy theory earlier embraced
by the Oregon courts. In the absence of express legislative history indi-
cating that the statutes supplanted the public policy theory in the area of
sex discrimination, the courts would not interpret the statutes to have
exclusive effect.
3 9
The defendants contended that it was inappropriate to base a public
policy wrongful discharge claim on the Fair Employment Practice Act
when the Act itself (and the federal discrimination laws) provided equi-
table relief, such as injunctions, reinstatement, and back pay, while the
plaintiff's public policy tort claim sought compensatory and punitive
damages. 40 This was of little concern to the courts, which concluded
that the Oregon legislature and Congress had both simply failed to ap-
preciate the full injuries suffered by a sex discrimination victim and to
provide the full relief necessary to make a sex discrimination victim
whole.
ORS 659.121 and Title VII fail to capture the personal nature
of the injury done to a wrongfully discharged employee as an
individual and the remedies provided by the statutes fail to ap-
preciate the relevant dimensions of the problem. Reinstate-
ment, back pay, and injunctions vindicate the rights of the
victimized group without compensating the plaintiff for such
personal injuries as anguish, physical symptoms of stress, a
sense of degradation, and the cost of psychiatric care. Legal as
well as equitable remedies are needed to make the plaintiff
whole.4 1
37. Oregon has long recognized the tort theory of public policy wrongful discharge.
See Brown v. Transcon Lines, 284 Or. 597, 588 P.2d 1087 (1978); Nees v. Hocks, 272 Or.
210, 536 P.2d 512 (1975).
38. OR. REV. STAT. § 659.121(1) (1983). See discussion supra note 36. The Supreme
Court also acknowledged that sex discrimination in employment was prohibited by Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e (1982). 689 P.2d at 1297-98.
39. In making this ruling, the courts failed to discuss a provision of the Oregon Fair
Employment Practice Act, OR. REV. STAT. § 659.121(4) (1983), indicating that a statutory
claim, such as the first claim raised by the plaintiff, was an effective waiver of any alterna-
tive proceedings to enforce rights under the statute:
This section shall not be construed to limit or alter in any way the authority
or power of the commissioner or to limit or alter in any way any of the rights of an
individual complainant until and unless the complainant commences civil suit or
action. The filing of a civil suit or action shall constitute both an election of
remedies as to the rights of that individual with respect to those matters alleged
in the complaint filed with the commissioner, and a waiver with respect to the
right to file a complaint with the commissioner pursuant to ORS 659.040(1) or
659.045(1).
40. The jury concluded that the plaintiff had lost wages in the amount of $292. and
general damages of $500, but nevertheless awarded $25,000 as punitive damages. 677
P.2d at 705.
41. 689 P.2d at 1303-04. The Supreme Court also rationalized that the Oregon legis-
lature, when it provided equitable relief by statute in 1977, did not intend to supplant legal
wrongful discharge remedies, because the legislature was unaware of common law devel-
opments at the time. Id. at 1300-04. Such an asertion is anomalous. Long before adop-
tion of the Oregon Fair Employment Practice Act, the Oregon courts created and
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Finally, the verdict on the statutory sex discrimination claim was held
not to legally bar or contradict the verdict on the wrongful discharge
claim.
4 2
A similar case is McKinney v. National Dairy Council.43  There, the
plaintiff contended that he was discharged because of his age, and that
public policy-as expressed in federal and state statutes44 -- denounced
such terminations. 4 5 The federal court analyzed the statutes relied
upon by the plaintiff, and properly concluded that the statutes provided
elaborate administrative and judicial procedures and remedies for dis-
discussed common law wrongful discharge relief in Nees v. Hocks, 272 Or. 210, 536 P.2d
512 (1975), and Campbell v. Ford Ind., Inc., 274 Or. 253, 546 P.2d 141 (1976). It seems
that the Oregon Supreme Court has a very low opinion of the collective intelligence of the
Oregon legislature.
A concurring Supreme Court justice expressed an alternative view-that the sex dis-
crimination statutes did not apply to Ms. Holien's claims because she was allegedly dis-
charged, not because of her sex, but because she had opposed her supervisor's sexual
advances. 689 P.2d 1305-07. This distinction is disingenuous. It is widely recognized that
the firing of an employee for resisting sexual demands is a form of sex discrimination
prohibited by the equal employment opportunity laws, see, e.g., Craig v. Y & Y Snacks, Inc.,
721 F.2d 77 (3d Cir. 1983); 29 C.F.R. § 1604.1 l(a)(2) & (g) (1984); Miller v. Bank of Am.,
600 F.2d 211 (9th Cir. 1979); see also infra note 68. Disciplining a worker for protesting
violations of the equal employment opportunity laws is also illegal, see, e.g., Gifford v. Atch-
ison, T. & S.F. Ry., 685 F.2d 1149 (9th Cir. 1982); Rucker v. Higher Education Aids Bd.,
669 F.2d 1179 (9th Cir. 1982); Parker v. Baltimore & O.R.R. Co., 652 F.2d 1012 (D.C. Cir.
1981).
42. The Oregon Supreme Court's opinion did not address this issue. The Court of
Appeals' decisions stated: "The trial court's determination of the facts on the first claim
did not preclude the jury from weighing the evidence in deciding the facts on the second
claim. Only when there is insufficient evidence to go to the jury may the trial court pre-
clude a jury determination." 677 P.2d at 708 n.5. Such platitudes overlook the fact that
sexual harassment was the single issue on both the first and second claims for relief, that
the evidence as to the first claim was the same evidence as to the second, and that the
substantive law governing the first claim was purportedly the same as that applicable to the
second. See infra text accompanying notes 70-77.
43. 491 F. Supp. 1108 (D. Mass. 1980).
44. The federal statute relied upon by the plaintiff was the Age Discrimination in Em-
ployment Act of 1967, as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 623 (1982). No explanation is provided in
the opinion as to whether the plaintiff ever sought relief under the administrative and
judicial procedures of the ADEA. See infra note 46.
The plaintiff relied on two sets of Massachusetts statutes regarding age discrimina-
tion. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 149, § 24A (West 1982), in effect at the time of the plain-
tiff's termination, stated: "It is hereby declared to be against public policy to dismiss from
employment any person between the ages of forty-five and sixty-five, or to refuse to em-
ploy him, because of his age." As of the time of the plaintiffs discharge, the adjoining
statutory sections provided for enforcement of Section 24A by the Commissioner of Labor
& Industry, through public hearings and the publication of names of violators. No statutes
provided for private enforcement of Section 24A, and the Massachusetts SupremeJudicial
Court had expressly held there was no civil right of action for a violation of the section.
Johnson v. United States Steel Corp., 348 Mass. 168, 202 N.E.2d 816 (1964).
A separate state age discrimination prohibition was found in the Massachusetts Fair
Employment Practice Act, MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 151B, § 1-10 (West 1982). In 1966,
Chapter 697, L. 1950 extended the prohibitions of the Fair Employment Practice Act to
employment discrimination on the basis of age. By its express terms, the Act did not
repeal Section 24A. See MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 151B, § 9 (West 1982).
45. Rather than utilizing the terminology of "public policy wrongful discharge," the
plaintiff contended that a discharge on the basis of age violated "the implied covenant of
good faith and fair dealing," adopted in Fortune v. National Cash Register Co., 373 Mass.
96, 364 N.E.2d 1251 (1977).
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charges on the basis of age. 46 The court observed that adoption of the
wrongful discharge theory advanced by the plaintiff would permit liti-
gants to circumvent the administrative and judicial procedures and rem-
edies provided by the Massachusetts statutes and the ADEA.
4 7
Nevertheless, having given lip service to the doctrine of federalism,
the court proceeded to hold that the plaintiff could raise a tort claim of
breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing against his
employer based on the public policy against age discrimination articu-
lated in the various statutes, without attempting to comply with the ad-
ministrative and judicial restrictions and limitations placed on recovery
under the statutes:
The three statutes mentioned above . . clearly enunciate
a public policy against discrimination in employment on the ba-
sis of age. It is but a short step to conclude that an action which
violates such a clear public policy is a breach of an implied cov-
enant of good faith and fair dealing. Since Massachusetts law,
as well as federal law, plainly manifests a public policy against
age discrimination in employment, it would be a striking limita-
tion on the scope of the implied covenant if it were held inap-
plicable to a decision to terminate because of age. Moreover, it
would be extraordinarily difficult to defend in principle a dis-
tinction that treats the covenant of good faith and fair dealing
as applying, at least potentially, to other termination decisions
generally but not to those based on age discrimination.
48
The court concluded that Massachusetts courts-by embracing a tort
46. Under the Massachusetts Fair Employment Practice Act, a complaint must be filed
by an aggrieved employee with the Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination
within six months after an act of discrimination. The filing of the complaint is followed by
an investigation by the Commission. If no probable cause is found by the Commission, the
complaint is dismissed. If probable cause is found, the Commission may bring a civil ac-
tion against the offending employer in Superior Court, or may endeavor to resolve the
matter through conciliation. If conciliation fails, a notice of hearing may be issued to an
employer, followed by an evidentiary hearing, and an order of the Commission. See MASS.
GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 151B, § 5 (West 1982). An order of the Commission may be appealed
to the Superior Court. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 151B, § 6 (West 1982). The Act
expressly provides that, "as to acts declared unlawful by section four [the substantive
prohibitions of the Act], the procedure[s] provided in this chapter shall, while pending, be
exclusive .. " See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 151B, § 9 (West 1982).
In order to bring an action under the ADEA, the employee must file a charge of age
discrimination with the United States Equal Employment Opportunity Commission within
180 days after the alleged age discrimination, or within 300 days after the alleged age
discrimination, in "deferral" states that have laws prohibiting age discrimination in em-
ployment and state agencies authorized to grant or seek relief from employers for age
discrimination. 29 U.S.C. § 626(d) (1982). The EEOC is required to investigate charges
of age discrimination, and to attempt to resolve any disputes through conciliation, confer-
ence, and persuasion. 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (1982). Actions under the ADEA may be
brought in federal court by the EEOC or, once a charge has been on file with the EEOC
for 60 days, an individual charging party. 29 U.S.C. § 626(c), (d) (1982). The interrela-
tionship between state age discrimination laws and agencies and the EEOC and the ADEA
is intricate, see 29 U.S.C. § 633 (1982), and the states should be wary of creating age dis-
crimination remedies inconsistent with the administrative and judicial system created by
Congress.
47. 491 F. Supp. at 1120.
48. Id. at 1121.
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theory of wrongful discharge-so dramatically changed the preexisting
law (both statutory and common law), that the plaintiff's wrongful dis-
charge tort claim was proper.
49
The third decision involving a public policy wrongful discharge
claim based on employment discrimination statutes is Lucas v. Brown &
Root, Inc.50 There, the plaintiff alleged that she was subjected to sexual
harassment and ultimately discharged from her employment because of
her refusal to accede to her supervisor's sexual demands. Three legal
bases for relief were alleged by the plaintiff: (1) sex discrimination in
violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,51 (2) violation of an
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, 52 and (3) intentional
infliction of emotional distress. The federal district court, exercising di-
versity jurisdiction over the Arkansas state law claims, dismissed the Ti-
tle VII claim as untimely. 53 The wrongful discharge and emotional
distress claims were dismissed for failure to state a cause of action.
The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the Title VII ruling,
but reversed the decision on the Arkansas state law claims. In support
of this decision, the court initially overstated: "[T]he Arkansas Supreme
Court has indicated a willingness to recognize a public policy exception
to the employment-at-will doctrine."' 54 The court then held that the
49. The court seemed to place much emphasis on the fact that the Fortune case, see
supra notes 33 & 45, was decided after Congress and the Massachusetts General Assembly
enacted the statutes creating administrative and judicial remedies for victims of age dis-
crimination. In Holien v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., the court placed much emphasis on the fact
that its state courts had adopted a public policy wrongful discharge theory before the Ore-
gon legislature enacted comprehensive statutes dealing with sex discrimination in employ-
ment. 689 P.2d at 1303. See also Mahoney v. Crocker Nat'l Bank, 571 F. Supp. 287, 293
(N.D. Cal. 1983) (if public policy not recognized before statutes enacted, statutes were
likely intended to provide exclusive remedies). Neither decision cited any legal authority
for its position. This contradiction may simply suggest that, if one wishes, one may read
the legislative history of a statute in any way conducive to the desired outcome.
50. 736 F.2d 1202 (8th Cir. 1984).
51. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1982).
52. The court analyzed this claim as a public policy wrongful discharge claim. 736
F.2d at 1204-05.
53. Title VII has strict time limitations on its administrative and judicial proceedings.
A charge of employment discrimination under Title VII must be filed with the E.E.O.C.
within 180 days, or-in states with employment discrimination laws and agencies to en-
force such laws-300 days, following the alleged discrimination, as under the ADEA. 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e) (1982). See also supra note 46. After the Commission investigates the
charge and attempts conciliation, the E.E.O.C. may bring a civil action against the em-
ployer, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f) (1982), or may issue a notice of right to sue to the charging
party, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(l) (1982). The charging party has 90 days following his
receipt of the notice of right to sue to commence his federal district court action. 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(l) (1982). See generally Baldwin County Welcome Center v. Brown,
104 S. Ct. 1723 (1984) (to toll running of 90-day period plaintiff must file a complaint).
Many courts hold that, the 90-day filing rule is not simply a limitations period, but ajuris-
dictional prerequisite, such that failure to comply therewith deprives the court of subject
matter jurisdiction. See, e.g., Hall v. Kroger Baking Co., 520 F.2d 1204 (6th Cir. 1975);
Cleveland v. Douglas Aircraft Co., 509 F.2d 1027 (9th Cir. 1975); Genovese v. Shell Oil
Co., 488 F.2d 84 (5th Cir. 1973).
54. 736 F.2d at 1204. Arkansas case law and statutes made clear that Arkansas was an
at will employment state. See Miller v. Missouri Pac. Transp. Co., 225 Ark. 475, 283
S.W.2d 158 (1955); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 81-310 (1976).
In support of its conclusion, the court cited M.B.M. Co. v. Counce, 268 Ark. 269, 596
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plaintiff's discharge violated public policy because of an Arkansas prosti-
tution statute. 55 Having concluded that the plaintiff would be a prosti-
tute, under the statute, if she had acceded to her supervisor's sexual
demands, the court held that it would violate public policy to permit the
defendant to terminate the plaintiff for refusing to commit a criminal
act.56
IV. PUBLIC POLICIES AGAINST PUBLIC POLICY EMPLOYMENT
DISCRIMINATION CLAIMS
To the extent that the courts are presently encouraged to create
private causes of action to redress employment terminations violating
public policy, the courts should be equally cognizant of public policies
mitigating against the adoption of the public policy theory. Further, in
any given case, if a discharged worker asserts that his termination con-
travened public policy, the courts-when considering the claim-should
give consideration to competing public policies. For a number of inter-
related policy reasons, common law wrongful discharge claims ad-
dressed by the federal and state employment discrimination statutes
should be repudiated.
First, decisions such as Holien, McKinney, and Lucas overlook the fact
that the public policy wrongful discharge theory was formulated by the
courts in response to situations where discharged workers had no other
S.W.2d 681 (1980). It takes great effort to read the M.B.M. decision as "indicating a will-
ingness to recognize" a public policy wrongful discharge theory. In that case, an employee
working under an express written at will employment contract was terminated on suspi-
cion of theft when money and checks were missing from the cash register. Although the
worker successfully completed a polygraph examination, the employer stood by his dis-
charge decision. The court rejected the plaintiff's wrongful termination claim, holding
that-even if it accepted the public policy theory, in principle-the plaintiff had demon-
strated no public policy contravened by the discharge. In this setting. the court made the
statement that it "might" adopt the public policy cause of action if a plaintiff demonstrated
the implication of a public policy right or duty; because the plaintiff failed to come even
close to a showing of a right or duty, the hypothetical raised by the court did not have to
be addressed. However, in Lucas, the Eighth Circuit elevated this hypothetical into a "rec-
ognition" of the public policy theory. 736 F.2d at 1204.
55. "A person commits prostitution if in return for, or in expectation of a fee, he
engages in or agrees or offers to engage in sexual activity with any other person." ARK.
STAT. ANN. § 41-3002(1) (Supp. 1983).
56. In response to the employer's contention that such a ruling effectively permitted
sexual harassment claimants to flaunt the procedural limitations on such claims imposed
by Congress in Title VII, the court ruled that the federal law expressly permits the co-
existence of state discrimination laws. 736 F.2d at 1205-06.
The court's reliance on Section 708 of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-7 (1982), is mis-
placed. First, that statutory provision relates to the co-existence of state and federal sub-
stantive laws prohibiting discrimination, while different provisions of Title VII govern the
interrelationship between the federal and state administrative and judicial procedures. See
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(c) (1982) (EEOC procedurally required to defer action on charge to
state fair employment practice agencies prior to issuance of notice of right to sue and
federal court litigation); 29 C.F.R. §§ 1601.70-.80 (1984) (federal regulations regarding
EEOC deferral to qualified state employment discrimination agencies). Second, the
court's ruling gives more dignity to the Arkansas prostitution statutes than they deserve.
They are not state discrimination laws; in fact, Arkansas does not even have an employment
discrimination statute.
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means of legal recourse, either under common law or by statute. 57 The
importance of the unavailability of alternative legal remedies is under-
scored by the fact that, in a number ofjurisdictions, such unavailability is
an express element of the public policy cause of action. As stated by one
Pennsylvania federal district court:
The cases which have established a tort or contract remedy for
employees discharged for reasons violative of public policy
have relied upon the fact that in the context of their case the
employee was otherwise without remedy and that permitting
the discharge to go unredressed would leave a valuable social
policy to go unvindicated.
It is clear then that the whole rationale undergirding the
public policy exception is the vindication or the protection of
certain strong policies of the community. If these policies or
goals are preserved by other remedies, then the public policy is
sufficiently served. Therefore, application of the public policy
exception requires two factors: (1) that the discharge violate
some well-established public policy; and (2) that there be no
remedy to protect the interest of the aggrieved employee or
society. 58
When a wrongful discharge plaintiff asserts that he or she has been
discriminated against on the basis of a factor proscribed by a federal or
state statute, and when the statute provides judicial or administrative
remedies to the employee, the very foundation for the development of
public policy law is missing. To recognize the public policy theory in
situations where statutory relief-such as the fair employment practice
laws-is available would be, not to fill in the gaps for employees unpro-
tected by the statutes, but rather, to overlap existing remedies. In such
situations, the theory should not be extended.
An illustrative case on this point is Chekey v. BTR Realty, Inc.,5 9 in
which a federal district court dismissed the plaintiff's implied contract
and abusive discharge claims under Maryland law, when the claims were
premised on the public policy against age bias arising from the federal
Age Discrimination in Employment Act and the Fair Employment Prac-
tice Act of Maryland. 60 Although the Court of Appeals of Maryland had
previously recognized the tort of "abusive discharge," 6 1 the court held
57. See Tarr v. Riberglass, Inc., 115 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 3688, 3690 (D. Kan. 1984).
58. Wehr v. Burroughs Corp., 438 F. Supp. 1052, 1054-55 (E.D. Pa. 1977). See also
Wolk v. Saks Fifth Ave., Inc., 728 F.2d 221, 223 (3d Cir. 1984); Stoecklein v. Illinois Tool
Works, Inc., 589 F. Supp. 139, 145 (N.D. Ill. 1984); Tarr v. Riberglass, Inc., 115 L.R.R.M.
(BNA) at 3690; Vasques v. National Geographic Soc'y, 34 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA)
295, 296-97 (D. Md. 1982); Schroeder v. Dayton-Hudson Corp., 448 F. Supp. 910, 917
(E.D. Mich. 1977). Contra, e.g., Lally v. Copygraphics, 85 N.J. 668, 428 A.2d 1317 (1981).
Vasques also questioned whether employment discrimination is subject to public policy
analysis, insofar as it does not conform with the "duties" and "rights" framework. 34 Fair
Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 297. See supra text accompanying notes 12-31.
59. 575 F. Supp. 715 (D. Md. 1983).
60. MD. ANN. CODE art. 49B (Supp. 1984).
61. Adler v. American Standard Corp., 291 Md. 31, 432 A.2d 464 (1981). See also
Adler v. American Standard Corp., 538 F. Supp. 572 (D. Md. 1982).
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the theory inapposite because it was limited to situations "when public
policy is violated but where a statutory exception to [the at will employ-
ment rule has] not already been provided." 6 2 Courts from numerous
jurisdictions have followed the same analysis. 6 3 Such a holding is not
surprising; it is difficult to conceive of a public policy which favors creat-
ing duplicative legal remedies under the guise of formulating a legal
remedy where one did not previously exist.
64
Of the three equal employment opportunity public policy cases dis-
cussed above, Holien and McKinney are the most disturbing, when consid-
eration is given to this factor. In Oregon and Massachusetts, elaborate
remedies had been provided under fair employment practice statutes. 65
Recognizing the plaintiffs' tort claims in those cases was not an effort by
the courts to advance an interstitial legal theory to avoid having wrongs
go legally unredressed; the rulings created duplicative legal remedies,
contrary to the very foundation of public policy wrongful discharge
law.
6 6
At first blush, the decision in Lucas does not seem as inappropriate
as the other two cases, when consideration is given to this public policy
factor, because there are no Arkansas state laws addressing the subject
of sex discrimination. 6 7 However, the public policy theory has devel-
oped because of the unavailability of legal remedies (both state and fed-
eral) to terminated employees. Public policy wrongful discharge law
should not tread on an area where federal statutory relief is available.
68
No public policy is served by stretching state prostitution laws to ad-
62. 575 F. Supp. at 717.
63. See, e.g., Bruffett v. Warner Communications, Inc., 692 F.2d 910, 919 (3d Cir.
1982); Bonham v. Dresser Indus., Inc., 569 F.2d 187, 195 (3d Cir. 1977); Pierce v. New
Process Co., 580 F. Supp. 1543, 1546 (W.D. Pa. 1984); Kamens v. Summit Stainless, Inc.,
586 F. Supp. 324, 329-30 (E.D. Pa. 1984); Crews v. Memorex Corp., No. 83-3750-T (D.
Mass., May 24, 1984); Stoecklein v. Illinois Tool Works, Inc., 589 F. Supp. at 145; Watkins
v. Great At. & Pac. Tea Co., 585 F. Supp. 879, 882 (E.D. Pa. 1984); Tarr v. Riberglass,
Inc., 115 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 3690; Vasques v. National Geographic Soc'y, 34 Fair Empl.
Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 296-97; McCluney v.Jos. Schlitz Brewing Co., 489 F. Supp. 24, 26-27
(E.D. Wis. 1980); Parets v. Eaton Corp., 479 F. Supp. 512, 518 (E.D. Mich. 1979); Schroe-
der v. Dayton-Hudson Corp., 448 F. Supp. at 917; Wehr v. Burroughs Corp., 438 F. Supp.
at 1054-55.
64. "We doubt that Pennsylvania courts would find the creation of such duplicative
litigation fosters the policy of the Pennsylvania [Human Relations] Act." Wehr v. Bur-
roughs Corp., 438 F. Supp. at 1056.
65. See supra notes 36, 38-39, 44, 46.
66. The Hoiien decision is particularly flawed in this respect. The Oregon Supreme
Court, in Walsh v. Consolidated Freightways, 278 Or. 347, 563 P.2d 1205 (1977), ex-
pressly held that the wrongful discharge tort theory should not be extended to an em-
ployee who was terminated for protesting safety violations because existing Oregon and
federal statutes provided relief to the worker. Nevertheless, the court in Holien chose to
disregard the teachings of W17alsh by delving into the question of the adequacy of the statu-
tory remedies for employment discrimination.
67. See supra note 56.
68. There was no dispute in Lucas that the plaintiff's claims of sexual harassment could
have been remedied by Title VII. See, e.g., Bundy v. Jackson, 641 F.2d 934 (D.C. Cir.
1981); Tomkins v. Public Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 568 F.2d 1044 (3d Cir. 1977); see also supra
note 41. The plaintiff's Title VII claim was unsuccessful, not due to the unavailability of
federal remedies, but because of her failure to comply with the jurisdictional requirements
of Title VII. See supra note 53.
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dress the subject of sex discrimination in employment, when such dis-
crimination is directly remedied by Title VII, if not a state discrimination
law.
6 9
A second public policy calling for the rejection of public policy em-
ployment discrimination claims, which is closely related to the first, is
that the fair employment practice statutes enacted by the states were
typically intended by the legislatures to be the exclusive source of state
legal relief for victims of discrimination. When adopting the fair em-
ployment practice acts, the legislatures were specifically confronted with
the problem of how best to remedy employment discrimination, and in
most instances, opted in favor of elaborate administrative and judicial
proceedings providing relief to employees. A number of courts have
recognized that the legislatures' creation of such extensive remedies re-
flects an intention to make the remedies exclusive. For example, the
United States District Court in the Northern District of California, in
Mahoney v. Crocker National Bank, 70 granted defendants' motion for par-
tial summary judgment and ruled that the California Fair Employment
and Housing Act (CFEHA)7 1 was intended by the California legislature
to preempt the field of remedies in areas it addressed:
Where the Legislature has provided a comprehensive remedial
scheme, there is a strong indication that the legislature in-
tended the remedy to be exclusive.
[Ilt clearly appears that the Legislature intended that the rem-
edy for age discrimination created by the CFEHA be exclusive.
The CFEHA remedy is specific and detailed, thus indicating its
exclusive nature. . . . Furthermore, as noted earlier, the Leg-
islature specially stated that the CFEHA was intended to pro-
vide a remedy for the discriminations it prohibited. This is a
strong indication that the Legislature intended the remedy it
created for age discrimination under the CFEHA to be
exclusive.
72
Similarly, in Chekey v. BTR Realty, Inc.,7 3 the court held that the
Maryland General Assembly barred wrongful discharge litigation based
69. As noted above, in Lucas, the court saved its conscience by making reference to
Section 708 of Title VII, the federal-state co-existence provision. See supra note 56. If the
issue in Lucas had been resolution of a conflict between the substantive employment dis-
crimination law of Arkansas and the substantive terms of Title VII, Section 708 would have
been meaningful. However, the issue was not the conflict of substantive law. Rather, one
problem arising from the ruling was the circumvention of Title VII's Section 706 proce-
dures. See supra note 56 and discussion infra text accompanying notes 78-94. Another
problem was that the court, rather than looking to the substantive law most directly ad-
dressing the subject of sex discrimination in the workplace, Title VII, chose to rely upon a
state criminal statute of doubtful application to the record facts.
70. 571 F. Supp. 287 (N.D. Cal. 1983). See supra note 49.
71. CAL. Govr. CODE § § 12900-12906 (West 1980). The procedural provisions of the
CFEHA, §§ 12960-12976, are similar to those in the Oregon and Massachusetts statutes at
issue in Holien and McKinney. See supra notes 36, 38-39, 44, 46.
72. 571 F. Supp. at 293-94.
73. 575 F. Supp. 715 (D. Md. 1983). See also supra text accompanying notes 59-64.
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on the public policy against age discrimination when it adopted the
Maryland Human Relations Act:
In enacting Article 49B, the Maryland General Assembly
created an elaborate and comprehensive statutory scheme for
the investigation and disposition of employment discrimination
claims, including claims of discrimination based on age. Article
49B, sections 9, 10, and 11 set forth the administrative proce-
dures in Maryland for relief in such cases. The Maryland
Human Relations Commission is empowered under the statute
to award monetary relief for violations thereof. Md. Ann.
Code, Art. 49B, § 11 (e).
[W]hen a statutory scheme provides a remedy for injury, that
statutory scheme provides an exclusive remedy which preempts
application of general civil common law, absent indication by
the legislature to the contrary.
74
Mahoney and Chekey are only two of many cases recognizing that legisla-
tures-when adopting elaborate remedial systems for employment dis-
crimination-intended to preempt the field.
75
Decisions such as Holien and McKinney not only fly in the face of
comprehensive remedial systems created by state legislatures and Con-
gress, 76 but statutory language confirming the exclusivity of the statu-
tory relief.77 The decisions derogate the efforts of legislative bodies.
The third, and most critical, public policy against the use of fair
employment practice statutes to create public policy wrongful discharge
claims is that such claims permit plaintiffs to circumvent the procedural
requirements for employment discrimination actions established by
74. 575 F. Supp. at 716-17. See also Soley v. Commission on Human Relations, 277
Md. 521, 356 A.2d 254 (1976); Dillon v. Great At. & Pac. Tea Co., 43 Md. App. 161, 403
A.2d 406 (1979).
75. See also Wilson v. Vlasic Foods, Inc., 116 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2419, 2421 (C.D. Cal.
1984); Galbraith v. Philips Information Sys., Inc., 116 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2519, 2521 (E.D.
Pa. 1984); Brudnicki v. General Elec. Co., 535 F. Supp. 84, 89 (N.D. Ill. 1982); Carrillo v.
Illinois Bell Tel. Co., 538 F. Supp. 793, 799 (N.D. Il. 1982); McCluney v. Jos. Schlitz
Brewing Co., 489 F. Supp. at 26-27; Schroeder v. Dayton-Hudson Corp., 448 F. Supp. at
914; Strauss v. A.L. Randall Co., Inc., 144 Cal. App. 3d 514, 194 Cal. Rptr. 520, 523-24
(1983); Mein v. Masonite Corp., 124 11. App. 3d 617, 464 N.E.2d 1137, 1139 (1984).
Much of the recent litigation dealing with the interaction of state employment discrim-
ination statutes and state public policy wrongful discharge law has arisen in Pennsylvania.
The Pennsylvania Human Relations Act, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43 §§ 951-963 (Purdon 1964 &
Supp. 1965-1983) contains exclusivity provisions similar to those of the Massachusetts Fair
Employment Practice Act, see supra note 46. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 962(b) & (c) (Purdon
1964 & Supp. 1965-1983). Although some have contended that the PHRA is the exclusive
remedy for victims of discrimination, only if they invoke its protections, the courts have
held that PHRA is the single remedy for discrimination, even when employees do not seek
relief under the Act. See, e.g., Wolk v. Saks Fifth Ave., Inc., 728 F.2d at 223-24; Bruffett v.
Warner Communications, Inc., 692 F.2d at 919-21; Bonham v. Dresser Indus., Inc., 569
F.2d at 195 n.9; Galbraith v. Philips Information Sys., Inc., 116 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2519,
2521 (E.D. Pa. 1984); Kamens v. Summit Stainless, Inc., 586 F. Supp. at 328-29. Naturally,
the courts also hold that the PHRA remedies are exclusive when complainants invoke the
protections of the Act. See, e.g., Shaffer v. National Can Corp., 565 F. Supp. 909, 912-13
(E.D. Pa. 1983).
76. See supra notes 36, 46 & 53.
77. See supra notes 39 & 46.
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Congress and the state legislatures. Even if the statutes were not in-
tended to be the exclusive source of substantive law to remedy employ-
ment discrimination, as discussed above, their administrative and
judicial procedures presumably were not designed to be ignored. The
timely filing of any agency charge, notice of the charge to the employer,
agency investigation, agency hearing, reasonable cause determination,
attempted conciliation, issuance of a notice of right to sue, and timely
commencement of a civil action by the employer or the agency, 78 are
required processes under the fair employment practice laws; their im-
portance is widely recognized. As stated by a Florida federal district
court:
The court views each one of the deliberate steps in the statu-
tory scheme-charge, notice, investigation, reasonable cause,
conciliation-as intended by Congress to be a condition prece-
dent to the next succeeding step and ultimately legal action.
Certainly, the E.E.O.C. does not contend that it could skip one
or more of these steps at will. The language of the Act is
mandatory as to each step and the Commission must complete
each step before moving to the next.
79
To permit a plaintiff to assert a public policy against employment dis-
crimination, premised on fair employment practice laws, without requir-
ing compliance with the procedural limitations of such laws on the
plaintiffs claims is to permit the picking and choosing of legal relief, in
violation of legislative wishes.
The Third Circuit Court of Appeals, in Bruffett v. Warner Communica-
tion, Inc.,80 analyzed the importance of this factor when affirming the
dismissal of a discharged employee's age discrimination public policy
claim. The court, in painstaking detail, isolated the various bases for
dismissal, and concluded that-not only did the Pennsylvania legislature
intend the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act to be the exclusive sub-
stantive remedy available to age discrimination claimants in the
state8 I-consideration of such a claim "would give the claimant an op-
portunity to circumvent the carefully drafted legislative procedures" of
the PHRA.
82
There are many dramatic differences between an employment dis-
crimination action under a fair employment statute and under the public
policy theory.8 3 Probably the most striking procedural distinction be-
tween the employment discrimination laws and the public policy theory
78. See supra notes 36, 46 & 53.
79. EEOC v. Container Corp. of Am., 352 F. Supp. 262, 265 (M.D. Fla. 1972).
80. 692 F.2d 910 (3d Cir. 1982); see supra text accompanying notes 63 and 75.
81. See supra note 64.
82. 692 F.2d at 919. See also Tombollo v. Dunn, 342 N.W.2d 23, 25 (S.D. 1984);
Stoecklein v. Illinois Tool Works, Inc., 589 F. Supp. at 145.
83. One major substantive difference is recoverable damages. Exemplary damages
are typically not available under the equal employment opportunity laws. See, e.g.,Johnson
v. Al Tech Specialities Steel Corp., 731 F.2d 143 (7th Cir. 1984) (ADEA); Shah v. Mt. Zion
Hosp., 642 F.2d 268 (9th Cir. 1981) (Title VII); Pearson v. Western Elec. Co., 542 F.2d
1150 (10th Cir. 1976) (Title VII). By contrast, punitive damages are recoverable under
the public policy theory. See, e.g., Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 27 Cal. 3d 167, 610
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involves the applicable statutes of limitation. For example, under the
federal equal employment opportunity laws, the charge normally must
be filed with the E.E.O.C. within 180 days following the alleged discrimi-
nation. 84 A 300-day limitations period is applicable, under some cir-
cumstances, in "deferral" states. 8 5 A judicial action must be
commenced within a brief period of time following completion of the
administrative process. 86 By contrast, the public policy claims asserted
by wrongful discharge plaintiffs are commonly governed by much longer
limitations periods. 87 If courts permit plaintiffs to raise public policy
employment discrimination claims, after failure to comply with fair em-
ployment practice law procedures, claims considered untimely by the
legislatures will be resurrected by the courts.
88
Of the three cases basing public policy claims on allegations of em-
P.2d 1330, 164 Cal. Rptr. 839 (1980). In the Holien case, for example, the plaintiff was
awarded $25,000 in punitive damages. See supra note 40.
A similar conflict on emotional injury damages exists. Compare Wiskotoni v. Michigan
Nat'l Bank-West, 114 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2596 (6th Cir. 1983) with Ferrell v. Finance Am.
Corp., 726 F.2d 654 (10th Cir. 1984) (no compensatory damages under ADEA).
The absence of such remedies in the discrimination statutes reflects legislative opposi-
tion, not neutrality, to the relief. Cf. Silverstein v. Sisters of Charity, 38 Colo. App. 286,
559 P.2d 716 (1976).
84. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e) (1982); 29 U.S.C. § 626(d)(1) (1982). See supra
notes 46 & 53.
85. 42 U.S.C. 2000e-5(e) (1982); 29 U.S.C. § 626(d)(2) (1982). See generally Mohasco
Corp. v. Silver, 447 U.S. 807 (1980) (discussion of time limits for filing claim in "deferral
states").
86. Title VII plaintiffs must bring their civil actions within 90 days following receipt of
a notice of right to sue from the EEOC. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) (1982). See supra note
53. Under the ADEA, a plaintiff must bring a civil action against the employer within two
years (three years, if the violation of the Act is willful) of the alleged discrimination. A
minimum period of 60 days of EEOC investigation and conciliation is required. 29 U.S.C.
§ 626(d) (1982).
87. See, e.g., CoLo. REV. STAT. § 13-80-110(l)(a), (d), (g) (1973) (six-year period); NEV.
REV. STAT. § 11.190.2(c), 11.190.3(c) (1983) (four-year period for actions on contract not
in writing and three-year period for actions to recover personal property); Wyo. STAT. § 1-
3-105(a)(ii)(A), (iv)(B), (iv)(C) (1977) (eight-year period for actions on contract not in writ-
ing, four-year period for actions to recover personal property or redress injury to plain-
tiff's rights).
The Holien case provides an excellent example of the problem. A public policy claim
is timely in Oregon for six years, OR. REV. STAT. § 12.080 (1981), while a statutory com-
plaint must be filed within one year of the alleged discrimination. See supra note 36.
88. A major question for future resolution is whether the substantive law under the
discrimination statutes should be followed in public policy cases. Section 708 of Title VII,
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-7 (1982). suggests that state substantive law may differ from, and yet
co-exist with, Title VII law. However, the legislative history of Title VII indicates that state
law should not be enforced when it is in conflict with federal law. See 110 CONG. REC.
S7205, 7215-18, 7243-46 (daily ed. Apr. 8, 1964) (statements of Sen. Clark and Sen. Case);
110 CONG. REC. R1521 (daily ed. Jan. 31, 1964) (statement of Rep. Celler). The ADEA
does not contain a provision comparable to Section 708, but has a highly ambiguous provi-
sion concerning the preemptive effect of an ADEA suit over "any State action." 29 U.S.C.
633(a) (1982). This provision may signify that the EEOC administrative process is exclu-
sive once a federal charge has been filed. Alternatively, the provision could be interpreted
to mean that substantive federal age discrimination law has preemptive effect over, and is
controlling on, the substantive age discrimination law of the states.
The Lucas opinion indicated that Title VII substantive law would apply to the liability
issue of the public policy claim. See 116 LRRM at 2746 n.3. This approach makes emi-
nently good sense. Otherwise, it seems, both the substantive and procedural terms of a
statute creating a public policy could be disregarded by a public policy claimant. However,
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ployment discrimination, discussed above, the Lucas case most dramati-
cally demonstrates the procedural circumvention problem.8 9 When the
plaintiff brought her Title VII sexual harassment action one day beyond
the federal limitations period, and when Arkansas statutes provided her
with no remedy for sexual harassment, the court was compelled to pro-
vide her with a cause of action based on criminal laws not directly deal-
ing with the substance of her claim. 9 ° After properly enforcing federal
law and taking the plaintiff's discrimination claim away with one hand,
the court gave her a windfall with the other.
A very similar case giving full consideration to the procedural re-
quirements of the fair employment practice laws is Schroeder v. Dayton-
Hudson Corp.9 1 There, the plaintiff commenced untimely claims under
the ADEA and the Michigan Fair Employment Practices Act. 9 2 She as-
serted a separate discrimination claim, relying upon the public policies
expressed in the statutes. The claim was appropriately dismissed on a
Rule 12(b)(6) motion, in part, because the plaintiff's public policy claim
was an apparent attempt to exploit the benefits of the statutes, 9 3 without
satisfying the procedural requirements of the statutes. The import of
such compliance was recently articulated by the United States Supreme
Court: "[I]n the long run, experience teaches that strict adherence to
the procedural requirements specified by the legislature is the best guar-
antee of evenhanded administration of the law."
94
The fourth public policy militating against public policy claims pre-
mised on fair employment practice statutes is federalism. It is interest-
ing to note that most of the decisions in this area are from the federal
courts. In such instances, of course, they are called upon to rule as the
state courts would rule if confronted with the problem of interpreting
the common law and the effect of state and federal statutes on the devel-
opment of that common law. 9 5 The federal courts are required to fol-
low state substantive law, regardless of its harsh effects, 9 6 and even if
they challenge its wisdom. 9 7 Most importantly, state law is not to be
in Holien, the court expressed no concern over the disparate damages law advanced by its
ruling. See supra notes 40 & 83.
89. Also, the court in McKinney frankly acknowledged the circumvention problem and
declared: "Courts should not lightly undertake action that would alter the balance the
legislatures have struck." 491 F. Supp. at 1120. Of course, having made this declaration,
the court then altered the balance struck by Congress and the Massachusetts General
Assembly.
90. See supra notes 50-56 and accompanying text.
91. 448 F. Supp. 910 (E.D. Mich. 1977). See supra notes 58, 63 & 75.
92. MIcH. CoMP. LAws ANN. §§ 423.301-.311 (West 1955) (current version at
§§ 37.201-37.2801 (West 1984)).
93. 448 F. Supp. at 913-14.
94. Baldwin County Welcome Center v. Brown, 104 S. Ct. 1723, 1726 (1984) (quoting
Mohasco Corp. v. Silver, 447 U.S. 807, 826 (1980)).
95. See generally Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938); Hackbart v. Cin-
cinnati Bengals,Inc., 601 F.2d 516, 522 (10th Cir. 1979); Imperial Enterprises, Inc. v. Fire-
man's Fund Ins. Co., 535 F.2d 287, 290 (5th Cir. 1976); Heeney v. Miller, 421 F.2d 434,
439 (8th Cir. 1970).
96. See, e.g., Parson v. United States, 460 F. 228, 234 (5th Cir. 1972).
97. See, e.g., Koch v. Gorrilla, 552 F.2d 1170, 1173 (6th Cir. 1977); Universal Under-
writers Ins. Co. v. Wagner, 367 F.2d 866, 874 (8th Cir. 1966).
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created or changed.9 8 "One of the authentic obligations of federalism
at the judicial level requires that [federal courts] permit the state courts
to decide whether and to what extent they will follow the emerging
law." 99
A recent decision from the federal district court in Utah, Amos v.
Corporation of Presiding Bishop, 0 0 typifies the deference federal courts
should give state courts in the development of public policies. There,
five employees of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints per-
forming secular work were allegedly discharged for religious reasons.
The plaintiffs asserted that the terminations violated Title VII and state
employment discrimination statutes,' 0 ' and a compelling public policy
against religious discrimination. The federal district court-while deny-
ing the defendants' motion for summary judgment as to the statutory
claims-dismissed the wrongful discharge claim, because adoption of
the tort theory would invade the province of the Utah state courts.
Although this court has the duty and power to mold the
laws of this state when applying uncertain state law, . . . it may
not change existing state law. . . . [T]he long history of the
Utah Supreme Court's recognition of the terminable-at-will
doctrine, the language the court has used in dismissing those
cases and the failure of the court to ever suggest that it might
recognize an exception to that rule lead this court to the con-
clusion that the recognition of an exception to the terminable-
at-will doctrine would be a change in Utah law. . . . The Utah
Supreme Court may decide to recognize an exception in the
future, but this court is not at liberty to determine what Utah
law ought to be.
0 2
Unfortunately, this type of judicial restraint is not always exercised.
State court judges (and employers) in Arkansas, for example, were un-
doubtedly startled to learn-via the wisdom of a federal court of appeals
in Lucas-that the public policy wrongful discharge theory existed in the
state, that a plaintiff could assert a public policy claim for wrongful dis-
charge after failing to satisfy the procedural requirements of a federal
statute dealing most directly with the discharge, and that state prostitu-
tion laws could be the basis for a wrongful discharge civil action.
10 3
Public policy issues are state issues; interference by the federal courts in
the development of the states' common law is inexcusable. '
0 4
98. See, e.g., Reeg v. Shaughnessy, 570 F.2d 309, 314 (10th Cir. 1978); System Opera-
tions, Inc. v. Scientific Games Dev. Corp., 555 F.2d 1131, 1142 (3d Cir. 1977); Mills v.
Hoflicht, 465 F.2d 29, 30 (10th Cir. 1972); Schultz & Lindsay Const. Co. v. Erickson, 352
F.2d 425, 435 (8th Cir. 1965); Goranson v. Kloeb, 308 F.2d 655, 656-57 (6th Cir. 1962).
99. Bruffett v. Warner Communications, Inc., 692 F.2d at 920.
100. 117 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2744 (D. Utah 1984).
101. UTAH CODE ANN. § 34-35-1 to -8 (1953 & Supp. 1983).
102. 117 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2770.
103. It is interesting to note that the Arkansas Supreme Court, in at will employment
cases after Lucas, has not even mentioned the decision. See Jackson v. Kinark Corp., 282
Ark. 548, 669 S.W.2d 898 (1984); Gaulden v. Emerson Elec. Co., 284 Ark. 149, 680
S.W.2d 92 (1984).
104. Carrillo v. Illinois Bell Telephone Co., 538 F. Supp. at 799; Chekey v. BTR Realty,
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V. CONCLUSION
Although most courts have held to the contrary, some recent judi-
cial opinions have accepted public policy wrongful discharge claims pre-
mised on allegations of employment discrimination, notwithstanding the
existence of state and federal statutes expressly addressing such discrim-
ination. To permit such claims for relief disregards the historical devel-
opment of the public policy theory. Further, it overlooks the legislative
intent to make the fair enjployment practice laws the exclusive source of
relief for employment discrimination victims, and permits the wholesale
circumvention of procedural systems devised by the legislative bodies.
When employees are subject to discrimination proscribed by state or
federal statute, the remedies provided by such statutes should be exclu-
sive and should not be utilized as the springboard for expansion of tort
common law.
Inc., 115 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 3282; Black v. Standard Oil Co., 115 Lab. Rel. Rep. (BNA),
L.R.R.M. at 3078; Brainard v. Imperial Mfg. Co., 571 F. Supp. 37, 40 (D.R.I. 1983).
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Employment discrimination, in its various forms, was a topic ac-
corded much attention within the political agenda of the administration
of President Johnson. Along with the host of legislation passed to ad-
dress racial, religious and sexual discrimination, Congress in 1967 en-
acted the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA).I At the heart
of the ADEA are provisions which prohibited age discrimination. 2 In ad-
dition to educational programs designed to reduce barriers to employ-
ment,3 the Act also contained an enforcement mechanism which allowed
suit by the aggrieved employee.
4
The prohibitions against age discrimination found in the ADEA
were patterned after the substantive provisions of Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII). 5 As a result, many issues arising under
the ADEA have been resolved by resort to cases decided under Title
VII. The remedial provisions of the ADEA 6 were patterned, not after
Title VII, but after the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA). 7 Hence, the
ADEA vests broad discretion in the trial court to fashion whatever legal
* Partner, Rothgerber, Appel, Powers & Johnson, Denver, Colorado; J.D., Drake
University (1976); B.A., Colorado State University (1969).
** Associate, Rothgerber, Appel, Powers & Johnson, Denver, Colorado; J.D., Uni-
versity of Michigan (1982); B.A., University of Denver (1978).
1. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-34 (1982). President Johnson was particularly concerned with
age discrimination. In January of 1967, the president publically endorsed the concept of
remedial legislation in what has become known as the Older Americans Message. Statis-
tics quoted by the president indicated that persons over age 45 comprised 27 percent of
the unemployed and accounted for over three-quarters of a billion dollars in unemploy-
ment compensation annually. See H. REP. No. 90-805, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. reprinted in
1967 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2213, 2214. The ADEA applies to individuals in the
40 to 70 year age range. 29 U.S.C. § 631 (1982).
2. 29 U.S.C. § 623 (1982). In pertinent part the legislation states:
(a) it shall be unlawful for an employer-
(i) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual or otherwise dis-
criminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, condi-
tions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's age:
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees in any way which would
deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or other-
wise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of such individual's age;
or
(3) to reduce the wage rate of any employee in order to comply with this
chapter.
3. 29 U.S.C. § 622 (1982).
4. 29 U.S.C. § 626 (1982).
5. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2 0 00e-2000e-17 (1982).
6. 29 U.S.C. § 626 (1982). See also H. REP. No. 90-805, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. reprinted
in 1967 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 2218 and 2222-3.
7. 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-19 (1982).
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or equitable relief is deemed appropriate to effectuate the purpose of
the Act.8 This is in sharp contrast to Title VII, which provides only for
equitable relief.9
The ADEA has become a fertile source of litigation,' 0 but very few
of the remedial issues raised by the ADEA have been addressed by the
Supreme Court. Unfortunately the Circuit Courts of Appeals have
reached varying solutions to many of the central issues. The ADEA
practitioner is faced with a morass of cases suggesting various ap-
proaches to the determination of appropriate relief under the ADEA.
The confusion in this area is compounded by the fact that some courts
rather blindly adhere to Title VII principles, while others attempt to
draw from FLSA precedent in determining remedial issues under the
ADEA. As stated, the remedial provisions of Title VII vary substantially
from those of the ADEA. The FLSA, on the other hand, was not drafted
to deal with the problem of the employee who is discharged for discrimi-
natory reasons. Therefore, neither statute provides a perfect model for
resolution of ADEA remedial problems.'
Due to the divergence of judicial approaches to ADEA remedial is-
sues, evaluation of the potential recovery by a plaintiff-employee and of
the corresponding potential exposure of a defendant-employer is prob-
lematical. In an effort to provide some guidance to the practitioner in
this area, this article will survey the judicial resolution of various remedy
issues arising under the ADEA. The focus of the article will be on the
remedies available to an individual employee who is discharged in viola-
tion of the ADEA. Discussion will be limited, for the most part, to issues
of monetary relief. 12
8. 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) and (c) (1982).
9. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1982). The equitable nature of back pay awards under
the Civil Rights Act is discussed in Albermarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 415-25
(1975).
10. Statistics released by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC)
show that the Commission filed 89 lawsuits under the ADEA during fiscal year 1981. This
is the largest number of ADEA suits filed by the government in one year. EQUAL EMPLOY-
MENT OPPORTUNITY NEWS, 10/6/81. An informal survey of cases filed in the United States
District Court for the District of Colorado from January 1982 through October 1984 also
reveals a continuing substantial increase in the number of age discrimination cases. The
survey consisted of a review of the civil cover sheets filed in that court. In 1982, 20 law-
suits which included a claim of violation of ADEA were filed. In 1984, as of October 15th,
39 such lawsuits had been filed. This represents an increase of approximately fifty percent
in the number of age discrimination cases filed in the District of Colorado during that
period.
11. For general discussions of ADEA remedies, see Richards, Monetary Awards for Age
Discrimination in Employment, 30 ARK. L. REV. 305 (1976); Comment, Damages in Age Discrimi-
nation Cases - The Need for a Closer Look, 17 U. RICH. L. REV. 573 (1983); Comment, Age
Discrimination: Monetary Damages Under the Federal Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 58
NEB. L. REV. 214 (1979); Note, Damages Remedies Under the Age Discrimination in Employment
Act, 43 BROOKLYN L. REV. 47 (1976). For a broader coverage of issues arising out of all
facets of the ADEA, see Age Discrimination: A Symposium 32 HASTINGS L.J. 111 I (1981); Sym-
posium: Age Discrimination, 57 CHI [-] KENT L. REv. 805 (1981).
12. The issue of reinstatement will also be addressed insofar as it is related to the




The basic remedial provision of the ADEA is found in 29 U.S.C.
§ 626(b), and states:
The provisions of this chapter shall be enforced in accordance
with the powers, remedies, and procedures provided in sec-
tions 211 (b), 216 (except for subsection (a) thereof), and 217 of
this title, and subsection (c) of this section. Any act prohibited
under section 623 of this title shall be deemed to be a prohib-
ited act under section 215 of this title. Amounts owing to a
person as a result of a violation of this chapter shall be deemed
to be unpaid minimum wages or unpaid overtime compensa-
tion for purposes of sections 216 and 217 of this title: Provided,
That liquidated damages shall be payable only in cases of will-
ful violations of this chapter. In any action brought to enforce
this chapter, the court shall have jurisdiction to grant such legal
or equitable relief as may be appropriate to effectuate the pur-
poses of this chapter, including, without limitation, judgments
compelling employment, reinstatement or promotion, or en-
forcing the liability for amounts deemed to be unpaid minimum
wages or unpaid overtime compensation under this section.
Before instituting any action under this section, the Equal Em-
ployment Opportunity Commission shall attempt to eliminate
the discriminatory practice or practices alleged, and to effect
voluntary compliance with the requirements of this chapter
through informal methods of conciliation, conference, and
persuasion. 13
The first interpretive difficulty encountered in construing this provi-
sion is the omission of any specific definition of the term "amounts ow-
ing as a result of violation."1 4 Thus, the statute vests the trial court with
extraordinary latitude to fashion remedies which will effectuate the pur-
poses of the Act.15
The courts are in basic agreement that the "make-whole standard of
13. 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (1982) (emphasis in the original). By way of contrast the Fair
Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) provides in relevant part:
Any employer who violates the provisions of Section 206 or 207 of this Title shall
be liable to the employee or employees affected in the amount of their unpaid
minimum wages, or their unpaid overtime compensation, as the case may be, and
in an additional equal amount as liquidated damages . . . . The court in such
action shall, in addition to any judgment awarded to the plaintiff or plaintiffs,
allow a reasonable attorneys' fee to be paid by the defendant, and costs of the
action.
29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (1982).
14. The language "[almounts owing . . . as a result of a violation . . . shall be
deemed to be unpaid minimum wages or unpaid overtime compensation for purpose of
sections 216 and 217 of this title," means only that "amounts owing" as a result of an
ADEA violation are to be treated as if they were "unpaid minimum wages or unpaid over-
time compensation" for the purposes of applying sections 216 and 217 of the FLSA, which
are incorporated into the ADEA.
15. The Congressional Statement of Purpose is found in 29 U.S.C. § 621(b) (1982):
It is therefore the purpose of this chapter to promote employment of older per-
sons based on their ability rather than age; to prohibit arbitrary age discrimina-
tion in employment; to help employers and workers find ways of meeting
problems arising from the impact of age on employment. Further details con-
cerning the congressional purpose in enacting the ADEA may be determined
1985]
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relief", as set forth in Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co.,16 should be the
touchstone in fashioning legal and equitable relief for victims of age dis-
crimination. In addition, the courts generally recite the perceived poli-
cies of encouraging voluntary compliance and of avoiding litigation by
fostering conciliation between employer and employee. 17 At least one
court has explicitly acknowledged that monetary awards in ADEA cases
serve the dual function of compensating the employee for injuries
caused by the discriminatory conduct, and deterring future violations.18
The basic remedies most frequently discussed by the courts in
ADEA cases are back pay, front pay, damages for emotional distress,
punitive and/or liquidated damages, and attorneys' fees. Each of these
will be addressed in turn.
II. BACK PAY
The basic remedy for an employee who is discharged in violation of
the ADEA is back pay. While all courts presume that an award of back
pay is appropriate, others have gone farther and held that it is
mandatory. 19
The first step in calculating a back pay award is to determine the
value of the compensation to which the plaintiff-employee would have
been entitled absent the discharge. Because the purpose of a back pay
award is to put the employee in the economic position she would have
occupied but for the discrimination, back pay awards generally include
the value of job related benefits that would have been received during
the back pay period. The value of benefits such as pension benefits, va-
cation pay, health and life insurance benefits, and profit sharing are usu-
ally added to the award. 20 Prospective raises and commissions have also
been included in computing back pay.
2 '
The usual time period for computing back pay runs from the date of
from the legislative history, see H. REP. No. 90-805, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. reprinted
in 1967 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2213.
16. 424 U.S. 747 (1976) (decided under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act).
17. Pfeiffer v. Essex Wire Corp., 682 F.2d 684, 686-7 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S.
1039 (1982); Slatin v. Stanford Research Institute, 590 F.2d 1292, 1295-96 (4th Cir. 1979);
Dean v. American Security Ins. Co., 559 F.2d 1036, 1038-39 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied,
434 U.S. 1066 (1978).
18. Rodriguez v. Taylor, 569 F.2d 1231, 1237 (3rd Cir. 1977) cert. denied, 436 U.S. 913
(1978).
19. McDowell v. Avtex Fibers, Inc., 740 F.2d 214, 217 (3rd Cir. 1984) (relying upon
dictim in Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 584 (1978)).
20. See, e.g., Loeb v. Textron, 600 F.2d 1003 (1st Cir. 1980) (pension benefits); Com-
bes v. Griffin Television, Inc., 421 F. Supp. 841 (W.D. Okla. 1976) (insurance benefits);
Whatley v. Skaggs, 508 F. Supp. 302 (D. Colo. 1981) (profit sharing), afd in part on other
grounds, 707 F.2d 1129 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 349 (1983); Kelly v. American
Standard, Inc., 640 F.2d 974 (9th Cir. 1981) (pension rights and fringe benefits).
21. Syvock v. Milwaukee Boiler Mfg. Co., 665 F.2d 149, 160-61 (future wage in-
creases); Kelly v. American Standard, Inc., 640 F.2d 974, 985-86 (9th Cir. 1981) (salary
increases); Loubrido v. Hull Dobbs Co., 526 F. Supp. 1055 (D. P. R. 1981) (commissions).
See also Kolb v. Goldring, Inc., 694 F.2d 869 (1st Cir. 1982) (reducing trial court's award,
holding that a projection of raises must be based on expert testimony, patterns of past
increases, or similar evidence).
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discharge to the date of trial. 22 However, in certain circumstances it has
been held that back pay should be computed from the date of discharge
to:
(1) the date upon which the employee reached an age beyond
the protection of the ADEA;23 (2) the date upon which the
employee would have been discharged for nondiscriminatory
reasons; 24 (3) the date upon which the employee, in a subse-
quent job, obtained the same income level as that of the job
held prior to the discriminatory discharge;2 5(4) the date of re-
instatement by the defendant-employer; 2 6 or, (5) the date of
the unreasonable refusal of a good faith offer of
reinstatement.
2 7
Once the amount of lost salary and job related benefits has been
determined, certain amounts are then deducted from the back pay
award. These "set-offs" usually fall into one of three categories: interim
earnings; amounts received directly from the defendant-employer at or




In contrast to Title VII, the ADEA contains no specific provisions
regarding set-offs.2 9 Nonetheless, those courts which have specifically
addressed this issue under the ADEA have held that an award of back
pay should be reduced by the wages actually earned by the plaintiff-em-
ployee following the unlawful discharge.3 0 While some courts appar-
ently view the deduction of interim earnings as automatic, other courts
have qualified the operation of the rule, allowing set-off only of those
interim earnings which actually mitigated the plaintiff-employee's loss.
For example, the Sixth Circuit has held that interim earnings from a part
time job that had been performed concurrently with the job from which
the plaintiff-employee had been unlawfully terminated should not be
set-off.3i The court reasoned that such earnings would not actually mit-
22. See, e.g., Brennan v. Ace Hardware Corp., 495 F.2d 368 (8th Cir. 1974); Combes v.
Griffin Television, Inc. 421 F. Supp. 841 (W.D. Okla. 1976).
23. Brennan v. Western Operations, Inc., Consent Decree No. C-74-1039 (D. Cal.,
March 15, 1974).
24. Hill v. Spiegel, Inc., 708 F.2d 233 (6th Cir. 1983); Gibson v. Mohawk Rubber Co.,
695 F.2d 1093 (8th Cir. 1982).
25. Kolb v. Goldring, Inc., 694 F.2d 869 (1st Cir. 1982).
26. Bishop v. Jelleff Associates, 398 F. Supp. 579 (D. D. C. 1974).
27. Fiedler v. Indianhead Truck Line, 670 F.2d 806, 808 (8th Cir. 1982); Coates v.
National Cash Register Co., 433 F. Supp. 655 (W. D. Va. 1977).
28. See Note, Set-Offs Against Back Pay Awards Under the Federal Age Discrimination in Em-
ployment Act, 79 MICH. L. REV. 1113 (1981) (author proposes categorization of potential
set-offs in accordance with "make whole" theory of damages) (hereinafter cited as Set-offs).
29. Title VII expressly requires that interim earnings or amounts earnable with rea-
sonable diligence be set-off against back pay otherwise owing. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)
(1982).
30. See, e.g., Rodriguez v. Taylor, 569 F.2d 1231 (3rd Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S.
913 (1978); Laugesen v. Anaconda Company, 510 F.2d 307 (6th Cir. 1975).
31. Laugesen v. Anaconda Company, 510 F.2d 307 (6th Cir. 1975).
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igate the plaintiff-employee's loss because those wages would have been
received even if the plaintiff-employee had not been terminated in viola-
tion of the Act.
3 2
In view of the inclusion of the value of fringe benefits in the compu-
tation of back pay, logic and equity would demand the set-off not only of
wages earned by the plaintiff-employee during the back pay period, but
also of the value of fringe benefits received during that period. 3 3 This
issue is seldom addressed in reported decisions.
Clearly, calculation and set-off of a plaintiff-employee's actual in-
terim earnings, including finge benefits received, are a prerequisite to an
accurate determination of the appropriate back pay award in an ADEA
action. Moreover, counsel should be cognizant of the fact that the court
may demand a showing as to whether the interim earnings actually miti-
gated the plaintiff-employee's loss. The time and effort expended in dis-
covery of interim earnings is well spent, for such information is also
helpful in determining whether the plaintiff-employee has exercised rea-
sonable diligence in mitigating losses.
34
B. Amounts Received from the Defendant-Employer
In deciding whether to set-off amounts received directly from the
defendant-employer at the time of or after termination, courts generally
look to the nature of the payment. Such amounts usually will be set-off
if the payment was one occasioned only by the wrongful termination. If,
on the other hand, the payment represents an amount actually earned by
the plaintiff-employee, it will not be set-off.
3 5
For instance, in Laugesen v. Anaconda Company 36 the court held that if
severance pay received by the plaintiff-employee was a payment that
32. Id. See also Rodriguez v. Taylor, 569 F.2d 1231, 1243 (3rd Cir. 1977) (holding that
wages actually earned from other employment that could not have been simultaneously
performed with the job sought by the applicant-plaintiff should be set-off). In Kolb v.
Goldring, Inc., 694 F.2d 869 (1st Cir. 1982), the court held that the period for measuring
back pay should end on the date when the plaintiff-employee's earnings at his new job
exceeded those which he would have earned at his previous job, because "to continue the
period to the date ofjudgment would arbitrarily reduce the award." Id. at 874. Thus, not
all interim earnings were set-off.
In a recent case, decided under Title VII, the Eleventh Circuit adopted a rather novel
approach to the set-off of interim earnings. In Darnell v. City of Jasper, 730 F.2d 653
(11 th Cir. 1984), the court held that interim earnings are to be set-off against that amount
of back pay on a periodic as opposed to aggregate basis. In Darnelt, this allowed plaintiff to
recover despite the fact that in seven of the nine years in question he earned more at his
subsequent job, and actually earned more in total than he would have earned as a police
officer. General adoption of this test in ADEA cases could serve to substantially increase
some ADEA back pay awards.
33. See Loubrido v. Hull-Dobbs Co. of Puerto Rico, 526 F. Supp. 1055, 1058 (D. P.R.
1981); see also Set-offs, supra note 28 at 1121-2. In Kolb v. Goldring, Inc., 694 F.2d 869 (1st
Cir. 1982), the court indicated that "post termination economic benefits" should be sub-
tracted from back pay awards, although apparently the bonuses received from the subse-
quent employer were not set-off from the back pay award.
34. The subject of mitigation is discussed infra notes 72-84 and accompanying text.
35. See, e.g., Coleman v. City of Omaha, 714 F.2d 804, 808 n.5 (8th Cir. 1983); EEOC
v. Sandia Corp., 639 F.2d 600, 626 (10th Cir. 1980).
36. 510 F.2d 307 (6th Cir. 1975).
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would not have been received by the employee but for the termination,
then it should be set-off.3 7 The court stated that even though severance
pay may be measured by length of past service, it was nonetheless a pay-
ment occasioned by an involuntary termination.3 8 The court distin-
guished severance pay from vacation pay, stating that the latter was an
amount actually earned by the employee and, therefore, vacation pay
should not be set-off.
39
However, in Naton v. Bank of California,40 the Ninth Circuit held that
amounts paid by the defendant-employer at the time of termination for
accumulated sick leave and vacation pay benefits were properly de-
ducted from a back pay award.4 1 The Ninth Circuit reasoned that the
plaintiff-employee would not have been entitled to receive the monetary
value of those benefits had he teminated his employment through nor-
mal retirement.4 2 Instead, he would have been required to use those
accrued benefits by ceasing work prior to his retirement date.43 There-
fore, the Ninth Circuit held that the trial court had properly deducted
those benefits from the back pay award.
It is more difficult to resolve the issue of set-off regarding this type
of payment in cases where reinstatement is offered by the employer or is
ordered by the court. In Cline v. Roadway Express, Inc. ,44 the court recog-
nized that its decision to allow or disallow set-off of a stock bonus re-
ceived at termination could result in a windfall to the plaintiff-employee
or alternatively promote under-recovery. 4 5 The court remanded with
instructions to structure a decree avoiding either possibility.
46
As the facts of the Cline case demonstrate, a simple inquiry into
whether the payment was "occasioned by" termination will not always
be sufficient. The courts must be willing to tailor their orders regarding
set-offs in such cases to avoid the award of either a windfall or an inade-
quate amount.
C. Collateral Benefits
One of the most troublesome remedy issues under the ADEA is the
propriety of deducting from a back pay award any post-termination pay-
ments received by the plaintiff-employee from sources other than the
defendant-employer. Some courts apply the common law collateral
37. Id. at 317.
38. Id.
39. Id. (citing Monroe v. Penn-Dixie Cement Corp., 335 F. Supp. 231 (N.D. Ga.
1971)).
40. 649 F.2d 691 (9th Cir. 1981).
41. Id. at 700.
42. Id.
43. Id. However, the court indicated that this result would have been different if the
employee had a "cash-out" option available.
44. 689 F.2d 481 (4th Cir. 1982).
45. Id. at 490.
46. Id. The crux of the issue was the plaintiffs ability to accept reinstatement and then
to voluntarily separate himself from the firm at a later date. If this was done absent an
offset of the stock bonus, plaintiff would reap a windfall. Thus the trial court was in-
structed to fashion a decree that would preclude manipulation by either party.
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source rule in deciding whether to set-off such benefits from a back pay
award. 47 Under the collateral source rule, amounts received by an in-
jured party from a source independent of the wrongdoer are not
credited against the damages owed by the wrongdoer. The rationale of
this rule is that the wrongdoer should not reap the benefit of payments
made by a third party.
The application of this rule to preclude set-off in ADEA cases, with-
out regard to the realities of the employment situation, can overcom-
pensate the plaintiff-employee and penalize the defendant-employer in a
manner never intended by Congress. On the other hand, if such bene-
fits are set-off, then the employer's liability is significantly reduced; re-
gardless of the nature or severity of the ADEA violation. Arguably, this
may reduce the incentives for voluntary compliance with the ADEA.
There is no clear concensus on the issue of set-off of collateral ben-
efits. The Third Circuit has held that unemployment compensation
benefits may not be deducted from back-pay awards. 48 Similarly, a
number of courts have affirmed where the trial court, in its discretion,
has refused to set-off unemployment compensation benefits from an
ADEA award. 49 The Seventh Circuit has, in dictum, approved a trial
court's decision to set-off both unemployment compensation and retire-
ment pension benefits from an ADEA award.
50
In Naton v. Bank of California5 l the Ninth Circuit held that "even if
the district court was authorized to treat unemployment compensation
as a collateral benefit, it retained the discretion under the ADEA to de-
duct the compensation from the back pay award.''52 However in a later
case decided under Title VII, Kauffman v. Sidereal Corp. , the same court
held that "unemployment benefits received by a successful plaintiff in an
employment discrimination action are not off-sets against a back pay
47. See, e.g., EEOC v. Sandia Corp., 639 F.2d 600 (10th Cir. 1980); Pedreyra v. Cornell
Prescription Pharmacies, Inc., 465 F. Supp. 936 (D. Colo. 1979). The collateral source
rule has not, however, been applied to preclude the set-off of interim earnings, which are
truly "collateral" benefits.
48. McDowell v. Avtex Fibers, Inc., 740 F.2d 214, 217 (3rd Cir. 1984) (no deduction
regardless of whether the benefits are funded by the employer). Other courts have ad-
hered to the same rule in the context of Title VII cases. See, e.g., Brown v. A.J. Gerrard
Mfg. Co., 715 F.2d 1549 (11 th Cir. 1983); Kauffman v. Sidereal Corp., 695 F.2d 343 (9th
Cir. 1982); EEOC v. Ford Motor Co., 645 F.2d 183 (4th Cir. 1981), rev'don other grounds,
458 U.S. 219 (1982), original position adhered to on remand, 688 F.2d 951 (4th Cir. 1982).
49. Orzel v. City of Wauwatosa Fire Dep't., 697 F.2d 743, 756 (7th Cir. 1983); EEOC
v. Sandia Corp., 639 F.2d 600, 624-6 (10th Cir. 1980); Marshall v. Goodyear Tire & Rub-
ber Co., 554 F.2d 730, 736 (5th Cir. 1977). These courts fail to indicate whether it is also
within the discretion of the trial court to allow set-off of such benefits.
50. Syvock v. Milwaukee Boiler Mfg. Co., 665 F.2d 149, 161-2 (7th Cir. 1981). See also
EEOC v. Enterprise Ass'n Steamfitters Local No. 638, 542 F.2d 579 (2d Cir. 1976) (de-
cided under Title VII) cert. denied, sub nom Rio v. Enterprise Ass'n Steamfitters, 430 U.S.
911 (1977); Satty v. Nashville Gas Co., 522 F.2d 850 (6th Cir. 1975), aff'd in part and vacated
in part on other grounds, 434 U.S. 136 (1977) (decided under Title VII), superceded by statute as
stated in Hayes v. Shelby Memorial Hosp., 726 F.2d 1543, 1547 (11 th Cir. 1984) (Preg-
nancy Discrimination Act case).
51. 649 F.2d 691 (9th Cir. 1981).
52. Id. at 700.
53. 659 F.2d 343 (9th Cir. 1982).
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award. ' 5 4 The court left open the issue of whether the collateral source
rule would apply if the unemployment compensation was funded "di-
rectly" by the plaintiffs employer, rather than through a state fund sup-
ported by a tax on employers. 55
In EEOC v. Sandia Corp.,56 the Tenth Circuit acknowledged that
some courts had upheld the set-off of such amounts. The court termed
that position "somewhat questionable," and noted that such set-offs
would result in unjust enrichment for employers who have violated the
Act. 57 In those states where, upon receipt of a back pay award, employ-
ees are required by statute to repay to the state all benefits (such as
unemployment compensation) received during the back pay period,
there is no danger of double recovery, and the courts are likely to refuse
to set-off such benefits.
5 8
In many circuits, however, the issue remains unsettled. The sugges-
tion of one author that all employment related benefits that represent a
true gain to the plaintiff-employee should be set-off is one worth of seri-
ous consideration. 59  The focus of the courts should be upon the
"make-whole" purpose of the ADEA, and decisions regarding set-off of
collateral benefits should be made in such a way as to effectuate that
goal.
III. FRONT PAY
Under the ADEA, the trial court may in its discretion order the rein-
statement of a plaintiff-employee who has been discharged in violation
of the Act. There are, nonetheless, numerous situations in which the
courts have found that reinstatement is not possible or appropriate. For
example, the position may have been filled by another innocent em-
ployee, or there may be extreme hostility between the plaintiff-employee
and the defendant-employer. In such circumstances, some courts have
granted an award of monetary relief in lieu of reinstatement. Such fu-
ture damages are commonly referred to as "front pay." The concept of
"front pay" is fairly simple; its application to the facts of a particular
case however can be extremely difficult, creating numerous problems
for practitioners and the courts.
As the First Circuit noted in Loeb v. Textron, Inc.,60 front pay consti-
tutes payment for services not rendered and, more importantly, "any
assessment of what an individual might have earned had he been rein-
stated usually is highly speculative, given the possibilities of promotions
or legitimate demotions or terminations."' 6' The speculative nature of
such awards reaches awesome proportions when the employee is at the
54. Id. at 347.
55. Id. at 347 n.2.
56. 639 F.2d 600 (10th Cir. 1980).
57. Id. at 625.
58. See, e.g., Wise v. Olan Mills, Inc., 495 F. Supp. 257, 259 n.3 (D. Colo. 1980).
59. Set-offs, supra note 28 at 1121-28.
60. 600 F.2d 1003 (lst Cir. 1979).
61. Id. at 1023. (Footnote omitted).
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low end of the broad age group protected by the ADEA. 62
Several courts, including the First and Third Circuits, have shown a
distinct reluctance to grant front pay damages. 63 These courts have rea-
soned that such awards are highy speculative and that the possibility of
an award of front pay might make it less likely that plaintiff-employees
would settle short of litigation.
64
However, awards of front pay have received approval in the Second,
Sixth, Eighth, Ninth and Tenth Circuit Courts of Appeals, and in numer-
ous district courts. 6 5 Those circuit courts which have allowed an award
of front pay have cautioned that there must be specific findings made by
the trial court as to why reinstatement is not appropriate. 66 Such awards
should only be made where calculation of the award does not require
undue speculation, either as to the possibility of future employment and
mitigation of damages, or as to the amount of money that the employee
would have received had she not been discriminatorily discharged.
6 7
These courts have reasoned that if front pay was not available in
lieu of reinstatement, the defendant-employer could significantly reduce
its liability by making the possibility of reinstatement unattractive for the
employee. 68 Concerns regarding the speculative nature of front pay
have been dismissed as insufficient to preclude such an award, due to
the experience of courts in calculating damages for future wages in em-
ployment contract and personal injury cases. 69 The requirement that
the plaintiff-employee mitigate damages, and the fact that front pay may
only be awarded in those limited situations where truly necessary to
compensate the plaintiff-employee have also been cited as justifications
for front pay awards.
70
In view of the fact that front pay is an award made in lieu of rein-
statement, which is an equitable remedy, the award should be made by
62. The protected age group under the ADEA consists of individuals between the
ages of 40 and 70. 29 U.S.C. § 631 (1982).
63. Kolb v. Goldring, Inc., 694 F.2d 869, 874 n.4 (1st Cir. 1982) (citing to Wehr);
Wehr v. Burroughs Corp., 619 F.2d 276, 283 (3d Cir. 1980) (holding that future damages
could not be awarded where the plaintiffhad impliedly disclaimed any desire for reinstate-
ment); Ginsberg v. Burlington Indus., Inc., 500 F. Supp. 696, 700-1 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (cit-
ing lack of support in a legislative history); Monroe v. Penn-Dixie Cement Corp., 335 F.
Supp. 231, 235 (N.D. Ga. 1971) (holding front pay not an appropriate remedy).
64. Ginsberg v. Burlington Indus., Inc., 500 F. Supp. 696, 701 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (dis-
cusses problem of settlement, but admits rationale weak); Monroe v. Penn-Dixie Cement
Corp., 335 F. Supp. 231, 235 (N.D. Ga. 1971) (noting speculative nature of damage).
65. Davis v. Combustion Eng'g Inc., 742 F.2d 916, 922-3 (6th Cir. 1984); Whittlesey
v. Union Carbide Corp., 742 F.2d 724, 727-9 (2d Cir. 1984); EEOC v. Prudential Fed. Say.
and Loan Ass'n, 741 F.2d 1225, 1230-3 (10th Cir. 1984); Gibson v. Mohawk Rubber Co.,
695 F.2d 1093, 1100 (8th Cir. 1982); Cancellier v. Federated Dept. Stores, 672 F.2d 1312,
1319 (9th Cir.) cert. denied, 459 U.S. 859 (1982). See also O'Donnell v. Georgia Osteopathic
Hosp. Inc., 574 F. Supp. 214 (N.D. Ga. 1983); Ventura v. Federal Life Ins. Co., 571 F.
Supp. 48 (N.D. Ill. 1983); Koyen v. Consolidated Edison Co., 560 F. Supp. 1161 (S.D.N.Y.
1983); Hoffman v. Nissan Motor Corp., 511 F. Supp. 352 (D.N.H. 1981).
66. See EEOC v. Prudential, at 1233.
67. Whittlesey, at 729.
68. EEOC v. Prudential, at 1232.
69. Whittlesey, at 728-9.
70. Id. at 729; Davis, at 923.
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the trial court, rather than by thejury.7 1 This arguably reduces the pos-
sibility of a large, completely speculative award of a punitive nature.
IV. MITIGATION
As noted previously, Title VII expressly requires the set-off of
amounts "earnable with reasonable diligence."'7 2 The ADEA has no
such express language, yet the courts have uniformly held that an em-
ployee who is discharged in violation of the ADEA is required to use
reasonable efforts to mitigate damages. 73 It is not required that such
efforts be successful, so long as the employee makes an honest, good
faith attempt to obtain other employment.
74
The burden is on the employer to demonstrate that suitable posi-
tions existed which the plaintiff-employee could have discovered and for
which plaintiff was qualified, and that the plaintiff-employee failed to ex-
ercise reasonable diligence in seeking such positions. 75 If the defendant
carries this burden the amount of the back pay award is reduced by
those amounts that the plaintiff-employee would have earned, had she
used reasonable diligence.
In determining mitigation issues under the ADEA, the focus is upon
the reasonableness of the plaintiff-employee's actions. It has been held
that a plaintiff-employee discharged her obligations to use reasonable
efforts to mitigate in situations where she had regular contact with an
unemployment board and held a part time job during the back pay pe-
riod,7 6 or where the employee accepted a lower paying position in a
field outside of her usual type of employment. 7 7 Nonetheless, it is not
unreasonable for a plaintiff-employee to reject the offer of a job in a
distant city.
78
In the situation where, prior to the time of trial, the defendant-em-
ployer has offered to reinstate the plaintiff-employee to her former posi-
tion, such an offer of reinstatement has been held to cut off the time for
calculating back pay. 79 However, if the plaintiff-employee's refusal to ac-
cept the offer of reinstatement is reasonable, then such refusal does not
constitute a failure to mitigate, and therefore does not toll the back pay
period.8 0 For example, where the offer of reinstatement is conditioned
in a way that could affect the plaintiffs claim, or the offer is to reemploy
71. Gibson, at 1100-1; Ventura, at 51.
72. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1982).
73. See, e.g., Cline v. Roadway Express, Inc., 689 F.2d 481, 488 (4th Cir. 1982); Fiedler
v. Indianhead Truck Line, Inc., 670 F.2d 806, 809 (8th Cir. 1982); EEOC v. Sandia Corp.,
639 F.2d 600, 627 (10th Cir. 1980).
74. Sandia, at 627.
75. Id. See atso Coleman v. City of Omaha, 714 F.2d 804, 808 (8th Cir. 1983); Wehr v.
Burroughs Corp., 619 F.2d 276, 278 n.3 (3d Cir. 1980).
76. Orsel v. City of Wauwatosa Fire Dep't, 697 F.2d 743, 756-57 (7th Cir. 1983).
77. Cline v. Roadway Express, Inc., 689 F.2d 481, 488-89 (4th Cir. 1982).
78. Spagnuolo v. Whirlpool Corp., 717 F.2d 114, 119 (4th Cir. 1983). The court
noted that relocation is particularly unwelcome for victims of age discrimination.
79. See cases discussed at note 27 supra.
80. Dickerson v. Deluxe Check Printers, Inc., 703 F.2d 276, 282 (8th Cir. 1983).
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in a different job with less status, fewer prospects for future advance-
ment, and less compensation, the offer does not automatically cut off the
back pay period. 8 1 On the other hand, it has been held that the mere
fact that there is some friction between the parties because of the pend-
ing litigation is, by itself, an insufficient basis for refusal of an offer of
reinstatement. 8 2 It is generally for the jury to determine whether the
reasons for refusal of the offer of reinstatement were reasonable.
8 3
The issue of mitigation is crucial to a determination not only of the
proper amount of back pay, but also as to the appropriate amount of
front pay. Courts which have allowed front pay have indicated that the
employee's duty to mitigate continues beyond the time of the trial.
84
These courts have not, however, dealt with the problematic issues of
proof created by allowance of front pay. For example, the burden will
remain on the defendant-employer to prove the amount that the plain-
tiff-employee can be expected to earn in the future. It is not clear
whether the courts will go so far as to require the defendant-employer to
demonstrate, by the use of expert testimony, the projected availability of
jobs in those fields in which the plaintiff-employee is qualified in order
to limit the front pay award. Obvious difficulties present themselves in
the situation where the plaintiff-employee has been terminated from a
job which is obsolete. Must the defendant-employer prove the availabil-
ity of training in fields other than those in which it had employed the
plaintiff?
In sum, despite statutory silence plaintiff-employees discharged in
violation of the ADEA are required to mitigate their damages. The bur-
den of proving a failure to mitigate rests on the employer. Issues of
proof of future mitigation in connection with a claim for front pay prom-
ise to create numerous, complex problems for practitioners and courts
in the future.
V. PAIN AND SUFFERING
All appellate courts which have ruled upon the availability of dam-
ages for emotional distress caused by an ADEA violation have held that
such damages are not recoverable, 85 although at least two district courts
81. Dickerson v. Deluxe Check Printers, Inc., 703 F.2d 276 (8th Cir. 1983); Orzel v.
City of Wauwatosa Fire Dep't., 697 F.2d 743 (7th Cir. 1983).
82. Cf. Dickerson v. Deluxe Check Printers, Inc., 703 F.2d 276, 282 (8th Cir. 1983).
83. Id., Fiedler v. Indianhead Truck Line Inc., 670 F.2d 806, 808-09 (8th Cir. 1982).
84. See cases discussed at note 65 supra.
85. Perrell v. Financeamerica Corp., 726 F.2d 654 (10th Cir. 1984); Hill v. Spiegel,
Inc., 708 F.2d 233 (6th Cir. 1983); Pfeiffer v. Essex Wire Corp., 682 F.2d 684 (7th Cir.
1982); Fiedler v. Indianhead Truck Line, Inc., 670 F.2d 806 (8th Cir. 1982); Naton v. Bank
of California, 649 F.2d 691 (9th Cir. 1981); Slatin v. Stanford Research Ins., 590 F.2d 1292
(4th Cir. 1979); Vazquez v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 579 F.2d 107 (1st Cir. 1978); Dean v.
American Sec. Ins. Co., 559 F.2d 1036 (5th Cir. 1977) cert. denied 434 U.S. 1066 (1978);
Rogers v. Exxon Research and Eng'g Co., 550 F.2d 834 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434
U.S. 1022 (1978). See also Waters & Pursell, Emotional Distress: The Battle Over a New Tort
Under Age Discrimination Continues, 30 LAB. L.J. 667 (1979); Comment, Awarding Compensatory
Damages for Pain and Suffering in Age Discrimination Cases: A Proper Reading of the Statute?, 29
S.C.L. REV. 705 (1978).
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have awarded such damages. 86
In denying damages for pain and suffering, the courts generally
have relied upon the ADEA's silence on the availability of such damages
and upon the adverse effect that the availability of awards might have on
the administrative conciliation process. 8 7 Some courts have based their
refusal upon perceptions of congressional intent. In Slatin v. Stanford
Research Institute,88 the Fourth Circuit focused on the incorporation of
certain FLSA provisions into the ADEA. The court reasoned that Con-
gress had implied knowledge of judicial interpretations of the FLSA
which uniformity failed to permit recovery of compensatory damages for
pain and suffering. Hence, Congress must have intended a similar result
under the ADEA. 89
Countervailing arguments exist. As the courts have acknowledged
in other contexts, the remedies specifically listed in the ADEA were not
intended to be as an exhaustive list.90 Instead, the courts are given the
power to grant whatever legal or equitable relief as appropriate to effec-
tuate the purposes of the Act. It is interesting to note that the Tenth
Circuit in Perrell v. Financeamerica Corp.,9 1 in denying damages for pain
and suffering, stated, "[wle can but conclude that the trial court erred in
allowing jury consideration of any item of damage except those specifically pro-
vided within the enforcement scheme of the ADEA. ' '92 However, in
holding that an award of front pay in lieu of reinstatement was an appro-
priate remedy under the ADEA, the Tenth Circuit in EEOC v. Prudential
Federal Say. and Loan Assn.,93 stated, "we conclude that the legal and eq-
uitable remedies available under the ADEA are not limited either to those
specifically listed or to those available under the FLSA, so long as the relief
if 'appropriate to effectuate the purposes of [the Act]'.
' '94
It might be argued that the refusal to award damages for pain and
suffering is inconsistent with the oft-stated goal of the ADEA; that is, to
counteract the adverse effects of age discrimination and to make the
plaintiff-employee whole for whatever losses were caused by the viola-
tion of the Act. However, it is fairly clear that damages for pain and
suffering and for emotional distress are not available under the ADEA.
VI. LIQUIDATED DAMAGES
29 U.S.C. § 216(b) provides, in part:
86. See, e.g., Wise v. Olan Mills, Inc., 485 F. Supp. 542 (D. Colo. 1980); Buchholz v.
Symons Mfg. Co., 445 F. Supp. 706 (E.D. Wis. 1978).
87. See, e.g., Perrell v. Financeamerica Corp., 726 F.2d 654 (10th Cir. 1984); Rogers v.
Exxon Research and Eng'g Co., 550 F.2d 834 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1022
(1978).
88. 590 F.2d 1292 (4th Cir. 1979).
89. Id. at 1293.
90. See, e.g., EEOC v. Prudential Fed. Say. and Loan Ass'n, 741 F.2d 1225 (10th Cir.
1984).
91. 726 F.2d 654 (10th Cir. 1984).
92. Id. at 657 (emphasis added).
93. 741 F.2d 1225 (10th Cir. 1984).
94. Id. at 1232 (emphasis added).
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Any employer who violates the provisions of this title shall be
liable to the employee or employees affected in the amount of
their unpaid minimum wages or their unpaid overtime compen-
sation. . . and in an additional amount as liquidated damages.
The ADEA also provides that "amounts owing to a person as a result of
a violation of this chapter shall be deemed to be unpaid minimum wages
or unpaid overtime compensation for purposes of §§ 216 and 217 of
this title ... " 95 and that liquidated damages shall be payable only in
cases of willful violations of the ADEA. Therefore, an employer who
willfully violates the ADEA is liable not only for "amounts owing", but
for an additional equal amount.
The liquidated damages provision of the ADEA has raised numer-
ous issues which have been resolved in varying ways by the courts.
Some courts have held that, in the event of a willful violation, the em-
ployee is automatically entitled to the maximum amount of liquidated
damages, 9 6 rejecting the argument that the good faith defense in Sec-
tion 11 of the Portal-to-Portal Act 9 7 applies in cases under the ADEA.
The courts have reasoned that Congress specifically selected those por-
tions of the Portal-to-Portal Act which it wished to incorporate into the
ADEA and that those provisions not expressly incorporated do not ap-
ply.9 8 The First Circuit, in Loeb v. Textron,9 9 reasoned that on its face, 29
U.S.C. § 216(b) required that liquidated damages be awarded once a vi-
olation is shown. "Section 11 mitigates this result in FLSA cases ... [i]n
ADEA cases the 'willfulness' test serves the same function and renders
§ 11 superfluous."' 0 0 Other courts, however, have indicated that there
is some discretion in the trial court to determine whether the full liqui-
dated damage award shall be made.' 0 ' At least one court has held that
the maximum liquidated damage award is twice the amount of the back
pay award, and that front pay should not be included in the
calculation. 102
The courts have also taken different positions as to the nature of an
award of liquidated damages. Some courts have held that the purpose
of such a liquidated damage award is punitive; and have thus denied
recovery of punitive damages.' 0 3 Other courts, however, have charac-
95. 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (1982).
96. EEOC v. Prudential Fed. Sav. and Loan Ass'n, 741 F.2d 1225, 1234 (10th Cir.
1984); Hill v. Spiegel, Inc., 708 F.2d 233, 238 (6th Cir. 1983); Kelly v. American Standard
Inc., 640 F.2d 974, 981-(9th Cir. 1981); Loeb v. Textron Inc., 600 F.2d 1003, 1020 (4st
Cir. 1979).
97. 29 U.S.C. §§ 216, 251-62 (1982).
98. See 29 U.S.C. § 626(e) (1982), expressly incorporating §§ 6 and 10 of the Portal-
to-Portal Pay Act.
99. 600 F.2d 1003 (1st Cir. 1979).
100. Id. at 1020. See also Wehr v. Burroughs Corp., 619 F.2d 276, 279 n.5 (3rd Cir.
1980) (citing Loeb v. Textron, 600 F.2d 1003 (1st Cir. 1979)).
101. Elliott v. Group Medical and Surgical Serv., 714 F.2d 556, 558 n.2 (5th Cir. 1983),
cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 2658 (1984); Hayes v. Republic Steel Corp., 531 F.2d 1307, 1311-12
(5th Cir. 1976); O'Donnell v. Georgia Osteopathic Hosp., 574 F. Supp. 214, 223 (N.D. Ga.
1982).
102. O'Donnell v. Georgia Osteopathic Hosp., 574 F. Supp. 214, 223 (N.D. Ga. 1982).
103. Kelly v. American Standard, Inc., 640 F.2d 974, 979 (9th Cir. 1981); Dean v.
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terized liquidated damages as compensatory rather than a punitive, 10 4
relying upon the House Conference Report regarding the 1978 amend-
ments to the ADEA:
The ADEA as amended by the Act does not provide remedies
of a punitive nature. The conferees therefore agree to permit a
jury trial on the factual issues underlying a claim for liquidated
damages because the Supreme Court has made clear that an
award of liquidated damages under the FLSA is not a penalty
but rather is available in order to provide full compensatory
relief for losses that are "too obscure and difficult to prove for
estimate other than by liquidated damages."'
10 5
Under this view, liquidated damages compensate the plaintiff-employee
for losses that are difficult of certain calculation, such as pre-judgment
interest. Therefore, to prevent double recovery by the plaintiff-em-
ployee, most courts have held that a plaintiff-employee cannot recover
both liquidated damages and pre-judgment interest, at least absent ex-
ceptional circumstances. 10 6 Recently, however, in Trans World Airlines,
Inc. v. Thurston,10 7 the Supreme Court held that "Congress intended for
liquidated damages to be punitive in nature."' 0 8
Even those courts, which prior to Transworld Airlines, characterized
the liquidated damage award as non-punitive in nature usually refused
to allow recovery of punitive damages. These courts reasoned that:
such damages are not expressly provided in the ADEA; Congress pre-
sumably had knowledge that the FLSA had been interpreted as disallow-
ing punitive damages when it incorporated the remedial provisions of
the FLSA into the ADEA; and, an award of punitive damages would un-
dermine the administrative conciliation process. 10 9
American Sec. Ins., Co., 559 F.2d 1036, 1039-40 (5th Cir. 1977) cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1066
(1978).
104. Gibson v. Mohawk Rubber Co., 695 F.2d 1093, 1102 (8th Cir. 1982). See also Blim
v. Western Elec. Co. Inc., 731 F.2d 1473, 1479 (10th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, sub nom
A.T.&T. Technologies, Inc. v. Blim, 53 U.S.L.W. 3241 (1984).
105. H. CONF. REP. No. 95-950, 95th Cong., 2nd Sess. 13-14, reprinted in 1978 U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 535. (Citation omitted).
106. See, e.g., Blim v. Western Elec. Co., Inc., 731 F.2d 1473, 1479 (10th Cir. 1984);
Gibson v. Mohawk Rubber Co., 695 F.2d 1093, 1102 (8th Cir. 1982); Spagnuolo v. Whirl-
pool Corp., 641 F.2d 1109, 1114 (4th Cir.) cert. denied, 454 U.S. 860 (1981). Contra Cris-
well v. Western Airlines, 709 F.2d 544 (9th Cir. 1983) appeal pending, 104 S. Ct. 2340
(1984); O'Donnell v. Georgia Osteopathic Hosp.. Inc.. 574 F. Supp. 214 (N.D. Ga. 1982).
107. 53 U.S.L.W. 4024 (1985).
108. Id. at 4027. The Court, in Trans Vorld Airlines, also adopted the "reckless disre-
gard" standard for the application of liquidated damages. If the employer knew his con-
duct was prohibited or showed reckless disregard as to whether his conduct was
prohibited, he committed a "willful" violation thus entitling the plaintiff to liquidated
damages. Id. at 4028. The Court also concluded that § 11 of the Portal-to-Portal Act was
not incorporated into the ADEA, but stated that, "[nievertheless, we think that the same
concerns are reflected in the proviso to § 7(b) of the ADEA." Id. at 4028 n.22.
109. Pfeiffer v. Essex Wire Corp., 682 F.2d 694, 686-7 (7th Cir.) cert. denied, 459 U.S.
1039 (1982). Cf. Johnson v. Altech Specialties Steel Corp., 731 F.2d 143 (2d Cir. 1984);
Rogers v. Exxon Research and Eng'g Co., 550 F.2d 834 (3rd Cir. 1977) cert. denied, 434
U.S. 1022 (1978).
19851
DENVER UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW
VII. ATrORNEY'S FEES
The Fair Labor Standards Act,' ' which is incorporated by the
ADEA,"' provides that in an action under the FLSA the court "shall, in
addition to any judgment awarded to the plaintiff or plaintiffs, allow a
reasonable attorney's fee to be paid by defendant, and costs of the
action." 1 12
Based on the statutory language "shall", most courts have viewed
the award of attorney's fees to a successful plaintiff-employee as
mandatory."13 The amount of any attorney's fee award is within the dis-
cretion of the trial court. An award of attorney's fees for the costs of
prosecuting an appeal under the ADEA may also be awarded.' l4 It
should be noted that the language of the FLSA regarding attorney's fees
is more restrictive than that of Title VII insofar as, under the FLSA,
attorney's fees are to be awarded in addition to any judgment awarded to
the plaintiff.' 1 5 Thus, there is no provision for the award of attorney's
fees in connection with administrative proceedings, and it is questiona-
ble whether attorney's fees would be awarded in a case where the plain-
tiff succeeded in obtaining a favorable settlement. 1 16 There is also no
provision in the ADEA for an award of attorney's fees to a successful
defendant. 117
VIII. CONCLUSION
The types and amounts of damages available in an ADEA action
remains a confusing area for the practitioner. The Circuit Courts of Ap-
peals remain divided on many of the central issues and the Supreme
Court has made few moves to resolve the resulting tangle of conflicting
authority. Over the near term, the law of the relevant circuit often will
remain the primary authority in the resolution of many issues; particu-
larly questions regarding front pay, mitigation and aspects of liquidated
damages remaining unresolved in the wake of Trans World Airlines.
110. 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-19 (1982).
I1. 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (1982).
112. 29 U.S.C. § 216 (1982).
113. Weisel v. Singapore joint Venture Inc., 602 F.2d 1185, 1191 n.18 (5th Cir. 1979);
Rodriguez v. Taylor, 569 F.2d 1231, 1244 (3rd Cir. 1977) cert. denied, 436 U.S. 913 (1978).
114. Goodman v. Heublein, Inc., 682 F.2d 44, 48 (2nd Cir. 1982); Hecrick v. Hercules,
Inc., 658 F.2d 1088, 1097-98 (5th Cir. 1981); Kelly v. American Standard, Inc., 640 F.2d
974, 986 (9th Cir. 1981); Cleverly v. Western Elec. Co., 594 F.2d 638, 643 (8th Cir. 1979)
(per curiam), afg 450 F. Supp. 507 (W.D. Miss. 1978).
115. Compare 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (1982) with 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) (1982).
116. See, e.g., Vocca v. Playboy Hotel, 686 F.2d 605, 607 (7th Cir. 1982).
117. See EEOC v. Western Elec., Co. 33 Fair Empl. Prac. Cases 1259, 1260 (1983).
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In May 1984, the Supreme Court held that Title VII I of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 prohibited law firms from discriminating against wo-
men and minorities when extending offers of partnership to associates
employed by the firm. 2 The ramifications of this decision, Hishon v. King
& Spalding, will not only affect law firm partnerships but also extend to
brokerage houses, accounting and architectural firms, and all other busi-
ness entities that operate as partnerships or professional corporations.
Although, at present, the scope of the decision is unclear, it eventually
will be drawn into focus as the courts set the limitations, if any, on civil
rights laws governing other aspects of firm management.
I. HISTORICAL NON-PARTICIPATION OF WOMEN AND MINORITIES IN LAW
FIRMS
The Court's opinion does not address the limited participation of
women and minorities in the legal profession. The historical absence of
women and minorities in law firms must be discussed in order to fully
understand the remedies which may be formulated to cure the problem.
Hishon's brief to the Supreme Court discussed at length the histori-
cal non-participation of women in the legal profession.3 To illustrate
this point, the brief stated that Harvard Law School did not admit wo-
men until 1950, Notre Dame Law School, not until 1969, and Washing-
ton and Lee Law School, not until 1972. 4 Other statistical data
* Partner, Sherman & Howard, Denver, Colorado; J.D., Harvard Law School
(1974); B.A., Kansas State University (1970).
1. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e17 (1982). Title VII states in pertinent part:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer. . .[t]o fail or refuse
to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any
individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions or privileges of
employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin.
Id. at § 2000e-2 (a)(l).
2. Hishon v. King & Spalding, 104 S. Ct. 2229 (1984).
3. Brief for Petitioner at 18-24, Hishon v. King & Spalding, 104 S. Ct. 2229 (1984)
[hereinafter cited as Brief for Petitioner].
4. C. EPSTEIN, Women in Law 50 (1981). Dean Griswold's comments on the admis-
sion of women to Harvard Law School were:
Women have made a place for themselves in the law, and we now have many
women serving with distinction on the bench and at the bar. Women have come a
long way since they were first admitted to membership in the American Bar Asso-
ciation in 1918.
Opportunities for women in the law still are limited, however, and the
Faculty is well aware that many able men are turned away from our doors every
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emphasized that from 1965 to 1980 the number of women graduating
from law schools in the United States increased from 367 to 10,754. 5 By
1981, approximately 35% of the students in the nation's law schools
were women. 6 A 1982 survey by the National Law Journal of 151 large
law firms employing approximately 5% of the lawyers in the United
States found that thirty-two of those firms had no women partners, 106
had no black partners, and 133 had no Hispanic partners. 7 By 1983,
37.7% of the 127,000 law students were women and 9.3% were mem-
bers of a minority.8 Considering the increasing numbers of women and
minorities graduating from law schools, the lack of partnerships offered
to these two groups may no longer be justified by the lack of qualified
candidates.
Future court decisions will, of course, focus upon the facts relating
to the particular partnership or professional corporation whose prac-
tices are being challenged. Nevertheless, the historical non-participa-
tion of women and minorities in a variety of professions cannot be
ignored. Particularly for partnerships and professional corporations
that have failed to make any apparent effort to alter the white male
make-up of their enterprises, it seems likely that the historical data will
have significant weight in formulating remedies. If the historical under-
representation of women and minorities as partners in the nation's law
firms continues, these groups will find no incentive to enter the legal
profession and past gains will be jeopardized.9
II. THE COURT'S DECISION IN HIsHON V. KING & SPALDING
A. Facts
In 1972, following her graduation from Columbia University Law
School, Elizabeth A. Hishon accepted an offer of employment with the
Atlanta law firm of King & Spalding. She was the second female lawyer
hired by the firm in its almost one hundred year history.1 0 Hishon al-
leged in her complaint that she and other new lawyers became associates
year. It is our expectation that we will admit only a small number of unusually
qualified women students for the present, at least.
9 HARV. L. REC. No. 2 (Oct. 11, 1949), as cited in 79 HARV. L. REC. No. 3 (Oct. 12, 1984).
In the fall of 1983, 33.8% (554 of 1,639) of the undergraduate law students at Harvard
Law School were women. Of the graduate and special students, 24.8% (42 of 169) were
women. A.B.A. SEC. LEGAL EDUC. & ADMISSIONS TO THE BAR, A REVIEW OF LEGAL EDUCA-
TION IN THE UNITED STATES 28 (1984).
5. Brief for Petitioner at 20.
6. Id.
7. Id. at 22 (citing Flaherty, Women and Minorities: The Gains, NAT'L L.J., Dec. 20, 1982
at 1, 8-11).
8. A.B.A. SEC. LEGAL EDUC. & ADMISSIONS TO THE BAR, A REVIEW OF LEGAL EDUCA-
TION IN THE UNITED STATES 70-72 (1984).
9. Brief Amicus Curiae for American Assoc. of Univ. Women at 16-17, Hishon v.
King & Spalding, 104 S. Ct. 2229 (1984).
10. The first woman hired by King & Spalding was an honor graduate of the Univer-
sity of Georgia and was employed as an associate in 1944. She was not elevated to the
partnership until 1977-thirty-three years after joining the firm. She was the firm's only
permanent associate and during that time more than 50 men hired after her were pro-
moted into the partnership. Brief for Petitioner at 21.
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with the understanding that they would be considered for partnership
on a fair and non-discriminatory basis after five or six years of satisfac-
tory performance.I 1 Hishon alleged that she was told that as long as an
associate's work was consistently evaluated by the firm as satisfactory,
elevation to partner was just a "matter of course." 12 Finally, Ms. Hishon
alleged that her annual evaluations were satisfactory and she was never
told her work was "unsatisfactory or that she had failed to perform pro-
fessionally at the expected level to become a partner in the firm."' 13 Ms.
Hishon was rejected for partnership and subsequently discharged from
the firm pursuant to the firm's "up or out" policy. She sued King &
Spalding for sex-based discrimination under Title VII. Ms. Hishon
sought back pay and compensation for loss of future earnings in lieu of
reinstatement and promotion to partnership.
14
In its answer, King & Spalding alleged that invitations to join a part-
nership were not an employment practice subject to Title VII. 1 5 Fur-
ther, they denied any assurances that Ms. Hishon would become a
partner and specifically alleged she was told "of her shortcomings in
dealing with clients' business and her inability and unwillingness to de-
velop professional and personal relationships which would make her a
full and complete lawyer."'
16
The district court dismissed Ms. Hishon's complaint on the ground
that Title VII was inapplicable to the selection of partners by a partner-
ship. 17 A divided panel for the court of appeals affirmed. 18 The
Supreme Court granted certiorari' 9 to determine whether it was proper
to dismiss a Title VII complaint "alleging that a law partnership discrim-
inated against petitioner, a woman lawyer employed as an associate,
when it failed to invite her to become a partner.''20 The Supreme Court
reversed the lower courts' decisions and held that Ms. Hishon had stated
a claim upon which relief could be granted. Upon remand, the case was
settled.
11. Joint Appendix at 8-9, Hishon Complaint, 8(b), Hishon v. King & Spalding, 104
S. Ct. 2229 (1984).
12. Id. at 9, 8(d).
13. Id. at 10, 11. Because this case was before the Court following a motion to
dismiss under FED. R. Civ. P. 12, the Court accepted all of Ms. Hishon's allegations as
true. 104 S. Ct. at 2233. Thus, the Court had no occasion to provide the lower courts with
any guidance in evaluating the highly subjective criteria involved in partnership decisions.
14. Id. at 19, 22, 25. Ms. Hishon also prayed for reasonable attorneys' fees, costs
and expenses, and a permanent injunction against further discrimination.
15. Joint Appendix at 27, King & Spalding Answer, Fourth Defense, Hishon v. King &
Spalding, 104 S. Ct. 2229 (1984).
16. Id. at 33, King & Spalding Answer 12.
17. 24 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1303 (N.D. Ga. 1980). Because the court held that
Title VII did not apply to partnerships, Hishon's complaint did not invoke the court's
subject matter jurisdiction and was dismissed pursuant to FED. R. CiV. PRO. 12(b)(1). Id. at
1307.
18. 678 F.2d 1022 (1lth Cir. 1982).
19. 459 U.S. 1169 (1983).
20. 104 S. Ct. at 2232. Before Hishon, one court had held that partnership considera-
tion matters were subject to Title VII's prohibitions on national origin and religious dis-
crimination, focusing upon partnerships as an "employment opportunity." Lucido v.
Cravath, Swaine & Moore, 425 F. Supp. 123 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
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B. The Opinion
The central issue facing the Court was whether consideration for
partnership is one of the "terms, conditions or privileges of employ-
ment" governed by Title VII. Title VII applies to partnerships 2 ' but
requires a minimum of fifteen employees. 2 2 King & Spalding met this
threshold requirement.
The Court characterized an associate's opportunity to become a
partner at King & Spalding as one of the terms, conditions, or privileges
of employment governed by Title VII. 23 Hishon alleged that she was
induced to join the firm by a promise of consideration for partnership
after she served an apprenticeship as an associate.2 4 This promise, if
established at trial, was a benefit provided in the employment contract.
In the alternative, Hishon alleged that, absent a contractual obligation,
consideration for partnership was a privilege of the employment rela-
tionship that was offered to the associates at King & Spalding. 25 The
Court held that contractual benefits and non-contractual privileges may
not be "doled out in a discriminatory fashion."
26
The Court's analytical framework is not new. The cases have long
required employers to make all terms, conditions, or privileges of em-
ployment available to all employees without regard to race, sex, or na-
tional origin.2 7 What is new is the Court's broad definition of
"privileges" of employment. Admission to partnership in a large law
firm is a highly subjective process, only partially dependent upon pure
21. The definition of "person" under Title VII includes partnerships. 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e(a).
22. An "employer" is any person with 15 or more employees in 20 or more calendar
weeks in the current or preceding year. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b).
23. 104 S. Ct. at 2233-34.
24. Id. at 2232.
25. Id. at 2234-35. See also White, Women in the Law, 65 MICH. L. REV. 1051, 1106
(1967) ("the prospect of... partnership and the added compensation which it is ex-
pected to bring can offset other detriments of a job, such as compensation, low beginning
pay or undesirable working conditions . . . [so as to] classify the opportunity to compete
for a partnership position as one of the 'privileges' of employment of which the Act
speaks").
26. 104 S. Ct. at 2234.
27. The starting point was McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
The Court set forth the basic framework for analyzing questions of disparate treatment-
the plaintiff must first present a prima facie case of discrimination. This is done by show-
ing: I) the claimant was a member of a protected class; 2) the claimant applied for and was
qualified for a job the employer had available; 3) the claimant, though qualified, was re-
jected; and, 4) the employer continued to seek to fill the job. Id. at 802. The employer
must then "articulate some legitimate non-discriminatory reason for the employee's rejec-
tion." Id. At this point, the burden shifts to the employee who must show that the articu-
lated reason is a mere pretext. Id. at 804. Cases arising on a motion to dismiss, as Hishon,
only deal with the first step in the analysis; whether a prima facie case has been alleged and
whether defenses have been raised. Defenses include the inapplicability of Title VII
(raised here by King & Spalding) or other defenses not addressed to the merits of the
particular plaintiffs claims. Questions as to burden of proof have been litigated exten-
sively. See, e.g., Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981). The
basic framework set forth in McDonnell Douglas has remained and is used, without refer-
ence, in Hishon.
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legal skill.2 8 The "privilege" of "consideration for partnership" is not
comparable to the move from apprentice to journeyman, or a promotion
to another non-management position or a first line supervisor's posi-
tion. Generally, only a fraction of new associates remain with a firm to
become partner. When this is coupled with the burgeoning exceptions
to the employment-at-will doctrine, the potential implications for all em-
ployers become inestimable.
2 9
Employers are free to provide or withdraw particular employment
benefits absent some express or implied contract. 30 However, although
a particular benefit may not be a right of employment, it may qualify as a
"privilege" of employment subject to the requirements of Title VII. 3 1
The Court emphasized the allegations in Ms. Hishon's complaint
supporting the conclusion that "the opportunity to become a partner
was part and parcel of an associate's status as an employee at [King &
Spalding]." 3 2 These allegations included the following: (1) associates
could regularly be expected to be considered for partnership while law-
yers outside the firm were not routinely considered; (2) the prospect for
ultimate partnership was used to induce young lawyers to begin working
at King & Spalding; and (3) associates' employment was terminated if
they were not elected to the partnership. 33 The Court concluded that
these allegations, if proved at trial, would be sufficient to establish that
partnership consideration was a privilege of employment and must oc-
cur without regard to sex.
3 4
The Court rejected the arguments of King & Spalding in fairly short
order. The first and strongest argument advanced by King & Spalding
was that the issue of consideration for partnership was beyond the pur-
view of Title VII because elevation to partnership involves a change in
status from an "employee" to an "employer." The Court accepted for
the sake of argument that "a partnership invitation is not itself an offer
of employment,"'3 5 but concluded that Title VII applies nevertheless.
The Court stated:
The benefit a plaintiff is denied need not be employment to fall
within Title VII's protection; it need only be a term, condition
28. See generally Lynch, How Law Firms Select Partners, 70 A.B.A.J. 65 (Oct. 1984) (law
firms select partners through a process that weighs objective and subjective factors).
29. In footnote six of Hishon, ChiefJustice Burger implies that Ms. Hishon's employ-
ment contract might have "afford[ed] a basis for an implied condition that the ultimate
decision would be fairly made on the merits." Hishon, 104 S. Ct. at 2233 n.6. The third
count of Ms. Hishon's complaint alleged breach of contract under Georgia law, pleading
pendent jurisdiction over that claim. Joint Appendix at 7, 16-17, Hishon Complaint 3,
23-25, Hishon, 104 S. Ct. at 2229 (1984). State employment-at-will exceptions are beyond
the scope of this article. Such state law claims may offer a fertile field for litigation of these
issues.
30. 104 S. Ct. at 2234.
31. Id. "A benefit that is part and parcel of the employment relationship may not be
doled out in a discriminatory fashion, even if the employer would be free under the em-
ployment contract simply not to provide the benefit at all." Id.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 2234-35.
35. Id. at 2235.
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or privilege of employment. It is also of no consequence that
employment as an associate necessarily ends when an associate
becomes a partner. A benefit need not accrue before a per-
son's employment is completed to be a term, condition, or priv-
ilege of that employment relationship.
3 6
The second argument raised by King & Spalding was that Title VII
categorically preempts partnership decisions from review. There is no
direct support for this in the legislative history, and the Court refused to
find such a broad exception.
3 7
King & Spalding's third argument was that applying Title VII to
partnership decisions would infringe upon the constitutional rights of
expression or association of the King & Spalding partners. The Court
acknowledged the distinctive role of lawyers in society, but rejected the
notion that invidious private discrimination could be given affirmative
constitutional protection.
38
Justice Powell filed a separate concurrence. He stated that the rela-
tionship among partners was not subject to Title VII and that the
Court's decision "should not be read as extending Title VII to the man-
agement of a law firm by its partners."139 In footnote three of his con-
currence, he includes such factors as participation in profits or other
compensation, work assignments, bar association, civic or political activ-
ities, acceptance of new clients and a number of other matters as law
firm management issues not subject to Title VII.
4 0
Before discussing the issues left unresolved by Hishon, it is impor-
tant to underscore the undisputed scope of the decision. It must be
remembered that Title VII applies not only to sex discrimination, but
also to discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion, and national
origin.4 1 Additionally, the fact that a law firm, accounting firm, architec-
tural firm, brokerage house, medical practice group, or other entity may
be organized as a professional corporation rather than a partnership is
unlikely to be of any significance. 4 2 If a member of a protected class can
plead and prove that he or she received promises such as those de-
scribed by the Court, variations in business organization will not, and
should not, alter the result. 4 3 Thus, any group of professionals with fif-
teen or more nonpartner employees must make its decision to promote
an employee to partner 44 without regard to race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin.
4 5
36. Id. (emphasis in original).
37. Id. "When Congress wanted to grant an employer complete immunity, it ex-
pressly did so." Id.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 2236.
40. Id. at n.3.
41. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1982).
42. Contra Panker & Davin, Law Partnership Decisions after Hishon v. King & Spalding, 30
PRAc. LAw., July 15, 1984, at 27, 29-30.
43. EEOC v. Dowd & Dowd, 736 F.2d 1177 (7th Cir. 1984).
44. The term "partner" is used throughout to include members of a partnership and
shareholders in a professional corporation.
45. Technically this overstates the Hishon holding. A prospective employer would be
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III. KEY ISSUES UNRESOLVED BY HISHON
The remaining issues to be resolved by the courts are whether part-
nerships with fewer than fifteen employees will be affected by the Hishon
ruling and whether management decisions other than decisions regard-
ing elevation to partner will be precluded from review as suggested in
Justice Powell's concurring opinion. A third unresolved issue is the type
of remedies available to litigants in a Hishon type dispute.
A. Size of Firms Affected by Hishon
Title VII expressly regulates entities having fifteen or more employ-
ees. 4 6 At the time the Hishon suit was filed, King & Spalding employed
over fifty partners, approximately fifty associates, plus an unstated
number of staff people. Clearly, the Court was dealing with a large or-
ganization that easily satisfied the threshold requirement of Title VII. In
addition, the Court rejected King & Spalding's argument that subjecting
questions of partnership to Title VII prohibitions would infringe on the
firm's right of association. 47 The Court refused to provide "affirmative
constitutional protections" to discriminatory employment practices mas-
querading as an exercise of freedom of association. 48 In so doing, the
court prevented other organizations from justifying discriminatory prac-
tices on the basis of the right to associate. 49 Consequently, all entities
within the purview of Title VII are within the mandate of Hishon.
1. Partners Counted as Employees or Employers Under Title
VII
The Hishon Court did not address whether partners in a particular
organization should be counted as employees for Title VII purposes.
The Court stated "even if respondent is correct that a partnership invi-
tation is not itself an offer of employment" Title VII is still applicable.
50
The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals has held that shareholders (part-
ners) in a professional corporation should not be considered employ-
ees. 5 1 Consequently, the defendant law firm in that case had fewer than
fifteen employees and was outside the purview of Title VII. By treating
free to refuse to state, and in fact could specifically negate, promises regarding considera-
tion for partnership and progress within the firm. As a practical matter, however, one
would expect that representations such as those highlighted by the Supreme Court will
continue to be made on a regular basis. Failure to do that could have a significant impact
upon a firm's ability to recruit new professional employees.
46. See supra note 22.
47. 104 S. Ct. at 2235.
48. Id.
49. For a later Supreme Court decision rejecting freedom of association as justifica-
tion for discriminatory policies toward the admission of women in male-only organiza-
tions, see Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 104 S. Ct. 3244 (1984) (discussed infta notes
62-72 and accompanying text).
50. 104 S. Ct. at 2235.
51. EEOC v. Dowd & Dowd, 736 F.2d 1177 (7th Cir. 1984). See albo Burke v. Fried-
man, 556 F.2d 867 (7th Cir. 1977) (partners in accounting firm held not to be "employ-
ees" under Title VII).
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an offer of partnership as an offer of employment both the issue of
counting partners as employees and the available remedies will be
affected.
The issue of whether partners are counted as employees under Title
VII is important in light of the fact that many state civil rights statutes
often have lower jurisdictional requirements than Title VII. 52 Most
state civil rights statutes encompass the protections of Title VII, and
many also prohibit discrimination on the basis of age and handicap. 5
3
The issue thus becomes whether there is some minimal size partnership
or professional corporation which the courts may choose as a matter of
policy not to regulate, or alternatively, to narrowly prescribe remedies
available to claimants against small enterprises.
The brief filed with the Supreme Court on behalf of King & Spald-
ing emphasizes the unique ethical and practical aspects of lawyer advo-
cacy. Arguments presented include contentions that "lawyers are
entitled to the highest degree of associational freedom," that "the inde-
pendence of the bar is essential," and that applying Title VII to partner-
ship decisions "necessarily would intrude on lawyer-client
confidentiality."' 54 Justice Powell's concurrence implicitly adopts these
notions, although to a lesser degree, stating that "[tihe relationship
among law partners differs markedly from that between employer and
employee."
'55
In contrast, petitioner argued that law partnerships, at least those
the size of King & Spalding, are "big business" and should be regulated
52. Of the states constituting the Tenth Circuit, Colorado, Kansas, New Mexico, and
Wyoming have statutes prohibiting discrimination by employers with fewer than fifteen
employees. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-34-401(3) (two or more employees); KAN. STAT.
ANN. § 44-1002(b) (four or more employees); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 28-1-2(B) (four or more
employees); Wvo. STAT. § 27-9-102 (two or more employees). But see OKLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 25-1301 (fifteen or more employees); UTAH CODE ANN. § 34-35-2(5) (twenty-five or
more employees).
53. See, e.g., CoLo. REV. STAT. § 24-34-402 (prohibiting discrimination based on hand-
icap, race, color, creed, sex, national origin, or ancestry); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 44-1009
(prohibiting discrimination based on race, religion, color, sex, physical handicap, national
origin, or ancestry); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 28-1-7 (prohibiting discrimination based on race,
age, religion, color, national origin, ancestry, sex, or physical or mental handicap); OKLA.
STAT. ANN. § 25-1302 (prohibiting discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, na-
tional origin, or handicap); UTAH CODE ANN. § 34-35-6 (prohibiting discrimination based
on race, color, sex, age, religion, ancestry, national origin, or handicap); Wyo. STAT. § 27-
9-105 (prohibiting discrimination based on age, sex, race, color, creed, national origin, or
ancestry). Colorado has a misdemeanor statute prohibiting age discrimination against
persons between the ages of 18 and 60. CoLo. REV. STAT. § 8-2-116. Onejudge has inter-
preted this statute as allowing an implied right of private action. Rawson v. Sears Roebuck
& Co., 530 F. Supp. 776 (D. Colo. 1982) (Kane, J.). Colorado appellate courts have yet to
address the issue. But see Silverstein v. Sisters of Charity of Leavenworth Health Services
Corp., 38 Colo. App. 286, 559 P.2d 716 (1976) (no civil action for damages for violating
state statute prohibiting employment discrimination against physically handicapped), rev'd
in part on other grounds, 43 Colo. App. 446, 614 P.2d 891 (1980). Accord Holter v. Moore &
Co., 681 P.2d 962, 965 (Colo. App. 1984) ("Where a statute creates legal duties and pro-
vides a particular means of enforcement, the designated remedy is exclusive and courts are
without authority to impose others.").
54. Brief for Respondents at 17, 21, 24, Hishon v. King & Spalding, 104 S. Ct. 2229
(1984) [hereinafter cited as Brief for Respondents].
55. 104 S. Ct. at 2236.
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as such. 56 Arguments advanced by petitioner included the claim that
whether someone is designated a "partner" or "employee" of the firm
should be of no moment; the focus should be upon the economic reali-
ties of the arrangement. 5 7 Further, petitioner argued that a law partner-
ship the size of King & Spalding is a separate entity which should be
considered the "employer" of a partner for Title VII purposes and that
having an "ownership" interest in firm assets or being paid from "prof-
its" should not alter the primary view of the arrangement as one of em-
ployment. 58 The Court did not need to address these arguments
because King & Spalding met the threshold employee requirement re-
gardless of the number of partners. These arguments undoubtedly will
be repeated in future cases.
The broad policy question remains: Will Hishon extend to partner-
ships with fewer than fifteen employees? One indication as to the direc-
tion the Court may take to answer this question is the interpretation of
section 1981 of the Civil Rights Act. 59 Section 1981 contains nojuris-
dictional size requirement. While discussing the ramifications of this
federal anti-discrimination statute, one commentator has stated:
It is unlikely, however, that § 1981 would be construed to cover
extremely small and personal private employment relationships
such as baby sitters and live-in caretakers. The Supreme Court,
while hinting that 'truly private' associations would be exempt
from coverage under §§ 1981 and 1982, has consistently
skirted the issue.
60
At some point, federal courts, and probably state courts, will be re-
quired to determine the extent to which smaller business relationships
might be exempted from regulation by the discrimination laws.
2. Jurisdictional Size Requirements Under State Law
A key factor in determining whether a partnership containing fewer
than fifteen employees will be subject to anti-discrimination prohibitions
may be whether the regulator is proceeding under federal or state law.
The reason is two-fold: first, many states require fewer than fifteen em-
56. Brief for Petitioners at 15-18. Petitioners noted that in 1980, King & Spalding had
more total lawyers (102) than 98% of all businesses had employees in the United States.
Counting only the 50-plus associate lawyers, King & Spalding still had more employees
than 7o of the businesses in the United States subject to Title VII. Id. at 17-18.
57. Id. at 27-30.
58. Id. at 31-41.
59. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1982). This section provides equal rights under the law and
states in pertinent part:
All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the same
right in every State and Territory to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be par-
ties, give evidence, and to the full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings
for the security of persons and property as is enjoyed by White citizens, and shall
be subject to like punishment, pains, penalties, taxes, licenses, and exactions of
every kind and to no other.
Id.
60. B. SCHLEI & P. GROSSMAN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAw 669 n. 1 (2d Ed.
1983).
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ployees under their own civil rights statutes;61 and second, the federal
courts seem willing to allow the states broad latitude in regulating eco-
nomic relationships. The decision of the Supreme Court in Roberts v.
United States Jaycees,6 2 decided one month after Hishon, is instructive in
this regard.
TheJaycees case involved the issue of whether the Minnesota Human
Rights Act could be applied to strike down the males-only membership
provisions of the United States Jaycees' bylaws. The Court, in striking
down these provisions, categorized freedom of association cases as in-
volving either "intimate association" or "expressive association.' '63 The
Court dichotomized the right of association as comprising the right of
each individual to keep certain personal relationships free from govern-
mental interference, and the right of all individuals to organize into
groups for political, economic, religious, and social purposes. Relation-
ships entitled to constitutional protection as intimate associations in-
volve primarily family matters such as marriage, contraception, and
childrearing.
64
The right to associate for expressive purposes is no more abso-
lute6 5 than the expressed first amendment freedoms of speech, press,
and assembly. The freedom of group life is always subject to some de-
gree of regulation in the public interest. An infringement on associa-
tional interests "unrelated to the suppression of ideas" which serves a
compelling state interest and "cannot be achieved through means signif-
icantly less restrictive of associational freedoms" is allowable. 66 The
Jaycees Court cited Hishon as an example of the failure to establish "any
serious burdens on the male members' freedom of expressive
association. "67
Applying the majority's approach, it seems unlikely that a private
law firm of any size could make a constitutional challenge to state stat-
utes regulating its employment or partnership practices. Thus, regard-
less of whether Section 1981 might be construed as inapplicable to
"extremely small" business relationships, state law is unlikely to be
overturned on federal constitutional grounds for regulating such
arrangements.
Justice O'Connor in herJaycees concurrence defines theJaycees or-
ganization as a commercial enterprise subject to minimal constitutional
protection. 68 She states:
It is only when the association is predominantly engaged in
protected expression that state regulation of its membership
will necessarily affect, change, dilute, or silence one collective
61. See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
62. 104 S. Ct. 3244 (1984).
63. Id. at 3249-50.
64. Id. at 3250.
65. Id. at 3252.
66. Id. at 3252 (citations omitted).
67. Id. at 3254.
68. Id. at 3258.
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voice that otherwise would be heard. An association must
choose its market. Once it enters the marketplace of commerce
in any substantial degree it loses the complete control over its
membership that it would otherwise enjoy .... 69
Justice O'Connor recognized that the first amendment protects some,
but not all lawyering activity. 70 The practice of law for commercial ends
is not accorded such protection. 7 1 "[N]o First Amendment interest
stands in the way of a State's rational regulation of economic transac-
tions by or within a commercial association."-72 Few lawyers are likely to
argue that the primary reason for their organization is expression of
ideas on matters of public affairs.
It seems highly unlikely that any federal constitutional prohibitions
would limit a state's efforts to prohibit discriminatory practices in law
firms or other commercial enterprises. Likewise, one would not antici-
pate that efforts to apply existing federal legislation to those practices
would run afoul of the Constitution. Questions of size should do little
to prevent an organization from having allegedly discriminatory prac-
tices scrutinized. As discussed below, however, size could have a signifi-
cant impact on issues as to remedies.
B. Impact on Internal Management Decisions
Justice Powell's Hishon concurrence clearly states his view that once
admitted to a partnership, a member of a protected class has no claim
under Title VII for discriminatory decisionmaking in compensation, as-
signment of work, and a variety of other matters. 73 This concurrence
poses what potentially will be the most difficult issue to arise from
Hishon; will courts interfere with operating decisions, and if so, to what
extent.
A recent survey has found that the largest law firm in the country
has 704 lawyers, including 428 associates, and that 202 firms have 100
or more lawyers. 74 While the survey does include legal assistants em-
ployed by those firms it does not include staff members. Accounting
and brokerage firms are frequently at least as large. It is difficult to ar-
gue that each professional's interests in preserving his independence
should allow him to operate his businesses using discriminatory criteria,
particularly in organizations of this magnitude.
69. Id. at 3259.
70. Id. at 3260. "Collective activity undertaken to obtain meaningful access to the
courts is a fundamental right within the protection of the First Amendment." Id. (citations
omitted).
71. Id. at 3260-6 1. "As a commercial enterprise, the law firm [of King & Spalding]
could claim no First Amendment immunity from employment discrimination laws.
Id.
72. Id.
73. 104 S. Ct. at 2236. By implication, this rationale could also be applied to 42
U.S.C. § 1981 and age discrimination.
74. Tarr, The NLJ 250, NAT'L L.J., Sept. 24, 1984 at 9 (special supplement). The sur-
vey listed King & Spalding as the 108th largest law firm in the United States with 145 total
lawyers, 80 of them associates. Id. at 12.
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Individuals in a business organization of 100 or more professionals
may not even see each other for days. They may never have to work
closely with a majority of their co-workers during their careers, depend-
ing upon their particular specialties and the organization of the busi-
ness. Certainly partners will be deeply interested in the integrity of the
prospective partner, the economic value to the firm of the prospective
partner, and the skill, expertise and leadership abilities of the prospec-
tive partner.7 5 The partnership admission process, while involving a
review of some objective data such as time with the firm and production
of income, also encompasses a number of intangible factors such as per-
sonal integrity and loyalty to the firm. 76 Nonetheless, the notion that
business organizations of this magnitude have some associational right
to exclude individuals on the basis of their membership in a class pro-
tected by Title VII has been rejected by the Supreme Court and should
be rejected by society as a whole.
Whether the courts will adopt Justice Powell's approach is uncer-
tain. Given the intangibles involved in compensation, case assignment,
and overall assessment of any particular partner's value to a business
organization, any effort to invalidate such decisions must proceed with
care. It should be apparent that fashioning a remedy will be difficult;
however, courts have not viewed that as a basis for denying relief.
Courts have looked to the economic realities of a work setting in
resolving other issues of discrimination. In a thorough discussion of the
law under Title VII, the Third Circuit 77 recently applied the hybrid
"right to control/economic realities" test of Title V11 7 8 to an age dis-
crimination claim to determine whether plaintiffs were employees for
the purposes of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act. 79 The
court noted that this test looks at the economic realities of the business,
"but focuses upon the employer's right to control the employee as the
most important factor in determining employee status." °8 0 This test
combines the common law principles of agency-the right of the em-
ployer to control the employee-and the "degree of economic depen-
dence" of the employees on the business itself.8 1 The court noted
75. For one lawyer's perspective on these issues, see Lynch, supra note 31.
76. Id. at 65-66.
77. See E.E.O.C. v. Zippo Mfg. Co., 713 F.2d 32 (3d Cir. 1983).
78. Two different standards developed to determine an individual's status as an em-
ployee. First, the "right to control" test, which was based on the common law principles
of agency, determined the status of employees by the degree of control over the individual
exercised by the employer. An individual was held to be an employee if the employer
determined not only what work was to be performed but also how it was to be performed.
Second, the "economic realities" test developed as a result of the limited nature of the
common law test. It recognized other factors, such as opportunities for profit and loss and
investment in facilities, as important when determining whether an individual was an em-
ployee for purposes of social legislation. A narrower hybrid test, combining the common
law "right to control" standard and the "economic realities" standard, was applied to de-
termine status for purposes of Title VII. For a more complete discussion of the develop-
ment of these tests, see id. at 36-38.
79. 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1) (1982).
80. 713 F.2d at 37 (citation omitted).
81. Id.
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eleven other factors for consideration under this hybrid test, including
the occupation of the individual, degree of supervision or control, man-
ner of payment, method of terminating the relationship, annual leave
afforded, and integration of the employee's work into the overall enter-
prise.8 2 If this analysis is applied to professional partnerships, one
would expect that at least some would be treated as employers with indi-
vidual partners being treated as employees for Title VII purposes.
At some point, it would certainly seem that a law or other partner-
ship could organize itself in such a way that its management decisions
might be subject to Title VII. The larger the enterprise, and the fewer
the individuals who are involved in the decisionmaking/management
process, the stronger the argument for Title VII oversight becomes.
These entities do not publish their partnership agreements or manage-
ment manuals; it is thus not possible to make comparisons or generaliza-
tions as to management structures. To the extent management
decisions are centralized and the latitude of individual partners reduced,
as seems to occur in the larger organizations, the considerations would
have a substantial impact on the vitality of Justice Powell's
interpretation.
At the other end of the size spectrum, it must be asked whether
state law or Section 1981 should be construed to require a partnership
of two professionals with three professional and two non-professional
employees to admit one of the professional employees into their part-
nership. It is difficult to assess in the abstract where such a line might be
drawn. Few, if any, would attempt to justify discrimination. It does
seem, however, that at some point the shared management arrangement
of a law firm, accounting firm, or other enterprise becomes sufficiently
small that serious questions must be answered before federal or state
statutes are construed to restrict decisionmaking as to the admission of
individuals into the ownership and operation of a small business.
83
IfJustice Powell's approach is ultimately followed by the courts, one
would have to ask whether there would be any real significance to Hishon
at all. Decisions relating to compensation, acceptance, and assignment
of work, and approval of commitments in bar association, civic, or polit-
ical activities, have a major impact upon the value of membership in a
82. id.
83. This issue may prove to be more theoretical than real. Smaller law firms seem to
be more ad hoc in their hiring and other practices than larger law firms. A firm which
interviews applicants at a number of law schools during the "fall season" will be far more
likely to do the bulk of its hiring at a particular time and in turn have more formalized
practices in the progress to partnership. Failure to follow standard operating procedures
may present a problem for the large firm in defending a claim of discrimination. A smaller
firm which has fewer formalized policies or practices may be able to justify variations in
approach more readily. Additionally, a smaller law or accounting firm will more closely
approximate the collegial environment, alluded to by King & Spalding in their brief to the
Supreme Court, and by Justice Powell in his concurrence. In such a setting it seems un-
likely that a "bad marriage" would be entered into or continued for long, if there were
serious conflicts or an obvious potential for them, whether based upon protected class
status, personalities, political views, work habits, or anything else.
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business partnership.8 4 If one assumes that a partnership or profes-
sional corporation wishes to discriminate, then under the approach sug-
gested by Justice Powell, all that would be necessary is to admit
protected individuals into the business, give them nothing to do, and
pay them nothing for it. It seems doubtful that courts would ignore the
reality of such an egregious arrangement, or some other subtler effort at
discrimination.
The better approach would be to continue following jurisdictional
size requirements of the state or federal statute being applied. Depend-
ing upon the size of the particular partnership, it may be necessary to
review "right to control/economic realities" questions as to firm opera-
tion to determine whether the organization has enough employees for
jurisdiction to be asserted. If jurisdiction and liability are found, ques-
tions of control and economic realities should be reevaluated to deter-
mine what remedies may be appropriate.
C. Reection of Justice Powell's Concurrence
The Hishon decision mandates no specific remedy if discrimination
is proved.
One can fairly ask whether it is appropriate for a court to direct
admission of an unwanted partner into a partnership rather than order a
monetary remedy. There is no real basis in theory or in the statute for
treating professionals' businesses differently from other enterprises.
However, the practical problems of directing partnership admission with
the myriad of future issues regarding compensation, client responsibil-
ity, and management of the operation, which may all present future
problems requiring subsequent judicial action, certainly suggest a mon-
etary remedy rather than injunctive relief. As described above, current
case law provides a framework for regulating internal partnership deci-
sions on these matters, depending upon how the partnership is organ-
ized and operated. There is no good rationale for carving out blanket,
special exceptions from these rules for lawyers or other professionals.
Nevertheless, one would expect that great care would be utilized before
significantly altering management decisions. An individual's value to an
enterprise cannot really be judged by a mechanical formula. Further,
economic realities are such that not everyone makes it to partnership in
any given organization. 8 5 Certain hard data such as hours worked and
84. These are the categories of decisions Justice Powell specifically stated he would
not review. 104 S. Ct. at 2236 n.3.
85. One court has stated:
[Plaintiff] is in no way different from hundreds of others who find that they have
to make adjustments in life when the opening desired by them does not open.
This situation is not confined to medical schools. Of a hypothetical twenty
equally brilliant law school graduates in a law office, one is selected to become a
partner. Extensive discovery would reveal that the other nineteen were almost
equally well qualified. Fifty junior bank officers aspire to become a vice presi-
dent-one is selected. And, of course, even judges are plagued by the difficulty
of decision in selecting law clerks out of the many equally well qualified.
Faro v. New York Univ., 502 F.2d 1229, 1232 (2d Cir. 1974).
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dollars of income generated through work performed and work gener-
ated by the individual can lead to tangible numbers. Other factors such
as management of the business and participation in a wide range of pro-
fessional and civic activities become quite difficult to assess. Firms, as
well as individuals within firms, vary widely in valuing these matters.
The Supreme Court has long taken the position that courts are not well
suited to second-guess or modify business judgments, 86 and one would
expect the courts to proceed with even greater care in this area. Where
violations of the discrimination laws have occurred, the courts should
act to remedy the violation as best they can. The subjective nature of
these internal decisions mandates the utmost care in formulating a
remedy.
8 7
Remedies must obviously vary with the facts of the particular case.
However, it is possible to suggest a potential framework for analysis in
dealing with issues of relief.
As a broad statement of the law, Justice Powell's suggested blanket
prohibition of review of internal partnership management decisions
should be rejected. Courts in the past have not hesitated to review deci-
sions of management where questions of discrimination are raised. Re-
viewing compensation or work assignment decisions, especially of
partners, is certainly fraught with difficulty. Courts have evaluated these
issues in assessing claims of discrimination by management employees
against large corporations, and there is no logical basis for distinguish-
ing lawyers in this setting from a large corporate employer. Of course,
willingness to modify such management decisions should vary, depend-
ing upon whether the entity has 250 or more professionals as opposed
to fifteen or twenty professionals, and the degree to which decisionmak-
ing is centralized within a particular organization. Size and management
structure should take on added importance in the setting of professional
partnerships. Ultimately, however, these are questions for the equitable
discretion of the court, not questions to resolve on the basis of a broad
hands-off policy.
Any review of management decisions made by professional organi-
zations will be difficult. This is true whether the decision involves evalu-
ations of progress, admission to partnership, or operation of a
partnership. Since the Supreme Court has initially determined that con-
sideration for partnership is a proper subject for Title VII review, it
86. See, e.g., Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567 (1978). "Courts are gener-
ally less competent than employers to restructure business practices, and unless mandated
to do so by Congress they should not attempt it." Id. at 568.
87. An apt analogy for the courts may prove to be teacher tenure cases. See, e.g.,
Zahorik v. Cornell Univ., 729 F.2d 85 (2d Cir. 1984); Lynn v. Regents Univ. of Cal., 656
F.2d 1337 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 823 (1982). Courts have approached Uni-
versity tenure cases with care, noting the multitude of subjective factors involved in such
consideration. Tenure decisions are often made at a departmental level without either the
competitive or economic factors potentially involved in a partnership decision. Ultimately,
the range of subjective factors involved in a tenure decision or a partnership decision are
probably comparable. A pivotal distinction for the tenure cases may well be the size differ-
ence between a single department at a university and a multi-state law firm.
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seems likely that partnership management decisions, at least in larger
enterprises, will also be reviewed. Outcome will vary depending upon
the size of the firm and its management structure. The fewer the
number of people who are involved in making a particular decision, the
greater the likelihood that the decision will be the subject of judicial
review. There is little basis in the cases for adopting Justice Powell's
suggested blanket prohibition of review of internal partnership manage-
ment decisions, particularly when to do so would allow those intending
to discriminate to render Hishon's holding a nullity.
IV. SUGGESTIONS FOR LAw FIRM MANAGEMENT
Law firms must now take to heart the advice their labor lawyers have
been giving clients for years-review and upgrade management policies
and practices relating to hiring and promotion of professional employ-
ees. Recruiting practices should be reviewed to determine what kinds of
things are being said and done in order to attract new associates. This
could have an impact not only on defense of discrimination claims but
also on possible claims for breach of implied contract and other theories
which are exceptions to the employment-at-will doctrine.
Training and evaluation policies should also be examined. While
evaluation criteria for professionals are more amorphous than for tech-
nical employees, efforts should be made both to formalize training and
to develop plans which advise professional employees of their progress.
This makes sense both in terms of Title VII compliance and in terms of
the substantial economic investment firms make in their professional
employees.
Serious consideration should be given to written reviews or evalua-
tions. It is unclear from the record in Hishon exactly what messages, if
any, were communicated to Ms. Hishon. It does not appear that any
written evaluation was given Ms. Hishon. The young lawyer may not get
the message which may well be conveyed in ambiguous, easily misinter-
preted terms. Certainly, this is not an uncommon phenomenon.
Some might argue that a written evaluation is in some way contrary
to the professional status of lawyers, accountants, brokers, or other indi-
viduals. Yet, if there is no written evaluation, it becomes very difficult to
reconstruct what was said in the evaluation process. Additionally, a writ-
ten evaluation has the advantage of forcing managers as well as profes-
sional employees to confront directly the progress toward partnership
and the plusses and minuses of an individual's performance.
While for many years they were collegial, intimate groups, organiza-
tions of professionals are increasingly becoming large business enter-
prises. They should review and upgrade their employment practices,
both because it is good management and because it will assist in defend-
ing claims of improper treatment. Failure to do so may rebound to their
detriment in the event of discrimination or wrongful discharge
litigation.
[Vol. 62:2
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V. CONCLUSION
Professional partnerships and corporations are now subject to Title
VII jurisdiction, at least to the extent of following nondiscriminatory cri-
teria in making partnership admission decisions. It seems likely, as well,
that judicial oversight will extend to internal partnership decisions in at
least some of the larger organizations, depending upon the degree of
centralization of management and the nature of the particular enter-
prise's decisionmaking processes.

FIREFIGHTERS LOCAL UNION No. 1984 V. STOTTS: ARE
SENIORITY SYSTEMS APPROACHING INVIOLABILITY IN
TITLE VII ACTIONS?
INTRODUCTION
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 19641 was enacted to eliminate
all forms of discrimination in the workplace. 2 Specifically, it prohibits
discrimination based on race, color, sex, and national origin with respect
to compensation, terms, and conditions of employment. 3 The impor-
tance of hiring and promoting employees in a manner free from the ra-
cially and sexually discriminatory practices of the past cannot be
contested.
Equally important in the workplace, however, are seniority sys-
tems.4 Seniority provisions often govern such vital issues as the em-
ployee's eligibility for promotion, the length of his vacation, and the
likelihood that he will be laid off. Seniority, in short, may be the primary
collective bargaining factor affecting a worker's security.
5
In many instances, the seniority expectations of workers directly
collide with the anti-discrimination provisions of Title VII. Layoffs by
seniority may completely erase the progress made in previous years by
1. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-l-2000e-17 (1982).
2. See generally Vaas, Title VII. Legislative History, 7 B.C. INDUS. & COM. L. REV. 431
(1966). ("[Flaced with 'a rising tide of discontent that threaten[ed] public safety' and 'the
events in Birmingham and elsewhere,' President Kennedy on June 19, 1963,. . . [stressed
before Congress] that the relief of Negro unemployment required progress in three major
areas, namely, creating more jobs . . .raising the level of skills through more education
and training and eliminating racial discrimination in employment." Id. at 432 (quoting
109 CONG. REC. 1174 (1963), after twelve months of debate, the Eighty-eighth Congress
translated this sentiment into law. Id. at 433-58).
3. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1982). Section 703(a) provides:
(a) It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to dis-
criminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, condi-
tions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin; or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment in
any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment
opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of
such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (1982).
4. The Supreme Court has defined a "seniority system" as:
[A] scheme that, alone or in tandem with non-"seniority" criteria, allots to em-
ployees ever improving employment rights and benefits as their relative lengths
of pertinent employment increase. . . . [T]he principle feature of any and every
"seniority system" is that preferential treatment is dispensed on the basis of some
measure of time served in employment.
California Brewers Ass'n v. Bryant, 444 U.S. 598, 605-06 (1980).
5. See Aaron, Reflections on the Legal Nature and Enforceability of Seniority Rights, 75 HARV.
L. REV. 1532, 1534 (1962). See also Wines, Seniority, Recession, and Affirmative Action: The
Challenge For Collective Bargaining, 20 AM. Bus. L.J. 37, 43 (1982) (suggesting that seniority
rights may be second only to wages in importance to labor organization members).
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affirmative action hiring.6 Awarding a discrimination victim retroactive
seniority7 may disrupt the existing seniority hierarchy and affect the sen-
iority rights of one or more incumbent employees.8 Since the inception
of Title VII, the judicial system has struggled with the competing inter-
ests of seniority rights and the anti-discrimination goals of Title VII.
Firefighters Local Union No. 1784 v. Stotts9 presents new issues in the con-
flict; it also relies on prior judicial interpretations of sections 703(h)' 0
and 7 06(g)" of Title VII, both of which specifically affect seniority
systems.
This article will discuss the significant Supreme Court and lower
federal court rulings on sections 703(h) and 70 6 (g) of Title VII. Then it
will examine the appellate and Supreme Court Stotts opinions, giving
particular attention to the opinions' consistency with precedent. Finally,
potential ramifications of Stotts on the ongoing tension between seniority
rights and successful affirmative action policies will be considered.
6. Wines, supra note 5, at 45.
7. Retroactive or constructive seniority, such as job offers and retroactive backpay, is
a remedy applied by the courts to place the discrimination victim in the employment posi-
tion in which he would have been were it not for the act of discrimination. It is calculated
from the date of the discriminatory act. See, e.g., Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S.
747, 765-66 (1976) (calculating the retroactive seniority award from the date of the plain-
tiff's application for employment, where the discriminatory act was the refusal to employ
the plaintiff on the basis of race); Acha v. Beame, 531 F.2d 648, 655-56 (2d Cir. 1976)
(instructing district court to award retroactive seniority to female police officers from the
date they would have been hired, provided that the women could show they had been
refused employment based on sex).
8. See, e.g., Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747 (1976); see infra notes 83-95
and accompanying text.
9. 104 S. Ct. 2576 (1984).
10. Section 703(h) states in relevant part:
Notwithstanding any other provision of this subchapter, it shall not be an unlaw-
ful employment practice for an employer to apply different standards of compen-
sation, or different terms, conditions, or privileges of employment pursuant to a
bona fide seniority or merit system, . . . provided that such differences are not
the result of an intention to discriminate because of race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin ....
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (1982).
11. Section 7 0 6 (g) provides:
If the court finds that the respondent has intentionally engaged in or is intention-
ally engaging in an unlawful employment practice charged in the complaint, the
court may enjoin the respondent from engaging in such unlawful employment
practice, and order such affirmative 'action as may be appropriate, which may in-
clude, but is not limited to, reinstatement or hiring of employees, with or without
back pay (payable by the employer, employment agency, or labor organization, as
the case may be, responsible for the unlawful employment practice), or any other
equitable relief as the court deems appropriate. Back pay liability shall not accrue from a
date more than two years prior to the filing of a charge with the Commission.
Interim earnings or amounts earnable with reasonable diligence by the person or
persons discriminated against shall operate to reduce the back pay otherwise al-
lowable. No order of the court shall require the admission or reinstatement of an
individual as a member of a union, or the hiring, reinstatement, or promotion of
an individual as an employee, or the payment to him of any back pay, if such
individual was refused admission, suspended, or expelled, or was refused employ-
ment or advancement or was suspended or discharged for any reason other than
discrimination on account of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin or in
violation of section 2000e-3(a) of this title.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1982) (emphasis added).
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I. SECTION 703(h)-PROTECTING BONA FIDE SENIORITY SYSTEMS
A. Timing and Intent
Section 703(h) immunizes "bona fide" seniority systems from the
operation of Title VII. 12 Congress wrote the section in response to its
concern about the impact of Title VII on employees' seniority rights.
13
Senator Clark, during the course of the Senate debate on Title VII, sub-
mitted a memorandum from the Justice Department which said:
[I]t has been asserted that Title VII would undermine vested
rights of seniority. This is not correct. Title VII would have no
effect on seniority rights existing at the time it takes effect. If,
for example, a collective bargaining contract provides that in
the event of layoffs, those who were hired last must be laid off
first, such a provision would not be affected in the least by title
VII. . . . It is perfectly clear that when a worker is laid off or
denied a chance for promotion because under established sen-
iority rules he is 'low man on the totem pole' he is not being
discriminated against because of his race.
14
The legislative history of section 703(h) clearly indicates that the section
was meant to protect seniority rights extant at the time of the enactment
of Title VII. 15 Whether Congress intended that section 703(h) protect
12. The problem of defining the elements of a bona fide seniority system is closely
related to the issue of the conflict between seniority systems and Title VII goals. The
Supreme Court has not clearly defined what constitutes a bona fide seniority system. See
Kasold, Toward Definition of the Bona Fide Seniority System, 35 U. FLA. L. REV. 41, 41 (1983).
One commentator, however, has suggested that the Court's sole criteria for determining
whether a seniority system is bona fide is if a discriminatory intent underlies the discrimi-
natory effects produced or propagated by the system. "These apparently alternative de-
terminations are one in the same." Id. at 48. See infra notes 69-75 and accompanying text.
Some Supreme Court opinions, however, treat the intent issue as being separate from
the question of what constitutes a bona fide seniority system. See, e.g., United Airlines v.
Evans, 431 U.S. 553, 559-60 (1977) (suggesting that a bona fide seniority system can cause
a disparate effect upon minorities as a result of intentional discrimination). This article
will follow Stotts, which similarly treats intent and the bona fides of a seniority system as
separate elements in a Title VII claim:
Section 703(h) of Title VII provides that it is not an unlawful employment prac-
tice to apply different standards of compensation, or different terms, conditions,
or privileges of employment purusant to a bone fide seniority system, provided
that such differences are as to the result of an intention to discriminate ....
Stotts, 104 S. Ct. at 2587.
13. See H.R. REP. No. 914, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 71-72 (1963), reprinted in 1964 U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWs 2391, 2439-41.
14. 110 CONG. REC. 7202 (1964). But see Senator Humphrey's remarks:
[§ 703(h)] has been added, providing that it is not an unlawful employment prac-
tice for an employer to maintain different terms, conditions, or privileges of em-
ployment either in different locations or pursuant to a seniority, merit, or other
incentive system, provided the differences are not the result of an intention to discriminate on
grounds of race, religion, or national origin. For example, if an employer has two
plants in different locations, and one of the plants employs substantially more
Negroes than the other, it is not unlawful discrimination if the pay, conditions, or
facilities are better at one plant than at the other unless it is shown that the employer
was intending to discriminate for or against one of the racial groups.
Bureau of National Affairs Operations Manual, The Civil Rights Act of 1964 at 302, quoted
in Quarles v. Philip Morris, Inc. 279 F. Supp. 505, 517 (E.D. Va. 1968) (emphasis added).
15. See generally Note, Expanding Title VII's Exemption for Seniority Rights: American To-
bacco Company v. Patterson, 25 B.C.L. REV. 44, 48-50 (1983) (referring to the congres-
sional debate preceding the enactment of Title VII as an indication that § 703(h) was
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seniority systems created after Title VII's effective date is less clear.' 6
Consequently, questions arose concerning whether the immunity af-
forded seniority systems by section 703(h) was to be prospective as well
as retroactive from Title VII's effective date. In addition, the issue arose
as to whether the employer's intent to discriminate was to be an element
of proof of Title VII violations. 7 These two issues of timing and intent
have been the main foci of judicial interpretation of section 703(h).
B. Juticial Interpretations of Section 703(h)
1. 'Present Effects of Past Discrimination
The earliest significant decision interpreting section 703(h) was a
district court case, Quarles v. Philip Morris, Inc. 18 Prior to the effective
date of Title VII, the defendant company had formally segregated its
employees into black and white departments.' 9 The white departments
-were generally better paying and more desirable. The company ceased
the discriminatory hiring policy on January 1, 1966, six months after
Title VII became effective. The department system was then facially
neutral. 20 Because the company's collective bargaining agreement in-
cluded a departmental seniority system, 2 1 when a black employee at-
tempted to transfer to one of the formerly white departments he was
forced to surrender his accrued seniority. 2 2 The plaintiffs argued that
Quarles and other blacks hired beforeJanuary 1, 1966, were deprived of
advancement opportunities due to the present effects of the company's
intentionally discriminatory hiring policy of the past.23 Philip Morris
argued that section 703(h), protected their seniority system. 24
The court rejected Philip Morris's argument, ruling that the senior-
ity system was not "bona fide."'2 5 The court stated that "[o]bviously one
characteristic of a 'bona fide' seniority system must be a lack of discrimi-
nation. Nothing in section 703(h), or in its legislative history, suggests
that a racially discriminatory seniority system established before the act
is a bonafide seniority system under the act."'2 6 Significantly, Quarles indi-
cated that a Title VII plaintiff was not required to demonstrate a present
discriminatory intent on the part of his employer to be successful. Plain-
tiff only needed to show that a past intent to discriminate had a present
included to appease the concerns voiced by opponents that Title VII would destroy ex-
isting seniority rights).
16. The Supreme Court eventually ruled that post-Act seniority systems did fall within
the protection of § 703(h). See infra note 58 and accompanying text discussing American
Tobacco Co. v. Patterson.
17. See infra notes 58-67 and accompanying text.
18. 279 F. Supp. 505 (E.D. Va. 1968).
19. Id. at 508.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 513.
22. Id. at 513-14.
23. id. at 514.
24. Id. at 515.
25. Id. at 517.
26. Id.
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discriminatory effect. 2 7
The Supreme Court again addressed the conflict between the valid-
ity of the seniority systems and intentional pre-Act discrimination in In-
ternational Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States.2 8 In Teamsters, the
United States brought a Title VII action against T. I. M. E.-D. C., Inc., a
nationwide carrier of motor freight, and its union, which represented a
large portion of T. I. M. E.-D. C.'s employees. 29 The dispute in Team-
sters focused on the difference in racial and ethnic composition between
two types of drivers employed by T. I. M. E.-D. C. The T. I. M. E.-D. C.
drivers were employed either as local city drivers or as line-drivers. The
local drivers and service positions were lower paying and less desirable
positions3 0 than the line-driver positions, which called for long distance
truck driving.s ' The line-drivers comprised a separate bargaining unit.
The government3 2 claimed that the line positions were given over-
whelmingly to whites, that blacks and spanish-surnamed persons worked
exclusively as local drivers,3 3 and that the Teamsters and T. I. M. E.-D.
C. had engaged in a system-wide practice of discrimination in violation
of Title VII.3 4 The government further alleged that the seniority system
in the collective bargaining agreement between the union and the em-
ployer violated Title VII by perpetuating the effects of past racial and
ethnic discrimination.
3 5
The defendant union argued that the intent of section 703(h) was to
ensure that the mere perpetuation of pre-Act discrimination was not vio-
lative of the Act.3 6 The union said that because it was not guilty of any
post-Act discrimination, it had not violated Title VII.3 7 Conversely, the
government took the position that no seniority system perpetuating dis-
crimination before or after the Act can be deemed bona fide.
3 8
After finding that T. I. M. E.-D. C. had engaged in discriminatory
hiring practices,3 9 the Court considered whether the seniority system
27. Id. at 517-19.
28. 431 U.S. 324 (1977).
29. Id. at 328.
30. Id. at 329.
31. Id. at 330 n.3.
32. At the time the Teamsters action was instituted, under § 707 the U.S. Attorney
General was responsible for bringing Title VII actions involving patterns or prac-
tices of employment discrimination. The Equal Employment Opportunity Act of
1972 amended § 707 and gave the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(EEOC) the authority to bring "pattern or practice" suits against private-sector
employers.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-6(c) (1982).
33. Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 329.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 328.
36. Id. at 345.
37. Id. at 345-46. The Court did not fully discuss the issue of post-Act discrimination.
The union argued, and the Court implicitly agreed, that there was no post-Act discrimina-
tion in Teamsters because the union had agreed to represent post-Act victims in grievance
proceedings. Id. at 345-47 and n.28.
38. Id. at 346.
39. The Court upheld the lower courts' findings that T. I. M. E-D. C. had engaged in a
racially premised pattern or practice in recruiting, hiring and promoting minority group
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contained in the collective bargaining agreement violated Title VII. 40
Under the collective bargaining agreement, employee benefits such as
vacations and pensions were tied to the particular employee's seniority
regardless of the employee's job or bargaining unit. However, matters
such as the order in which the employees bid for particular jobs, and the
order of layoffs and recalls from layoffs were determined by the length
of time spent in a particular bargaining unit.4 l Hence, the structure of
the collective bargaining agreement created a disincentive for the ser-
vicemen and the local drivers to apply for a line-driver position because
a transfer out of the local drivers' bargaining unit would result in a com-
plete loss of seniority. The Court explained that "[t]he practical effect is
that a city driver or serviceman who transfers to a line-driver job must
forfeit all the competitive seniority he had accumulated in his previous
bargaining unit and start at the bottom of the line drivers' 'board.' "42
The Court therefore agreed that the seniority system perpetuated
the effects of pre-Act discrimination. 4 3 The issue before the Court then
was whether section 703(h) validated "otherwise bona fide seniority sys-
tems that afford no constructive seniority to victims discriminated
against prior to the effective date of Title VII . . . . 44 After careful
consideration of the legislative history of Title VII, the Court concluded
that "routine application of a bona fide seniority system would not be
unlawful under Title VII. . . . even where the employer's pre-Act dis-
crimination resulted in whites having greater existing seniority rights
than Negroes." '4 5 The Court rejected the government's contention that
a neutral seniority system that perpetuates the effects of pre-Act discrim-
ination could not be "bona fide" within the meaning of section 703(h),
thereby overruling Quar/es.4
6
Teamsters did not comment directly on the intent issue. It did, how-
ever, specifically proscribe the use of the disparate impact test set forth
in Griggs v. Duke Power Co.4 7 Under Griggs, a hiring or promotion system
members. 431 U.S. at 337. Based on statistical and testimonial evidence, the Court con-
cluded that the government sustained its burden of showing a prima facie case of unlawful
discrimination. d. at 337-43. The Court stated that the government met its burden of
proving by a preponderance of evidence that "racial discrimination was the company's
standard operating procedure." Id. at 336-37.
40. Id. at 343-56.
41. Id. at 343.
42. Id. at 344.
43. Id. at 345-47.
44. Id. at 348.
45. Id. at 352.
46. The Court held that "an otherwise neutral, legitimate seniority system does not
become unlawful under Title VII simply because it may perpetuate pre-Act discrimina-
tion." Id. at 353-54. The Court in Teamsters suggested that a seniority system is bona fide
if it "applies equally to all races and ethnic groups." Id. at 355-56.
47. 401 U.S. 424 (1971). The Supreme Court held that an employer could not use
facially neutral intelligence and comprehension tests or require a high school education as
a prerequisite to hiring job applicants because the requirements discriminated against
blacks and were unrelated to job performance. Id. at 427-30. The suit was filed in North
Carolina. Due largely to a segregated public school system, almost three times as many
white males as black males graduated from high school in that state, and 58% of the whites
taking the employer's test passed, while only 6% of the blacks passed. Id. at 430 & n.6.
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which is facially neutral and has no discriminatory intent violates Title
VII if it has a discriminatory effect. 48 The Teamsters court distinguished
Griggs because Griggs did not challenge a seniority system, and section
703(h) specifically protects bona fide seniority systems.4 9 Teamsters thus
approves seniority systems that do not facially discriminate against racial
or ethnic groups.50 By ruling out the Griggs "effects" test, the Court
effectively imposed an "intent" test. Later, in American Tobacco Co. v. Pat-
terson,5 1 the Court clarified its test by specifically requiring plaintiffs
challenging a seniority system to show "actual intent" to discriminate.
52
As Justice Marshall observed in a strong dissent, Teamsters signified a
major change in judicial interpretation of section 703(h) and treatment
of seniority systems. 53 He correctly anticipated that the new intent re-
quirement tacitly suggested by the majority for invalidating a discrimina-
tory pre-Act seniority system could easily be extended to post-Act
systems, 54 thereby further weakening the effectiveness of Title VII in
combating discrimination. Furthermore, requiring proof of intent im-
poses a heavy burden on the Title VII claimant. As one court observed:
"Seldom does a party intent on practicing discrimination declare or an-
nounce his purpose. It is more likely that methods subtle and elusive
are used to accomplish the desired discrimination."-5 5 Justice Marshall
wrote that the effect of the decision was to "write off an entire genera-
tion of minority group employees."
5 6
2. Post-Act Protection and Present Intent
In 1982, the Court fully extended the protection afforded to senior-
ity systems by section 703(h) to include seniority systems implemented
The Court wrote that "[Congress has] provided that the vessel in which the milk is prof-
fered must be one all seekers can use." Id. at 431. The Court also stated:
Under [Title VII], practices, procedures, or tests neutral on their face, and even
neutral in terms of intent, cannot be maintained if they operate to "freeze" the
status quo of prior discriminatory employment practices . . . The Act proscribes
not only overt discrimination but also practices that are fair in form, but discrimi-
natory in operation . . . . Good intent or absence of discriminatory intent does
not redeem employment procedures [that are discriminatory in effect] . . . Con-
gress directed the thrust of the Act to the consequences of employment practices,
not simply the motivation.
Id. at 430-32 (emphasis in original).
This rationale came to be known as the "disparate impact" concept of discrimination,
and remains the standard by which employment practices are measured for possible Title
VII violations in cases not involving seniority systems protected by § 703(h). See, e.g.,
Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 (1977) (reaffirming the viability of the Griggs disparate
impact analysis in gender cases).
48. Id. at 430, cited in Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 349.
49. 431 U.S. at 349-53.
50. Id. at 355.
51. 456 U.S. 63 (1982). See infra notes 58-66.
52. 456 U.S. at 65.
53. 431 U.S. at 337-94 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
54. Id. at 383 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
55. Rachlin, Title VII Limitations and Qualifications, 7 B.C. INDUS. & COM. L. REv. 473,
480 (1966) (quoting Marano Constr. Co. v. New York State Comm'n for Human Rights, 45
Misc. 2d 1081, 1085, 259 N.Y.S.2d 4, 9 (1965)).
56. 431 U.S. at 388 (Marshall.J.. dissenting).
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after the effective date of Title VII. 5 7 In American Tobacco Co. v. Patter-
son,5 8 discrimination victims argued that the protections afforded em-
ployers under section 703(h) applied only to bona fide systems which
were in existence before the effective date of Title VII. If this were true,
then employers would be liable when any post-Act seniority system had
a "disparate impact" on groups covered under Title VII. 59 The Court
rejected the employees' argument and held that section 703(h) applied
to seniority systems adopted after the effective date of the Civil Rights
Act as well as those adopted before the effective date.
60
The Court closely analyzed the legislative history of section 703(h)
and concluded there was no clear indication that Congress intended to
distinguish between pre-Act and post-Act seniority systems. 6 1 The
Court relied on interpretive memoranda prepared by the Justice Depart-
ment and various senators during legislative deliberations on Title VII
stating that Title VII would have no effect on established seniority
rights.6 2 Relying on Teamsters6 3 and United Airlines v. Evans,6 4 the Court
held that section 703(h) makes no distinction between seniority systems
adopted before the effective date and those adopted after the effective
date. The Court stated:
In Teamsters v. United States. .. we held that section 703(h) ex-
empts from Title VII the disparate impact of a bona fide senior-
ity system even if the differential treatment is the result of pre-
Act racially discriminatory employment practices. Similarly,
. .[in Evans] the Court interpreted section 703(h) to immu-
nize seniority systems which perpetuate post-Act discrimina-
tion. Thus, taken together, Teamsters and Evans stand for the
proposition . . . that section 703(h) on its face immunizes all
bona fide seniority systems .... 65
On the issue of intent the American Tobacco Court clearly stated:
"Under section 703(h), the fact that a seniority system has a discrimina-
tory impact is not alone sufficient to invalidate the system; actual intent
57. Title VII became effective on July 2, 1965. The Court first indicated its willing-
ness to extend its protection to post-Act seniority systems in Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 348
n.30.
58. 456 U.S. 63, 68 (1982).
59. See supra note 47.
60. 456 U.S. at 76.
61. Id. at 71-75.
62. Id. at 73-75. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
63. 431 U.S. 324 (1977).
64. 431 U.S. 553 (1977).
65. 456 U.S. at 75 (quoting Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 348 n.30).
The American Tobacco Court incorrectly attributes the Evans decision with having im-
munized seniority systems perpetuating post-Act discrimination. In fact, Evans involved a
Title VII claim which was rejected by the Court because it was filed late. 431 U.S. at 555.
The Evans Court said, "A discriminatory act which is not made the basis for a timely
charge is the legal equivalent of a discriminatory act which occurred before [Title VII] was
passed." Id. at 558 (emphasis added). The Court rejected the claim, not to protect the
seniority system, but because the petitioner did not file her claim in time. The Evans Court
held that "[t]he statute does not foreclose attacks on the current operation of seniority
systems which are subject to challenge as discriminatory." Id. at 560.
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to discriminate must be proved."' 6 6 The same year, in Pullman-Standard
v. Swint,6 7 the Court re-affirmed that, absent discriminatory intent, a
seniority system perpetuating pre-Act discrimination does not violate
Title VII. 68 Furthermore, the opinion offers helpful guidance to the Ti-
tle VII claimant regarding the proof of discriminatory intent. The Court
tacitly approved the four-prong test first articulated by the Fifth Circuit
in James v. Stockham Valves & Fittings Co.69 According to the Fifth Circuit,
a court should focus on four factors when determining discriminatory
intent. First, a court must consider whether the seniority system "oper-
ates to discourage all employees equally from transferring between sen-
iority units." 70 More generally, the court must decide whether a system
applies equally and uniformly to all employees. 7 1 "Second, a court must
examine the rationality of departmental structure, upon which the sen-
iority system relies, in light of the general industry practice." 72 Third, a
court must consider "whether the system had its genesis in racial dis-
crimination." 7 3 Fourth, it must consider " 'whether the system was ne-
gotiated and has been maintained free from any illegal purpose.' -74
Hence, although a showing of intent is a prerequisite for establishing an
unlawful seniority system under Title VII, intent can be inferred from
the existence of certain conditions.
7 5
66. Id. at 65. Two additional Supreme Court opinions clearly emphasizing the intent
requirement are United Airlines v. Evans, 431 U.S. 553 (1977) ("[Section 703(h)] ex-
pressly provides that it shall not be an unlawful employment practice to apply different
terms of employment pursuant to a bona fide seniority system, provided that any disparity
is not the result of intentional discrimination.") id. at 559-60 and Trans World Airlines v.
Henderson, 432 U.S. 63 (1977) ("[A]bsent a discriminatory purpose, the operation of a
seniority system cannot be an unlawful employment practice even if the system has some
discriminatory consequences.") Id. at 82.
67. 456 U.S. 273 (1982).
68. Id. at 277 (citing Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 83 (1977)).
69. 559 F.2d 310 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1034 (1978). The origins of the
four prong test can be found in Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 355-56.
70. Pullman-Standard, 456 U.S. at 279 (quotingJames, 559 F.2d at 352).
71. 456 U.S. at 279.
72. Id. at 280 (citingJames, 559 F.2d at 352).
73. 456 U.S. at 281 (quotingJames, 559 F.2d at 352).
74. Id.
75. The four prong test approved of in Pullman-Standard arose in the context of a class
action. In McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973), the Court listed four
factors which an individual complainant should show in order to successfully establish a
prima facie case of racially discriminatory hiring practices. McDonell did not involve a chal-
lenge to a seniority system. The proof-of-intent analysis, however, could be applied to
seniority system cases. The four factors are:
(i) that he belongs to a racial minority; (ii) that he applied and was qualified for a
job for which the employer was seeking applicants; (iii) that, despite his qualifica-
tions, he was rejected; and (iv) that, after his rejection, the position remained
open and the employer continued to seek applicants from persons of complain-
ant's qualifications.
Id. at 802. Once these factors have been established, the burden shifts to the employer or
union to articulate a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for denying employment
opportunities.
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II. JUDICIAL REMEDIES UNDER TITLE VII: APPLICATION
OF SECTION 706(g)
A. Remedies Generally
Once a court has determined that an employer has engaged in dis-
crimination demanding judicial relief, it must determine the scope of
relief. The court may follow one of two courses. The scope of relief is
directly related to the definition of the membership of the affected mi-
nority group. In class actions, the court may choose to follow a restric-
tive path and limit the membership of the class to the victims who were
qualified for starting or transfer positions, applied for the positions but
were excluded because of race, color, religion, sex or national origin.
76
Alternatively, the court may apply a more expansive remedy and award
relief to all potentially qualified applicants of the aggrieved group in the
geographic area from which the employer selects employees, provided
these persons can establish that they would have applied for the job had it
not been for the discriminatory practice.
77
In addition to deciding who is entitled to relief, the court must de-
cide on the particular type of remedy. The court may provide compen-
satory relief in an attempt to make the victim whole for the losses
suffered. In fashioning a compensatory decree, courts have awarded vic-
tims: the job, training, seniority, or back pay they would have received
had it not been for the employer's discrimination. 78 Courts may also
order injunctions to prevent further discrimination. 79 Courts have en-
joined employers from continuing the seniority systems or work alloca-
tion systems which unlawfully discriminate. Injunctive relief is the
"minimum" amount of relief required in any proven case.80 Courts
have also ordered a governmental employer to hire a designated
number of employees from minority groups in order to cure the effect of
prior discrimination. 8 1
B. Judicial Interpretations of Section 706(g)
The statutory authority forjudicial relief from violations of Title VII
is section 706(g). 8 2 Retroactive seniority is not specifically included
among the remedies suggested by the statute. Courts, however, are per-
mitted to award "other equitable relief" as appropriate. Three impor-
tant Supreme Court cases have ruled on whether retroactive seniority is
an appropriate form of equitable relief under section 7 06(g). The first
76. See Cooper & Sobol, Seniority and Testing Under Fair Employment Laws: A General Ap-
proach to Objective Criteria of Hiring and Promotion, 82 HARV. L. REV. 1598, 1634 (1969).
77. See infra note 97 and accompanying text.
78. See, e.g., Cooper & Sobol, supra note 76, at 1632.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 1633.
81. See, e.g., United States v. United Papermakers and Paperworkers Local 189, 282 F.
Supp. 39 (E.D. La. 1968) (paper mill and paper workers union ordered to establish non-
discriminatory seniority system).
82. See supra note 11.
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of those is Franks v. Bowman Transportation Co. 8 3
Franks involved a class action brought against the employer and the
union. The complaint charged, and the district court agreed, that the
employer had engaged in racially discriminatory hiring practices. 8 4 The
discrimination victims, applicants who had been denied jobs, did not at-
tack the seniority system itself. Once successful in proving their discrim-
ination charges, however, they sought an award of seniority status
comparable to the status they would have enjoyed had it not been for
the discrimination. 8 5 The Franks court was therefore presented with the
issue of whether retroactive seniority is an appropriate remedy under
section 706(g) to compensate the victims of a discriminatory hiring
practice.
8 6
To answer this question, the Court considered the congressional
intent in enacting Title VII and concluded that Congress intended that
broad relief be available to the discriminatee. The Court stated that
"one of the central purposes of Title VII is 'to make persons whole for
injuries suffered on account of unlawful employment discrimination.'
To effectuate this 'make whole' objective, Congress in [section] 706(g)
vested broad equitable discretion in the federal courts .... 87 After
examining the remedial approach taken by the National Labor Relations
Board, 88 the Court concluded that retroactive seniority awards are ordi-
narily necessary to achieve the "make-whole" purposes of the Act. By
"slotting the victim in that position in the seniority system that would
have been his had he been hired at the time of his application" for the
job in question,8 9 the victim will be restored to his "rightful place." 90
Justice Powell, in the dissent, wrote that retroactive seniority would
83. 424 U.S. 747 (1976).
84. Id. at 750-51.
85. Id. at 758.
86. Id. at 750.
87. Id. at 763 (citations omitted) (quoting Albermarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S.
405, 418 (1975)). Albermarle was a Title VII class action in which the defendant had imple-
mented a discriminatory seniority system. The plaintiffs demanded backpay as a part of
their remedy. The Supreme Court ruled that although the award of backpay under Title
VII was a matter for the discretion of the district court, a determination that an employer's
breach of Title VII was not in bad faith was not a sufficient reason to deny backpay. 422
U.S. at 422-25.
88. The Court observed that section 7 06(g) was modeled after the National Labor
Relations Act, section 10(C), 29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (1982). Decisions construing section
10(C) of the NLRA specified that affirmative action awards include awards of seniority
status because the purpose of affirmative action awards is to redress "the wrong incurred
by an unfair labor practice . . . and to 'make the employees whole and thus restor[e] the
economic status quo that would have obtained but for the company's wrongful [act].' "
424 U.S. at 769 (quoting NLRB v. J.H. Ruter-Rex Mfg. Co., 396 U.S. 258, 236 (1969)).
The Court depended on the National Labor Relations Board's practice of requiring that
applicants who have been discriminatorily denied employment be given an award of sen-
iority equivalent to that which they would have enjoyed but for the illegal conduct. The
Court, however, made it clear that it was not necessarily authorizing a relief of seniority
status in all circumstances. Id. at 770. The trial court must view the facts and circum-
stances of the case "to allow the most complete achievement of the objectives of Title
VII." Id. at 770-71.
89. 424 U.S. at 765-66.
90. Id. at 764 n.21.
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be inappropriate because such grants would conflict with the economic
interests of "innocent employees." 9 1 He argued that an award of com-
petitive seniority serves not as a sanction against the employer but
rather as a sanction against innocent workers who bear the risk of losing
their jobs entirely.
92
The Franks majority rejected this argument by stating that the bur-
den of past discrimination should be shared by innocent employees as
well as the employer. 93 The Court was not, however, requiring a com-
plete dismantling of the seniority hierarchy but merely the placement of
the identified victims in their "rightful place."'94 The Franks ruling is
significant for two reasons. It provides the identified victim with the
remedy of retroactive seniority, and it indicates that the Supreme Court
was still concerned with the seniority rights of existing, "innocent"
employees.
95
The Teamsters case, discussed earlier with respect to the intent re-
quirement to invalidate bona fide seniority systems,9 6 is also important
for its discussion on the use of seniority as a remedy. In Teamsters the
Court addressed for the first time the question of whether those who
failed to apply for a job during the period of discrimination are entitled
to relief. The Court held that "an incumbent employee's failure to ap-
ply for a job is not an inexorable bar to an award of retroactive senior-
ity," 9 7 thereby rejecting the company's claim that only persons who had
actually applied and were rejected could be considered for a grant of
retroactive seniority.
98
The Court based its decision to grant relief to non-applicants on
several different factors. First, the Court reasoned that "a primary ob-
jective of Title VII is prophylactic: to achieve equal employment oppor-
tunity and to remove the barriers that have operated to favor white male
employees over other employees." 9 9 Furthermore, courts are author-
ized to exercise broad powers in granting the most appropriate relief
possible. l0 0 Second, the Court reasoned that potential applicants who
are aware of the employer's discriminatory practice would be disinclined
to apply for the jobs.10 ' The Court stated: "A consistently enforced
discriminatory policy can surely deter job applications from those who
are aware of it and are unwilling to subject themselves to the humiliation
91. Id. at 788 (Powell, J., dissenting).
92. Id. at 789.
93. Id. at 777.
94. Id. at 764 n.21, 776-77.
95. With respect to § 703(h), the Franks court held that the legislative history revealed
that Congress did not intend to change seniority rights existing before the effective date of
the Act. 424 U.S. at 758-61. The Court, however, concluded that 703(h) did not bar an
award of seniority relief to unhired job applicants for post-Act discrimination. Id. at 761-
62.
96. See supra notes 28-56 and accompanying text.
97. Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 364.
98. Id. at 363.
99. Id. at 364 (citations omitted).
100. Id.
101. Id. at 365-66.
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of explicit and certain rejection." 10 2 Hence, the Court refused to create
a per se rule barring non-applicants from recovering relief from an em-
ployer who has violated Title VII.
0 3
The Court did not, however, abandon the requirement that the Ti-
tle VII claimant prove himself to be an actual victim of discrimination, as
set forth in Franks.10 4 The Court placed a difficult burden of proof on
the non-applicant to establish that he was in fact interested in the posi-
tion. The mere fact that a pattern or practice of discrimination has been
shown is not enough to satisfy the burden. The non-applicant must
show that he would have applied for the job had it not been for his pro-
spective employer's discriminatory practices, 10 5 and that he possessed
the requisite qualifications. 10 6 The Court emphasized that "each spe-
cific individual" must prove his status as a discrimination victim to be
awarded relief. 10 7 Together Franks and Teamsters indicate the victim-spe-
cific remedial approach taken by the Court.
A third important Supreme Court decision involving the use of sen-
iority as a remedy was Ford Motor Co. v. EEOC.10 8 This opinion is consis-
tent with the victim-specific remedial focus of Franks and Teamsters, and,
perhaps more significantly, it restricts the judiciary's power to interfere
with existing seniority rights in devising a remedy under section 706(g).
Ford involved the issue of what action an employer charged with discrim-
ination must take to toll the accrual of backpay liability. 10 9 Previous
cases had held that an employer was liable for backpay to the successful
Title VII claimant for the period of time between the date the employee
was discriminatorily discharged and the date the employer made an un-
conditional offer to reinstate the claimant in his former, or substantially
equivalent, position. ''0 Ford raised the previously unaddressed issue of
whether the unconditional offer must also include seniority retroactive
to the date of the alleged discrimination. I"'
In 1971, three women, including the eventual Title VII claimants
involved in Ford, applied to Ford Motor Company for employment and
were rejected."12 The women filed a claim with the EEOC charging
102. Id. at 365.
103. Id. at 367.
104. 424 U.S. at 765-66.
105. 431 U.S. at 368.
106. Id. at 369 & n.53.
107. Id. at 371.
108. 458 U.S. 219 (1982).
109. Id. at 221.
110. See, e.g., Polynesian Cultural Center, Inc. v. NLRB, 582 F.2d 467 (9th Cir. 1978);
NLRB v. Midwest Hanger Co., 550 F.2d 1101 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 830 (1977);
NLRB v. Huntington Hosp., Inc., 550 F.2d 921 (4th Cir. 1977).
111. 458 U.S. at 221. Nor had the issue been addressed by the N.L.R.B. In unfair
labor practice cases, however, the N.L.R.B. and lower federal courts had approved the
tolling of backpay liability without an offer of retroactive seniority. See Peterson & Lynch,
Limiting Employer Back-Pay Liability in Employment Discrimination Cases: Ford Motor Co. v.
EEOC, 9 EMPLOYEE REL. L.J. 276, 277 (1983). The Ford Court emphasized, moreover, the
analogous relationship between § 7 06(g) and the National Labor Relations Act, § 10(C),
29 U.S.C. § 160(C), as it decided the case. 458 U.S. at 226 n.8.
112. 458 U.S. at 221-22.
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Ford with sex discrimination. Two years later, Ford offered a warehouse
job to one of the claimants but without seniority retroactive to the date
of her 1971 application. The offer was declined, partly because the
plaintiff did not wish to lose the seniority she had earned working else-
where during the two year interim and partly because she did not wish
to be the only woman at the warehouse. 31 3 Ford made a similar offer to
the second plaintiff, who also declined for similar reasons. The EEOC
sued Ford in 1975, alleging violation of Title VII.
1 1 4
The district court and court of appeals held that because Ford had
not offered the claimants retroactive seniority, the offer did not serve to
terminate the accrual of back pay relief."15 The Supreme Court re-
versed the lower court and held that "absent special circumstances," the
rejection of an employer's unconditional job offer tolls the accrual of
back pay liability. 1 16 Retroactive seniority was not required to be in-
cluded with the job offer. The Court emphasized the disruptive effect in
the workplace that the interference with existing seniority would create,
stating that the granting of retroactive seniority benefits would be likely
to cause "deterioration in morale, labor unrest, and reduced
productivity."' 1
7
In addition, the Court noted that requiring retroactive seniority
under section 7 06(g) of Title VII could violate collective bargaining
agreements. 1 8 The Court also considered the large cost that the em-
ployer would be forced to bear if he made offers of retroactive seniority
to each alleged victim, who would then effectively be a newly-hired, in-
experienced worker with advanced seniority rights. 119 Based on all these
factors, the court reasoned that requiring each employer to offer retro-
active seniority to toll backpay liability would eliminate the incentive of
employers to hire Title VII claimants and thereby defeat the Title VII
policy of encouraging voluntary settlement of discrimination dis-
putes. 120 Echoing the victim-oriented remedial approach of Franks and
Teamsters, the Ford Court stated that the primary goal of Title VII is to
get "the victims of employment discrimination into the jobs they de-
serve as quickly as possible."'
2 '
More than in any previous Supreme Court opinion, Ford demon-
strates the Court's unwillingness to disrupt "the established seniority
hierachy."' 12 2 The Court clearly indicated that there are limitations
upon the judicial remedial power as defined in section 7 06(g), particu-
larly when seniority is an element of the remedy or will be affected by
113. Id. at 222.
114. Id. at 223.
115. Id. at 223-24.
116. Id. at 238-39.
117. Id. at 229.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 228-30.
121. Id. at 241.
122. Id.
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III. FIREFIGHTERS LOCAL UNION No. 1784 v. SToTTs
A. Facts
In 1977 Carl Stotts, a black firefighter, filed a class action suit
against the Memphis, Tennessee Fire Department.' 2 4 Stotts alleged
that the fire department's hiring and promotion policies violated Title
123. It is possible to interpret the Ford opinion as being in direct conflict with the
Franks ruling, which allowed awards of retroactive seniority in discrimination cases, and
with the "make-whole" remedial intent of Title VII itself. Several commentators have
done so. See, e.g., Note, Ford Motor Co. v. EEOC: A Setback for Victims of Discrimination, 44
PirrrsBUaGH L. REV. 707 (1983); Note, Ford's Got a Better Idea: How to Toll Backpay Liability to
Title VII Claimants: Ford Motor Co. v. EEOC, 4 BRIDGEPORT L. REV. 311 (1983).
The Ford opinion, however, eliminates only the requirement that an employee offer a
retroactive seniority award in order to toll backpay liability. The Title VII claimant, in
accepting the unconditional job offer, does not compromise his right to continue pursuing
his claims against the employer for the underlying act of discrimination. Backpay and ret-
roactive seniority are still available as remedies should he prove successful in the suit.
Ford, 458 U.S. at 232 n.18, 237-38; see Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747
(1976); Albermarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405 (1975).
124. 104 S. Ct. at 2581. The Sixth Circuit opinion statistically demonstrates the dis-
criminatory hiring practices of the Memphis Fire Department:
Between 1950 and 1976, the Memphis Fire Department hired
94 black and 1683 white firemen. Promotions within the Fire














Investigator - Lieutenant 0 6
Captain 0 2
1973 Black White
Investigator - Captain 0 5
Captain 0 3








In 1979, blacks constituted between 33 and 37 percent of the
Memphis population. However, the Fire Department was only 10
percent black. The past hiring and promotional policies of the City
of Memphis caused the Fire Department to exhibit the following
racial characteristics in 1979:
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IV. AIR MASK SRV
Hydrant Repairman





Fire Alarm Operator I
Fire Alarm Operator II
Fire Alarm Operator III
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VII, as well as 42 U.S.C. §§ 1980 and 1983.125 The district court con-
solidated the suit with a claim filed against the fire department by Fred
Jones, a black fireman who alleged that he had been denied a promotion
by the department solely on the basis of race. 126 In 1980, the city set-
tled the lawsuit and entered into a consent decree with the claimants to
remedy the department's hiring and promotion practices. The decree
established a hiring goal stating that qualified minorities should fill at
least 50% of all new vacancies as they became available and a promo-
tional goal indicating that qualified minorities should receive at least
20% of all promotions. 12 7 The District Court for the Western District
of Tennessee retained jurisdiction to enter further orders that might be
necessary to effect the purpose of the decree.128 The decree contained
no provisions governing lay offs or demotions.
In early May, 1981, the city announced that projected budget defi-
cits required personnel reduction in all divisions of the city government.
The layoffs were to be based upon a last-hired, first-fired basis, deter-
mined by the individual's city-wide union seniority.129 On May 4, 1981,
the plaintiffs obtained a temporary restraining order preventing the city
from laying off or demoting any minority employee in the Memphis Fire
Department. The following day the parties agreed to the intervention of
the firefighters union in the case.
1 30
At the evidentiary hearing held to consider the plaintiffs request for
a preliminary injunction, the district court determined that nearly 60%
VIII. FIRE FIGHTING
Fire Private I 0 (13) 7 (31)
Fire Private II 100 (71) 594 (504)
Driver 8 (15) 281 (296)
Lieutenant 2 (29) 215 (211)
Captain 1 (2) 73 (82)
Air Crash Chief 0 1
District Chief 0 20
Deputy Chief 0 4
Total 111 1195
IX. AMBULANCE SERVICE
Emergency Unit Operator 7 82
Emergency Unit Lieutenant 0 6
District Chief 0 1
Total 7 89
(As of May 8, 1981)
679 F.2d 541, 550 n.5 (1982).
125. Section 1981 states that all persons within the United States shall have the same
rights in every state as white citizens. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1982). Section 1983 provides a
civil action against any individual depriving another of his constitutional rights under color
of state law. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982).
126. 104 S. Ct. at 2581.
127. Stotts v. Memphis Fire Dep't, 679 F.2d 541, 73-78 app. (6th Cir. 1982), rev'd, 104
S. Ct. 2576.
128. Id. at 578 app.
129. 104 S. Ct. at 2581-82. The city's seniority system was incorporated in a memoran-
dum of understanding between the union and the city. The memorandum had been re-
ferred to in an earlier consent decree entered into by the city as a result of an action by the
United States Justice Department against the city in 1974 for discriminatory hiring and
promotion practices. See Stotts, 679 F.2d at 549.
130. 104 S. Ct. at 2582.
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of all fireman affected by demotions and approximately 38% of those
terminated would have been minorities if the layoffs were conducted in
accordance with the seniority provisions.' 3 1 The district court con-
cluded that the execution of the layoff policy specified by the city's sen-
iority plan would have a discriminatory impact on the black firemen.
13 2
The court enjoined the city from applying the layoff policy of the senior-
ity system in a manner that would decrease the percentages of minority
employees in the various fire department job classifications and modi-
fied the consent decree accordingly "to minimize the disruptive effect
that layoffs would have on the efforts to achieve the goals of the
decree."1
3 3
B. The Sixth Circuit Opinion
On appeal by the city and the union, the Sixth Circuit upheld the
district court's modification of the consent decree. After finding that the
decree in its original form was fair and reasonable, and that the district
court had not abused its discretion in approving it,'3 4 the appellate
court set forth two legal justifications for the modification of the 1980
consent decree.' 3 5 First, the court determined that under a contract
theory the city could be held to its obligation to engage in affirmative
action in its hiring and promotion practices. In announcing the pro-
posed layoffs, the city had given notice of its intended anticipatory repu-
diation of the terms and goals of the decree because the layoff policy, if
implemented, would largely destroy the progress made in the affirmative
action program.136 The plaintiffs, as parties to a contract, were entitled
to full performance of its terms, which if strictly applied, would have
compelled the city to retain all of the firemen at great expense.
13 7
Hence, the modification allowed by the district court was merely an eq-
uitable adjustment in contractual terms which allowed the city to pro-
ceed with a modified layoff system more responsive to the original goals
of the decree.
Second, the Sixth Circuit observed that a trial court has continuing
equity jurisdiction "to modify a consent decree upon a showing that
'changed circumstances' have transformed the original decree into an
131. 104 S. Ct. at 2581-82; 679 F.2d at 549. It was anticipated that 15 of an estimated
total of 40 firemen to be laid off would be black. 104 S. Ct. at 2582.
132. 104 S. Ct. at 2582.
133. 679 F.2d at 550-51. Although the district court did not explicitly forbid the city's
seniority system, it forced the city to change its provisions to implement the proposed
layoffs. In theory, the city could have solved its financial problems without laying anyone
off, and left the seniority system layoff provisions intact. One proposal made to avoid
layoffs was the reduction of working hours for all fire department employees. See 104 S.
Ct. at 2602.
134. 679 F.2d at 552-55.
135. A third possible mechanism for modification, relief under FED. R. Civ. P. 60(b)
when the decree is void or no longer equitable, was mentioned by the court but not
evaluted because the issue was not clearly presented on appeal. Id. at 562.
136. Id. at 561.
137. Id. at 561-62. The court observed the basic contract principle that economic hard-
ship is not an excuse for nonperformance of a contract.
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instrument of wrong."' 3 8 The court reasoned that the city's un'antici-
pated economic crisis and the resulting disproportionate hardship on
minority fireman justified a revision of the terms of the decree lest its
purpose be frustrated.13 9 Therefore, the district court correctly revised
the decree to prohibit layoffs that would affect minority fireman
disproportionately.
In addressing the city's and union's assertions that the district
court's modification of the decree impermissibly awarded the minority
firemen retroactive seniority in violation of Franks and Teamsters, the
court proferred three theories that allow a consent decree to alter ex-
isting seniority provisions. 140 The settlement theory, supported by
opinions of the Seventh and Tenth Circuits, 14 1 holds that courts
strongly favor settlement of Title VII suits; therefore, it is error to re-
138. Id. at 562-63 (quoting United States v. Swift & Co., 286 U.S. 106, 115 (1932)).
The court relied upon Swift & Co. and Brown v. Neeb, 644 F.2d 551 (6th Cir. 1981) for
authority. Brown involved a similar conflict between a collective bargaining agreement re-
quiring layoffs on the basis of seniority and a consent decree which stipulated the imple-
mentation of an affirmative action program in the hiring of Toledo firemen. As in Stotts,
the agreement was silent with respect to layoffs. The Brown court held that the district
court, when faced with imminent layoffs due to economic conditions, had the authority to
modify the consent decree by proscribing layoffs in accordance with the "last-hired, first
fired provisions" of the seniority agreement. 644 F.2d at 559-60. The Brown opinion did
not rule upon the more important issue of whether § 703(h), with its built-in protection of
seniority, would prevent modification of a bona fide seniority system because Brown was
not brought pursuant to Title VII. Id. at 564.
The Supreme Court plurality opinion did not directly discuss the "changed circum-
stances" rationale applied by the Sixth Circuit. Instead, the Court proceeded directly, and
perhaps incorrectly, to the Title VII issues underlying the consent decree modification. See
infra note 182. However, it is arguable whether the "changed circumstances" approach
was appropriate in this case. Justice Stevens held that the adverse effects the layoffs would
have on the level of minority employment was not a "changed circumstance" because it
was obvious at the time at which the decree was entered into that any necessary layoffs
would have such an effect. 104 S. Ct. at 2595 (Stevens, J., concurring). Furthermore, the
Swift case has been applied strictly by numerous courts in denying requests for modifica-
tion of court ordered decrees and injunctions. See Steinberg, SEC and Other Permanent In-
junctions - Standards for Their Imposition, Modification, and Dissolution, 66 CORNELL L. REV. 27,
46-47 (1980).
139. While the Sixth Circuit was willing to modify the terms of the decree under its
equity theory to prevent undue hardship upon the minority firemen, the court emphati-
cally denied the city the defense of "economic hardship" under the contract rationale.
Compare 679 F.2d at 561 with 679 F.2d at 563. Apparently the Sixth Circuit sees a deviation
from the affirmative action policies of the decree as a breach of contract, in spite of the
absence of specific terms in the decree regarding affirmative action in conducting layoffs
and demotions. A modification of the terms of the decree, however, to prevent the termi-
nation and demotion of a disproportionate number of blacks is not a breach of contract
but a legitimate act of equity, justified by an "unanticipated economic crisis." 679 F.2d at
563. When viewed together, it is evident that the two justifications posed by the Sixth
Circuit for modification of the terms of the decree are in effect one. The decree is not
actually treated as a contract, equally binding upon both parties by the plain meaning of its
terms, but rather as a judicial order intended to benefit minority firemen through affirma-
tive action, and subject to any modification necessary to achieve that goal.
140. See 679 F.2d 564-67. It is interesting to note that the Sixth Circuit never, in any of
its arguments supporting the alteration of existing seniority agreements by consent de-
crees, addresses the fact that the district court's modifications, rather than the 1980 de-
cree, interfered with the city's seniority system. It would seem to be a large step from the
principle that one can bargain away one's own rights to the conclusion that a court can also
do so, yet the Sixth Circuit makes it without explanation.
141. 679 F.2d at 564-66 (citing Airline Stewards and Stewardesses Ass'n, Local 550 v.
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view the facts underlying each party's position before approving a con-
sent decree.! The appellate court must review only the settlement to
determine whether the lower court has abused its discretion in approv-
ing it. 142 The merits of the underlying controversy with respect to the
substantive law of Title VII and the Teamsters and Franks rulings are not
relevant to-a decision which should be made on the basis of the legal
principles regulating judicial review of settlement of agreements.
Second, the Sixth Circuit stated that if the Stotts plaintiffs had
proven their Title VII claims of discriminatory hiring and promotion
practices at trial, rather than entering into the decree before trial, the
district court could have then employed the supremacy clause to over-
ride the conflicting provisions of the seniority system. 143 The court rea-
soned that had plaintiffs allegations been true, the trial court would
have had the power to modify the state seniority system, as the federal
law in Title VII is supreme to the state seniority systems. It follows that
a consent decree, which is "the preferred means of settling an employ-
ment discrimination suit,' 1 4 4 should not decrease the court's power to
order relief by modifying conflicting seniority system provisions. To en-
courage employees to comply with the consent decrees voluntarily, the
trial court has the power to treat the allegations in the complaint as true
and, accordingly, override the seniority system.'
4 5
The third rationale suggested by the Sixth Circuit was based upon
the conclusion that the district court's injunction merely achieved the
same results that the city itself could have accomplished by adopting an
affirmative action program requiring layoffs and demotions to be con-
ducted on a racial basis. 146 The court could see no reason why the dis-
trict court should not be able to impose layoff procedures similar to
those to which the city itself might have legally agreed.
Taken collectively, the elements of the Sixth Circuit's analysis hold
that when the goals of an affirmation action program, as set forth in a
consent decree, conflict with a bona fide seniority system, the courts
should modify the terms of the decree to achieve the goals of the affirm-
ative action plan, even at the expense of the seniority system.
C. The Supreme Court Opinion
1. The Plurality
Justice White delivered the plurality opinion of the Supreme
American Airlines, 573 F.2d 960 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 876 (1978)); E.E.O.C. v.
Safeway Stores, 611 F.2d 795 (10th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 952 (1980).
142. 679 F.2d at 564-65.
143. Id. at 566. "This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be
made in Pursuance thereof. . . shall be the supreme Law of the Land." U.S. CONST. art.
VI, § 2.
144. 679 F.2d.at 566.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 566-67 (citing Sisco v.J.S. Alberici Construction Co., 655 F.2d 146 (8th Cir.
1981)), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 976 (1982). Sisco involved the modification of a collective
bargaining agreement by the employer rather than by court order.
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Court. 1 4 7 Joined by the concurrences ofJustices O'ConnorI 4 8 and Ste-
vens, 149 the plurality reversed the Sixth Circuit. The Court held that the
district court had exceeded its powers by entering the injunction and
thereby requiring non-minority fireman to be laid off in contravention of
the terms of a bone fide seniority system.150 Additionally, by modifying
the consent decree, the district court had acted against the policy of
both sections 703(h) and 7 06(g) of Title VII.
15 1
After disposing of the mootness claim raised by the respondents,'
52
the Court rejected the proposition that the district court's injunction on
the city was an action provided for by the original terms and goals of the
1980 decree. 153 Citing the absence of any specific language in the de-
cree providing for the contingency of layoffs and demotions, the Court
said:
[T]he "scope of a consent decree must be discerned within its
four corners, and not by reference to what might satisfy the
purposes of one of the parties to it". . . Had there been any
intention to depart from the seniority plan in the event of lay-
offs or demotions, it is much more reasonable to believe that
there would have been an express provision to that effect.'
54
The Court began its attack on the heart of the Sixth Circuit holding,
the affirmation of the consent decree modification, by citing Teamsters for
147. 104 S. Ct. 2576, 2581 (1984).
148. Id. at 2590.
149. Id. at 2594.
150. Id. at 2590.
151. Id. at 2588-89.
152. The Court found that the dispute between the parties remained alive because the
district court injunction was never vacated and would therefore still apply to any future
layoffs by the fire department. Furthermore, the consent decree as modified would have a
continued impact on the operation of the seniority system and the fire department's settle-
ment of backpay and retroactive seniority claims entered by terminated or demoted non-
minority firemen. 104 S. Ct. at 2583-84. Said the Court, "Respondents cannot invoke the
jurisdiction of a federal court to obtain a favorable modification of a consent decree and
then insulate that ruling from appellate review by claiming that they are no longer inter-
ested in the matter, particularly when the modification continues to have adverse effects on
the other parties to the action." Id. at 2585.
153. Id. at 2585. Although the Supreme Court attributes the Sixth Circuit with holding
that the district court's injunction merely enforced the terms of the decree, the Sixth Cir-
cuit did not directly apply the specific terms of the decree. Instead, the Sixth Circuit
looked to the remedial goals of the decree. 679 F.2d at 559. The decree provided that its
purpose was:
to remedy the past hiring and promotion practices of the Memphis Fire Depart-
ment with respect to the employment of blacks . . . [Tihe parties agree that the
long term goal established in this decree shall be. . . to raise the black represen-
tation in each job classification . . . to levels approximating the black proportion
of the civilian labor force in Shelby County . . .
The Court retains jurisdiction of this action for such further orders as may be
necessary or appropriate to effectuate the purposes of the decree.
679 F.2d at 575-76, 578 app. In contrast, the Supreme Court looked to the specific reme-
dial provisions of the decree and, finding no provisions for layoffs or demotions, held that
the parties would have expressly provided for any remedy as drastic as reworking the city's
seniority system. 104 S. Ct. at 2586. The decree contained specific remedies, 679 F.2d at
576-78 app., and the parties waived their rights to any relief beyond the decree. Id. at 574
app.
154. 104 S. Ct. at 2586 (quoting United States v. Armour & Co., 402 U.S. 673, 682
(1971)).
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the principle that "[slection 703(h) . . . permits the routine application
of a seniority system absent proof of an intention to discriminate."'' 55
Observing that the district court found no intent to discriminate on the
basis of race, the Court found that the lower court's injunction modify-
ing the decree, and consequently the seniority system, was improper.
The Court rejected each of the Sixth Circuit's three justifications for
alteration of existing seniority systems. First, the settlement theory
15 6
was discarded because the decree could not be read to be a settlement
on the disputed issues. Nowhere in the decree were the retroactive sen-
iority awards or departure from the specific terms of the seniority system
discussed. 1
57
The second justification was found to be faulty because its underly-
ing premise was a misstatement of the district court's authority. The
Sixth Circuit had reasoned that the district court could override discrim-
inatory aspects of the seniority system by assuming that the firemen had
proved their allegations of discriminatory hiring and promotional prac-
tices. 158 The Supreme Court disagreed. "Title VII precludes a district
court from displacing a non-minority employee with seniority under [a]
contractually established seniority system absent either a finding that the
seniority system was adopted with discriminatory intent or a determina-
tion that such a remedy [is] necessary to make whole a proven victim of
discrimination."1 5 9
The Court also criticized the Sixth Circuit for awarding relief to
people not identified as specific victims. "Mere membership in the dis-
advantaged class is insufficient to warrant a seniority award."' 60 There
had been no finding by the district court that any of the individual plain-
tiffs had been actual victims of illegal discrimination, nor had there been
a finding of discriminatory intent. Therefore, under Teamsters and
Franks, retroactive seniority was not available as a remedy. 161 The Court
stated that the purpose of section 7 06(g) of Title VII is to make victims
of racial discrimination whole. Court ordered quotas, a form of class
based relief rather than victim-specific relief, benefit individuals who
have not shown that they were specific victims of discrimination; there-
fore, quotas are not within the legislative intent of Title VII.'
6 2
155. 104 S. Ct. at 2587.
156. See supra note 141 and accompanying text.
157. 104 S. Ct. at 2587-88.
158. See supra notes 143-145 and accompanying text.
159. i04 S. Ct. at 2587 n.9.
160. Id. at 2588 (citing Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 367-71).
161. The lower court's modification of the consent decree was effectively an award of
retroactive seniority. Black firemen with lower seniority rank were to remain employed
while senior non-minority firemen were laid off. Although the fire department did not
actually revise the seniority list to reflect a new seniority order, the consent decree modifi-
cation operated as if it had. 679 F.2d at 551.
162. 104 S. Ct. at 2588-90. The Court did not rule upon the final Sixth Circuit ration-
ale for modification of the decree. Whether the city itself could have voluntarily altered
the seniority system by adopting race conscious layoff and demotion practices was irrele-
vant because the city had not in fact attempted such action. 104 S. Ct. at 2490. See supra
note 146.
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2. The Concurrences
Justice O'Connor's concurring opinion supported the Title VII
analysis of the plurality. Beginning with the principle that bona fide sen-
iority systems are protected by Title VII, 16 3 the opinion reiterated the
Teamsters requirement that only identified victims of unlawful discrimina-
tion are entitled to a remedy. 16 4 The firemen had entered into a con-
sent decree with the city without establishing either discriminatory
animus or the identity of any specific victims of discrimination. The
Supreme Court was simply "holding [the] respondents to the bargain
they struck during the consent decree negotiations in 1980," reasoned
Justice O'Connor. 16 5 To award relief to firemen not specifically identi-
fied as victims, or to allow the respondents to identify victims after en-
tering into the decree, would undermine the Title VII policy of
encouraging voluntary settlement of employment discrimination
cases.1 6 6 Justice O'Connor agreed that the district court's preliminary
injunction was beyond the bounds of the court's authority and therefore
an abuse of discretion.
Justice Steven's concurrence was based strictly upon the procedural
issues surrounding the interpretation and modification of a consent de-
cree. He wrote that "the Court's discussion of Title VII is wholly advi-
sory . . . . If the consent decree justified the District Court's
preliminary injunction, then that injunction should be upheld irrespec-
tive of whether Title VII would authorize a similar injunction."' 16 7 Jus-
tice Stevens found that the District Court had not explained how its
injunction could be based on a reasonable interpretation of the decree.
Nor could modification of the decree be justified due to changed circum-
stances, as suggested by the district court, because the adverse effect on
black employment that the proposed layoffs were expected to cause
could have been anticipated at the time of the formation of the de-
cree. 16 8 Therefore Justice Stevens agreed with the Court's conclusion




The dissenting opinion, written by justice Blackmun, joined by jus-
tices Brennan and Marshall, agreed with Justice Stevens that the Stotts
case should not have been decided on the basis of Title VII issues for
two reasons. First, the dissent held that the Stotts case was moot because
the 1981 consent decree modification applied only to the 1981 layoffs
and not to any future layoffs.17 0 Second, the dissent held that the plu-
163. Id. at 2592 (citing American Tobacco, 456 U.S. at 65 and Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 352).
164. 104 S. Ct. at 2593 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
165. Id.
166. Id. at 2593-94.
167. Id. at 2594.
168. Id. at 2595. See supra note 138 and accompanying text.
169. Id.
170. Id. at 2596, 2597 (Blackman, J., dissenting). See infra note 182.
19851
DENVER UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW
rality had not applied the correct standard of review to the preliminary
injunction issued by the District Court. 17 1 The dissent felt that by re-
viewing the merits of the underlying legal claim, that is whether the pro-
posed layoffs violated the consent decree, the plurality had treated the
case as if a permanent injunction rather than a preliminary injunction
had been involved. "The question before a reviewing court 'is simply
whether the issuance of the [preliminary] injunction, in light of the ap-
plicable standard, constituted an abuse of discretion.' "172
IV. ANALYSIS
A. An Issue of Procedure
Stotts presents the Supreme Court with the recurring conflict be-
tween the socially important Title VII goals and the preciously guarded
seniority rights of incumbent employees. As we have seen, the Supreme
Court has struggled with this problem from the first instance in which
the operation of Title VII began to impinge on seniority rights. Both
the operation of seniority systems and the use of seniority as a remedy
have been at issue. The debate has been vociferous, its life prolonged in
part by the ambiguity of Title VII's legislative history on the amount of
protection seniority systems are to be afforded, and in part due to the
vitality of the interests at stake. Because the Supreme Court plurality
has chosen to decide Stotts in terms of this issue, the opinion will inevita-
bly be one of social import. Stotts will be closely read for its potential
ramifications upon the debate, of which there are several.
But Stotts is more than a renewed opportunity to re-examine in rela-
tive simplicity the seniority-affirmative action problem. Undeniably in-
tertwined, and the over-riding issue from the legal if not social
perspective, is the issue of consent decree interpretation and modifica-
tion. Therefore, the first evidence of the significance of Stotts may be
gleaned from the large extent to which the Supreme Court relied upon
and discussed Title VII policy and case law in a case which could have
been decided strictly in terms of federal procedure.
The Sixth Circuit analyzed Stotts almost entirely as a procedural
problem. It applied the law of the operation and modification of con-
sent decrees to the facts, and found the lower court's actions to be
within the law of procedure. 173 The Sixth Circuit quickly disposed of
the Franks and Teamsters defenses, relying instead on procedural argu-
ments, 174 and never delved into the substantive law underlying the con-
sent decree.
Similarly, four of the nine Supreme Court justices believed that
171. Id. at 2600 (Blackman, J., dissenting). See supra note 13 1-33 and accompanying
text (discussing the preliminary injunction requested by the plaintiffs).
172. 104 S. Ct. at 2600 (quoting Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc., 422 U.S. 922, 931 (1975)).
173. See supra notes 134-44 and accompanying text.
174. Id. Only in its third argument did the Sixth Circuit comment upon the appropri-
ateness of layoffs by seniority with respect to Title VII. 679 F.2d at 566-67. See supra note
146 and accompanying text.
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Stotts was a procedural case and not a Title VII case.17 5 AsJustice Black-
mun suggested, the plurality gave the wrong answer to what was proba-
bly the wrong question. 176 Justice Stevens wrote that "the Court's
discussion of Title VII is wholly advisory,"' 17 7 as he observed that sec-
tions 703(h) and 706(g) place no limitations whatsoever on what parties
can do in a consent decree.178 Other courts have found that the terms
of consent decrees and state agency orders, rather than the policies of
Title VII, govern disputes over the application of the orders and decrees
in Title VII cases. 179 In fact, the plurality itself effectively reversed the
Sixth Circuit opinion based on a strictly procedural analysis. It held that
a consent decree should be interpreted within its four corners and there-
fore, inasmuch as the decree did not mention abandonment or altera-
tion of the seniority system, the seniority system should not be
abandoned or altered to construct a remedy for unlawful discrimina-
tion.' 8 0 It is not obvious from the opinion why the plurality felt com-
pelled to compound this satisfactory holding with discussion and
application of the Title VII issue. 18 1 The lack of necessity for the discus-
175. See 104 S. Ct. at 2594 (Stevens J., concurring) and 104 S. Ct. at 2605 (Blackmun,
J., dissenting).
176. Id. at 2605 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
177. Id. at 2594 (Stevens, J., concurring).
178. Id. at 2594 n.3; accord id. at 2605 n.9 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
179. See, e.g., Grann v. City of Madison, 738 F.2d 786 (7th Cir.) cert. denied, 105 S. Ct.
296 (1984) (holding "reliance on a state agency's order enforcing the right of a protected
group to be free from discrimination in employment is an absolute bar to suits by fellow
employees claiming that the action required by the remedial order constitutes a violation
of Title VII" Id. at 794.); EEOC v. McCall Printing Corp., 633 F.2d 1232 (6th Cir. 1980)
(agreeing that blacks may be hurt by a consent decree awarding women retroactive senior-
ity which gave them status superior to the blacks who entered an earlier decree without
seniority, but denying black's claim because a "consent decree cannot form the basis of a
valid Title VII action in this case" Id. at 1237 quoted in Grann, 738 F.2d at 794.); Dennison
v. City of Los Angeles Dep't of Water and Power, 658 F.2d 694 (9th Cir. 1981) (non-
minority employee challenge to a consent decree establishing an affirmative action plan
was rejected in part because the consent decree "is not subject to collateral attack." Id. at
695, cited in Grann, 738 F.2d at 794).
180. Stotts, 104 S. Ct. at 2586. See supra note 153 and accompanying text.
181. Justice White suggests in a footnote that the "posture" in which the case came to
the Supreme Court required a Title VII analysis. 104 S. Ct. at 2587 n.9. As mentioned
above, however, the Sixth Circuit's "posture" was essentially one of procedure. See supra
notes 134-44 and accompanying text.
The footnote contains a second, and equally unconvincing, rationale for deciding the
case in terms of Title VII. The Court observed that a change in the law which brings a
consent decree into conflict with the statute pursuant to which the decree was entered is a
change of circumstances sufficient to allow a modification of the decree.(citing System
Fed'n No. 91, Ry. Employee's Dep't, AFL-CIO v. Wright, 364 U.S. 642 (1961). The rule
of law that changed circumstances may justify the modification of a consent decree is well-
settled. See U.S. v. Swift & Co., 286 U.S. 106, 119 (1932); see generally Comment, Requests by
the Government for Modification of Consent Decrees, 75 YALE L. J. 657 (1966). The Court then
proposed that if a change in law is reason to modify a newly conflicting decree, then there
can be no modification of a decree which would result in a conflict with existing law. 104
S. Ct. at 2587 n.9. The Court therefore reasoned that because the modification would
violate Title VII, it was improper. This is a clever turn of logic, which obviously serves the
Court's purpose in bringing the Title VII issues into the decision, but it has no clear sup-
port in the law. As the dissent pointed out, it is by no means certain "that a consent decree
cannot provide relief that could not be obtained at trial." Id. at 2605 n.9 (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting). Additionally, by interjecting the Title VII substantive law into its review of the
consent decree modification, which was in fact a preliminary injunction entered by the
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sion suggests that the Court was eager to rule once again upon the Title
VII issue. This eagerness serves to amplify the import of the Court's
Title VII analysis, whatever the content may itself suggest.'
8 2
B. Interpreting the Significance of Stotts
Section 703(h) was enacted to protect seniority systems.' 8 3 Section
706(g) was enacted to define the limitations of judicial remedial
power. 18 4 Through the course of several decisions interpreting both of
these sections as they apply to Title VII's overall purpose of eliminating
discrimination in the workplace, the Court has erected the twin pillars of
intent and the victim's proof of harm.' 8 5 The two requirements are
highly favorable toward bona fide seniority systems. Nonetheless, they
have been in place since the American Tobacco and Teamsters decisions.
18 6
The Stotts holding on its face does not modify this precedent as it
applies sections 703(h) and 706(g). Justice White reiterated that absent
proof of intent to discriminate, the routine application of a seniority sys-
tem is permissible. 187 Similarly, the opinion repeated the requirement
that claimants show themselves to be victims before they are entitled to
the remedy of retroactive seniority. t 88 Justice O'Connor echoed both
requirements. ' 89
The narrow interpretation of the Stotts holding is that where parties
enter into a consent decree to implement affirmative action policies;
where the defendant's seniority system is bona fide and has no discrimi-
natory animus;190 where the plaintiff is not a proven victim of the under-
lying discrimination; 19 1 and where the decree does not set forth the
procedure with which layoffs, if necessary, are to be executed; the lower
court may not modify the decree to limit the detrimental effect of the
layoffs on the minorities benefitted by the decree at the expense of bona
fide seniority rights of incumbent non-minority employees. At its nar-
district court, the Court did not utilize the requisite, less probing, "abuse of discretion"
standard of review. Id. at 2600 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (citing University of Texas v.
Camenisch, 451 U.S. 390, 392 (1981)).
182. The Court was also forced to leap the mootness hurdle before getting to the Title
VII issues. See supra note 152. Although the majority's mootness arguments were not as
strained as the efforts to go beyond the procedural ruling, the plurality and concurring
opinions each addressed the mootness defense in some depth. See 104 S. Ct. at 2583-85;
Id. at 2591-92 (O'Connor, J., concurring); Id. at 2594 & n.2, (Stevens J., concurring). The
dissent persuasively argued that because the city had rehired every worker who had been
laid off pursuant to the modified plan, the "adverse relationship between the opposing
parties . . . is gone." Id. at 2596 (Blackman, J., dissenting).
183. See supra notes 12-75 and accompanying text.
184. See supra notes 76-123 and accompanying text.
185. American Tobacco, 456 U.S. at 65; Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 371. See supra note 66.
186. American Tobacco, 456 U.S. at 65; Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 371.
187. 104 S. Ct. at 2587 (citing Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 352). As discussed above, the
intent requirement was not clearly stated until the American Tobacco decision. See American
Tobacco, 456 U.S. at 65; supra note 66 and accompanying text.
188. 104 S. Ct. at 2588-89 (citing Teamsters).
189. Id. at 2592-93. (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
190. Id. at 2587.
191. Since Stotts never went to trial, he never proved that he was victimized by the fire
department's discrimination. See Id. at 2588.
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rowest, Stotts reiterates prior case law and bars the interpolation of af-
firmative action layoff terms into consent decrees in which those terms
do not exist.
Stating the Stotts holding in this manner raises the question of
whether the outcome of the case would have been different if the con-
sent decree's affirmative action provisions had been made applicable
specifically to layoffs. The Court deliberately avoided answering this
question. 19 2 The Court, however, ruled in WR. Grace & Co. v. Local
Union 759,193 that where an employer's Title VII conciliation agreement
protecting its female employees conflicted with the seniority rights of
the male employees, the male employees were entitled to an award for
being laid off in contradiction of their seniority rights. The court rea-
soned that if an employer enters into two conflicting contractual obliga-
tions, he will be liable when he is forced to breach the terms of one of
the agreements.19 4 The rationale of this opinion suggests that a consent
decree could contain layoff terms that contradict the seniority system
provisions, but if the employer then lays off minority employees in order
to respect the seniority rights of the non-minorities, he would be liable
to the minorities. It would therefore be incorrect to interpret Stotts as
indicating that employers may violate express affirmative action layoff
provisions that conflict with a bona fide seniority system without incur-
ring liability. The Stotts opinion contains a strong pro-seniority posture
but does not limit the employer's ability to expressly agree to affirmative
action layoff policies that contravene its own seniority system.
There are, however, two aspects of the Stotts opinion that may indi-
cate to future courts that new limitations have been placed upon the
effectiveness of Title VII. The first is the strong emphasis upon victim-
specific remedial policies and the clear rejection of court-ordered racial
quotas.19 5 Voluntary, private quotas and race-conscious remedies have
been approved by the Supreme Court, 19 6 but the clear denunciation of
the use of quotas for remedial purposes in Title VII cases may be an
abandonment by the Supreme Court of other private or court-ordered
quota systems. Furthermore, the victim-specific emphasis may serve to
discourage class action settlement in Title VII cases because each claim-
ant may elect to await a judicial decree declaring himself an actual victim
of discrimination, thereby availing himself of possible reinstatement,
backpay, and retroactive seniority remedies.
The second aspect of Stotts which may indicate an increasingly pro-
seniority tenor to Title VII opinions is the characterization of the Ford
192. Id. at 2590.
193. 103 S. Ct. 2177 (1983).
194. Id. at 2184. The seniority rights stemmed from the collective bargaining agree-
ment which provided for arbitration of disputes. The Court heard the case on an appeal of
an arbitrator's award, and could only overturn the agreement if it violated public policy or
if the decision failed to "draw its essence from the collective bargaining agreements." (ci-
tations omitted). Id. at 2183.
195. 104 S. Ct. at 2589-90.
196. United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979) (holding that voluntary, pri-
vate, race-conscious affirmative action is not prohibited by Title VII):
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ruling as standing for the proposition that seniority is only to be
awarded after balancing all of the equities. 19 7 The Ford case dealt with
the limited issue of whether seniority should be a part of the offer to
alleged discrimination victims required to toll backpay liability. 19 8 Ret-
roactive seniority as a remedy for proven victims of discrimination, as
allowed in Franks,19 9 was not at issue in Ford. Once a victim proved his
discrimination claim, retroactive seniority could become an element of
his remedy without requiring the court to first balance the competing
interests of the incumbent employees and the victim. 20 0 But the Stotts
summary of the Ford holding fails to distinguish seniority as an element
of an offer to toll backpay liability from the general use of seniority as a
remedy. Therefore, the Stotts Court seemingly broadens the applicabil-
ity of the Ford requirement that the equities be balanced before an award
of seniority can be made; hence, it increases the protection afforded
bona fide seniority systems. Stotts confirms the Court's heightened sen-
sitivity to any interference with seniority systems.
20 '
In summary, the bare holding of Stotts, on the relatively narrow is-
sue presented in the case, is not a dramatic one. No new law was created
regarding the fundamental seniority-affirmative action conflict except
the rule that incomplete consent decrees cannot be re-written to violate
existing Title VII policies. The true significance of Stotts will remain
unknown until future courts interpret the opinion. The possible shifting
of posture of the Supreme Court as indicated above, and the Court's
eagerness to rule on Title VII issues, may suggest significant change to
some courts and provoke rulings antagonistic toward Title VII discrimi-
nation claimants. 20 2 The significance of Stotts can be curtailed easily by
limiting it closely to its facts. It is possible that courts seeking to bolster
affirmative action policies and courts seeking to protect seniority sys-
tems will both find application for the Stotts opinion.
Lawrence K. Hoyt*
197. 104 S. Ct. at 2588; Id. at 2593 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
198. See supra note 109 and accompanying text.
199. 424 U.S. at 762-70. See supra note 86 and accompanying text.
200. 104 S. Ct. at 2593 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
201. See supra note 122 and accompanying text.
202. The Tenth Circuit has already referred to Stotts as an acknowledgement by the
Supreme Court that earlier Title VII holdings must be modified to "more clearly reflect
the letter and intent of Title VII." Carlile v. South Routt School Dist. RD-35, 739 F.2d
1496, 1500 (10th Cir. 1984) (female teacher failed to establish a prima facia case that she
was denied tenure for discriminatory reasons). In contrast, the Sixth Circuit of Appeals, in
a decision rejecting a non-minority challenge to a voluntary affirmative action hiring pro-
gram, denied that the Stotts opinion had any bearing on its case because Stotts involved a
court-ordered plan rather than a voluntary plan. Van Aken v. Young, No. 82-1570, slip
op. at 3 (6th Cir. December 13, 1984).
* The author gratefully acknowledges the assistance of Terence M. Ridley in writ-
ing and researching sections I and II of this article.
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It is now more than twenty-five years since the United States
Supreme Court established in San Diego Building Trades Council v. GarmonI
one of the broadest rules of federal preemption ever created by the
Court. 2 Garmon provides, with some exceptions, that neither state nor
federal courts can regulate conduct that is actually or arguably protected
* Associate, Holland and Hart, Denver Colorado. J.D., University of Utah (1984);
M.A., University of Northern Colorado (1974); B.S., Illinois State University (1973).
** Partner, Holland and Hart, Denver, Colorado. J.D., University of Toledo (1977);
B.S., Ohio State University (1974).
1. 359 U.S. 236 (1959). In Garmon, a union had begun the peaceful picketing of the
employer's business after the employer had refused to recognize the union as the exclusive
bargaining agent for employees. Id. at 237. The employer brought suit in state court and
obtained an injunction to enjoin the union from picketing and from using other pressure
to force a collective bargaining agreement and was awarded $1,000 for damages for loss to
the business as a result of the picketing. Id. at 237-38. Initially, the case worked its way to
the Supreme Court where it was held that the preemption issues could not be adjudicated
until it was determined whether the award of damages was proper under California law.
353 U.S. 26, 29 (1957). On remand, the California court set aside the injunction on the
basis of the preemption doctrine, but sustained the award of damages. Garmon v. San
Diego Building Trades Council, 49 Cal.2d 595, 320 P.2d 473 (1958). Once again, the
Supreme Court granted certiorari, and determined that the California court did not have
jurisdiction to award damages arising out of peaceful union activity which it could not
enjoin.
The Garmon decision generated a large body of critical literature. See, e.g., McCoid,
State Regulation of Labor-Management Relations: The Impact of Garmon and Landrum-Griffin, 48
IOWA L. REV. 578 (1963); Meltzer, The Supreme Court, Congress and State Jurisdiction Over Labor
Relations: 1, 59 COLUM. L. REV. 6 (1959); 74 HARV. L. REV. 641 (1961).
2. See J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA AND J. YOUNG, HANDBOOK ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW,
267-70 (1977) (discussing the preemption doctrine). Federal preemption is a pragmatic
doctrine derived from the need to avoid conflicts between state and federal law. Under the
Supremacy Clause, U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2, all laws of the United States made in pursu-
ance of the Constitution become the supreme law of the land. The difficult aspect of the
preemption doctrine is determining when a congressional enactment conflicts with state
law. The preemption issue is not difficult when the state and federal laws are mutually
exclusive; however, it is not always clear whether the state law actually conflicts with fed-
eral law. The touchstone for determining federal preemption is congressional intent:
whether Congress intended there to be any room for federal regulation of the field that is
the subject of the federal enactment. Because congressional enactments generally are si-
lent on the question of preemption, the courts are left to infer the intent of Congress from
the language, structure and purpose of the federal enactment. When a scheme of federal
regulation is so pervasive that there are no reasonable grounds for believing that Congress
left room for the states to operate, the state law will be preempted. See Cloverleaf Butter
Co. v. Patterson, 315 U.S. 148 (1945). Second, an act of Congress may involve a field of
regulation in which the federal interest is so dominant that the federal system must rule to
the exclusion of any state law. See Hines v. Davidowitz, 313 U.S. 52 (1941). Finally, a state
law may reflect a policy that is inconsistent with the goals set forth in a federal statute. See
Hill v. Florida, 325 U.S. 538 (1945).
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or prohibited by the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA). 3 Although it
can be argued that the exceptions to Garmon have swallowed up the
rule,4 the Supreme Court slavishly adheres to the Gannon formulation.
The result is to ignore the fundamental principles which federal pre-
emption was meant to serve.
The time has come to consider carefully whether the doctrine of
federal preemption under the NLRA should be reformulated. Garmon
struck a balance that favored federal rather than state resolution of pre-
emption issues and the protection of federal rights created by labor law
rather than the protection of state created rights. Assuming those bal-
ances were proper when struck, there is a serious question whether they
are appropriate for the 1980s and beyond.
After examining the purposes of federal labor law and the policy
established by Gannon, this article surveys state compliance with Gannon.
The article then critically evaluates the fundamental assumptions that
underlie the Gannon decision. Finally, it argues that the blanket rule of
the Gannon decision should be rejected in favor of a rule that expressly
balances state and federal interests when determining whether preemp-
tion is appropriate.
I. PURPOSES OF FEDERAL LABOR LAw
A. Basic Purposes of Federal Labor Law
The National Labor Relations Act, as originally adopted, was part of
a series of laws designed to lift the United States out of the economic
misery of the 1930s. The Act established the basis for collective bar-
gaining which was viewed as an answer to the labor strife then endemic
in American society. 5 The strike or lockout was to be replaced by rea-
soned negotiation which would search out the economic common
ground for management and labor. To ensure that collective bargaining
would take place, Congress established in section 7 of the NLRA6 that
certain collective action by workers would be protected by federal law.
Thus, the NLRA manifested a conscious choice to give impetus to the
fledgling American labor movement by protecting collective action from
3. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-69 (1982). The NLRA, commonly known as the Wagner Act of
1935, was amended by the Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act of 1947, and
amended again by the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure (Landrum-Griffin)
Act of 1959.
4. See Bryson, A Matter of Wooden Logic: Labor Law Preemption and Individual Rights, 51
TEX. L. REV. 1037, 1040 (1937).
5. See Marshall, The Future of the American Labor Movement: The Role of Federal Law, 57
CH. [-] KENT L. REV. 521, 526 (1981). The National Labor Relations Act was part of the
New Deal legislation designed to lift the United States out of the economic crisis of the
1930's. See THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAw 25 (C. Morris ed. 2d ed. 1983) (hereinafter "DE-
VELOPING LABOR Law").
6. 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1982). That section guarantees to employees "'the right to self-
organization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through
representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the
purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection. Id. See also DE-
VELOPING LABOR LAw, supra note 5, at 28.
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retaliation by management and hostile state legislatures and courts. 7
A truly federal labor law was envisioned because it was felt that only
the federal government could respond to the dangers that lurked in na-
tional economic markets. Labor strife in the steel, railroad, or coal in-
dustries threatened the welfare of the entire economy. States,
responding in multifarious ways, could not be relied on to cope with
national economic markets. Indeed, states could undermine a uniform
regulation of markets by competing for the location of business with la-
bor laws that favored management over labor. Thus, state laws could
cause the federal policy of spreading the benefits of collective bargain-
ing to founder.
The heart of federal labor law is found in sections 7 and 8 of the
NLRA which establish the ground rules for industrial combat.8 As origi-
nally enacted, the NLRA only delineated unfair labor practices by man-
agement; but as political winds changed the NLRA was amended to
include a great array of union unfair labor practices. 9 Sections 7 and 8,
therefore, establish a balance of bargaining power between management
and labor. The protection of some forms of industrial combat, and the
prohibition of others, created a framework within which union organiza-
tion and collective bargaining could take place.
B. The Threat of State Interference
There is no doubt that the NLRA was, in part, adopted to promote
the organization of labor in the United States.' 0 The recognition of the
entity status of the modern corporation facilitated the aggregation of
capital. Meanwhile, the independent craftsman supported by several ap-
prentices was replaced by largescale manufacturing operations with far
greater bargaining power than the atomized labor market. In addition,
the division of labor, as "perfected" by scientific management, deskilled
the labor market, causing the individual worker to become fungible. I1
Existing crafts were broken down into elementary routine tasks to be
performed repetitively by workers in discrete departments of the mod-
ern factory. The NLRA and related labor laws recognized the virtual
impotence of the American worker and established a legal framework to
invigorate the floundering labor movement. The standard of living for
most Americans could be improved only by strengthening the relative
bargaining power of labor, and strength was to be found in
organization.
7. See Marshall, supra note 5 at 526; DEVELOPING LABOR LAw, supra note 5, at 29.
8. 29 U.S.C. §§ 157 and 158 (1982).
9. Id. § 158(b).
10. See History and Development, in ARBITRATING LABOR CASES 10-11 (N. Levin ed.
1974). The findings and declaration of policy of the National Labor Relations Act make
clear that Congress was concerned about the right of employees to organize and engage in
collective bargaining for the purpose of avoiding strikes and other forms of industrial
strife. 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1982).
11. See Massie, Management Theory, in THE HANDBOOK OF ORGANIZAnONS 387-422 (.
March ed. 1965).
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The American labor movement had floundered largely because of
hostile state and federal courts. 12 Since the earliest days of the labor
movement in this country, the courts created legal doctrines to block
labor's every move. The illegal conspiracy doctrine, prima facie tort and
labor injunction were part of the arsenal used to thwart the effort to
organize labor. 13 The labor injunction was one of the most effective
weapons for counter-acting collective action by labor because the in-
junction can eliminate the momentum that is necessary to organize
workers or ensure the success of collective action. Courts granted in-
junctions in ex parte hearings on the basis of scandalous affidavits and
purported to apply the injunction to all persons with knowledge of the
court's order even if those persons were not parties to the court
action. 14
Even the adoption of federal legislation could not, by itself, protect
American labor from the hostility of many federal and state courts. The
United States Supreme Court typified that hostility by narrowly constru-
ing statutes designed to excempt labor from the effects of antitrust
laws.' 5 A shift in the Supreme Court's attitude ultimately caused the
Court to align itself with the Congress. That shift was most apparent in
1937 when the Court upheld the constitutionality of the National Labor
Relations Act. 16
By the time the NLRA was adopted, many state governments al-
ready had adopted their own comprehensive labor laws. In addition,
state courts continued to apply common law doctrines and generic eco-
nomic regulations to labor cases. Admittedly, not all state regulation of
labor-management relations was motivated by hostility toward labor.
Some part of that regulation was due to a feeling that labor strife was a
proper subject for the police power of the state. Nonetheless, conflict
between state and federal laws was inevitable and the Supreme Court
would need to determine the extent to which federal law displaced state
regulation of labor-management relations.
12. See Cox, Federalism in the Law of Labor Relations, 67 HARV. L. REV. 1297, 1307
(1954). One reason for the perceived hostility of state courts was the desire by states to
compete for the location of business at the expense of the worker. Id. at 1317.
13. See F. FRANKFURTER & N. GREENE, THE LABOR INJUNCTION, 2-5 (1930).
14. Id. at 17-24; 66-81; and 86-89. The effect of the injunction was to cripple the
labor movement by taking "the wind" out of the momentum that is necessary to organize
workers or to make collective action successful. Id. at 200.
15. See Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 254 U.S. 443 (1921). The Supreme
Court first determined that antitrust laws applied to organized labor in Loewe v. Lawlor,
208 U.S. 274 (1908). Congress attempted to limit the application of antitrust laws to or-
ganized labor in §§ 6 and 20 of the Clayton Act. 38 Stat. 730 (1914) (codified as amended
at 15 U.S.C. §§ 12 et. (1982).
16. NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937). See also Cox, supra note
5, at 1298-99. The Supreme Court's shift in attitude regarding the scope of the Com-
merce Clause has resulted in a situation where there is now virtually no area that cannot be
regulated by Congress under the Commerce power. See Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111
(1942).
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C. Federal Labor Law Preemption
The Supreme Court began by defining the scope of federal labor
law preemption on a piecemeal basis. It established early that the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board (NLRB or Board) would be responsible for
regulating the certification of labor unions in those industries subject to
the Board's jurisdiction. 17 States could neither certify a rival union nor
regulate the officers and agents of a certified union.18 Similiarly, the
states could not prohibit the exercise of rights protected by the NLRA.19
On the other hand, federal regulation of labor-management relations
was held not to be exclusive. Thus, when a labor dispute was accompa-
nied by violence, the state was free to regulate the violent conduct.
2 0
States also could regulate certain nonviolent labor practices that were
neither protected nor prohibited by the NLRA.
2 1
The Court's task of defining the scope of federal preemption was
frustrated by Congress' failure to address the extent to which the NLRA
displaced state law; yet, congressional intent is the touchstone for deter-
mining the scope of federal preemption. 22 Although Congress deter-
mined that the NLRB would have jurisdiction to adjudicate charges of
"unfair labor practices,"12 3 that term is not self-defining. Thus, the
Supreme Court faced two recurrent issues: did the state common or
statutory law implicate conduct within the ambit of the NLRA and, if so,
did the state law unreasonably interfere with the federal regulation of
that conduct.
Eventually, the Supreme Court grew weary of its piecemeal adjudi-
cation of federal preemption, and in San Diego Building Trades Council v.
Garmon,24 announced one of the broadest rules of preemption in any
field of federal law. The Court determined that the states were not free
to regulate conduct which was actually or arguably protected or prohib-
ited by the NLRA.
2 5
17. See Bethlehem Steel Co. v. New York State Labor Relations Board, 330 U.S. 767
(1947).
18. See, e.g., La Cross Telephone Corp. v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Board,
336 U.S. 18 (1949); Hill v. Florida, 325 U.S. 538 (1945).
19, See Hill v. Florida, 325 U.S. 538 (1945).
20. See UAW v. Russell, 356 U.S. 634 (1958); Youngdahl v. Rainfair, Inc., 355 U.S. 131
(1957); United Construction Workers v. Laburnum Construction Corp., 347 U.S. 656
(1954); Allen-Bradley v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Board, 315 U.S. 740, 749
(1942).
21. See, e.g., UAW Local 232 v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Board, 336 U.S. 245
(1949) (state could regulate intermittant work stoppages); Algoma Plywood & Veneer Co.
v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Board, 336 U.S. 301 (1949) (state could prohibit re-
quirement of union maintenance-of-membership clause).
22. See San Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 239-240 (1959).
23. 29 U.S.C. § 160(a) (1982).
24. 359 U.S. 236 (1959).
25. Id. at 244-45.
1985]
DENVER UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW
II. FEDERAL LABOR LAW PREEMPTION UNDER GARMON
A. Varieties of Federal Labor Law Preemption
Federal labor law preemption is not a monolithic construct; rather,
there are no less than five variations on the theme of federal preemp-
tion. First, federal law preempts state laws which purport to perform the
administrative functions of the NLRB when the affected industry is
within the Board's jurisdiction. 26 Thus, for example, the states are not
free to certify unions as the authorized bargaining agent for employees
subject to NLRB jurisdiction. 2 7 Second, federal law limits the extent to
which states can restrict the terms and conditions of employment be-
cause those terms and conditions are protected as appropriate for deter-
mination by collective bargaining. 28 Third, under Garmon, states cannot
regulate conduct that is actually or arguably protected or prohibited by
Sections 7 and 8 of the NLRA.2 9 It is this branch of the federal preemp-
tion doctrine that is the focus of this article. The fourth variety of fed-
eral preemption concerns conduct that is neither protected nor
prohibited by federal law, but which the states still are not free to regu-
late because it was Congress' intent to leave such conduct to the free
play of economic forces.3 0 Finally, preemption involves the extent to
which state entitlement programs can include workers involved in a la-
bor dispute.
3 1
B. Board Preemption: Garmon and its Progeny
Ad hoc rationalization likely could discover some over-arching prin-
ciple which explains all varieties of federal labor law preemption. This
paper focuses, however, only on federal preemption involving unfair la-
bor practices, otherwise known as "Board preemption." Garmon crystal-
lized the principles of Board preemption, clearly identifying two strands
of the doctrine:
When it is clear or may fairly be assumed that the activities
which a State purports to regulate are protected by § 7 of the
National Labor Relations Act, or constitute an unfair labor
practice under § 8, due regard for the federal enactment re-
quires that state jurisdiction must yield . . . . At times it has
26. See, e.g., Bethlehem Steel Co. v. New York State Labor Relations Board, 330 U.S.
767 (1947).
27. See La Crosse Telephone Corp. v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Board, 336
U.S. 18 (1949).
28. Local 24, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. Oliver, 358 U.S. 283 (1959) (state cannot
apply antitrust law to issues that are subject of mandatory bargaining under the NLRA).
The NLRA establishes the duty of employers and unions to negotiate over mandatory
terms of bargaining. 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1982).
29. 359 U.S. 236, 244-45 (1959).
30. See, e.g., Lodge 76, Int'l Ass'n of Machinists v. Wisconsin Employment Relations
Commission, 427 U.S. 132 (1976); Local 20, Teamsters v. Morton, 377 U.S. 252 (1964).
31. See, e.g., New York Telephone Co. v. New York State Department of Labor, 440
U.S. 519 (1979). Federal preemption cases which involve state entitlement programs are
similar to those in which the state seeks to prohibit conduct permitted by federal labor law.
The difference between the cases is that entitlement programs provide benefits to partners
who engage in permitted behavior rather than attempting to sanction those persons.
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not been clear whether the particular activity regulated by the
States was governed by § 7 or § 8 or was, perhaps, outside both
these sections. But courts are not primary tribunals to adjudi-
cate such issues. It is essential to the administration of the
[NLRA] that these determinations be left in the first instance to
the National Labor Relations Board. What is outside the scope
of this Court's authority cannot remain within a State's power
and state jurisdiction too must yield to the exclusive primary
competence of the Board.
3 2
Thus, the essence of Garmon is that neither state nor federal courts can
exercise jurisdiction over conduct that is actually or arguably protected
or prohibited by the NLRA. To the Garmon court, it did not matter
whether the state law was one of general application or one specifically
designed to apply to labor-management relations.
33
The Garmon court recognized that there were exceptions to the
broad rule of federal preemption which it had created. First, jurisdiction
is not withdrawn from the states "to regulate where the activity regu-
lated was a merely peripheral concern of the Labor Management Rela-
tions Act."' 3 4 Second, states still are free to regulate conduct that
"touched interests so deeply rooted in local feeling and responsibility
that, in the absence of compelling congressional direction, [the Court]
could not infer that Congress had deprived the States of the power to
act."'3 5 In a later decision, the Court created another exception which
applies when the rule of law is "so structured and administered that...
it is safe to presume that judicial supervision will not disserve the inter-
ests promoted by the federal labor statutes."
3 6
In 1978, the Supreme Court created yet another exception to Gar-
mon in Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Carpenters.3 7 Sears held that a state court
action for peaceful trespassory picketing is not preempted when the
state court plaintiff had no opportunity to present the matter to the
NLRB. 38 Thus, the primary jurisdiction strand of Board preemption is
inappropriate in those cases when the conduct at issue will not be re-
viewed by the Board.
C. Branches of the Garmon Doctrine
There are three reasonably distinct branches to the Gannon doc-
trine. The first, and most obvious, is that under the supremacy clause, 39
states cannot prohibit conduct that is protected by the NLRA.40 Like-
32. 359 U.S. 236, 244-45 (1959).
33. Id. at 244 n.3. For a general discussion of Garmon, see Cox, Recent Developments in
Federal Labor Law Preemption, 41 OHIo ST. L.J. 277, 277-78 (1980).
34. Garmon, 359 U.S. at 243.
35. Id. at 244.
36. Amalgamated Ass'n of Motor Coach Employees v. Lockridge, 403 U.S. 274, 297-
98 (1971).
37. 436 U.S. 180 (1978).
38. Id. at 207.
39. U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2.
40. 29 U.S.C. §§ 157 and 158(a) (1982). This branch of the preemption doctrine pro-
hibits states from interfering with conduct protected under federal law. See Wellington,
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wise, states cannot protect prohibited conduct by sanctioning parties
who would interfere with the prohibited conduct.
Primary jurisdiction is the second branch to Board preemption, but
it is not the same type of primary jurisdiction discussed in administrative
law. 4 1 Typically, primary jurisdiction implies that an administrative tri-
bunal has the initial responsibility for determining some particular issue.
It is likely that a court will then make thefinal determination on the is-
sue. Under Garmon, state courts are completely preempted from adjudicat-
ing controversies that actually or arguably involve protected or
prohibited conduct under the NLRA.4 2  Only after the Board deter-
mines 'that the conduct at issue is not within the broad penumbras of the
NLRA can the state proceed to adjudicate the dispute; even then, how-
ever, it is arguable that Congress intended that the conduct be subject to
the free play of economic forces and free from interference of state
laws.
4 3
The third branch to the Garmon doctrine is a variation on
supremacy: the states cannot provide remedies to aggrieved parties
when those remedies would interfere with a uniform body of federal la-
bor law. 4 4 The states are not free to sanction persons who engage in
unfair labor practices even though the state would apply federal law. 4 5
Additionally, states cannot remedy the violation of state created rights
when the remedy would unreasonably interfere with the enforcement of
federal labor law. 46 Presumably, the remedies established in the NLRA
help to create the balance in bargaining power that Congress thought
was necessary to foster collective bargaining.
Labor and the Federal System, 26 U. CHI. L. REV. 542, 545-49 (1959). The branch also bars
the state from remedying conduct prohibited by federal law. This is true because the
Supreme Court has determined that state remedies for violations of federal law also will
result in serious conflicts that undermine a uniform system of federal regulation of labor
law. See Cox, Labor Law Preemption Revisited, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1337, 1342-43 (1972).
Prohibiting states from sanctioning conduct prohibited by federal law is premised on the
notion that the NLRA establishes a balance of power in sections 7 and 8, and that that
balance is preserved properly by the sanctions afforded in the Act. See Lesnick, Preemption
Reconsidered. The Apparent Reaffirmation ofGarmon, 72 COLUM. L. REV. 469,477 (1972). For
example, the fear of state damages might deter conduct that is protected by federal law in
addition to that conduct which is prohibited. See Wellington, at 553.
41. See Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. San Diego Council of Carpenters, 436 U.S. 180, 199
n.29 (1978).
42. Id.
43. See, e.g., Lodge 76, Int'l Ass'n of Machinists v. Wisconsin Employment Relations
Commission, 427 U.S. 132 (1976) (states could not regulate refusal of organized labor to
work overtime).
44. See Amalgamated Ass'n of Motor Coach Employees v. Lockridge, 403 U.S. 274
(1971). In Farmer v. United Bhd. of Carpenters Local 25, 430 U.S. 290 (1977), the
Supreme Court established a three part test to determine if Garmon should be applied:
first, that there was no risk that a state would prohibit conduct that Congress intended to
protect; second, that there was an overriding state interest in protecting residents from an
invasion of their rights; and, third, that there was little risk that the state cause of action
would interfere with the effective administration of national labor policy. Id. at 298.
45. See supra note 40 and the discussion therein.
46. See, e.g., Weber v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 348 U.S. 468 (1955), where the Supreme
Court held that the state could not regulate labor relations through the use of a general
restraint of trade statue.
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D. The Justification for Board Preemption
Board preemption as embodied in Garmon has been justified on var-
ious grounds: to ensure the uniform application of federal labor law; to
guarantee expertise in the adjudication of the preemption doctrine; and
to protect the labor movement from hostile state courts.
4 7
Federal preemption is not necessary to ensure that federal law is ap-
plied when resolving labor disputes; 48 it is thought to be necessary to
ensure that federal law is applied uniformly.49 The Supreme Court has
argued that different judicial procedures can undermine uniformity as
readily as the application of different substantive rules of law. 50 Uni-
formity implies that parties in different parts of the country will be
treated alike and that state courts will be unable to compete for business
by adopting procedural rules that would favor management.
Uniformity could, however, be achieved by vesting jurisdiction to
adjudicate labor disputes exclusively in federal courts; but, the Garmon
doctrine also ousts federal courts from resolving disputes in which pro-
tected or prohibited conduct might be in issue. That ouster is premised
on the belief that an expert administrative tribunal is better equipped to
determine when conduct is protected or prohibited by the NLRA. 5 1 Os-
tensibly, the Board is a superior body for ascertaining when conduct
must be protected or proscribed to further the goals that Congress in-
tended to advance when it enacted the National Labor Relations Act.
Implicit in the Garmon doctrine is the desire to protect the labor
movement from hostile state courts. "States' rights" have always been
equated with antiunion policies, while "federal preemption" is seen as
prounion. 52 Those tendencies, no doubt, go back to the early days of
the labor movement when state courts created doctrines that stifled the
growth of collective labor action. It probably is true that state courts in
some regions of the country continue to display a marked antiunion
bias.
47. See Come, Federal Preemption of Labor-Management Relations: Current Problems in the
Application of Garmon, 56 VA. L. REV. 1435, 1436-37 (1970). There are a variety of factors
that weigh in favor of a federal, as opposed to a state, labor law. Federal labor law is
important for the purpose of regulating the national economy, to prohibit interstate com-
petition for business at the expense of labor, to provide convenience to parties through a
uniform system of regulation and for spreading the benefits of the federal labor policy.
See, Cox, supra note 12, at 1302-04. On the other hand. state regulation often can be more
convenient to the parties involved, can result in better decision-making because the deci-
sion-makers are closer to the problem, can provide the opportunity for flexible solutions
and can encourage local responsibility. Id. at 1304-05.
48. For example, states can be given concurrent jurisdiction to determine issues in-
volving labor-management relations, yet be required to apply federal law to the resolution
of those issues. See Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957) (states
have concurrent jurisdiction over § 301 claims but must apply federal law).
49. See Come, supra note 7, at 1452.
50. See Garner v. Teamsters Union Lodge 776, 346 U.S. 485, 490-91 (1953) (even if
the same substantive laws applied, different tribunals and procedures are likely to result in
"incompatible or conflicting adjudications").
51. See Come supra note 47, at 1443-44 (Board expertise required to balance private
rights and union § 7 rights).
52. Cox, supra note 12, at 1302.
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Finally, Garmon's broad rule of preemption was designed to reduce
the tremendous number of cases coming to the Supreme Court on the
issue of preemption. The Court tired of building the preemption doc-
trine brick by brick and adopted an approach that would discourage the
states from exercising jurisdiction over conduct that even arguably was
within the ambit of the NLRA. Not only did constant adjudication dissi-
pate judicial resources, it taxed the ability of the Court to define pro-
tected and prohibited conduct.
E. Current Analytical Method
The Garmon doctrine has been transformed into a rigid analytical
method which the Supreme Court uses to resolve federal preemption
questions. First, the Court determines whether the conduct at issue is
actually or arguably protected or prohibited by the NLRA. 53 Although
the Court does not usurp the Board's power, it must decide whether the
conduct sought to be regulated by the state is within the ambit of the
NLRA. Occasionally, forgetting its manners, the Supreme Court deter-
mines whether the conduct being considered is protected or prohib-
ited.5 4  The second part of the analytical process is to determine
whether one of the exceptions to the rule applies. Thus, the Congress
engages in a pigeon-holing exercise as it tries to decide whether the
facts of the case being considered fit either the "traditional state con-
cern" 55 or "merely peripheral concern" exception.
56
Finally, the Court decides whether the state action would interfere
with the actually or arguably protected or prohibited conduct. 5 7 When
the state regulates only some aspects of a labor dispute, it is not immedi-
ately clear whether the state action will unreasonably interfere with the
federal law. Before Garmon, the Court applied a test based on the gen-
eral versus specific nature of the state law. 58 A state law of general ap-
plicability is less likely to interfere with federal labor law than a state law
53. See Note, Labor Law-Invoking State Trespass Laws to Enjoin Peaceful Union Picketing, 15
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 288, 292-93 (1979).
54. See, e.g., Int'l Longshoremen's Ass'n Local 1416 v. Ariadne Shipping Co., 397 U.S.
195 (1970); UAW Local 232 v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Board, 336 U.S. 245
(1949).
55. See Hooton, The Exceptional Garmon Doctrine, 26 LAB. L. J. 49, 51-63 (1975) (dis-
cussing the Garmon exceptions). Cases within this exception include UAW v. Russell, 356
U.S. 634 (1958); Youngdahl v. Rainfair, Inc., 355 U.S. 131 (1957); and United Construc-
tion Workers v. Labrunun Construction Co., 347 U.S. 656 (1945).
56. See Hooton, supra note 55, at 51-63. Cases within this exception include Linn v.
United Plant Guard Workers Local 114, 383 U.S. 53 (1966) (malicious libel); Hanna Min-
ing Co. v. Dist. 2 Marine Engineers Beneficial Ass'n, 382 U.S. 181 (1965) (regulation of
supervisory employees); and Int'l Ass'n of Machinists v. Gonzales, 356 U.S. 617 (1958)
(reinstatement to union status).
57. See, e.g., Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. San Diego Council of Carpenters, 436 U.S. 180,
197 (1978), where the Supreme Court stated that the critical inquiry was "whether the
controversy presented to the state court is identical to . . .or different from . . . that
which could have been, but was not, presented to the Labor Board."
58. See Cox, supra note 12, at 1323-24. A law of general application is one that has no
reference to the labor or management status of the parties involved in the litigation. A law
of specific application is one that could be applied only to labor or management parties.
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specifically designed to regulate labor-management relations. 59 The
Court now looks to the elements of the state cause of action to deter-
mine whether they are identical with the federal claim. 60
Although the Supreme Court habitually recites the purposes to be
served by Garmon 6l and the rationale for exceptions to the doctrine, 62
the Court has failed to consider carefully whether the policy assump-
tions which support Garmon still are valid. Rather than carefully weigh-
ing competing state and federal interests, the Court applies a rigid
conclusory test to resolve questions of preemption.
III. BOARD PREEMPTION IN THE STATE COURTS
A. A Rule Made to be Broken
The analytical method used to apply the Garmon rule invites state
courts to hold that preemption does not apply to the case before them.
A state court faced with a preemption issue must decide if the conduct at
issue is within the construction of the NLRA, if the state cause of action
would interfere with the federal remedy for an unfair labor practice, and
if the exceptions to Garmon do not apply. If the answer to any of those
subissues is "no," preemption is not appropriate.
It is the exceptions to Garmon that provide the widest escape hatch
to the rule. First, preemption does not apply when the cause of action
touches "interests . . .deeply rooted in local feeling and responsibil-
ity. ' ' 63 Second, preemption is not proper when the conduct at issue is
"a merely peripheral concern" of federal law. 64 Finally, if the state
cause of action is unlikely to interfere with the purposes of federal labor
law, the action is not preempted by the Board.6 5
Unless the state cause of action is identical to the one that would be
presented to the Board, state courts likely will find that an exception to
Garmon applies. States traditionally have been responsible for protect-
ing health, safety and public order by the exercise of their police powers.
Thus, state courts will not readily assume that Congress, acting against a
backdrop of general state statutory and common law, intended to pre-
empt a cause of action arising under those laws. 6 6 The result is that a
broad rule of preemption is construed narrowly to a point where pre-
emption is the exception and not the rule. Acting with a clear con-
59. Id.
60. See Local 926, Int'l Union of Operating Engineers v. Jones, 460 U.S. 669, 681.
(1983).
61. Id. at 675-76.
62. Id. at 1459. See also DEVELOPING LABOR LAw, supra note 5, at 1512-17.
63. Garmon, 359 U.S. at 244.
64. Id. at 243.
65. See Farmer v. United Brotherhood of Carpenters Local 25, 430 U.S. 290 (1977).
66. The states traditionally have been responsible for protecting property rights and
the health and safety of their citizens. When Congress enacted the National Labor Rela-
tions Act, it did so knowing that state laws of a general nature were in existence and did
nothing to preempt those laws from applying to labor management relationships. See
Whitacre, Property Rights and Pre-emption Under the National Labor Relations Act, 47 Mo. L. REV.
59 (1982).
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science, state courts can determine that the issues before them touch
interests rooted in local feeling or are of merely peripheral concern to
the federal law.
B. Charting Compliance Under Garmon
Garmon attempted to establish a broad rule of preemption designed,
in part, to minimize state interference with federal labor law. However,
Garmon can be successful only if it is applied properly by state courts
because they adjudicate far more cases in which Board preemption is an
issue than does the Supreme Court. If state courts do not understand
Garmon, or simply refuse to follow it, the goals of the decision cannot be
realized.
One of the more recurrent issues facing state courts is the extent to
which federal labor law preempts the application of state trespass laws
to labor disputes. Trespass laws come into play most often when union
organizers or picketers enter private property to conduct their activities.
Because the Supreme Court, has not squarely addressed the issue, 6 7
state courts have been left to determine the vitality of trespass laws when
applied in a labor relations context.6 8 A majority of the state courts fac-
ing the issue have held that the NLRA does not preempt state trespass
laws applied to labor disputants. 69 Although the courts generally agree
that trespass laws can be applied against union organizers who are not
employees,7 0 the decisions are not in agreement on the issue of peaceful
trespassory picketing by employees following a strike.
7 1
Typical of state court reasoning is the decision in May Department
Store Co. v. Teamsters Union Local No. 74372 where the Illinois Supreme
Court held that a state trespass law applied to union organizers was not
preempted by the NLRA even though the union had filed an unfair labor
practice charge against the employer. 73 The court stressed the historic
interest of the states in maintaining domestic peace through the use of
67. In Amalgamated Meat Cutters Local 427 v. Fairlawn Meats, Inc., 353 U.S. 20, 24-
25 (1957), the Supreme Court left open the issue of whether a state could apply its tres-
pass laws to peaceful trespassory picketers. When the issue again came before the court in
Taggart v. Weinacker's, Inc., 397 U.S. 223 (1970) the Supreme Court dismissed a writ of
certiorari as having been improvidently granted. In a concurring opinion, Chief Justice
Burger stressed that when enacting the NLRA, Congress acted against the backdrop of
"the general application of state trespass laws." 397 U.S. at 228.
68. Despite the ChiefJustice's opinion, the trespass issue remains. See Cox, supra note
33, at 280. See also Note, supra note 53, at 295.
69. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Noflke, 5 Mass. App. Ct. 496, 364 N.E.2d 1274 (1977);
People v. Bush, 39 N.Y.2d 529, 349 N.E.2d 832 (1976); May Department Stores Co. v.
Teamsters Union Local 743, 64 III. 2d 153, 355 N.E.2d 7; (1976); Hood v. Safford, 213
Tenn. 684, 378 S.W.2d 766 (1964). But see Freeman v. Retail Clerks Union Local 1207, 53
Wash. 2d 426, 363 P.2d 803 (1961).
70. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Noffke, 5 Mass. App. Ct. 496, 364 N.E.2d 1274 (1977).
71. Compare PTA Sales, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Local 462, 96 N.M. 581, 633 P.2d 689
(1981) with Wiggins & Co., Inc. v. Retail Clerks Union Local 1557, 595 S.W.2d 802 (Tenn.
1980).
72. 355 N.E.2d 7 (I1. 1976).
73. Id. at 11.
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trespass laws. 74 In addition, the court reasoned that even peaceful
trespassory picketing could lead to violence.7 5 Thus, the court em-
ployed a Garmon exception and concluded that the state's interest in do-
mestic peace overrode any possible interference with federal labor law.
State courts now use the identity between the state cause of action
and the possible unfair labor practice as the touchstone for determining
whether a state tort or contract claim is preempted. 76 When the state
claim is identical to the issue that could be presented to the Board, state
courts hold that preemption is proper regardless of whether the state
law is one of general applicability or one specifically applied to labor-
management relations.
77
When the state court reasons that the state cause of action is some-
how different from the unfair labor practice charge, the court will be
more reluctant to find preemption. 7 8 Perhaps the best recent example
of this practice is the decision of the Wisconsin Supreme Court in Lueck
v. Aetna Life Insurance Co..79 In Lueck, the employee/plaintiff charged that
the employer had exercised bad faith in handling the employee's disabil-
ity claims pursuant to a disability plan which was part of a collective bar-
gaining agreement. The employer and its insurer argued that the state
tort action was preempted by the NLRA because the mishandling of the
disability payments arguably was a violation of section 8(a)(5) of that
Act.80 The court disagreed, emphasizing that the issue before the court
was the manner in which payments were made, not whether payments
were made or not.8 1 Thus, the issue facing the court was different than
that which would be presented to the Board. In addition, the court em-
phasized the Garmon exceptions, especially for issues touching local in-
terests, and held that the state interest was more important than any
possible interference with federal labor law.
8 2
Lueck points out one of the inherent difficulties with Garmon. The
state court must make some preliminary decision regarding the pro-
tected or prohibited nature of the conduct at issue; but, in doing so, the
court performs the Board's function. 83  In Lueck, the Wisconsin
Supreme Court decided that the mishandling of disability payments is
not a violation of section 8(a)(5) and therefore, the state action was not
preempted. There is no real alternative to permitting the court to ana-
lyze whether the conduct at issue is within the scope of the NLRA; other-
74. id.
75. Id. at 10.
76. See, e.g., Gouveia v. Napili-Kai, Ltd., 65 Hawaii 189, 649 P.2d 1119, 1126 (1982).
77. Id.; Bebensee v. Ross Pierce Electric Corp., 400 Mich. 233, 253 N.W.2d 633
(1977); Schena v. Smiley, 488 Pa. 632, 413 A.2d 662 (1980).
78. See, e.g., Whelan's Inc. v. Kansas Department of Human Resources, 235 Kan. 425,
681 P.2d 621, 624 (1984).
79. 116 Wis.2d 559, 342 N.W.2d 699 (1984), cert. granted sub noma. Allis-Chalmers Corp. v.
Luech, 105 S. Ct. 80 (1984).
80. Id. at 704.
81. Id. at 704-07.
82. Id. at 707.
83. See Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. San Diego Council of Carpenters, 436 U.S. 180, 199
n. 29 (1978).
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wise, an employer always could argue that the state cause of action was
within the NLRA and thereby divest the state court ofjurisdiction. Con-
sequently, the state must make its own determination as to whether the
conduct is arguably prohibited or protected by federal law. Nonethe-
less, it is important to keep in mind that the state court determines in
the first instance whether the conduct at issue is within the scope of
NLRA.
States are more reluctant to find preemption for a cause of action
based on a state statute. Enactment of a state law more clearly empha-
sizes the state's interest in the conduct that might be subject to the
NLRA. Thus, state courts have held that a union agent can be prose-
cuted for using intimidating language,8 4 that an employee can maintain
an action for reinstatement after termination following a compensable
job-related injury, 85 and that employees can maintain a suit for unpaid
vacation pay even though the Board adjudicated a similar issue.
86
These decisions also focus on the similarity of the state cause of action
and the possbile unfair labor practice and the exceptions to Garmon.
It is clear that the states are struggling with the Garmon rule. It is
equally clear that many state courts are balancing the states' interest in
adjudicating the disputes before them with the federal interest in main-
taining the integrity of the national labor law. 8 7 Those courts are able
to avoid applying Garmon by reasoning that the state cause of action is
different from the possible unfair labor practice and that one of the ex-
ceptions to Garmon applies. 8 8 The net result is that the state's interest
overrides any potential interference with federal law.
IV. EVALUATING GARMON
A. The Basic Failure of the Rule
The United States Supreme Court established a broad rule of Board
preemption, in part, to avoid the constant adjudication of specific pre-
emption cases. The Court's effort was unsuccessful. Barely a term goes
by that the Supreme Court is not called on to determine the scope of
federal preemption.8 9 More importantly, Garmon has not withdrawn ju-
risdiction from the state courts. Gannon creates too many decision
points for state courts; not only can the courts determine the protected
or prohibited nature of the conduct at issue, the courts also determine
whether there will be interference with federal law and whether excep-
tions to the rule apply. Thus, Garnon has not been successful in estab-
84. People v. Holder, 119 I1. App. 3d 366, 456 N.E.2d 628 (1983).
85. Vaughn v. Pacific Northwest Bell Telephone Co., 289 Or. 73, 611 P.2d 281
(1980).
86. Whelan's, Inc. v. Kansas Department of Human Resources, 235 Kan. 425, 681
P.2d 621 (1984).
87. See, e.g., Lueck v. Aetna Life Insurance Co., 116 Wis.2d 559, 342 N.W.2d 699, 707
(1984).
88. See, e.g., Whelan's, Inc. v. Kansas Department of Human Resources, 235 Kan. 425,
681 P.2d 621, 624 (1984).
89. See Come, Federal Preemption Since Garmon, 17 LAB. L.J. 195, 196 (1966).
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lishing a rule that protects federal labor law from interference by state
courts. Rather than search for another rule, it is time to consider care-
fully whether the assumptions of Garmon are now, if ever, valid.
B. Validity of the Garmon Assumptions
The Garmon decision is based on the need for an inviolate federal
law of labor relations.9 0 The finely tuned balancing of labor-manage-
ment relations established in sections 7 and 8 of the NLRA created the
optimum conditions for spreading the perceived benefits of collective
bargaining. At the same time, fledgling labor unions would be pro-
tected from hostile state courts. It is doubtful whether the federal gov-
ernment must continue its paternalistic policies toward collective
bargaining and labor unions. The labor movement has matured to a
point where it can defend itself in state courts. 9 ' Moreover, preemption
does not always protect employees from management. Often the doc-
trine withdraws jurisdiction from state courts to hear claims by employ-
ees against employers or unions.
9 2
If the issue were only the need to apply federal law to labor dis-
putes, state courts could have concurrent jurisdiction over unfair labor
practices but the Supreme Court has stressed the need for the uniform
application of federal laws. Uniformity, it is argued, requires that the
same law and procedures be applied. 9 3 Thus, a single, expert board was
established to create the uniformity required to effect federal labor prac-
tices. Unfortunately, uniformity is a myth in federal labor law. First, the
NLRA provides for review of Board decisions by the United States
Courts of Appeals.9 4 On any number of important labor issues, the cir-
cuits are split on the interpretation of federal labor law. 95 Second, the
inability or refusal of state courts to comply fully with Garmon principles
renders uniformity an impossibility.9 6 The various approaches taken by
90. See San Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 244 (1959)
(states that cannot be free to regulate conduct plainly within the central aim of federal
regulation). However, somewhat contrarily, states are free to adjudicate many issues
which have the potential to interfere with federal labor law. See Sears, Roebuck & Co. v.
San Diego Dist. Council of Carpenters, 436 U.S. 180, 189 n. 14 (1978).
91. But see Marshall supra note 5, at 527 (arguing that there are still segments of the
labor pool that are unprotected by labor laws).
92. See, e.g., Local 926, Int'l Union of Operating Engineers v. Jones, 460 U.S. 669
(1983); Farmer v. United Brotherhood of Carpenters Local 25, 430 U.S. 290 (1977).
93. See Garner v. Teamsters Union Local 1776, 346 U.S. 485, 490-91 (1953).
94. 29 U.S.C. § 160(f) (1982).
95. Ultimately, of course, guidance could come from the Supreme Court; however,
differences of opinion by the circuit courts are likely to continue. Admittedly, differences
among twelve circuit courts of appeals could be less troublesome than differences among
fifty state courts.
96. See, Updegraff, Preemption, Predictability and Progress in Labor Law, 17 HASTINGS L.J.
473, 483 (1966). The result of all of the factors that undermine uniformity in federal labor
law is that uniformity is a myth. See Amalgamated Ass'n of Motor Coach Employees v.
Lockridge, 403 U.S. 274, 318 (1971) (White, J., dissenting). Ultimate review by the
Supreme Court has been of little help because the Court's opinions have offered no over-
riding principles that can effectively guide the state courts. See, Cox, supra note 33, at 300.
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state courts regarding trespass laws evidences the lack of uniformity in-
herent in the Garmon formulation.
Board preemption also is justified on the basis of the need for deci-
sionmaking by an expert tribunal.9 7 Unfortunately, expert decisionmak-
ing also is a myth in labor relations. First, the Board's decisions are
reviewed by the federal circuit courts and, even with deference to agency
decisionmaking, the circuit courts are not reluctant to reverse a Board
order or to refuse to enforce a Board order.9 8 Second, the Board is not
so much an expert body as it is a political body of decisionmakers. The
Board appointment process is structured so that Board members will
reflect the political philosophy of the party in power.9 9 Finally, in de-
fense of state courts, it is difficult to argue that while these courts have
concurrent jurisdiction over most questions of federal law, they are not
competent to adjudicate issues implicating federal labor law.10 0 Assum-
ing that a state court oversteps its authority, the defendant in the state
court action can obtain injunctive relief from the Board.' 0 '
An analysis of the assumptions supporting Garmon reveals that they
either are invalid or not effectuated by the current structure of federal
law. The Garmon rule was established over twenty-five years ago when
the United States Supreme Court perceived a need to protect federal
labor law from interference by state courts. It is time to consider
whether the balance struck by Congress and protected by the Supreme
Court is appropriate in the 1980s.
C. Countervailing Interests
The Garmon decision strikes a balance that favors federal decision-
making when an issue presented for adjudication implicates the NLRA.
State courts must be permitted to play a more important role in our
judicial system. Those courts are responsible for protecting rights cre-
ated by state law and their integrity is undermined when they must defer
so readily to the Board. The federal judicial system and the NLRB face a
caseload that should encourage court involvement.'
0 2
The legitimate rights of employees and employers also are sacri-
97. See supra note 47.
98. See 29 U.S.C. § 160(e), (f) (1982).
99. See 29 U.S.C. § 153(a) (1982). The National Labor Relations Board is subject to
significant political pressures that seek to influence federal labor policies. See Marshall,
supra note 5, at 523.
100. The fact is that there is no evidence that the Board makes its decisions on the basis
of any expertise. See Getman & Goldberg, The Myth of Labor Board Expertise, 39 U. CHI. L.
REV. 681 (1972). The Board does not examine whether its assumptions about the results
of certain labor practices are true in fact. Id. at 682. A prime example of the failure of the
Board to investigate the reality of its assumptions is in the area of campaign practices. The
Board has been criticized for its failure to conform its assumptions to reality. See Bok, The
Regulation of Campaign Tactics in Representation Elections Under the National Labor Relations Act,
78 HARV. L. REV. 38, 46-53 (1964). The fact remains that the Board often is more respon-
sive to political pressures than empirical investigation. See Cox, supra note 33, at 319-21.
101. 29 U.S.C. § 160(j) (1982).
102. See Morris, The Case for Unitary Enforcement of Federal Labor Law-Concerning a Special-
ized Article III Court and the Reorganization of Existing Agencies, 26 Sw. L.J. 471, 481 (1972).
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ficed when a state court does defer to the Board. Under Garmon, a state
court litigant is not permitted to have his or her case heard if the state
action implicates conduct that is arguably protected or prohibited by the
NLRA. Thus, the litigant is turned away from the protection of local
courts and channeled into a federal agency with which the person proba-
bly has little or no familiarity.'
0 3
V. REFORMULATING BOARD PREEMPTION
A. Garmon: Balancing or Pigeonholing
Garmon purports to establish a broad rule of preemption with cer-
tain categorical exceptions. The job of a state court is to determine
whether the conduct at issue fits into the preemption box or one of the
exception boxes. There is no room to balance state interests with fed-
eral interests because in any doubtful situation, the state court is to de-
fer to the Board. In fact, the Garmon rule is a balancing test that
underwent a metamorphosis. Both of the primary exceptions to Garmon
are the result of balancing state and federal interests. However, what
started out as examples of instances when preemption was not proper,
turned into hard and fast rules to be applied in every fact situation.
10 4
However, while state courts recite the Garmon formulation, it is clear that
they often do little more than balance the state interest and federal
interest.
B. Establishing a New Rationale for Board Preemption
A reformulation of Board preemption requires analysis of the goals
to be achieved by preemption. Federal preemption can be justified
when the state cause of action clearly interferes with federal labor law.
However, preemption has gone too far when a state claim is preempted
on grounds that it arguably implicates section 7 or 8 of the NLRA. A
reformulation of Board preemption should recognize that state courts
must be given credit for their ability to protect the interests of private
litigants without sacrificing the goals of federal law. Similarly, reformu-
lation should place greater emphasis on the rights of state court liti-
gants. Both employees and employers'have righ'ts created by state
statutes and common law. Many of those rights exist irrespective of the
fact that the litigant is part of a labor-management relationship. Fur-
thermore, many of those rights existed when Congress enacted the
NLRA without indicating the extent to which that Act was to displace
preexisting state law. Finally, many of those rights, especially private
property rights, have been recognized for hundreds of years. That en-
durance suggests that state created rights should not readily be sacri-
ficed in the name of protecting the sanctity of federal labor law.
103. See id. at 476-81.
104. See supra notes 34-36 and accompanying text.
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C. Reformulating Board Preemption
Board preemption should be reformulated into a two-tiered analy-
sis. 10 5 Tier one would ask whether the state action would regulate con-
duct that is actually protected or prohibited by the NLRA. If the answer
is "yes", the state action should be preempted per se without further in-
vestigation. Under the per se analysis, a state court would first determine
if the state claim implicates conduct that is actually protected or prohib-
ited by the NLRA. That determination would be made, in part, on the
basis of Supreme Court precedent and Board decisions. Second, the
state court would need to determine if resolution of the state claim
would interfere with federal labor law. That determination would be
made by analyzing the similarity between the state claim and the poten-
tial unfair labor practice.' 0 6 If the state claim implicates actually pro-
tected or prohibited conduct and would interfere with federal labor law,
the state claim is preempted.
When the state claim implicates conduct that only is arguably pro-
tected or prohibited by the NLRA, the second tier of preemption analy-
sis would come into play-balancing. Balancing would involve a variety
of factors: the state's interest in remedying the state claim; the plaintiffs
interest; the public's interest; the federal interest; and the degree of in-
terference between state and federal law. The state's interest and plain-
tiffs interest likely will be similar. The nature of the claim can be
examined to determine its relative validity. For example, the state's in-
terest in adjudicating a claim based on a law of general applicability
would have more validity than one based on a specific state labor statute.
The harm suffered by the plaintiff should also be considered. Actual or
potential physical harm to a state litigant might weigh more heavily in
the balance than economic injury. The public interest would support
the state litigant when the litigant's state claim could prevent injury to
the public. Thus, for example, conduct threatening public order might
be a proper subject for state adjudication.
The federal interest can be analyzed on at least two levels. First, a
court could consider the "arguability" of the protected or prohibited
nature of the conduct being evaluated. 10 7 The greater the likelihood
that the conduct is within the scope of the NLRA, the stronger would be
the federal interest. Second, the size of the business and the industry
involved in the dispute could be examined. An industry of national im-
portance, such as the automobile industry, would strengthen the case
for preemption. A relatively small business, even though within the ju-
risdiction of the Board, would not argue for preemption.
105. The analysis suggested here is similar to that used in antitrust litigation where
some conduct is held to be illegal per se while other conduct is only illegal under a rule of
reasonableness. See L. SCHWARTZ,J. FLYNN AND H. FIRST, FREE ENTERPRISE AND ECONOMIC
ORGANIZATIONS: ANTITRUST 12 (1983).
106. See supra note 60 and accompanying text.
107. See Cox, supra note 33, at 289, discussing the ability of a court to examine the
"arguability" of the protected nature of the conduct at issue when determining if preemp-
tion is appropriate.
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Finally, the state court would have to examine the extent to which
resolution of the state claim would interfere with federal law. Again, the
similarity of the state claim and the potential unfair labor practice
should be considered.' 0 8 Interference with federal law would not, in
and of itself, result in preemption; rather, all of the factors outlined
above would have to be examined.
No precise algebraic formula can be suggested for weighing all of
the factors that a court should consider in its balancing analysis. Indeed,
the factors suggested here probably are not exhaustive of the factors to
be considered by the court. Nonetheless, a balancing analysis is a more
honest approach to the problem of preemption.
D. Benefits of Balancing
A balancing analysis of preemption issues candidly recognizes what
courts are in fact doing. State courts can openly admit that they are
weighing the state's interest in adjudicating the state claim with the fed-
eral interest in protecting federal labor law. That honesty will open up
to the deliberative process to a discussion of the policy factors that favor
or oppose preemption.
The policy factor most dramatically brought into focus is the bal-
ance struck by federal law between labor and management. The labor
movement has matured to the point that a hyperpaternalistic federal la-
bor law cannot be justified. None of this is to suggest that the funda-
mental rights of collective action in the NLRA should be cut back;
rather, a reformulation of Garmon recognizes that the heavy hand of the
federal government does not need to tip the scale in favor of collective
bargaining and the labor movement.
Balancing can restore the vitality of state courts by permitting them
to protect the legitimate rights of state court litigants. Under Garmon, a
state court must defer to the Board whenever the state claim implicates
conduct arguably within the NLRA. With balancing, a state court can
consider a variety of factors to determine whether adjudication of the
state claim would unreasonably interfere with federal labor law. Pre-
emption is a federal law issue and state courts would apply federal law
when analyzing the preemption issues; however, state courts should be
permitted to weigh the interest of the state against the federal interest
before determining that its jurisdiction has been withdrawn.
Finally, balancing better protects the rights of state court litigants.
Employees and employers have legitimate state created rights that de-
serve a remedy after violation. Preemption under Garmon too often
shunts the litigant away from a familiar and local state court into an in-
convenient federal beauraucracy. As noted, Garmon favors protection of
federal labor law, collective bargaining, and the labor movement at the
expense of the state court litigant. Admitting that the rights created by
the NLRA are part of a comprehensive federal labor law, it still is true
108. See supra note 60.
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that those rights are statutory and of relatively recent origin. Given the
maturity of the labor movement, it is difficult to argue that rights created
by the NLRA should take such high priority over state created rights.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Garmon rule was formulated over twenty-five years ago when a
need to protect federal labor law as developed by an expert board from
interference by state courts was perceived. A broad rule of Board pre-
emption can no longer be justified. Garmon failed to limit the adjudica-
tion of preemption issues because the supposedly hard and fast rules of
preemption disguised the balancing process that lurked beneath the sur-
face of the doctrine.
A reformulation of Board preemption reevaluates the assumptions
of preemption. The two-tiered balancing process suggested here will
permit state courts to fulfill their purpose by better protecting the legiti-
mate rights of state courts. For the 1980s and beyond, state court liti-
gants should not be required to defer to the NLRB whenever federal
labor law is implicated by the state claim.
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The National Labor Relations Board (NLRB or Board), currently
composed of a majority of members appointed by President Reagan,'
has in recent months been reversing earlier Board decisions at a fast and
furious pace. These reversals have involved a number of critical la-
bor/management issues including: the right of employers to relocate
work during the term of a union contract, 2 the deferral of unfair labor
practice charges to labor arbitrators,3 the legality of misrepresentations
of fact during labor representation campaigns, 4 rules regarding solicita-
tion and distribution, 5 and employer interrogation of employees regard-
ing their union sympathies.
6
Labor Board vacillation in decisionmaking has been a perennial
problem, 7 and in many respects reflects the quasi-political nature of the
agency. 8 The intensity of recent Board "flip-flopping," however, has
prompted increased concern regarding the impact such shifts in policy
have on the effective administration of the Labor Act.
Observers have contended that such rapid changes create consider-
able uncertainty and instability in the law,9 and indeed tend to en-
courage parties to press cases they might otherwise have settled had the
* Assistant Professor, Texas A&M Business School; B.S., Cornell University; J.D.,
University of Pennsylvania; M.A., (In economics), University of California, Los Angeles.
Fellow, UCLA Program in Law and Economics, 1978-80.
1. The three Reagan appointees are Donald Dotson (chair), Patricia Diaz Dennis,
and Robert Hunter. For a biographical sketch of Board members and a review of recent
Board squabbling, see Wall St. J., June 28, 1984, at 29, col. 3.
2. See Milwaukee Springs II, 268 N.L.R.B. No. 87, 1983-84 NLRB Dec. (CCH)
16,029 (1984), rev k Milwaukee Springs I, 265 N.L.R.B. 206 (1982).
3. See United Technologies Corp., 268 N.L.R.B. No. 83, 1983-84 NLRB Dec. (CCH)
16,027 (1984), revg General Am. Transp., 228 N.L.R.B. 808 (1977).
4. See Midland Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 263 N.L.R.B. 127 (1982), revg General Knit of
Cal., 239 N.L.R.B. 619 (1978).
5. See Our Way, Inc., 268 N.L.R.B. No. 61, 1983-84 NLRB Dec. (CCH) $ 16,003
(1983), revg T.R.W. Bearings, 257 N.L.R.B. 442 (1981).
6. See Rossmore House, 269 N.L.R.B. No. 198, 1983-84 NLRB Dec. (CCH) 16,225
(1984), revg PPG Indus., 251 N.L.R.B. 1146 (1980).
7. See Dunau, The Role of Criticism in the Work of the National Labor Relations Board, 16
N.Y.U. CONF. ON LAB. 205 (1963); Hickey, Stare Decisis and the NLRB, 17 LAB. L.J. 451
(1966); Cooke & Gautschi, Political Bias in NLRB Unfair Labor Practice Decisions, 35 INDUS. &
LAB. REL. REV. 539 (1982).
8. See generally Summers, Politics, Policy Making, and the NLRB, 6 SYRACUSE L. REV. 93
(1955).
9. See Cooke & Gautsche, supra note 7, at 548-59; NLRB Rulings That Are Inflaming
Labor Relations, Bus. W.,June 11, 1984 at 122 (statements of William N. Cooke, a "promi-
nent Washington management attorney").
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"rules of the game" themselves been more settled.' 0 One president of a
major union recently put it as follows: "The pendulum in Labor Board
decisions has swung so rapidly and erratically over the recent past that
volumes of Board precedents no longer can be relied upon by unions or
employers and their legal counsel."" Such concerns have also
prompted a number of prominent observers of the labor scene to call
for congressional action to deal with this "problem."12
This article will explore the NLRB's recent policy reversals in the
context of these calls for congressional reform. Part II will examine
three important areas where NLRB shifting decision-making has been of
a particularly strident nature. Part III will then address the policy impli-
cations of these shifts in terms of some possible avenues for congres-
sional reform. In this regard, particular attention will be given to the
various proposals raised as part of the aborted Labor Law Reform Act of
1978,'3 and to broader administrative law implications which may be
involved in any legislative reforms in this area. Part IV will conclude
with a call for limited congressional action.
I. SOME REPRESENTATIVE AREAS OF NLRB POLICY REVERSAL
A. Arbitration and the National Labor Relations Act
Over ninety percent of extant labor-management collective bargain-
ing agreements in the United States contain grievance arbitration
clauses pursuant to which disputes arising between the parties, during
the term of the agreement, are submitted for final and binding resolu-
tion to a neutral third party arbitrator. 14 Such grievance arbitration
clauses grew in popularity after Congress, in the Taft-Hartley amend-
ments of 1947, amended the Labor Act to specifically encourage parties
to establish voluntary dispute settlement procedures, 15 and made con-
tractual grievance arbitration clauses directly enforceable in federal dis-
trict court. 16 The national policy favoring the peaceful resolution of
labor disputes through grievance arbitration also received a sharp boost
in 1960 from the Supreme Court in three decisions known as the "Steel-
worker's Trilogy."' 17 There has been, however, an ongoing tension be-
tween the national policy favoring labor arbitration, and the role of the
10. See 14 LAB. REL. REP. (BNA) 194 (Nov. 7, 1983) (statement of NLRB Member
Patricia Diaz Dennis); see generally Gould, The Economics of Legal Conflicts, 2 J. LEGAL STUD.
279 (1973).
11. 116 LAB. REL. REP. (BNA) 190 (July 9, 1984) (statements of Thomas W. Gleason,
President, International Long Shoremen's Association).
12. See Cool Rhetoric; Bitter NLRB Debate, 115 LAB. REL. REP. (BNA) 203 (March 12,
1984) (statement of then NLRB General Counsel William Lubbers); see generally Regulatory
Reform For NLRB Stability, 116 LAB. REL. REP. (BNA) 68-69 (May 28, 1984).
13. This legislation was passed by the U.S. House of Representatives but filibustered
in the U.S. Senate. For a complete listing of the relevant legislation, see Comment, Labor
Law Reform: The Regulation of Free Speech and Equal Access in NLRB Representation Election, 127
U. PA. L. REV. 755 & n. 1 (1979).
14. See F. ELKOURI & E. ELKOURI, How ARBITRATION WORKs 7 (5th Ed. 1978).
15. See 29 U.S.C. § 173(d) (1982).
16. See 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1982).
17. United Steelworkers of Am. v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960); United
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National Labor Relations Board in enforcing the National Labor Rela-
tions Act (NLRA or Act).18 This tension has been reflected in a string of
shifts in Labor Board policy in this area.
By way of background, take, for example, the case of a unionized
employee who is covered by a collective bargaining agreement which
provides, as nearly all of them do, that employees cannot be fired except
for "just cause." 19 The employee is then fired for trying to get new
employees to join the union.20 This action would almost certainly not
constitute "just cause" for dismissal, and would thus represent a con-
tractual violation. It would also represent a violation of the NLRA,
which in section 8(a)(3), 2 1 prohibits discrimination against employees
on the basis of union activity. The issue then becomes: where does the
employee go first to assert his rights, to a labor arbitrator with the power
to enforce the collective bargaining contract, or to the Board with the
power to enforce the NLRA?2 2 The issue has been a highly controver-
sial one.
In 1971 the NLRB addressed this issue in the leading case of Collyer
Insulated Wire. 23 In Collyer an employer unilaterally changed his pay
scale, an action which arguably violated both the parties' collective bar-
gaining contract and section 8(a)(5) of the Act. 24 Section 8(a)(5) gener-
ally makes it an unfair labor practice for employers to fail to bargain with
unions in "good faith" over issues like pay and other "mandatory" sub-
jects of bargaining before they take action with respect to them. 2 5 The
union wanted the NLRB, as opposed to an arbitrator, to address the
alleged violation first. The Board demurred over the dissent of its two
most pro-union members, 2 6 and held that the parties had agreed to sub-
mit contractual disputes to arbitration and that the Board would defer
from intervention until the parties' own dispute-resolution machinery
had been utilized. One year later, in the National Radio27 case, the Board
extended its Collyer pre-arbitration deferral policy to cases involving in-
stances other than refusals to bargain, including alleged individual rights
violations of sections 8(a)(1) 2 8 and 8(a)(3) such as the kind set forth in
the example above involving an employee being discharged for union
Steelworkers of Am. v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960); United Steel-
workers of Am. v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960).
18. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-69 (1982).
19. See generally Summers, Individual Protection Against Unjust Dismissal: Time for a Statute,
62 VA. L. REV. 481, 483-84 (1976).
20. In states which have passed "right-to-work" laws pursuant to NLRA § 14(b), it is
unlawful for a union and employer to have an agreement requiring union membership as a
condition of employment. See 29 U.S.C. § 164(b) (1982).
21. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1982).
22. See generally Vause, The NLRB Policy on Deferral to Arbitration-Deference or Abdication?,
58 FLA. B.J. 461 (1984).
23. 192 N.L.R.B. 837 (1971).
24. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (1982).
25. See generally R. GORMAN, LABOR LAw: UNIONIZATION AND COLLECTIVE BARGAINING
498-523 (1976).
26. The dissenters were members John Fanning and Howard Jenkins.
27. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) (1982).
28. 198 N.L.R.B. 527 (1972).
1985]
554 DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 62:2
organizing activity.
2 9
Five years later, however, with new membership on the Board, the
NLRB reversed its decision in National Radio. The Board held in the
1977 General American Transportation Corp.30 case that it would no longer
defer to arbitration cases involving the exercise of individual employee
rights under the Act such as those involving alleged violations of sec-
tions 8(a)(1) and 8(a)(3). In a case decided the same day, however, the
Board reaffirmed its original Collyer decision policy of initially deferring
to arbitration charges involving alleged refusals to bargain.
3 1
The Board's holding in General American Transportation was not, how-
ever, destined to be a long standing one. On January 19, 1984, the
Board, again comprised of new members decided, in the case of United
Technologies Corp. ,32 to reverse General American and reinstate the rule of
National Radio. This constituted the third major shift on the issue of pre-
arbitration deferral of unfair labor practice charges in approximately
thirteen years.
The Board's record of policy reversals is perhaps even worse on the
issue of post-arbitration deferral. Cases in this area arise after arbitration
has been conducted, and there is a question as to how much weight the
Board should give the arbitrator's award in a subsequent unfair labor
practice case. The general standards were set forth by the Board in the
1955 case of Spielberg Manufacturing3 3 where the Board said that, in gen-
eral, it would broadly defer to an arbitrator's award in any subsequent
proceeding so long as the arbitrator's decision was "not clearly repug-
nant to the purposes and policies of the Act. ' 34
Eight years later, however, the "Kennedy Board" in its Raytheon
Co. 3 5 decision said that it would not defer to an arbitrator's decision un-
less the arbitrator had carefully considered the unfair labor practice is-
sue involved in the case. This decision was reversed in 1974 by the
"Nixon Board" in Electronic Reproduction Service Corp. ,36 which essentially
returned to the old Spielberg standard. Electronic Reproduction Service was
overruled in 1980 by the "Carter Board" in Suburban Motor Freight
37
which essentially returned to the holding of the Raytheon case. In its
1982 Propoco, Inc. 38 decision, though, the Carter Board went even be-
yond the holding of the Raytheon case, and decided to limit deferral to an
arbitrator's award in subsequent Board proceedings involving the same
case only to instances where the arbitrator procedurally disposed of the
issues in precisely the same manner the Board would have. The Board's
post-arbitration deferral policy has culminated, for the present, in the
29. See supra notes 16-20 and accompanying text.
30. 228 N.L.R.B. 808 (1977).
31. See Roy Robinson Chevrolet, 228 N.L.R.B. 828 (1977).
32. 268 N.L.R.B. No. 83, 1983-84 NLRB Dec. (CCH) 16,027 (1984).
33. 112 N.L.R.B. 1080 (1955).
34. Id. at 1081.
35. 140 N.L.R.B. 883 (1963).
36. 213 N.L.R.B. 758 (1974).
37. 247 N.L.R.B. 146 (1980).
38. 236 N.L.R.B. 136 (1982).
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"Reagan Board's" 1984 decision in Olin Corp. 39 overruling Suburban Mo-
tor Freight and Propoco and again essentially returning to the "Eisenhower
Board's" Spielberg standard. To say the least, the Board's policy ap-
proach to this area has not been a static one!
B. The Work Relocation Conundrum
Perhaps the most controversial 40 recent decision of the Reagan La-
bor Board was its decision in Milwaukee Spring Division of Illinois Coil
Spring Co. ,41 better known as Milwaukee Spring II. This decision involved
the critical issue of union veto power over employer determinations to
relocate a plant.
Legal analysis of this issue turns to a large degree on section 8(d)
4 2
of the Act which mandates that once a union and a company reach
agreement over a collective bargaining contract, the company is re-
quired to obtain the union's consent before it can modify any term of the
contract. If, for example, a union contract provides that for the con-
tract's duration employees are to be paid ten dollars an hour, an em-
ployer seeking to reduce this rate of pay to nine dollars per hour must
first obtain the union's consent. A change without such consent would
constitute both a breach of contract and an unfair labor practice.
4 3
The fact that the employer's desire to modify the above hourly rate
was motivated by economic necessity does not privilege the modifica-
tion. Nor does it matter that the employer was willing to bargain in
good faith, or that the employer has bargained in good faith before tak-
ing action. The employer's modification of an extant collective bargain-
ing contract without union consent, in and of itself, violates the Act.
4 4
In a string of decisions4 5 culminating in the first Milwaukee Spring
case 4 6 (Milwaukee Spring I), the Carter Board held that a decision by an
employer having a union contract to relocate work constituted a "modi-
fication," albeit an indirect one, of the given contract's wage, benefit and
recognition provisions. Consequently, such relocations made without
the given union's consent were deemed to violate section 8(d) and con-
stitute unfair labor practices subject to Board remedial powers under
section 10 of the NLRA.
4 7
The Reagan NLRB, however, in its highly controversial decision in
Milwaukee Spring II overruled these earlier decisions and held that absent
39. 268 N.L.R.B. No. 86, 1983-84 NLRB Dec. (CCH) 16,028 (1984).
40. See Statement of Peter G. Nash Before Joint Hearings before House Subcomm. on Labor-Man-
agement Relations and Subcomm. on Manpower and Housing at 7 (June 26, 1984) (on file, Texas
A&M Business School).
41. 268 N.L.R.B. No. 87, 1983-84 NLRB Dec. (CCH) 16,029 (1984).
42. 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1982).
43. See Oak Cliff-Golman Baking Co., 207 N.L.R.B. 1063 (1973), enforced, 505 F.2d
1302 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 826 (1975).
44. See C&S Industries, 158 N.L.R.B. 454 (1966).
45. See Brown Co., 243 N.L.R.B. 769 (1979); Los Angeles Marine Hardware Co., 235
N.L.R.B. 720 (1978), enforced, 602 F.2d 1032 (9th Cir. 1979).
46. 265 N.L.R.B. 206 (1982).
47. 219 U.S.C. § 160 (1976).
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specific language to the contrary, employer decisions to relocate work
can, once "good faith" bargaining has been conducted, be made without
the given union's consent.4 8 The Board held that section 8(d) prohibits
mid-term contractual modification without union consent only of terms
"contained in" the parties' collective bargaining agreement. In the
Board's opinion, unless the parties included a "work preservation" or
similar clause clearly within the contract, the Board would not attempt
to read such a provision into the parties' agreement.49 In short, under
the new Reagan NLRB interpretation, unlawful contract modifications
will be found only where a term contained in the contract is clearly being
modified. How a Democratic appointed Board might interpret section
8(d) at some point in the future is certainly open to speculation.
C. Representation Election "Misrepresentations of Fact"
A final notable area which is representative of Board policy rever-
sals is the NLRB's regulation of labor representation election misrepre-
sentations of fact. In 1947, as part of that year's Taft-Hartley
amendments to the NLRA, Congress enacted section 8(c) 50 of the Labor
Act. This section afforded both employers and unions rights of "free
speech" under the Act, and stated that speech by either party would not
constitute an unfair labor practice as long as it did not contain a "threat
of reprisal or force or promise of benefit."
5 1
The Truman Labor Board, however, declined to give free rein to
labor speech despite seemingly clear congressional intent and action.
Instead, in the landmark 1948 case of General Shoe Corp. 5 2 the Board dif-
ferentiated between labor speech which constitutes an unfair labor prac-
tice, i.e., speech prohibited by section 8(c), and speech which is lawful
under section 8(c), but which the NLRB nevertheless deems to interfere
with holding fair labor representation elections. For example, an in-
flammatory appeal to racial prejudice may contain no "threat . . . or
promise of benefit" and thus be lawful under section 8(c). But it may
nevertheless be held by the NLRB to improperly interfere with the hold-
ing of a labor representation election and thus justify postponing or set-
ting aside such an election. 53 Similarly, the NLRB has held that
employer or union election misrepresentations of fact, e.g., misstate-
ments regarding the amount of money earned by unionized employees
at other plants, can also constitute improper election interferences. 5 4
48. 268 N.L.R.B. No. 87, 1983-84 NLRB Dec. (CCH) $ 16,029 (1984) at 27,333-
27,335.
49. Id.
50. 29 U.S.C. § 158(c) (1982).
51. Id. This provision was enacted in response to the Board's doctrine of "strict neu-
trality" prohibiting any anti-union speech by employers, and the Supreme Court's decision
in the case of NLRB v. Virginia Electric & Power Co., 314 U.S. 469 (1941), holding this
practice to be unlawful. For an excellent discussion of the history behind this provision
see Comment, supra note 13, at 756-62.
52. 77 N.L.R.B. 124 (1948).
53. See e.g., Sewell Mfg. Co., 138 N.L.R.B. 66 (1962).
54. For an outstanding, albeit now somewhat dated, study of the whole issue of NLRB
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The Board's regulation of this latter area, however, has of late been
something akin to a roller coaster ride.
Perhaps the leading case involving the NLRB's regulation of labor
election campaign misrepresentations of facts is the Kennedy Board's
1962 decision in Hollywood Ceramics Co.55 In this case the Board explic-
itly set forth the rule that a labor election will be set aside where there
has been a misrepresentation (or other campaign trickery) which "in-
volves a substantial departure from the truth . . . [and which] may rea-
sonably be expected to have a significant impact on the election."
56
Almost from the day Hollywood Ceramics was decided, however, labor
analysts have questioned the Board's ability to determine what kinds of
statements actually have a "significant impact" on an election, and have
criticized the subjectivity involved in these determinations. 57 In 1976
these criticisms were buttressed by a major, and highly controversial,
5 8
empirical study by Professors Getman, Goldberg and Herman 59 which
attacked the basic behavioral assumption behind the Hollywood Ceramics
doctrine: that employee voters are generally influenced by campaign
misrepresentations and other election propaganda. The Getman,
Goldberg and Herman empirical study purported to show that employ-
ees are generally inattentive to information offered during representa-
tion election campaigns and uninfluenced by it in their voting. 60
Relying on the Getman, Goldberg and Herman study and on a gen-
eral perception of increased employee sophistication, the Nixon Board
in 1977 overruled the Hollywood Ceramics decision in the case of Shopping
Kart Food Market, Inc.6 1 where it held that it would "no longer set elec-
tions aside on the basis of misleading campaign statements." '6 2 This de-
cision represented the Nixon Board's "last hurrah," however, for less
than two years later the Carter Board, in General Knit of California,63 over-
ruled Shopping Kart and reinstated the general rule of Hollywood Ceramics.
But the issue was not yet to be put to rest. Soon there was another
change of national administration, and the Reagan Board in the case of
Midland National Life Insurance Co.6 4 abruptly overruled General Knit and
reinstated the precedent of Shopping Kart. In sum, over the past seven
years the NLRB has reversed itself three times with respect to its role in
regulation of campaign tactics, see Bok, The Regulation of Campaign Tactics in Representation
Elections Under the National Labor Relations Act, 78 HARV. L. REV. 38 (1964).
55. 140 N.L.R.B. 221 (1962).
56. Id. at 224.
57. See e.g., R. WILLIAMS, P. JANUS & K. HOHN, NLRB REGULATION OF ELECTION CON-
DUCT 57 (1974).
58. See e.g., Eames, An Analysis of the Union Voting Study From a Trade-Unionist s Point of
View, 28 STAN. L. REV. 1181 (1976); Weiler, Promises to Keep: Securing Workers' Rights to Self-
Organization Under the NLRA, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1769, 1781-87 (1983).
59. J. GETMAN, S. GOLDBERG &J. HERMAN, UNION REPRESENTATION ELECTIONS: LAW
AND REALITY (1976).
60. Id. at 149.
61. 228 N.L.R.B. 1311 (1977).
62. Id. at 1313.
63. 239 N.L.R.B. 619 (1978).
64. 263 N.L.R.B. 127 (1982).
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regulating misrepresentations of fact in labor representation elections. 6 5
II. OPrIONS FOR CONGRESSIONAL REFORM
A. Maintaining the Status Quo
From some perspectives, the best reform which could be made re-
garding the Board's shifting policies is no reform at all. Indeed, the
whole controversy regarding NLRB policy reversals may be much ado
about nothing.
Adopting this point of view, the Collyer/General American Transporta-
tion/United Technologies, Spielberg/Suburban Motor Freight/Olin, Milwaukee
Spring, and Shopping Kart/General Knit/Midland National Life "flip-flops"
can be regarded as anomalies. It is a fact that the overwhelming major-
ity of the Board's decisions involve clear adherence to time-honored
precedents. 6 6 Over ninety percent of all NLRB decisions are, regardless
of political shifts in membership, made by a unanimous vote. 67 Conse-
quently, we might accept occasional flip-flopping with respect to a few
highly controversial issues. This may be the price we must pay for hav-
ing an administrative agency, with considerable flexibility and discre-
tion, regulate a highly contentious and ever-changing area of the law.
6 8
With regard to the political nature of the Board's policy shifts, i.e.,
policies changing as a result of new political appointments to the Board,
it can be argued that administrative agencies like the NLRB should be
responsive to changes in national political administration. 6 9 First, as
former SEC Chairman William Cary has insightfully pointed out, while
the ordinary operations of an administrative agency generally have little
political effect, there can be serious deleterious impact on the incum-
bent resident of the White House "if there is any trouble." 70 Thus if the
President may ultimately be held politically responsible for an adminis-
trative agency's actions, it is reasonable for him to appoint agency mem-
bers who will best promote his political ideologies and goals. Shifts in
the substance of Board policy which follow shifts in the Board's political
complexion may be necessary, as Professor David Shapiro has noted, "if
the administration of federal labor law is to reflect in some degree the
prevailing political climate." 7 1 Professor Clyde W. Summers has elabo-
rated on this theme, stating:
Ought not government, in the making of policies, reflect major-
65. For a stinging criticism regarding the NLRB's "fickleness" in this area of the law,
see Mosey Manufacturing Co. v. NLRB, 701 F.2d 610, 612 (7th Cir. 1983) (Posner, J.).
66. See generatly Dunau, supra note 7, at 211-12. But see id. at 212 (pointing out that
sometimes the issue of quality is far more important than quantity).
67. See Statement of Edward B. Miller Before House Oversight Hearings On NLRB, DAILY LAB.
REP. (BNA) at E-7 (June 27, 1984).
68. The Supreme Court has clearly held that the Board possesses a wide degree of
discretion and flexibility in applying the NLRA. See generatty Radio Officers v. NLRB, 347
U.S. 17, 48-52 (1954); NLRB v. A.J. Tower Co., 329 U.S. 324 (1946); Republic of Aviation
Corp. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 793, 798 (1945).
69. See generally Hickey, supra note 7, at 460-61.
70. See W. CARY, POLITICS AND THE REGULATORY AGENCIES 7-9 (1967).
71. See Shapiro, Why Do Voters Vote?, 86 YALE L.J. 1532, 1545 (1977).
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ity will? Should not administrative agencies, within the area of
discretion granted them, choose the policy which most accu-
rately expresses the desires of the majority? To do so is to
make democracy more responsive, an especially significant con-
tribution when government tends to become remote. It is true
that our principal instrument for expressing majority will is
Congress speaking through legislation. However, there is seri-
ous doubt whether Congress is capable of expressing small
shifts or gradual changes. Amendments to the National Labor
Relations Act make long jumps, tending to go beyond the ex-
isting balance of public opinion. The Board, by bending to the
wind can enable the same statutory words to serve a range of
shifts, thus avoiding the necessity of frequent changes. When
the amendments come, it can soften the shock and ease the ad-
justment, thereby preserving a measure of continuity and
stability.
72
Professor Summers thus offers a more subtle, positive view of policy
shifts that follow changes in the political complexion of the Board. Such
shifts help keep the NLRA a malleable and responsive document, rather
than one set in stone. Shifts in Board policy serve as precursors for fu-
ture legislative reform, softening the blow when such reforms come. In
this respect, such shifts enable far greater stability and continuity.
Congress, though, has put some clear checks on the political nature
of the Board. Appointments to the Board are for staggered terms of five
years, which is, of course, one year longer than that of the President.
73
Board members cannot be removed from office by the President absent
"neglect of duty or malfeasance in office" and even under such circum-
stances cannot be forced out without "notice and hearing."' 74 Further,
appointments to the Board are subject to Senate advice and consent.
7 5
The Senate on occasion has exercised its prerogative to reject a Presi-
dent's nominee, most notably in the recent case of President Reagan's
nomination of John Van de Water to the post of Board Chairman.
76
72. See Summers, supra note 8, at 100.
73. See 29 U.S.C. § 153(a) (1982). For a general discussion of the importance of stag-
gered terms which are longer than those of the President, from the perspective of regula-
tory independence, see MacIntyre, The Status of Regulatory Independence, 29 FEn. BAR J. 1, 4
(1969). The importance of such staggered terms diminishes, of course, if a President
serves for more than one term. Id. at 4.
74. 29 U.S.C. § 153(a) (1982). Judiciai guidelines regarding the removal of admninis-
trative agency members by the President were established in the case of Humphrey's Exec-
utor v. United States, 295 U.S. 602 (1935). That case was an outgrowth of an attempt by
President Franklin Roosevelt to remove, for political reasons, a commissioner of the Fed-
eral Trade Commission. The Supreme Court held that administrative agencies had quasi-
judicial and quasi-legislative powers which were different from those of the executive de-
partments. Consequently, while the President had absolute removal power over executive
officers, he did not have such power over quasi-judicial or quasi-legislative officers. See
generally Dixon, The Independent Commissions and Political Responsibility, 27 AD. L. REV. 1, 3
(1975).
75. 29 U.S.C. § 153(a) (1982).
76. For a criticism of the Senate's failure to confirm Van de Water by a former Board
member, see Walther, Suggestions and Comments on the Future Directions of the NLRB, 34 lAB.
L.J. 215, 228 (1983).
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Thus, as the late labor practitioner and scholar Bernard Dunau
77
noted, Congress has established a delicate balance with respect to the
appropriate level of NLRB political responsiveness. In Dunau's opin-
ion, if in nothing more than setting the term of Board tenure at five
years, Congress has consciously assured "the infusion of new faces at
fairly frequent intervals," and that these new faces will invariably hold
differing political views. 78 Dunau further points out that "[i]f in one
sense this hinders stability, in another sense it impedes stagnation, and
it is not unfair to conclude that Congress prefers the former risk to the
latter." 79 For example, by mandating five year terms for members of
the NLRB, in contrast to the fourteen year terms provided for members
of the Federal Reserve Board,80 Congress has deliberately chosen the
Board to be an agency which is relatively sensitive to shifts in the polit-
ical winds. In Dunau's opinion, if Congress is unhappy about this situa-
tion it should do something about it; in the meantime, blame for shifting
Board policy should be placed on Congress and not on Board
appointees.81
B. Altering Board Tenure and Composition
Given the discussion above, one obvious option for reform in de-
politicizing the NLRB would be for Congress to lengthen the tenure in
office of Board members or alter the Board's structure and composition.
Indeed, one such reform was considered by Congress as part of the ill-
fated Labor Law Reform Act of 1978.82 Under both the House and
Senate versions of the proposed Labor Reform Act, section 3(a) of the
NLRA was to be amended to provide staggered seven year terms for
Board members.8 3 In addition, these proposed statutory amendments
provided that no more than a simple majority of the members of the
Board were to be members of the same political party.
8 4
Both of these amendments were part of a broader proposal to ex-
pand the size of the NLRB from five to seven members, and unfortu-
nately were greatly overshadowed in the ensuing debate.
8 5
Nevertheless, both Congress and those testifying before it were aware of
the potential benefits of extending members' terms to seven years. The
77. For a memorial tribute to Dunau's legal skills both as a scholar and practitioner
see the articles set forth in 62 VA. L. REV. 469-662 (1976).
78. See Dunau, supra note 7, at 225.
79. Id.
80. 12 U.S.C. § 241 (1982).
81. See Dunau, supra note 7, at 225-29.
82. This Act was introduced in the House of Representatives as H.R. 8310, 95th
Cong., 1st Sess. § 6 (1977) and in the Senate as S. 2467, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. § 6 (1978).
83. See H.R. REP. No. 637, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977) at 52; S. REP. No. 628, 95th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1978) at 45.
84. Id.
85. See, e.g., Labor Reform Act of 1977: Hearings on S. 1883 Before the Subcomm. on Labor of
the Senate Comm. on Human Resources, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 1031-35 (1977) (analysis of pro-
vision by former Board General Counsel Peter Nash on behalf of management clients). See




Senate Human Resources Committee, for example, noted in its legisla-
tive report that longer terms might create "greater stability" and result
in Board decisions in precedent setting cases being accorded "a greater
degree of respect by the affected parties."' 86 Former United Auto Work-
ers President Douglas Fraser elaborated on this theme in his congres-
sional testimony, stating that: "the use of a seven-year term should
moderate the political see-sawing the Board has seen throughout its his-
tory. It will take nearly two full presidential terms to appoint a com-
pletely new Board, rather than the approximately one term now
required. 
8 7
Further, Congress also clearly wanted to codify the existing "de
facto" practice of having no more than a simple majority of Board mem-
bers from the same political party. As the House Committee on Educa-
tion and Labor noted: "[alt the present the practice is that no more than
three members of the Board shall be members of the same political
party. To assure continued balance on the Board, [this bill] expressly
provides that no more than a simple majority of the Board's member-
ship shall be drawn from one party."
'88
One obvious question which must be asked, however, is how much
impact amendments providing longer terms for members, and mandat-
ing political party "balance," would really have on depoliticizing the
Board? One need only look to the Federal Trade Commission (FTC)-
which has had from its inception, both seven-year terms for commission-
ers and provisions statutorily mandating political party balance 89-for
evidence that the impact of such legislative amendments on depoliticiza-
tion may not be great. The FTC has regularly experienced sharp shifts
in policy resulting from political shifts in membership. 90 In 1980, Con-
gress, reacting in part to the "politically charged" nature of the Com-
mission's activities, enacted special legislation sharply limiting the
Commission's authority. 9 1
Important in all of this is the fact that requiring that no more than a
simple majority of an administrative agency's members be from the
same political party may not necessarily provide an adequate check on
86. S. REP, No. 628, supra note 83, at 8.
87. Hearings, supra note 85, at 1618.
88. H.R. REP. No. 637, supra note 83, at 31.
89. See 15 U.S.C. § 41 (1982).
90. Most recently, for example, "activist" Democratic Chairman Michael Pertschuk's
strong push for the stricter regulation of children's television advertising fell into oblivion
when Republican James C. Miller, an advocate of less government intervention in private
enterprise, became the new FTC Chairman. See generally Washington Post, Oct. 1, 1981, at
D 11, col. I. For a more general discussion of this issue in the context of the FTC, see
Stewart & Cromartie, Partisan Presidential Change and Regulatory Policy: The Case of the FTC
and Deceptive Practices Enforcement, 1938-1974, 12 PRES. STuD. Q., (Fall 1982).
91. See Federal Trade Commission Improvements Act of 1980, Public L. No. 96-252,
94 Stat. 374 (1980) (codified in various sections of the FTC Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 41-51
(1982). This legislation was enacted despite the fact that Congress was dominated in both
houses by the same political party as dominated the FTC. Indeed, the legislation was
signed into law by a President who was also a member of the same party and who had also
appointed the new "politically charged" FTC members.
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undue agency politicization. Certainly, the current de facto practice of
the NLRB has had relatively little such effect. 92 One former NLRB
member has observed that political labels are of no meaning whatso-
ever.93 The simple truth of the matter is that categorization of an indi-
vidual as "Republican" or "Democrat" can be very misleading. A
President can appoint a conservative Democrat or a liberal Republican
and meet the "no more than a simple majority from one political party"
litmus test, while creating a clear ideological imbalance within a given
agency. Nevertheless, there are indications that Congress will go only
so far in allowing "wolves to parade in sheep's clothing." Recently, for
example, the Senate rejected the nomination of a purported "Demo-
crat" to a "democratic" seat on the FTC, at least in part because of a
feeling that President Reagan, in appointing the former director of
"Democrats for Reagan," had pushed things beyond acceptable limits.
94
Consequently, even if only at the outer extremes, it seems that
political party limitations on agency appointments do put a political
check on administrative agency makeup. Coupled with longer tenure
for agency members and other possible reforms, 95 such limitations may
help to stabilize and depoliticize administrative agencies. Those
pondering future reforms with respect to the NLRB might do well to
keep this in mind.
C. Greater Board Use of Rulemaking
Section 6 of the NLRA gives the NLRB the power to make, rescind,
and amend in the manner prescribed by the Administrative Procedure
Act (APA) "such rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry out
the provisions of this [act]." 96 Despite its section 6 rulemaking author-
ity, however, the Board has almost completely refused to engage in
rulemaking, instead preferring to reach policy decisions on an ad hoc,
case-by-case basis. 9 7 This refusal by the Board to engage in rulemaking
92. Former NLRB Member Peter Walther, a relatively pro-management Republican
appointee, points out that over sixty percent of his Board dissents were from majority
opinions written by the three "Republican" members of the Board. Walther, supra note
73, at 228.
93. Id. See generally Irving, Recent NLRB Developments: The Survival of the Misguided Ma-
jority, THE SOUTHWESTERN LEGAL FOUNDATION, PROCEEDINGS OF TWENTY-NINTH ANNUAL IN-
STITUTE OF LABOR LAW, 78 (1982).
94. See Wall St.J., March 31, 1982, at 22, col. 3; N.Y. Times, Oct. 18, 1982, at D2, col.
1.
95. One possibility in this regard might be congressional legislation mandating a tri-
partite NLRB; made up of designated number of members representing labor, manage-
ment and the general public. A number of the boards administering state public sector
labor relations acts have been constituted in this manner. See, e.g., N.J. Stat. Ann.
§ 34:13A-5.2 (West Supp. 1984). A tri-partite approach to the administration of labor
laws is also quite common on Western Europe. See Aaron, Labor Courts: Western European
Models and Their Significance for the United States, 16 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 847, 854-55 (1969).
96. See 29 U.S.C. § 156 (1982). Since the NLRA does not specifically mandate formal
"on the record" rulemaking, the type of rulemaking proceeding required under NLRA
section six is the "informal". "notice and comment" kind. See 5 U.S.C. § 553(c) (1982).
97. See generally Parker & Gilmore, The Unfair Labor Practice Caseload: An Analysis of Se-
lected Remedies, 34 LAB. L. J. 172, 173 (1983). The Supreme Court in NLRB v. Bell Aero-
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has been strongly and perenially criticized by a multitude of observers. 9 8
As Professor Clyde W. Summers has stated:
The National Labor Relations Board, in administering the
Act, has followed almost exclusively the procedure of case by
case adjudication. This method, specially designed for resolv-
ing questions of fact, has limited usefulness in policy making.
It is fragmentary in character, placing primary emphasis on the
special facts of the single case, and focusing attention on one
small facet of what is often a complex problem. This piecemeal
process makes perspective difficult, for it tends to obscure the
fact that policy is being made and to discourage direct discus-
sion of the wisdom of the policy.
Policy making requires full consideration of an entire
problem in its context, with a weighing of the views of all inter-
ested parties. The impact of a proposed policy in every fore-
seeable situation needs to be carefully studied and all possible
alternatives considered. The adjudicatory process is ill-
adapted to these ends. The procedures prescribed for rule
making, especially those sketched in the Administrative Proce-
dure Act, are far more appropriate.
The Board is not compelled to continue with such awk-
ward and inadequate procedures, for Section 6 grants to it
broad powers to carry out the provisions of the Act through
rule making. It is submitted that the adoption and extensive
use of rule making procedures would substantially improve the
policy developing functions of the Board. It would compel the
Board to face more directly its policy problems, would provide
more complete and pointed discussion, and would encourage
the Board to make more articulate the rules and policies which
it follows. 99
In response to Professor Summers and others, the proposed Labor
Law Reform Act of 1978 contained major amendments to section 6 of
the NLRA. The amendments required the Board to promulgate rules
regarding appropriate units for collective bargaining,' 0 0 and rules per-
taining to the standards to be applied in regulating labor elections. 1°O
To support these proposed statutory amendments both the House and
Senate Labor Committees stated: "[t]here is no labor relations issue on
space, 416 U.S. 267 (1974), though, clearly held that the choice between rulemaking and
adjudication lies within the NLRB's discretion.
98. See, e.g., Bernstein, The NLRB "s Adjudication-Rulemaking Dilemma Under the Administra-
tive Procedure Act, 79 YALE L. J. 571 (1970); Peck, The Atrophied Rule-making Powers of the
National Labor Relations Board, 70 YALE L. J. 729 (1961); Comment, Shopping Kart: The Need
for a Broader Approach to the Problems of Campaign Regulation, 56 N.C.L. REV. 389, 403-04
(1978). But see generally Note, NLRB Rulemaking: Political Reality Versus Procedural Fairness, 89
YALE L.J. 982 (1980).
99. Summers, supra note 8, at 105-06 (footnotes omitted).
100. For a general discussion of the issue of appropriate bargaining units, see R.
Gorman, supra note 25, at 66-92.
101. See H.R. 8410, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., §§ 6(b)(1) & (2) and S. 1883, 95th Cong., 1st
Sess., §§ 6(b)(1) & (2) texts reprinted in Senate Hearings, supra note 85, at 5-6, 28-29. See
also H.R. REP. No. 637, supra note 83, at 53; S. REP. No. 628, supra note 83, at 47-48.
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which there has been such a strong consensus as on the proposition that
the Board should make greater use of its rule-making authority under
section 6 of the Act."
10 2
Greater use of rulemaking may indeed be one way to create greater
stability and predictability in Board actions. One benefit would be that
shifts in policy, although they might still occur,' 0 3 would be less abrupt.
If nothing else, pursuant to APA rulemaking guidelines, interested par-
ties would have advance notice of the proposed change and the oppor-
tunity to comment on it. 10 4  Rulemaking also avoids the myriad of
problems 10 5 involved in applying policy changes retroactively. 10 6
Perhaps even more significantly, rulemaking would recognize shifts
in policy for what they are, and make them more visible. Professor
David Shapiro has conjectured that part of the reason for the Board's
reluctance to engage in rulemaking might stem from the view that its
changes in policy "would be more visible, and thus more embarrasing, if
such changes were made by amending an outstanding regulation."' 10 7
Under rulemaking, as Shapiro implies, Board policy changes would be
made explicitly and openly. Rulemaking would not allow the Board to
justify its decisions on narrow factual grounds turning on the peculiari-
ties of a given case.' 0 8 One positive result of this approach, and the
increased visibility it requires, might be a greater reluctance on the part
of the Board to make rapid and radical shifts in policy. 10 9
Another positive result of the rulemaking approach, as Professor
Samuel Estriecher recently pointed out very forcefully, would be the op-
portunity it affords for greater public commentary, input, and debate on
major issues of Board policy." 0 Rulemaking affords an opportunity to
look at a problem from its broadest perspective and evaluate the views
of all interested parties."I' Rulemaking proceedings would also afford
the Board the flexibility to consider alternatives more varied than merely
upholding or overruling a given precedent." 12
Further, under rulemaking a complete hearing could be given to the
premise underlying the Board's decision. For example, in the misrepre-
sentations of fact area, the Board in overruling its Hollywood Ceramics de-
cision in the Shopping Karl case, relied heavily, albeit selectively, on the
empirical study done by Professor Julius Getman and his colleagues." 3
Rulemaking proceedings would allow free public discussion of such
102. See H.R. REP. No. 637, supra note 83, at 36; S. REP. No. 628, supra note 83, at 19.
103. See 29 U.S.C. § 156 (1982) (giving the Board the power to "rescind" and
"amend", as well as "make" rules pursuant to the APA).
104. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 553(b)(2) & (3) & (c) (1982).
105. See 116 Lab. Rel. Rep. (BNA) 145 (June 25, 1984) (statement of union labor attor-
ney Marc Rauch).
106. See generally Bernstein, supra note 98, at 598-602.
107. See Shapiro, supra note 71, at 1544.
108. See Bernstein, supra note 98, at 597-98.
109. See generally Bernstein, supra note 98, at 597.
110. See 116 LAB. REL. REP. (BNA) 142-44 (June 25, 1984).
111. See Summers, supra note 8, at 105-06.
112. See Comment, supra note 98, at 403-04.
113. See supra notes 55-65 and accompanying text.
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studies and permit them to be viewed from a broad perspective, includ-
ing their implications on the Board's overall policy. In addition, data
regarding such studies could be presented in informal rulemaking pro-
ceedings without the strictures of the formal rules of evidence which are
generally applicable in adjudicatory proceedings.
1 14
Finally, it may be possible for the NLRB, in some circumstances, to
use rulemaking and adjudication in tandem.' 15 For example, the Board,
to gain some experience in a given area, could proceed at first on a case-
by-case basis. During this period the Board could expressly limit the
precedential authority of its decisions, suggesting that it was in the pro-
cess of evolving a rule and that changes might come in the process. Per-
haps at this stage the Board might issue a broad non-binding "general
statement of policy"' 16 signaling where it was heading. Then, at a point
when the Board felt it had gained sufficient knowledge of the problem, it
could hold binding rulemaking proceedings to elaborate and crystallize
the rule.
In sum, greater use of Board rulemaking might create a regulatory
system with greater certainty and stability. Policy shifts would be recog-
nized for what they are and would be given a full public airing. A system
involving abrupt, retroactive, factually-oriented policy shifts would be
replaced by one requiring a full opportunity for notice and public com-
ment, and involving prospective applications. Congress, in considering
possible labor law reforms, should once again consider the possibility of
mandating that the NLRB make greater use of rulemaking.
D. Selectively Amending the Act
1. Overview
One final possible option for Congress in terms of dealing with the
problem of NLRB policy reversals would be to make selective clarifying
amendments to given provisions of the NLRA. Two particularly salient
amendments in this regard were offered as part of the proposed Labor
Reform Act of 1978.117
2. Applying Section 8 (c) to Representation Elections
One key amendment which was offered as part of the proposed
1977-78 labor reform legislation was a proposal to amend the Act's
"free speech" section, section 8(c),'' 8 to explicitly apply it to labor rep-
resentation elections. This statutory section states that union or em-
ployer speech will not constitute an unfair labor practice unless it
114. See generally Shapiro, supra note 71, at 1545.
115. The author is indebted to Professor Clyde W. Summers for this insightful point.
116. See 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(3)(A) (1982). See generally Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. Fed-
eral Power Comm'n., 503i F.2d 33 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (policy statement on natural gas curtail-
ment plans held exempt from APA rulemaking requirements).
117. This Act was introduced in the House of Representatives as H.R. 8310, 95th
Cong., 1st Sess. § 6 (1977) and in the Senate as S. 2467, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. § 6 (1978).
118. 29 U.S.C. § 158(c) (1982).
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contains a "threat of reprisal or force or promise of benefit."' "l 9 The
Board, under the aegis of its "laboratory conditions" doctrine,' 2 0 has in
the past set aside and postponed elections because of speech involving
neither threats nor promises of benefit. In recent years, however, the
NLRB has begun to question the viability of its "laboratory conditions"
doctrine, particularly as applied to the area of election misrepresenta-
tions of fact. 12 1 In 1977 the Board in an important decision held that, as
a general rule, elections would no longer be set aside or postponed be-
cause of election misrepresentations.' 22 This decision was, however,
then reversed by the Board in 1978 and reinstated in 1982.123
The policy instability which has recently plagued this area would
have been avoided had the Labor Law Reform Act of 1978 become
law. 124 That proposed legislation contained language explicitly apply-
ing section 8(c) to the representation election context, and abolishing
the "laboratory conditions" doctrine. Initially, the amendment was part
of an alternative minority party labor reform bill entitled the "Employee
Bill of Rights Act" introduced in the House of Representatives by Con-
gressmen Erlenborn and Ashbrook.' 25 This proposed amendment was
then incorporated by the Senate into the basic majority party reform
package as enacted by the House. 12 6 In reporting the incorporation of
this minority proposal into the basic labor reform bill, the Senate
Human Resources Committee noted the importance it would serve in
fostering free debate and speech in labor elections.1
2 7
There are forceful arguments that Congress should once again give
careful attention to the issue of free speech in labor representation elec-
tions. The results of the Getman, Goldberg and Herman study aside, it
seems unclear at best whether Congress ever had any idea that the
NLRB would circumvent section 8(c) and establish an independent "lab-
oratory conditions" scheme for regulating labor election speech. In-
stead, it appears considerably more likely that Congress simply assumed
that the Board would continue, as it had done in the past, applying stan-
dards established for unfair labor practices in the election area as well,
119. Id. See supra notes 50, 51 and accompanying text.
120. The NLRB stated in the 1948 General Shoe case that "[i]n election proceedings, it is
the Board's function to provide a laboratory in which an experiment may be conducted,
under conditions as nearly ideal as possible, to determine the uninhibited desires of the
employees." General Shoe Corp., 77 N.L.R.B. 124, 127 (1948) (this statement announced
what has come to be known as the "laboratory conditions doctrine"). See generally notes
52-65 supra and accompanying text; Bok, supra note 54.
121. See supra notes 61-65 and accompanying text.
122. Shopping Kart Food Market, Inc., 228 N.L.R.B. 1311 (1977).
123. See supra notes 63, 64 and accompanying text.
124. The legislation was ultimately "defeated", i.e., enough votes could not be gar-
nered to stop the filibuster inJune, 1978. 124 CONG. REC. S9405 (daily ed. June 22, 1978).
This was well before the Labor Board's General Knit decision of December 6, 1978 revers-
ing Shopping Kart. See generally Comment, supra note 13, at 777 n.129.
125. See Comment, supra note 13, at 792-93 & nn. 188-191.
126. H.R. 8310, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. § 6 (1977); see also S. 2467, 95th Cong. 2d Sess.
§ 6 (1978); see also Comment, supra note 13, at 795.
127. See S. REP. No. 628, supra note 79, at 26-28.
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and that section 8(c) would govern both. 128 From the point of view of
enforcing original congressional intent, as well as from the central per-
spective of increasing labor policy stability, congressional action clearly
applying section 8(c) to labor representation elections is merited.
3. Codifying Collyer?
Another important amendment offered as part of the Labor Reform
Act of 1978 was a minority party proposal presented by Congressmen
Erlenborn and Ashbrook, and Senators Hatch and Tower, designed to
codify the Board's Collyer and National Radio precedents 129 mandating
NLRB deferral to arbitration.' 3 0 The proposed statutory amendment
provided that:
[I]f an employer, or a labor organization on its own behalf or
on behalf of employees, or employees on their own behalf or
on behalf of other employees could submit a dispute to binding
arbitration under the terms of an existing collective-bargaining
agreement, or have agreed to submit a dispute to binding arbi-
tration, or have submitted a dispute to binding arbitration, then
such arbitration shall be the exclusive forum and such party or
any person on whose behalf such action has or could be taken,
shall only have the right to institute or maintain an unfair labor
practice proceeding before the Board involving the same inci-
dent or subject matter when determinations of such arbitration
are inconsistent with the rights granted by this Act.'
3 '
Arguably, under this amendment, contractual arbitration would
have become the exclusive remedy in disputes involving both breaches
of contract and unfair labor practices. Recourse to the Board's unfair
practice machinery would be permitted only under Spielberg-like condi-
tions' 3 2 where the arbitrator's determinations are found to be "inconsis-
tent" with the Act. Unlike the proposed amendment regarding
application of section 8(c) to representation elections, however, no bi-
partisan consensus was reached on this issue during congressional con-
sideration of the Labor Reform Act in 1977 and 1978. There are never-
theless many strong arguments in support of the
Erlenborn/Ashbrook/Hatch/Tower approach, particularly in terms of
promoting the Labor Act's bias in favor of the use of voluntary dispute
settlement mechanisms. '
3 3
128. See Note, Free Speech and Free Choice in Representation Elections: Effect of Taft-Hartley Act
Section 8(c), 58 YALE L.J. 165, 174 (1948). Board dictum in Dal-Tex Optical Co., 137
N.L.R.B. 1782, 1787 n. 11 (1962), stated that "Congress specifically limited Section 8(c) to
the adversary proceedings involved in unfair labor practice cases and [that] it has no appli-
cation to representation cases." This seems clearly erroneous. It is far more likely that
Congress simply assumed that the Board would apply section 8(c) in both instances. See
generally NLRB v. Shirlington Supermarket, Inc., 224 F.2d 649, 658-59 & n.5 (4th Cir.)
(Soper, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 914 (1955).
129. See supra notes 23-32 and accompanying text.
130. See S. 1855, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., § 7 reprinted in Hearings, supra note 85, at 23-24.
131. Id.
132. See generally notes 33 to 39 supra and accompanying text.
133. See 29 U.S.C. § 173(d) (1982).
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The primary weakness with such a broad deferral approach, how-
ever, is its impact on individual employee rights, both with respect to the
potential abrogation of statutory rights which may be involved,"3 4 but
even more so with respect to inherent weaknesses in the American labor
arbitration system. This latter point has recently been very insightfully
developed by Professor Reginald Alleyne, 135 who noted that the exist-
ence of a grievance arbitration mechanism in a labor contract does not
per se mean that a dispute will necessarily be heard by a labor arbitra-
tor. 136 Alleyne emphasized that, absent a breach of the duty of fair rep-
resentation,'1 7 unions are free to take, or not take, a case to arbitration,
and that a number of political and economic factors may influence this
decision.' 38 The bottom line in all of this being that there is little cer-
tainty that the rights of the individual employee will be vindicated in the
arbitration process.'
39
As a possible reform in this area, Professor Alleyne suggested that
parties charging unfair labor practices be given the option of pursuing a
given case in either the arbitral or NLRB forums. 14 0 This approach
would afford charging parties the opportunity to pursue a particular
case in the manner they perceive as most advantageous while avoiding
the "two bites at the apple" problem, the anathema of many manage-
ment representatives.' 4 ' Such an approach, if statutorily mandated,
would also provide a sharp measure of procedural stability for an area of
labor law beset by ongoing change and controversy.142 In considering
future labor law reforms, the "Alleyne charging party option" approach
to arbitral deferral, is one that Congress should study closely.
III. CONCLUSION
The perennial problem of National Labor Relations Board policy
instability has, in recent months, taken on rather unusual proportions,
engendering cries for congressional reform. This article has examined
the problem of NLRB policy vacillation, and has offered several reme-
dies in the context of possible congressional action. Particular attention
has been given to various proposals presented as part of the Labor Law
Reform Act of 1978, which was enacted by the U.S. House of Represent-
atives, but successfully filibustered in the U.S. Senate.
134. See generally Harper, Union Waiver of Employee Rights Under the NLRA: Part II, A Fresh
Approach to Board Deferral Arbitration, 4 IND. REL. L.J. 680 (1981).
135. See Alleyne, Arbitrators and the NLRB: The Nature of the Deferral Beast, 4 IND. REL. L.J.
587 (1981).
136. Id. at 600-02.
137. See generally Summers, The Individual Employee's Rights Under The Collective Agreement:
What Constitutes Fair Representation?, 126 U. PA. L. REV. 251 (1977).
138. See Alleyne, supra note 135, at 602 & n.54.
139. Id. at 601-03.
140. Id.
14 1. See, e.g., Statement of Former NLRB General Counsel John Irving Before House
Oversight Hearings on NLRB, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA),June 27, 1984 at E-8. See generally
Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36 (1974) (upholding an employee's right to
"two bites at the apple" under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act).
142. See supra notes 23-32 and accompanying text.
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It has been asserted that, as a general proposition, there is consider-
able merit to the idea that Congress resist pressures for reform in this
area, and maintain the status quo. From this perspective, NLRB shifts in
policy can be seen as merely reflecting the rather regular shifts in Board
membership which occur because of the relatively short terms office
members are afforded under the Act. It can be argued that such changes
in membership, and consequently in policy, help keep the Board and
our labor laws responsive to prevailing political climates. Moreover, it is
clear that the overwhelming majority of Board decisions do involve clear
adherence to time honored precedents.
Nevertheless, there are also strong arguments in favor of congres-
sional action dealing with the problem of Board decisional instability.
Various proposals presented as part of the aborted Labor Reform Act of
1978 present considerable promise. In particular, congressional action
requiring that the Board make greater use of rulemaking, and applying
section 8(c) to representation elections would be especially constructive.
Careful congressional study of other ways of better coping with the
problem of abrupt NLRB policy shifts, such as mandating Board polit-
ical balance, and providing for a charging party arbitration deferral op-
tion, also seem called for. The considerable uncertainty caused by
recent bouts of NLRB policy "flip-flops" seems to argue, if nothing else,
for more careful congressional examination of the issue.
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LABOR LAW REFORM: Do LABOR ORGANIZATIONS
HAVE EQUAL ACCESS TO THE SYSTEM?
A. RANDALL VEHAR*
INTRODUCTION
Despite the right to freely associate, which is guaranteed by the first
amendment of the Constitution, it has not always been clear that work-
ing men and women in this country have a legal right to engage in con-
certed activity, or to join together into labor organizations, in order to
seek mutual aid, protection, and better conditions of employment.'
Once the right to organize into labor organizations and to engage in
concerted activities was recognized, courts and legislative bodies re-
mained reluctant to provide labor organizations with the legal tools nec-
essary to enforce these rights. On the other hand, employers have not
generally been found wanting when they have sought various legal tools
with which to fight labor organizations and employees' concerted
actions.
This article suggests that labor organizations generally have not had
adequate, and certainly not equal, access to the legal system to protect
their rights and the rights of their members. History tells us that fertile
ground for militants is created when groups with strong economic dif-
ferences have relatively unequal or inadequate access to dispute resolu-
tion mechanisms. As the effectiveness of the National Labor Relations
Board (NLRB or Board), the primary government agency for protecting
rights of employees to engage in concerted activities, is again called into
question, 2 we should not disregard too quickly the lessons of history.
Indeed, many labor leaders who recently testified before Congress
called for the repeal of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA or Act),
suggesting the seeds of frustration, a breakdown in the system, and the
eventual elevation of more militant labor leaders.
3
* Senior Attorney, United Mine Workers, Washington, D.C. J.D. University of
Denver (1977), A.B. Ohio University (1972).
1. Section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1982) provides:
Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor
organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choos-
ing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bar-
gaining or other mutual aid or protection . . .
2. See HOUSE COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS DELAY, SLOWNESS IN DECI-
SIONMAKING, AND THE CASE BACKLOG AT THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD, H.R. REP.
No. 1141, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984); STAFF OF HOUSE LABOR-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS
SUBCOMMITrEE, 98TH CONG., 2D SESS. FAILURE OF THE LABOR LAw-A BETRAYAL OF AMER-
ICAN WORKERS (COMM. PRINT, 1984) (HEREINAFTER CITED AS FAILURE OF LABOR LAW).
3. FAILURE OF LABOR LAW, supra, at 2. In his testimony to the subcommittee, the
Associate General Counsel for the United Brotherhood of Carpenters & Joiners of
America, Robert Pleasure, testified on June 26, 1984, that:
[When asked whether] we ought to return to the law of the jungle, through a
repeal of the Act . . . our answer to that is that we are living under the law of the
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After examining the proposition that labor organizations have not
been granted equal or adequate access to the legal system for a redress
of their grievances, the article will explore several areas for reform that
deserve renewed attention and consideration. Instead of providing a
comprehensive analysis of the numerous proposals for procedural and
substantive labor law reforms advanced in recent years, the article will
focus on three suggested procedural reforms which this author believes
deserve increased attention: (1) availability of a private right of action to
proceed against all unfair labor practices; (2) expansion of discovery
procedures in unfair labor practice proceedings; and (3) authorization of
the General Counsel of the National Labor Relations Board to seek Sec-
tion 10(j) injunctions without prior Board approval. None of these sug-
gested reforms deal with substantive provisions of the NLRA; however,
considering the prevailing political climate, these may be the minimum
reforms achievable and necessary to help re-establish a more equitable
balance in the approach of the law to labor-management relations.
Increasingly, unions believe that their access to legal redress for vi-
olations of their rights is being effectively cut off. Whether correct or
not, such perceptions defeat a belief that the law will treat each side
fairly. This author suggests, as did the Anthracite Coal Strike Commis-
sion in 1902, 4 that, rather than stressing more repressive approaches
toward labor unions, we ought to consider providing fuller access to the
legal system through which enforcement of rights can be sought. Ready
access to the legal system for labor organizations is not only fair, but
necessary and proper in order to re-establish the proper balance be-
tween labor and management in this country.
Obtaining such a balance in the approach of the law toward labor-
management relations has been a continuing struggle for policy mak-
ers. 5 A brief examination of the evolution of public policy in this coun-
jungle right now, except that unions are living in a cage and the employers are
well armed.
Id. at 23. The President of the United Mine Workers of America, Richard L. Trumka, in a
statement before the same subcommittee, warned:
It has been said that it takes two to make peace, but only one to make war. My
experience is that corporate America has reignited the labor war which prompted
the passage of the National Labor Relations Act. But, unlike the 30s, workers are
now hamstrung by an act which prohibits secondary boycotts, hot cargo argu-
ments, and many forms of picketing. In return, as I have described in detail, they
have been afforded little protection from employer [sic] excesses.
The time has come for us to question whether the National Labor Relations
Act, with its delay ridden procedures, token sanctions, and contorted perception
of employee rights, has become an albatross on the labor movement. Without a
major overhaul of the Act, I am convinced this is the case.
Among the many changes needed, we want: . . . (7) A labor law that pro-
vides a private right of action for workers and unions.
Considering today's political realities, we know these changes are not going
to be made soon. But I close with a message to corporate radicals and their
friends in the Federal Government: Those who make cooperation impossible,
make confrontation inevitable.
Id.
4. See infra text accompanying note 29.
5. See supra note 2. While the House of Representatives has focused on employer
abuses of labor's rights, the Senate, in examining relations between labor and manage-
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try toward labor organizations illustrates the reluctance of the
government to fully recognize and to fully protect the rights of employ-
ees, asserted through their own labor organizations.
The author hopes that this article will stimulate further discussion
and analysis of these proposals as Congress continues to re-examine
these areas.
I. THE LAW HAS ALWAYS BEEN RELUCTANT TO RECOGNIZE AND
PROTECT CONCERTED ACTIVITY BY EMPLOYEES
Under the common law, as developed in England, even peaceful
concerted activities by employees attempting to better their pay and
working conditions was deemed to be a criminal conspiracy.6 The first
labor conspiracy case in America 7 was decided in 1806, and attempted
to transplant the English common law to America. The court held that,
while there was nothing illegal in each employee's individual objective
of seeking higher wages, and nothing unlawful in the methods used to
obtain this objective, the seeking of such goals by employees acting in
concert, instead of individually, constituted an unlawful criminal conspir-
acy. 8 The court, in justifying criminal conspiracy actions as a legal tool
for preventing even the existence of effective labor organizations, stated,
"a combination of workmen to raise their wages may be considered in a
twofold point of view: one is to benefit themselves . . . , the other is to
injure those who do not join their society. The rule of law condemns
both." 9 Thereafter, until 1842, there were seventeen trials in which la-
bor unions were charged as being criminal conspiracies.10 Yet this did
ment, has focused on picket line violence, a matter traditionally left to state control. Some
bills would federalize this area and make picket line violence by strikers a violation of the
extortion statutes, thereby overturning United States v. Enmons, 410 U.S. 396 (1973) (but
see United States v. Thordarson, 646 F.2d 1323 (9th Cir. 1981));see S. 613, 97th Cong., Ist
Sess. (1981), introduced by Senator Thurmond (for himself, Senator East and Senator
Hatch). Yet violence or threats by the employer or by replacement workers against strikers
would not become a federal crime under these bills.
6. See, e.g., Krystad v. Lau, 400 P.2d 72, 76 (Wash. 1965).
7. Philadelphia Cordwainers' Case, (Pa. 1806), reported in Nelles, The First American
Labor Case, 4 1 YALE L.J. 165 (1931).
8. Sayre, Criminal Conspiracy, 35 HARV. L. REV. 393, 413-14 (1921); J. TAYLOR & F.
WHITNEY, LABOR RELATIONS LAW (4th ed., 1983).
9. J. TAYLOR & F. WHITNEY, supra note 8 at 21, quoting fromJ. COMMONS & GILMORE,
3 A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF AMERICAN INDUSTRIAL SOCIETY 233 (1910).
10. Id. At least two of the most important industrial states of the time, Pennsylvania
and New York, accepted the common law view that a combination of workmen to raise
wages constituted a criminal conspiracy. People v. Melvin, 2 Wheeler's Crim. Cases 262
(N.Y. 1810); People v. Trequier, I Wheeler's Crim. Cases 142 (N.Y. 1823); Philadelphia
Cordwainers' Case, supra note 7. While there is some suggestion that the idea of a criminal
conspiracy did not "take root in this country," Krystad, 400 P.2d at 77, the downplaying of
this theory should be examined carefully. Those authors who argue that the criminal con-
spiracy theory was not generally followed prior to 1842, submit that these courts found the
illegal conspiracy based upon the objective of the concerted activity or strike and not just
upon the existence of the labor organization or the existence of the concerted activity in
and of itself. Witte, Early American Labor Cases, 35 YALE LJ. 825 (1926). The court in
Commonwealth v. Hunt, infra note 11, finally drew the distinction between the labor organi-
zation as a conspiracy in and of itself, as opposed to a conspiracy in which a labor organiza-
tion, while lawful as an association, seeks to obtain illegal objectives or lawful objections
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not stop the innate desire of employees to strive, through self-organiza-
tion, for better working conditions. Finally, in 1842, doubts as to
whether the English common law conspiracy theory would be trans-
planted to America were ended when Chief Justice Shaw, in Common-
wealth v. Hunt,'I held that a labor union was a lawful and legitimate
organization which could engage in a strike for higher pay without per
se being found in criminal conspiracy.12
Following Commonwealth v. Hunt, the theory that labor unions inher-
ently constitute a criminal conspiracy began to lose its force in America.
However, while employers lost the conspiracy tool to thwart employees'
concerted activity they soon found courts friendly to the use of injunc-
tions to serve the same purpose.' 3 Blanket injunctions often outlawed
not only illegal activity, but lawful activity as well. 14 Supreme Court
Justice Felix Frankfurter, prior to taking his seat on the high Court, rec-
ognized how the effective, but unfair, use of the injunction could thwart
legitimate, concerted activity:
In theory, the final injunction decree alone is an adjudication
on the merits; temporary restraining orders and temporary in-
junctions are nominally provisional. In fact, however, the re-
straining order and temporary injunction usually register the
ultimate disposition of a labor litigation, which seldom persists
to a final decree. Lack of resources may frustrate pursuit on the
litigation, or as is often the case, the strike is ended before the
final stage is reached and ended not infrequently as a result of
the injunction. 15
At least some of the abuses of injunctive power were ameliorated
when Congress passed the Norris-LaGuardia Act of 1932.16 This Act
was intended to severely restrict the ability of employers to utilize the
injunction to thwart legitimate employee activity. For awhile, the Nor-
ris-LaGuardia Act was the basis for decisions preventing federal or state
courts from issuing an injunction against a labor organization or its
members in the event of an alleged violation of an explicit no-strike
clause, even for peaceful picketing.1 7 However, unions later discovered
that the injunction was not totally unavailable as a management tool. In
Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Local 770,18 the Supreme Court permit-
ted an injunction, despite the dictates of the Norris-LaGuardia Act,
through illegal means. However, Professor Cox argues that this distinction may have been
a distinction without a difference, at least until 1932, when the Norris-LaGuardia Act was
enacted, because courts took a very narrow view as to what constituted a lawful object of
concerted activity. A. Cox, LAW AND THE NATIONAL LABOR POLICY 3, 44 (1960 & reprint
1983).
II. 45 Mass. (4 Met.) 111, 38 American Decisions 346 (1842).
12. See Nelles, Commonwealth v. Hunt, 32 COLUM. L. REv. 1128 (1932).
13. See A. Cox, supra note 10, at 3-4;J. TAYLOR & F. WHITNEY, supra note 8, at 29-47.
14. J. TAYLOR, supra note 8, at 37.
15. F. FRANKFURTER & N. GREENE, THE LABOR INJUNCTION 654 (1930).
16. 47 Stat. 70-73 (1932), 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-10, 113-15 (1982). See L.A. Concrete
Pumping, Inc. v. Majich, 84 L.R.R.M. 2652 (C.D. Cal. 1973).
17. See Sinclair Refining Co. v. Atkinson, 370 U.S. 195 (1962); Avco Corp. v. Aero
Lodge 735, Int'l Ass'n of Machinists, 390 U.S. 557 (1968).
18. 398 U.S. 235 (1970).
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under highly specialized circumstances.' 9 Underlying the rationale of
Boys Markets and its progeny is the Court's view that, when a union
agrees to settle disputes through a mandatory grievance arbitration pro-
cedure, there is an implication that the union has also waived its statutory
right-to-strike 2° over disputes that can be resolved by such arbitration.
The court has gone so far as to imply and impose a no-strike obligation,
2 '
even when the labor contract does not have an explicit no-strike clause
and the labor organization had previously negotiated an explicit no-strike
clause out of the agreement.
2 2
The weakness of the injunctive approach to labor relations23 is that
it normally only restricts activities, sometimes including lawful or peace-
19. Writing for the Court, Justice Brennan narrowly circumscribed the allowance of
an injunction to situations where the pertinent collective bargaining agreement provides
for arbitration, the arbitration clause applies to the conflict at bar, and the parties should
be ordered to arbitrate. Ordinary balancing of equities applies as well. Id. at 253-54. In
practice, a temporary restraining order is often granted without careful attention to the
Boys Markets three part test.
20. 29 U.S.C. § 163 (1982) provides: "Nothing in this subchapter, except as specifi-
cally provided herein, shall be construed so as either to interfere with or impede or dimin-
ish in any way the right to strike, or to affect the limitations or qualifications on that right."
21. Local 174, Teamsters v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95 (1962).
22. In Gateway Coal Co. v. UMW, 414 U.S. 368 (1974), the Court found that the
UMW had implicitly agreed in the National Bituminous Coal Wage Agreement of 1968
("NBCWA of 1968") to a no-strike obligation for those disputes which could otherwise be
resolved through the arbitration procedure. (The NBCWA of 1968 did not have an explicit
no-strike clause.) This finding occurred, even though a predecessor National Bituminous
Coal Wage Agreement had an explicit no-strike clause, which the UMW had negotiated out of
the Agreement. Carbon Fuel Co. v. UMW, 444 U.S. 212, 219-22 (1979). The Agreement
at issue also contained a provision which further suggested that the UMW had not agreed
to a no-strike obligation:
[a]ny and all provisions in either the Appalachian Joint Wage Agreement ofJune
19, 1941, [a predecessor to the NBCWA], or the National Bituminous Coal Wage
Agreement of April I1, 1945, containing any "no strike" or "penalty" clause or
clauses or any clause denominated "Illegal Suspension of Work" are hereby re-
scinded, cancelled, abrogated and made null and void.
Gateway Coal, 414 U.S. at 384 n.15. Given this negotiating history, one must seriously
question whether the UMW had ever agreed to such a no-strike commitment, explicitly or
implicitly, in the NBCWA of 1950, or its successor, the NBLWA of 1968. Yet, the Court
implied (and imposed) a no-strike obligation on the UMW.
23. While one may argue that the Court in Boys Markets equitably approached viola-
tions of § 301, (29 U.S.C. § 185 (1982)), a comparison of remedies available to employers,
as opposed to those available to unions, suggests otherwise. If a labor organization vio-
lates an implied no-strike clause, the employer may obtain an injunction under Boys Markets,
along with contempt citations and fines against the union and employees for violation of
that injunction under Consolidation Coal Co. v. Local 1702, UMW, 683 F.2d 827 (4th Cir.
1982). The employer may also recover damages for lost profits during the strike, and it
may lawfully discharge the employees. The only remedy denied to the employer is dam-
ages directly against the employees for peaceful strike activity. Complete Auto Transit,
Inc. v. Reis, 451 U.S. 401 (1981).
On the other hand, if an employer violates its contractual duty to arbitrate a dispute
or refuses to abide by an arbitration award, the union is generally not permitted to strike
(despite the absence of an explicit no-strike clause in the contract), but must file a § 301
case. Even if it is successful, the union is rarely awarded even its attorneys fees and costs.
Trustees of Boston Univ. v. American Assn. of Univ. Professors, 746 F.2d 924 (1st Cir.
1984); but see Washington Hospital Center v. Service Employees Int'l Union, Local 722,
746 F.2d 1503 (D.C. Cir. 1984). Meanwhile, the employer has continued to violate the
arbitration clause of the contract, thereby undermining the integrity of the contract and
the union's ability to expeditiously enforce the agreement.
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ful activities of employees, without addressing the underlying issues of
the dispute so that employees can be assured of equitable treatment
from the courts.
2 4
For a number of years, the federal government was uncertain as to
how this imbalance in treatment of employers and employees should be
addressed. Initially, the government sided in strikes with the employers,
even going to the extent of seizing and temporarily operating industrial
property seventy-one times in this country's history.
2 5 In most of these
cases, the government was siding with employers, or, at least, simply
attempting to have production resume because of the government's own
needs, without giving effective attention to resolving the disputes that
led to the strike. For instance, during the Civil War, President Lincoln,
without regard to the merits of the employees' grievances, seized the
Philadelphia & Reading Railroad in July, 1864 and had the War Depart-
ment replace strikers, so the railway could provide coal for the Army and
Navy. Within a week after the Army began operation of the Railroad,
more than a quarter of the strikers were fired, thereby breaking the
strike and weakening the union.
2 6
The first peacetime use of presidential intervention in a labor dis-
pute occurred in February, 1877 when President Hayes, through his at-
torney general, directed that the local strike leaders of the Brotherhood
of Locomotive Engineers, who had struck and closed the Boston & Main
Railroad, be arrested for conspiracy to obstruct the United States mail.
This rather innovative, one-sided approach to labor relations was based
on the theory that employees who agreed among themselves to strike
prior to the end of their work day for better conditions, were interfering
with delivery of the mail even though this interference was not directly
intended and only incidental to the slowing down of rail traffic. The
strike leaders were tried and found guilty in federal court.
2 7
The first use of presidential intervention in a labor dispute, which
sought equitable treatment for employees, occurred in 1902 by Presi-
dent Theodore Roosevelt. During an anthracite coal strike in Penn-
sylvania, President Roosevelt learned that the employers would not
voluntarily accept the decision of his fact finders on how to resolve the
labor dispute. Contrary to previous governmental intervention into la-
bor disputes, he threatened to seize the operations to force employer
acquiesence to the fact finders' report, which provided for a more equi-
24. While it is argued (once one accepts that the existence of a mandatory arbitration
provision implies a concomitant no-strike obligation) that violation of a no-strike clause
justifies injunctive relief, because the employees' actions are not legitimate, such a ration-
ale has not prevented the Supreme Court from prohibiting an injunction sought by a pri-
vate party under § 301 for a "political" strike, while permitting a damage action against
the union for the same type of strike under § 303 (29 U.S.C. § 187 (1982)). Jacksonville
Bulk Terminals v. International Longshoremen's Assoc., 457 U.S. 702 (1982); Interna-
tional Longshoremen's Assoc. v. Allied Int'l, Inc., 456 U.S. 212 (1982).
25. J. BLACKMAN, PRESIDENTIAL SEIZURE IN LABOR DISPUTES 3 (1967).
26. Id. at 8.
27. U.S. v. Stevens, 27 F. Cas. 1312 (C.C.D. Maine 1877) (No. 16,392);J. BLACKMAN,
supra note 25, at 8.
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table solution to the employees' grievances. 28 The fact finders' report
succinctly states the thesis of this article:
Experience shows that the more full the recognition given to a
trades union, the more businesslike and responsible it be-
comes. Through dealing with businessmen in business mat-
ters, its more intelligent, conservative, responsible members
come to the front and gain general control and direction of its
affairs. If the energy of the employer is directed to discourage-
ment and repression of the union, he need not be surprised if
the more radically inclined members are the ones most fre-
quently heard.
2 9
Based upon the recognition that employers would have to be co-
erced into granting employees their rights, the federal government be-
gan to move slowly toward a more balanced approach in labor disputes.
For instance, in 1918, President Wilson established the National War
Labor Board (NWLB). The NWLB recognized the right of employees to
organize in trade unions and to bargain collectively, without interfer-
ence by employers. The NWLB conducted elections, ordered reinstate-
ments with back pay, and directed employers to bargain. However, the
NWLB had no express authority to enforce its findings, except through
President Wilson's moral backing. 30 Wilson, however, gave some teeth
to his moral authority by seizing the properties of Western Union Tele-
graph Company because the carrier discharged workers who joined the
union, and by seizing the Smith & Wesson Arms Company because the
employer would not bargain. 3' Yet, labor unions had no formal legal
tools to use to seek enforcement of their rights.
Congress then attempted to codify the right of employees to engage
in concerted activities in Section 7(a) of the National Industrial Recovery
Act of 1933.32 Contrary to almost every formal governmental policy
before or since, the NIRA attempted to establish a role for government
in addressing the substance of employee disputes through industrial
codes, which were to establish working conditions for specific industries.
However, massive resistance to the NIRA, as well as lack of an effective
enforcement mechanism, shattered the dreams of those who had hoped
that public policy was finally beginning to approach labor-management
relations with an even hand.
3 3
28. J. BLACKMAN, supra note 25, at 12.
29. REPORT OF THE ANTHRACITE COAL STRIKE COMM'N, S. Doc. No. 6, 58TH CONG.,
SPEC. SESS. (1903).
30. J. TAYLOR & F. WHITNEY, supra note 8, at 139.
31. Id. at 140; see also U.S. DEP'T. OF LABOR BULLETIN No. 1000, BRIEF HISTORY OF THE
AMERICAN LABOR MOVEMENT 18-19 (1976) (discussing the creation of the NWLB, the first
federal labor agency to set forth union organizations and collective bargaining rights of
employees).
32. 48 Stat. 195 (1933).
33. A Board to enforce the NIRA was established by President Franklin Roosevelt by
executive order on August 5, 1933, with Senator Robert F. Wagner as its chairman. How-
ever, it was not until December 16, 1933, that an executive order formalized the power of
the Board. The authority of the Board was further formalized by an executive order on
February 19, 1934. The Board, however, did not have statutory powers, or authority
under the executive order, to enforce its own decisions. Instead, violations of a report of
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Whatever effect the NIRA may have had in attempting to bring bal-
ance to the government's approach to labor-management relations
ended when the Supreme Court found the Act unconstitutional in
Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States. 34 Shortly thereafter, the National
Labor Relations Act, 35 also known as the Wagner Act, the Magna Carta
of the labor movement, was passed. Section 7 of the NLRA3 6 clearly
established the right of employees to engage in concerted activity for
their mutual aid and protection, as well as for the purpose of bargaining
for improved conditions of employment. This right was strengthened
by the prohibitions listed as employer unfair labor practices in section 8
of the Act.3 7 Under the NLRA, as originally passed, the NLRB was con-
tinued as the primary administrative agency regulating public policy re-
garding labor-management relations. 38  Section 1039 of the Act
authorized the NLRB to investigate charges filed by private parties, to
hold hearings, to issue cease and desist orders, and to require affirma-
tive remedies. However, the Board's findings were not self-enforcing;
the Board had to seek judicial enforcement of its orders. In addition,
employees and unions had no private right-of-action to have their cases
actually brought to litigation. Clearly, though, this was at least a step
forward, since there was the clear statutory authorization for courts to
enforce the Board's decisions.
Unlike the NIRA, however, the NLRA did not attempt to force the
federal government into deciding the merits of labor disputes. The
NLRA, as originally enacted, only attempted to provide and protect a
private mechanism-collective bargaining between employees and labor
organizations freely chosen by the employees-by which the parties
would attempt to resolve their disputes. The government would statu-
torily recognize the right of employees to bargain collectively, the obli-
gation of employers to bargain with recognized and certified unions, and
it would protect employees who attempted to assert these rights through
collective or union action. The government would not try to impose any
specific terms or conditions of employment on labor or management but
would leave the definition of such terms to the parties.
One might ask whether the weakening of the collective bargaining
the Board were to be referred to the Compliance Division of the National Recovery Ad-
ministration (NRA) or to the Attorney General for appropriate action.
Then, on June 16, 1934, Congress passed Joint Resolution 44, 48 Stat. 1183 (1934),
establishing the National Labor Relations Board. The NLRB was to conduct elections and
to investigate violations of § 7(a) of the NIRA. However, Congress was reluctant to give
enforcement powers or sanctions to the NLRB. Effectiveness of the NLRB to enforce the
NIRA was further hindered, because the Compliance Division of the NRA and the Depart-
ment ofJustice were not in sympathy with the NLRB's aims. SeeJ. TAYLOR & F. WHITNEY,
supra note 8, at 150-52; MILLIS & BROWN, FROM THE WAGNER ACT TO TAFT-HARTLEY: A
STUDY OF NATIONAL LABOR POLICY AND LABOR RELATIONS 25-26 (1950); and LORWIN &
WLBNIG, LABOR RELATIONS BOARDS 268 (1935),
34. 295 U.S. 495 (1935).
35. 49 Stat. 449 (1935).
36. 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1982).
37. 29 U.S.C. § 158 (1982).
38. Id. §§ 160, 161.
39. Id. § 160.
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mechanism will ultimately lead to renewed demands for federal inter-
vention into the substance of labor disputes, as under the NIRA. 40 For
instance, as we see the Board41 and the Courts4 2 erode a union's right
to demand bargaining over plant closures or relocations, we see in-
creased interest by the state and federal governments in plant closure
legislation.43 Rather than moving toward more governmental interven-
tion into the substance of labor disputes, increased attention should be
given to making the private procedural system of collective bargaining
work. To do that, there must be an effective mechanism to enforce the
right to collectively bargain through freely chosen unions. Unfortu-
nately, government policy has not always recognized the need to
strengthen these procedural mechanisms as a way to avoid demands for
more substantive intervention.
II. EVEN WITH THE ADVENT OF THE NLRA, THE GOVERNMENT WAS
RELUCTANT TO GIVE LABOR ORGANIZATIONS ACCESS TO THE
SYSTEM
For a brief period in our country's history, the government placed
itself squarely on the side of protecting employees' rights to engage in
concerted activity for improvement of their working conditions. Passage
of the Norris-LaGuardia Act, the NIRA, and the Wagner Act evidenced
this changed perspective. However, between 1935 and 1947, there were
40. On the other hand, one might argue that the growth of federal intervention into
pension matters with the passage of ERISA, and into health and safety matters with the
passage of OSHA and MSHA, as well as the promulgation of various anti-discrimination
statutes, have actually weakened the collective bargaining structure by undercutting part
of the raison d'etre for unions.
41. Milwaukee Spring, 268 N.L.R.B. No. 87, 1983-84 NLRB Dec. (CCH) 16,029
(1984). The Board held that an employer's decision to relocate assembly operations from
a unionized facility to a nonunionized one without the consent of the union was not unlaw-
ful. However, Member Zimmerman's dissent pointed out that the employer's actions were
in derogation of its bargaining obligation under § 8(d), thereby violating § 8(a)(5).
42. First National Maintenance Corp. v. NLRB, 452 U.S. 666 (1981); Textile Workers
v. Darlington Co., 380 U.S. 263 (1965). The underlying rationale in Darlington may have
been weakened by the holding in Golden State Bottling Co. v. NLRB, 414 U.S. 168 (1973).
When an employer entirely closes its business in order to frustrate unionization it is nor-
mally a violation of § 8(a)(3) of the NLRA, but for the Darlington decision. The Court in
that case determined that an anti-union employer had a right to totally close its business,
but did not have a right to selectively close part of the business in order to stymie union
activity. However. in Golden State Bottling, the Court subsequently recognized that even an
innocent employer who purchased an operation knowing of a § 8(a)(3) violation by the
predecessor, could be required to remedy the violation. The Court recognized that the
purchaser who takes with notice, could take the unfair labor practice liability into account
in negotiating the purchase price. There is no reason why this latter principle should not
be recognized in cases of a complete closure and sale, as well as in cases of a partial closure
and sale. Thus, if a company completely closes for anti-union reasons, this should still be
considered a violation of § 8(a)(3). However, the company need not be ordered to resume
operations, but any successor company takings with notice should be required to remedy
that violation. Unfortunately, this theory will probably not be judicially tested, since the
NLRB General Counsel has failed to date to issue such a complaint.
43. See Responsible Conduct Called Key to Avoiding Plant Closing Laws, Daily Labor Report
(BNA), December 12, 1984, at A-7, E-I-E-6 for summary of proposed federal legislation
and proposed legislation in nineteen states and summary of ten states with plant closing
laws.
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strong employer criticisms of the NLRB, in part based upon this change
in the government's approach to labor-management relations. This crit-
icism led to the Taft-Hartley Amendments of 1947 and a significant shift
toward strengthening employer rights, while restricting those of labor
organizations. One need only examine the change in procedures avail-
able to enforce respective rights in order to recognize the heightened
importance given to employer rights over rights of employees and
unions.
In the Taft-Hartley amendments to the National Labor Relations
Act, Congress established an independent General Counsel, a presiden-
tial appointee subject to senatorial approval with a term of four years,
who would enforce the NLRA. 4 4 Congress was concerned that the
NLRB was acting as prosecutor, judge, and jury.4 5 Under the "old"
NLRA, there was no independent prosecutor; the NLRB appointed its
own legal staff to review and investigate charges and decide whether to
issue a complaint, and hearing officers would meet privately with the
NLRB after a public hearing to discuss the case. Employers argued that
this led to a denial of due process and to unfair decisions.4 6 Now, after
the amendments, there is still no private right-of-action for unions to
seek a remedy for unfair labor practices by employers. The General
Counsel retains sole, unreviewable discretion as to whether a complaint
should issue against an employer. Thus, regardless of the merits of the
charge against an employer, if the General Counsel decides not to issue
a complaint,4 7 that decision may not be the subject of a successful writ
44. 29 U.S.C. § 153(d) (1982).
45. 1 NLRB LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE LABOR-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS ACT, 1947,
at 292, 297 (1948) (hereinafter cited as "LEGISLATIVE HISTORY").
46. Id. at 297, 426, 540-41; 2 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY at 1494; but see MILLIS & BROWN,
supra note 33, at 66-75.
47. The General Counsel has delegated to various Regional Directors her authority to
decide whether to issue a complaint. The Regional Director acts, inter alia, as an assistant
prosecuting attorney and makes the initial decision whether to issue a complaint against an
employer or labor organization. If the Regional Director decides not to issue a complaint,
his decision may be administratively appealed to the NLRB General Counsel, who acts as
the prosecuting attorney. 29 C.F.R. 102.19 (1984). The General Counsel has established
an Office of Appeals to consider these administrative appeals from a Regional Director's
refusal to issue a complaint. However, one must question whether or not this "appeal"
process is, or was ever intended to be, adequate. For instance, while the appealing party
may request oral argument before the Office of Appeals, these arguments are rarely
granted. Also, when the appeal has been dismissed based upon the administrative resolu-
tion of factual disputes, the appealing party has no right to examine affidavits submitted by
the respondent in order to prepare an effective rebuttal. In fact, neither the appealing
party nor the respondent are required to file their briefs with the other party. Indeed, a
Regional Director's refusal to issue a complaint is reversed by the Office of Appeals only
about three to four percent of the time. NLRB General Counsel's Summary of Operations
for Fiscal 1983, reprinted in Labor Relations Yearbook 1983 (BNA), 226-27 (1984) (herein-
after cited as NLRB General Counsel's Summary). Former chairman of the NLRB, now
management attorney, Edward B. Miller, has stated that reversals by the Office of Appeals
of a Regional Director's decision do not occur:
in any substantial number of cases, but the opportunity for an appeal from the
regional director's determination is doubtless sound administrative practice and
has helped blunt some of the criticism of the power invested in the General
Counsel.
E. MILLER, AN ADMINISTRATIVE APPRAISAL OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
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of mandamus to force the issuance of a complaint. 48
Since rights created or recognized by the National Labor Relations
Act are generally deemed to be public and not private rights, an em-
ployee whose "rights" under the NLRA have been violated by an em-
ployer has no control over whether or not his or her case may ever be
put before a judicial officer for ultimate resolution. The Regional Direc-
tor's decision not to issue a complaint is almost never administratively
overturned. Thus, an employer against whom a charge has been filed
knows that the employee or union has little or no control over whether
the unfair labor practice charge will be aggressively pursued.
On the other hand, unions may be the subject of numerous private
actions that can be controlled by the plaintiff. For instance, Congress in
the Taft-Hartley amendments not only established that secondary boy-
cott attempts to force an employer into an employer's group, certain
recognitional strikes and jurisdictional strikes were unfair labor prac-
tices, 4 9 but it also provided employers with a private right-of-action to
sue unions for damages in federal court for these unfair labor prac-
tices. 50 While an employer does not have standing to seek a temporary
injunction against alleged violations by unions of section 8(b)(4) or
8(b)(7) of the NLRA, the amendments mandate that once the Regional
Director issues an 8(b)(4) or 8(b)(7) complaint, he must seek a temporary
injunction from a district court. 5 1 Moreover, when an employer files
such charges against a union, these charges are given expedited treat-
ment over all other types of charges, 5 2 including charges alleging em-
ployer discriminatory action against employees.
In contrast to the mandatory 10(l) injunction against unions, actions
against employers brought under section 10(j) permit but do not require
the pursuit of temporary relief by federal district courts, pending Board
processing of a section 8(a) violation. Also, unlike section 10(l), a Re-
gional Director has no authority on his own to pursue a 10(j) injunction.
He must first refer the matter to the General Counsel's Division of Ad-
vice, who must then obtain approval from the five-member Board before
the Regional Director may go to court for the injunction.
53
One may also look to the remedies provided by the Taft-Hartley
(1977). Thus, it appears that the existence of the Office of Appeals, which almost always
"rubber stamps" the Regional Director's decision, is more for appearance than to provide
actual fairness to the charging party.
48. See Meat Cutters Union v.Jewel Tea Co., 381 U.S. 676, 687 (1965); Vaca v. Sipes,
386 U.S. 171, 182 n.8 (1967); Baker v. International Alliance of Theatrical Stage Employ-
ees, 691 F.2d 1291, 1293-95 (9th Cir. 1982).
49. 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4), (7) (1982).
50. 29 U.S.C. § 187 (1982).
51. 29 U.S.C. § 160 () (1982) reads in pertinent part:
If, after [a § 8(b)(4)(A), (B), or (C), or § 8(b)(7)] investigation, the . . . regional
attorney ... has reasonable cause to believe such charge is true and that a com-
plaint should issue, he shall, on behalf the Board, petition . . . for appropriate
injunctive relief pending the final adjudication of the Board.
52. 29 U.S.C. § 160(m) (1982).
53. See A. Cox, D. BOK, & R. GORMAN, LABOR LAw 929-30 (1981).
1985]
DENVER UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW
amendments for a violation of section 8(d) of the Act 54 in order to see
the more punitive approach taken toward employees who violate the
employer's right not to have a contract strike unless notification require-
ments are met. Employees who violate section 8(d) are not only subject
to normal Board remedies but also automatically lose their status as
"employees" and thus all protection under the Act. However, an em-
ployer who locks out employees in violation of 8(d) is not faced with
corresponding sanctions.
5 5
One need look no further than the statutory priority for remedying
certain union unfair labor practices and the employers' right to seek pri-
vate remedies before realizing that employee and union rights have
lesser legal importance than employer rights. 56 Yet some of the most
important rights enjoyed by employees and unions involving labor-man-
agement relations are those protected by sections 7 and 8(a) of the
NLRA. The union though, must rely on the Regional Director or Gen-
eral Counsel for judicial enforcement of these rights. Contrary to the
wishes of the union, an action may not be pursued for any number of
reasons. For instance, if the Board has taken a certain position regard-
ing an interpretation of the Act, the General Counsel will follow the
Board's interpretation and may dismiss a case, even though the Board's
decision has been overturned by one or more courts of appeal. The
Regional Director will continue to follow the Board's position, at least
until the Board acquiesces in the position taken by the appellate court,
54. 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1982) requires labor and management to bargain in good
faith over wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment.
55. Id.
56. See A. Cox, supra note 53, at 930. Employers also enjoy the use of other effective
alternative weapons to protect their interests, while union access to the tools to protect
their interests are often blunted. For instance, while mass picketing or picket line violence
violate § 8(b)(l)(A) of the NLRA, employers need not be limited to filing an unfair labor
practice charge, but may also independently pursue state court injunctive relief, damages,
and contempt. Youngdahl v. Rainfair, 355 U.S. 131 (1957); Consolidation Coal, supra note
19. In addition, the employer who, in this commentator's experience, is often able to
obtain an ex parte restraining order or preliminary injunction with little or no evidence of
union involvement, despite the "clear proof" requirement of Norris-LaGuardia (see Ram-
sey v. UMW, 401 U.S. 302 (1971)), has the full use of available discovery mechanisms to
pursue its court case. Similarly, while the violation by a union of the duty of fair represen-
tation is an unfair labor practice under § 8(b)(1)(A), there is also a private right-of-action
against a union for such a violation under § 301. Vaca v. Sipes, supra note 48. On the
other hand, many coercive actions of employers against employees cognizable under
§ 8(a)(1) and (2) may only be pursued before the NLRB. For instance, while a union can
be sued for damages for attempting to force an employer into an employer's group, 29
U.S.C. §§ 158(b)(4)(ii)(A) and 187 (1982), a union has no such private right-of-action for
an employer's interference with the formation of a labor organization, but can only file an
unfair labor practice charge, 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(2 ) (1982).
Likewise, § 301 ex parte restraining orders are frequently issued against unions with
the possibility of substantial damages looming over their heads, while employers may re-
fuse to abide by grievance/arbitration procedures or awards without great risk. And while
employers may easily establish standing to bring an anti-trust suit against a union with the
possibility of treble damages; Connell Co. v. Plumbers & Steamfitters, 421 U.S. 616
(1975); UMWA v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (1965), unions for all practical purposes have
been denied access to this remedy, even when the employers have conspired among them-
selves to prevent unionization. Associated Gen. Contractors v. California State Council of
Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519 (1983).
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or until the Supreme Court resolves the issue. 57
It is often more difficult for unions to prove their charges against
employers in an unfair labor practice proceeding than for employers to
prove their charges against a union in a section 301 or section 303 court
proceeding in which the Federal Rules of Procedure allow full discovery.
While the Regional Director is required to investigate a charge once it is
filed, there are no statutory provisions which facilitate full discovery. In
complicated cases, such as an alter-ego case or a secondary boycott case
in which the union is claiming the ally-doctrine as a defense, the Board
agent in practice rarely engages in an aggressive investigation of the in-
terconnections between the various companies involved. 58 Instead, the
charging party is responsible for finding evidence and presenting it to
the Board agent in order to establish the prima facie case. The problem,
of course, is that the union is rarely privy to necessary information. For
example, in an alter-ego situation the employer is generally attempting
to avoid its statutory bargaining or contractual obligations by establish-
ing a sham transaction or sham corporation, thereby hiding the true
identity of the employer. Because the Board has not adopted by regula-
tion pre-trial discovery procedures similar to the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, though authorized to do so, 5 9 the employer is not discour-
aged from attempting to escape its bargaining obligations by establish-
ing a sham transaction because it can frequently hide such a transaction
from a charging party. In such a case, there will not normally be enough
information readily available to the charging party to establish a prima
facie case for the Regional Director. Since the Board agent often does
not aggressively develop the evidence necessary to establish such a rela-
tionship, 60 the charge may be dismissed, allowing the employer to suc-
57. For instance, the Board originally took the position that an employee on sick leave
could be considered a striker, even if incapable of working, if she declared support for the
strike, thereby permitting the employer to stop her disability payments. This position of
the Board was overturned by the Third Circuit, though the Board did not immediately
acquiesce to the court's view of the law. Compare E.L. Weigand Div. v. NLRB, 650 F.2d
463, 474 (3d Cir. 1981) (court did not approve the Board's order which permitted stop-
page of payment to employees on basis of public support of strike) with Conoco, Inc., 265
N.L.R.B. No. 116 (1982) (Board ruled that termination of employee's benefits based on
public support for strike violated employees' § 7 rights, following Weigand). During the 20
months between the Third Circuit decision and the Board's general acquiescence to the
court's position in Conoco, this commentator had a charge dismissed by the Regional Direc-
tor and the Office of Appeals based on the Board's original position, due to the Board's
lagging acceptance of Weigand. (For a full analysis of this doctrine, see Remarks on NLRB v.
The Courts by Tracy H. Ferguson Before New York University's 35th National Conference on Labor
Law, Daily Labor Report, June 17, 1982, at D-l). Thus, the employee, whose statutory
right was violated, was left without a remedy simply because the Regional Director fol-
lowed the "Board's" position, rather than the prevailing court decision. Although mo-
tions for reconsideration were then filed with the Office of Appeals, there has been no
action on this matter.
58. Report of 1977 Proceedings, Chicago, A.B.A. SEC. LABOR RELATIONS LAw, 167-68.
59. 29 U.S.C. § 156 and 160(b) (1982). While NLRB rules do provide for pre-trial
depositions, 29 C.F.R. § 102.30 (1984), the private party must first obtain the Regional
Director's approval. In practice, such approval is rarely, if ever, given.
60. While the Regional Director is authorized to seek investigative subpoenas and
subpoena duce tecum prior to the issuance of the complaint, 29 U.S.C. 161(1) (1982), such
authority is rarely used in alter ego cases.
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ceed in skirting the law.
6 1
The union's lack of access to information or to pre-trial discovery is
particularly harmful during a strike in which a secondary boycott
6 2
charge is filed against a union. Under the Act, the Regional Director is
required to seek an injunction against the strike 63 if he has a reasonable
belief that a violation of the secondary boycott provisions has occurred.
Frequently, an employer who has a reprehensible alter ego or ally rela-
tionship, will initially only file secondary boycott charges under section
8(b)(4) and hold off on its damage suit which would expose it to discov-
ery in federal court. Since the union does not have ready access to the
information to prove its alter ego or ally defense to the section 8(b)(4)
charge and the Region may not adequately investigate the defense,6 4 the
Regional Director may have sufficient reason to believe that a violation
of section 8(b)(4) has occurred so as to support the issuance of a section
10() injunction against the union. Thus, an 10(l) injunction may issue
against the strike, even though the union may ultimately prevail in its
defense when the case is fully litigated before an administrative law
judge. Meanwhile, the employees' rights to concerted activity may have
been severely damaged. Subsequently, the union is left with inadequate
discovery procedures, which are critical in determining the interrelation-
ships necessary to establish defenses. Instead, the union may only sub-
poena witnesses and documents for production on the day of the trial.
This does not, however, permit the type of follow-up discovery through
depositions, further subpoenas, and interrogatories that is allowed by
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Nevertheless, if the union should
lose in the 8(b)(4) proceeding, it may be collaterally estopped in a subse-
61. While some courts are now finding a private right-of-action to pursue the alter ego
or single employer theory in a § 301 action, Carpenters Local Union No. 1846 v. Pratt-
Farnsworth, Inc., 690 F.2d 489 (5th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 335 (1983), it is not
clear that this trend will extend to all jurisdictions. Moreover, if there is no labor contract
right at issue to invoke jurisdiction under § 301, as would be the case in a newly organized
run-away employer situation, the only remedies available for an alter ego action would be
pursuant to an unfair labor practice procedure at the Board.
62. 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4) makes secondary boycotts illegal, with a handful of
exceptions.
63. Using the required § 10(l) injunction petition. See supra note 51 and accompany-
ing text.
64. Former Board Chairman Miller has stated that the Regions and Board have a con-
tinuing problem in developing and maintaining a "top notch corps of trial lawyers." E.
MILLER, supra note 47, at 18. The same problem also holds true for investigative agents,
which are frequently attorneys. Miller explained that the primary cause of the problem is
that:
. . . law firms are able to offer, and do offer, attractive salaries to the NLRB attor-
ney who acquires trial skill, and they can promise a future which is not subject to
the same compensation limits as government employment. Furthermore, these
offers tend to go to the most competent NLRB lawyers . . . . The 'cream' has
been very likely skimmed off by the private firms which have lured away many of
the best lawyers.
Id. It is well known that, generally speaking, management oriented labor law firms are
more numerous and can frequently offer more lucrative job opportunities. While one
must be careful and not jump too quickly to conclusions, it is fair to ask whether an investi-
gative NLRB attorney, who may be considering private employment in the same field and
area will be quite as aggressive against an employer in investigating a complicated, contro-
versial alter ego case, if the management firm is a prospective employer.
[Vol. 62:2
LABOR LA W REFORM
quent section 303 damage action on the liability question. Thus, while
the union would have had full use of the discovery mechanisms to prove
its ally doctrine or alter ego defense had the section 303 trial been held
prior to the section 8(b)(4) hearing, the union, which was prevented
from obtaining full pre-trial discovery in the 8(b)(4) case, can no longer
establish a defense to the damages action.
III. PROCEDURAL CHANGES IN THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT
THAT SHOULD BE RECONSIDERED
As we have seen, there exists a private right-of-action for most of
the major legal weapons that can be used against unions regarding la-
bor-management disputes: secondary boycott damage actions, damages
for efforts to force an employer into an employer's group, section 301
breach-of-contract injunctions and damage actions, state tort actions for
picket line conduct, duty of fair representation violations, and treble
damage actions in anti-trust suits. However, unions find that no such
private right exists by which they can protect the employees' rights to
engage in concerted activity for their mutual aid and protection, to bar-
gain collectively through freely chosen labor organizations, to engage in
union activity, and to engage in lawful strikes-all without fear of em-
ployer retaliation or discrimination. We have seen that pre-trial discov-
ery procedures are available to employers, although such necessary
tools are rarely available to unions in unfair labor practice proceedings.
And we have seen that injunctions or temporary restraining orders
against unions can be quickly obtained through private section 301 ac-
tions or mandated, expedited NLRB section 10() actions, while unions
do not have the same ability to expeditiously obtain such relief against
employers.
This commentator suggests that it is these structural defects in the
NLRA, not just the present political climate or makeup of the member-
ship of the Board, which underlie the growing frustration in some
quarters that the promises of the Wagner Act are becoming even harder
to fulfill. While others have suggested such changes as repealing the
Wagner and Taft-Hartley Acts, 6 5 creating a labor court, 66 or substan-
65. In 1953, John L. Lewis, President of the United Mine Workers of America, pro-
posed the repeal of the Wagner and Taft-Hartley Acts, leaving the Norris-LaGuardia and
Clayton Acts to govern labor-management relations. Return American Business and Labor to
the Bargaining Table, 83rd Cong., 1st Sess. 11 (1953) (statement ofJohn L. Lewis before the
U.S. Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare). Lewis argued for less governmen-
tal intervention into labor-management relations on behalf of either side by eliminating the
injunction, secondary boycott, and anti-discrimination provisions of the Wagner Act. His
theory, ironically, was most succinctly stated and supported by Harry M. Moses, president
of the Bituminous Coal Operators Association, the employer group with whom Lewis
bargained:
Nine times out of ten, we believe, labor disputes would be more quickly settled if
both parties knew that there was no forum for their settlement other than the
collective bargaining table. When government is permitted to inject itself in our
af'airs. all matters that it handles are settled on the basis of expediency, usually
political. There is no hope that laws and government can settle our problems as
well as we can.
1hL at 18. Rather than encouraing either side in a labor dispute to run to the government
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tively changing the NLRA, 6 7 these proposals do not appear to be politi-
cally possible in the foreseeable future. This does not mean, however,
that several procedural changes in the NLRA designed to better protect
rights already recognized in the law should not be reconsidered, such as:
(1) a private right-of-action for all and not just some unfair labor prac-
tices; (2) pre-trial discovery for unfair labor practice hearings; and
(3) expedited 10(j) proceedings.
Since the Wagner Act was enacted, a number of other anti-discrimi-
nation statutes have also been passed. In almost every situation, either
by statute or case, a private right-of-action exists for employees alleging
racial, religious, sexual, or ethnic discrimination, 68 for certain employ-
ees alleging employment discrimination based on a handicapping condi-
tion, 69 for veterans seeking re-employment rights,70 for employees
alleging age discrimination, 7 1 and for some employees alleging discrimi-
nation or retaliation based on their attempts to enforce health and safety
requirements. 72 While the original version of H.R. 77, the Labor Law
Reform Act of 1977, contained a provision requiring the General Counsel
to issue a complaint, unless no genuine issue of any material fact existed
and the charge failed to state an unfair labor practice, 73 this provision,
which still did not provide for a private action, was quickly dropped by
its sponsors when President Carter endorsed the bill.
74
In granting a private right of action for unfair labor practices, Con-
gress would only be extending enforcement authority to employees and
unions similar to that which has already been extended to employers for
secondary boycotts, hot cargo contracts, certain coercive activities on
bureaucracy, seeking help to influence the labor-management balance, Lewis wanted
nearly all labor disputes resolved by the private parties through collective bargaining. He
believed that the elimination of the injunction and secondary boycott would more than
compensate for elimination of the protections of § 8(a) of the NLRA. Employees would
then see that their rights would only be protected if they joined together in concerted
activities, thus strengthening labor unions. In addition, elimination of the injunction and
secondary boycott restrictions would force employers to sit down at the bargaining table
to resolve their differences, rather than running to court or to the NLRB.
While much can be said for this theory, it does not appear to be politically obtainable
at the present, despite the lip service given by the present administration to "get the gov-
ernment off the backs of the American people."
66. Morris, Procedural Reform in Labor Law-A Preliminary Paper, 35J. AIR L. AND COMM.
537, 560-74 (1969). E. MILLER, supra note 47, at 128-31. Since the NLRB cannot enforce
its final orders, subpoenas, discovery, or issue preliminary injunctions, thereby slowing
down the enforcement process, this proposal would address a number of these concerns.
67. See Trumka, supra note 3.
68. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) (1982).
69. See Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Darrone, 104 S. Ct. 1248, 1252 n.7 (1984). But see
Myers v. New England Tel. and Tel. Co., 35 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 767 (D. Mass.
1983).
70. 38 U.S.C. § 2022 (1982).
71. 29 U.S.C. § 626(c) (1982).
72. 30 U.S.C. § 815(c)(3) (1982). But see Taylor v. Brighton Corp., 616 F.2d 256 (6th
Cir. 1980).
73. Section 7 of H.R. 77, as introduced by Cong. Thompson, 95th Cong. 1st Sess.
(January 4, 1977).
74. E. MILLER, supra note 47 at 114; H.R. 8410, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1977). This bill
with amendments subsequently passed the House by 257-163, but failed in the Senate,
when the Senate was unable to break a filibuster.
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picket lines,jurisdictional strikes, strikes to force recognition or bargain-
ing with the union where another union has been certified as the exclu-
sive representative, and actions attempting to force an employer into an
employers' group. 75 In view of Congress' and the Courts' recognition
of a private right-to-sue for numerous other types of discrimination or
retaliatory actions, the primary reasons at this time (other than political
reasons) for not extending this right so employees may seek to protect
themselves from coercive, restraining or discriminatory acts of employ-
ers in response to concerted or union activity, would appear to be the
potential that administrative costs for the NLRB would escalate or that
such a right would discourage the high settlement rate which the NLRB
has been able to achieve.
76
These legitimate administrative cost concerns, however, might be
minimized by pursuing other methods for "screening out" non-merito-
rious charges, or encouraging the settlement of cases. For instance, in-
creased access to pre-trial discovery tools may expedite hearings by
reducing the number of contested issues and by focusing the issues
prior to trial. In addition, evidence developed in discovery may help
encourage settlement, by exposing the weaknesses of each side.
A procedure similar to that utilized in civil rights cases might be
used in unfair labor practice cases to discourage pursuit of non-meritori-
ous cases. 77 The charging party and the respondent could first be re-
quired to submit to an investigation by the Regional Director. Now
knowing (1) that a private right of action may exist if the matter is not
settled (which would block the private action) or dismissed by the Re-
gional Director; (2) that discovery tools will become available upon the
proper filing of a private action; (3) that the Regional Director's dismis-
sal letter, while not dispositive, may be given some weight by the Admin-
istrative Law Judge in the event a private action is filed; 78 and (4) that
75. 29 U.S.C. §§ 158(b)(4), 158(e), 187 (1982).
76. Approximately ninety-four percent of unfair labor practice charges are "settled,"
according to the General Counsel. NLRB General Counsel's Summary, supra note 47, at
227. However, about one-third of the charges are withdrawn by charging parties (nor-
mally after the Region advises that the charge will be dismissed if it is not withdrawn),
another one-third are dismissed by the Region, and one-fourth are actually settled. Forty-
Sixth Annual Report of NLRB, Fiscal Year 1981, reprinted in Labor Relations Yearbook
1983, supra note 47, at 208. Only about three to four percent of all unfair labor practices
go to Board decision, and only about six percent are heard by an Administrative Law
Judge. E. MI ._LER, supra note 47, at 16.
77. After a party files a charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(EEOC), she may bring a private action if the EEOC has not issued a complaint within a set
time period, has not obtained a conciliation agreement with the respondent, or has dis-
missed the charge. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(l) (1982). Some courts have held that the
EEOC's findings and dismissal letter may be given consideration by the trial court. Nulfv.
International Paper Co., 656 F.2d 553, 563 (10th Cir. 1981). A successful defendant may
be eligible for attorneys' fees and costs, if the plaintiffs claim is or becomes "frivolous,
unreasonable, or groundless." Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412, 422
(1978); Keys v. Lutheran Family & Children's Services of Missouri, 668 F.2d 356, 359
(10th Cir. 1982). Successful plaintiffs are ordinarily awarded attorneys fees absent special
circumstances in EEOC cases. Christiansburg Garment Co., supra at 417.
78. In order to continue to protect confidential sources, matters developed by the
Region during investigation could be exempted from discovery, even if a private action
19851
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attorneys' fees may be available against either party in the private ac-
tion, 79 all private parties may become more amenable to settling the
case without further litigation.
80
If the charge is still not settled8 l and the Region dismisses it, the
charging party then must decide whether or not to file a complaint,
82
taking into consideration the risk that the charge may be frivolous. A
more stringent "standing" requirement would probably be necessary
for filing private actions than for filing charges.8 3 On the other hand, in
complex, difficult cases, such as alter ego, "runaway plant," or secon-
dary boycott cases, 84 the private party may determine (1) that access to
pre-trial discovery tools, which often may be more effective than the Re-
gion's investigation, is important enough to risk an award of attorneys
fees if it should lose its private action, 85 (2) that even though court deci-
sions favor the charging party, they have not yet been acquiesced to by
the Board, thus precluding the General Counsel from relying on the
court's different interpretation of law; or (3) that factual disputes could
be erroneously resolved by the Regional Director. All of these may ar-
gue in favor of filing a private action, despite the risks, and expenses, of
losing.
Employers, faced with these new procedures, may no longer find it
worth the risk to set up an alter ego relationship, to "run away" from a
union organizing campaign, or to fire union supporters, since they could
were filed. Only a dismissal letter or report might be admissible at trial. Such an exclusion
would also prevent increased litigation costs for the Region.
79. Attorneys fees might not be available to either side if the General Counsel files a
complaint, except against the General Counsel, as provided for in the Equal Access to
Justice Act, 5 U.S.C. § 504 (1982). Various standards, other than the difficult-to-meet
"bad faith" American rule, have been adopted for various types of discrimination actions,
sometimes using a different standard for prevailing plaintiffs than is used for prevailing
defendants. See 5 U.S.C. § 7701(g)(1) and (2) (1982); 5 U.S.C. § 504(a)(1) (1982).
80. Kuenzel, The Attorney's Fee. Why Not a Cost of Litigation? 49 IOWA L. REV. 75, 80, 86
(1963).
81. Since the Charging Party now could file its own action, there would be no need for
the General Counsel's Office of Appeals, which now simply "rubber stamps" the 4,500
appeals from a Regional Director's dismissal. See NLRB General Counsel's Summary,
supra note 47, at 228. Resources saved by eliminating this office could be used to hire
more Administrative Law Judges, if these new private rights create more litigation.
82. Under present procedures, the Region may settle a charge with the respondent,
even if the charging party objects to the settlement. NLRB FIELD MANUAL, § 10 134.2(b).
Retaining such a right on behalf of the Region, which effectively could block a private
action or parts of the action if a partial settlement were entered into, may also be an effec-
tive "screening" device.
83. Presently, any "person," regardless of whether they have an interest in the matter,
may file and pursue an unfair labor practice charge, except possibly for certain § 8(a)(5)
actions. A more stringent standing requirement for private actions would also be a
"screening" device.
84. If access to discovery procedures are expanded for use in certain unfair labor
practice proceedings, they should be available for § 8(b) charges for which a private action
already exists under § 303, due to the possible collateral estoppel effects of the NLRB pro-
ceeding on the § 303 action, regardless of whether the General Counsel or the employer
files the 8(b) complaint.
85. It should be noted that, while most Regions now require the charging party's wit-
nesses to sign sworn oaths subjecting them to possible perjury charges, respondent's wit-
nesses are often only interviewed and not put under oath during the investigation stage.
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no longer hope that the Region might not do a thorough investigation,
that the union might not be able to ascertain all relevant facts without
discovery, and that the union could do little, if anything, about its
"rights" in the event its charge were dismissed.
Granting a private right-of-action with expanded discovery rights,
though, may create other concerns. However, many of these concerns
can be readily addressed. For instance, an Administrative Law Judge
(A.LJ.) should be assigned more quickly to each case, since pre-trial dis-
covery disputes could arise requiring his attention. However, many dis-
covery issues could be handled, as some pre-trial conferences are now
handled, by a telephone conference call between all parties and the
A.L.J. after pre-trial motions and briefs are filed on the matter, or ver-
bally argued during the conference. Also, by being involved in earlier
stages of the proceedings, the judge may be able to help the parties fo-
cus issues or settle all or part of the matter sooner.86
Granting the right to discovery in a private unfair labor practice ac-
tion need not result in further delay of most litigation, as some fear.
Expedited discovery rules, such as those adopted by the Federal Mine
Safety and Health Review Commissionwhich apply to safety discrimina-
tion,8 7 and other cases, could be adopted by the NLRB to require that
discovery procedures be initiated within twenty days of filing of the com-
plaint by the private party and be completed within sixty days of such
filing, unless the A.LJ. otherwise permits.
While the A.L.J. would not have authority to enforce any of his or-
ders requiring responses to discovery,8 8 he could more vigorously en-
force the present rule that failure to produce non-privileged evidence
will cause an adverse inference to arise against the non-complying
party.8 9
Some have argued that expanded discovery in NLRB cases will lead
to more tampering with witnesses or less cooperation in the investiga-
tion stage by potential witnesses or confidential sources who fear retalia-
tion. However, these concerns can be moderated if witness lists are not
required to be disclosed until two days before trial, as in safety discrimi-
nation cases; 90 if the section 8(a)(4) procedure is expedited; and if the
10(l) injunction is made available for section 8(a)(4) violations, in order
to obtain quick action against a party who is tampering with the discov-
86. U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, CONCERNS REGARDING IMPACT OF EMPLOYEE
CHARGES AGAINST EMPLOYERS FOR UNFAIR TAKEN PRACTICES 25 (1982).
87. 30 U.S.C. § 815(c) (1982).
88. As presently, an action would have to be entertained in federal district court for
enforcement of such orders. Enforcement of discovery rulings by the Administrative Law
Judge could proceed as enforcement of subpoenas is now handled, the responsibility for
which remains primarily in the hands of the private party. 29 C.F.R. § 102.31(d) (1984).
89. Zapex Corp., 235 N.L.R.B. 1237 (1978). The Administrative Law Judge found
that Zapex had violated the rule that "when a party has relevant evidence within his con-
trol which he fails to produce, that failure gives rise to an adverse inference that the evi-
dence is unfavorable to him." Id. at 1239. See also International Union, United
Automobile, Aerospace and Agricultural Implement Workers of America, UAW v. NLRB,
459 F.2d 1329, 1335 (C.A.D.C. 1972).
90. 29 C.F.R. Sec. 2700.59 (1982).
1985]
DENVER UNIVERSITY IL W REVIEW
ery or trial process. Confidential sources developed by the Region dur-
ing investigation, who will not be witnesses, need not be disclosed.
Thus, since the right to pre-trial discovery would not arise until the Gen-
eral Counsel had completed his investigation and dismissed the matter,
there should not be any significant interference with the government's
investigation of the matter. By providing that confidential information
obtained by the General Counsel be non-discoverable, as well as de-
manding a stricter standing requirement for private actions and other
"screening" mechanisms, such as attorneys' fees and pre-trial discovery,
there may not be an unacceptable increase in the case load for the
Board. 9 1
It should be recognized, though, that granting a right to a private
action and pre-trial discovery will not eradicate the inequity that now
exists. Section 10(j) and 10(t) of the NLRA were added by the Taft-
Hartley Amendments to provide expedited temporary relief, pending
completion of the administrative process. However, the Regional Direc-
tor, who is authorized to seek a 10() injunction against a union upon
issuance of an 8(b)(4) or 8(b)(7) complaint, does not have such authority
upon issuance of an 8(a) complaint against an employer. Instead, the
Regional Director must first seek permission from the Division of Ad-
vice, who, in turn, must obtain permission from the five-member Board
before the Regional Director may go into federal district court to seek a
10(j) injunction.
If the Regional Director is capable of acting on his own to seek tem-
porary relief for certain union unfair labor practices, he should also be
granted such authority, either statutorily or by delegation from the




While the procedural reforms suggested in this article, particularly
those regarding a private right of action, may raise other concerns not
addressed here, they do suggest a somewhat different approach to labor
law reform, when considered as a package, than those advanced by
others in recent years. The suggestions are drawn from actions taken by
Congress in anti-discrimination and health and safety acts passed since
the enactment of major labor legislation.
91. One might argue that all actions under Section 303, 29 U.S.C. 2187, and possibly
some under section 301, 29 U.S.C. § 185, including fair representation cases, should only
be litigated before the NLRB, rather than federal courts, since the Board has the labor
expertise to address these matters. While increasing the Board's workload, this suggestion
would result in a corresponding drop in federal district court workloads, while bringing
more uniformity to the application of labor law.
92. Certainly, such temporary relief should be available where a violation of 8(a)(4),
regarding the tampering with an NLRB witness, is alleged by the General Counsel. Alle-
gations involving substantial 8(a)(3) discharges and unfair labor practice strike complaints,
which often tend to involve many persons in the unit, should result in the authorization for
the Regional Director to pursue a 10(j) injunction on his own motion should he deem it
appropriate.
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This article, hopefully, will stimulate more thought about the ap-
proaches suggested, further discussion of the merits of such sugges-
tions, and additional consideration of the problems that such reforms
might raise, as well as ways to address these concerns. 93 The sugges-
tions are designed to help rebuild faith and trust in the labor law system,
through approaching union and employer unfair labor practices simi-
larly. Until both labor and management recognize that the Natural La-
bor Relations Act is still the law of the land and that it will be enforced
equitably and even-handedly, respect for the system by both sides will
continue to wane.
93. Professor Paul Weiler also recently examined whether or not the law equitably
approaches labor-management relations. He concluded that it does not and suggested
three reforms not discussed here that are designed to better equalize the approach of the
law toward labor and management. Weiler, Striking a New Balance: Freedom of Contract and
the Prospects for Union Representation, 98 HARV. L. REV. 351-420 (1984).
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JUDICIAL INTERVENTION IN ARBITRATION ENFORCEMENT
CASES- THE TENTH CIRCUIT EXPANDS UPON THE
LIMITED JUDICIAL REVIEW STANDARD OF
ENTERPRISE WHEEL
INTRODUCTION
The use of arbitration as a means of dispute resolution can be
traced to before the development of English common law.' Likewise,
arbitration has been used in America since the early colonial period; for
example, George Washington specified that arbitration be used to settle
any disputes concerning the intent of his will. 2 Today one of the more
common applications of arbitration is as a last step dispute resolution
mechanism in the grievance procedure of a collective bargaining agree-
ment. As a product of labor-management negotiations, arbitration
serves both to interpret and enforce the collective bargaining agree-
ment, thus playing an important role in the industrial self-government
system.
3
This self-government system, however, has not operated free of
outside influences. Throughout recent history both the legislature and
the judiciary have intruded upon the labor-management relationship.
Judicial interference has taken the form of "review" of arbitration
awards, whereby courts would apply traditional contract principles to
determine whether an arbitrator had properly interpreted the collective
agreement. Quite often the courts concluded that the arbitrator had ex-
ceeded the clear and express language of the contract, thus, the entire
arbitral decision was void. 4 In response to this judicial interventionism,
Congress enacted legislation establishing arbitration as the preferred
method of labor-management dispute resolution. 5 The Supreme Court
formally recognized this legislative mandate in United Steelworkers of
America v. Enterprise Wheel and Car Corp. ,6 establishing a "hands off" judi-
cial standard toward arbitration review, whereby a court was not to re-
place the arbitrator's judgment with its own merely because the court
disagreed with the arbitrator's interpretation of the collective agree-
1. F. ELKOURI & E. ELKOURI, How ARBITRATION WORKS 2 (3d ed. 1973) (referring to
Murray, Arbitration in the Anglo-Saxon and Early Norman Periods, 16 ARB. j. 193 (1961)).
2. ELKOURI, supra, at 2-3 citing American Arbitration Association, Arbitration News,
No. 2 (1963).
3. See infra text accompanying notes 53-54.
4. See infra text accompanying notes 31-32.
5. 29 U.S.C. § 173(d) (1982). See infra text accompanying notes 23-24.
6. 363 U.S. 593 (1960). Note that the Court's holding has been almost universally
praised by experts in the field of labor-management relations. As one commentator has
declared: "Ideally, the roles ofjudge and arbitrator are separate and distinct. Arbitrators
interpret collective bargaining agreements, while judges interpret substantive law."
Siwica, Defining the Relationships Between Judges, Arbitrators, and Employee Rights, 33 LAB. L.J.
417, 418 (1982).
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ment. 7 However, this standard recently has been altered by some lower
federal court decisions in which the courts replace the arbitrator's defi-
nition of justness with their own. 8
This article examines the relationship between the judge and arbi-
trator with regard to the Enterprise standard and the enforcement of arbi-
tration awards. It also looks at the extent to which the lower courts have
expanded the limited judicial review standard of Enterprise, thereby
thwarting the Supreme Court's clear intent in deciding the Steelworkers
Trilogy,9 to bar judicial interference in the labor-management arena.
Part I provides an overview of arbitration and judicial intervention prior
to the Supreme Court's decisions in the Trilogy cases. The Trilogy is ana-
lyzed in Part II, with particular emphasis placed on the manner in which
each case furthered acceptance of arbitration as the preferred means of
dispute resolution. To determine what standard of review the Tenth
Circuit Court of Appeals applies in light of the Enterprise standard, Part
III surveys post Trilogy decisions of both the Tenth Circuit and the Colo-
rado Federal District Court. Part IV briefly examines the Sixth Circuit
Court of Appeals' expanded definition of judicial review and compares
that circuit's position with that of the Tenth Circuit's.
I. ARBITRATION AND JUDICIAL INTERVENTION-ARBITRATION LAW PRIOR
TO THE STEELWORKERS TRILOGY
Arbitration plays an important role in the settlement of labor-man-
agement disputes, particularly when compared with the "principle al-
ternat[ive] method of settling day-by-day disputes, i.e., work
stoppages."' 0 Thus, arbitration has developed as the standard adjunct
to collective bargaining. To understand how arbitration acquired its
preeminent role in labor dispute settlement, it is necessary to look back
to the 1920's and the attitudes which then existed toward collective bar-
gaining and the labor agreement and then to review how Congress and
the Supreme Court interpreted and applied those attitudes.
In the 1920's and 1930's the collective bargaining agreement was
idealized as representing an entirely consensual arrangement between
labor and management-an arrangement which was not to be intruded
upon by external forces, particularly the judiciary.' 1 The Norris-La-
7. See infra text accompanying notes 66-70.
8. See infra Parts III and IV.
9. The three cases which comprise the Steelworkers Trilogy (hereinafter referred to
as the Trilogy) are: United Steelworkers of Am. v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564
(1960); United Steelworkers of Am. v. Warrior and Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574
(1960); United Steelworkers of Am. v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960).
10. Taylor, Effectuating the Labor Contract Through Arbitration, in THE PROFESSION OF LA-
BOR ARBITRATION, SELECTED PAPERS FROM THE FIRST SEVEN ANNUAL MEETINGS OF THE NA-
TIONAL ACADEMY OF ARBITRATORS 1948-1954 24 UJ.T. McKelvey ed. 1957).
11. Morris, Twenty Years of Trilogy: A Celebration, in DECISIONAL THINKING OF ARBITRA-
TORS AND JUDGES, PROCEEDINGS OF THE THIRTY-THIRD ANNUAL MEETING OF THE NATIONAL
ACADEMY OF ARBITRATORS 331, 333 (J.L. Stern and B.D. Dennis eds. 1981) (cited hereinaf-
ter as Morris, Twenty Years of Trilogy).
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Guardia Act of 193212 represented the embodiment of this non-inter-
vention philosophy since it greatly limited the power of the federal
courts to issue injunctions in labor disputes.' 3 In fact, the Act required
that a claimant come to court with "clean hands" or evidence that
"every reasonable effort" had been made to settle the dispute, either by
negotiation, mediation, or voluntary arbitration.14 The principles ex-
pressed in the Act were founded on the belief that "if courts-particu-
larly the federal courts-would no longer issue injunctions in labor
disputes, the parties and the public would benefit from the agreements
which labor and management would reach by themselves through the
interplay of voluntary negotiations and the use of traditional economic
means." 15 Clearly the intent of the Act was to allow the parties to nego-
tiate in an environment free from intrusion by authorities which neither
knew nor appreciated the special needs of labor and management.
This laissez-faire principle was rather short-lived. By the mid-
1940's, the general political climate viewed the Norris-LaGuardia and
Wagner 16 Acts as having imposed stringent fair labor practice obliga-
tions upon employers while leaving labor unions unfettered by any cor-
responding obligations. 17 Furthermore, almost every major industry
had been successfully organized, thus, the unions were viewed as wield-
ing massive economic power to which little if no federal restraint could
be applied. 18 In response to these growing fears Congress passed the
Taft-Hartley Act of 1947.19
The Taft-Hartley Act imposed several restrictions upon union prac-
tices. The Act made it an unfair labor practice for a union to refuse to
bargain collectively with an employer.2 0 The Act also gave the federal
courts specific power to enforce collective bargaining agreements by
granting the courts jurisdiction over suits by and against labor organiza-
12. Anti-Injunction (Norris-LaGuardia) Act of 1932, 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-15 (1982).
This Act was intended to prevent abuse of injunctions in labor disputes. Brotherhood of
R.R. Trainmen v. Chicago River & Indiana R.R. Co., 353 U.S. 30, reh 'g denied, 353 U.S. 948
(1957).
The . . . Act forbids the federal courts from issuing injunctions in labor disputes
except under strictly limited conditions. Before an injunction may be issued, it
must be shown, among other things, that there were prior efforts to settle the
dispute peaceably, that law enforcement officials are unable or unwilling to safe-
guard the employer's property, and that a denial of an injunction will entail
greater loss to the employer than granting it will cause to the union. No injunc-
tions may be issued against peaceful picketing.
H. ANDERSON, PRIMER OF LABOR RELATIONS 6 (1980).
13. 29 U.S.C. § 101.
14. Id. at § 108.
15. Morris, Twenty Years of Trilogy, supra note 11, at 333 (citing generally I. BERNSTEIN,
THE LEAN YEARS 391-415 (1960)).
16. National Labor Relations (Wagner) Act of 1935, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-69 (1973). The
Wagner Act was directed at protecting the employees' right to organize and, toward that
end, it made unlawful employer practices which interfered with that right. The Wagner
Act did not impose restrictions on union practices.
17. 1 C. MORRIS, THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAw 875 (1983).
18. Id.
19. Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act of 1947, Pub. L. No. 80-101, 61
Stat. 136 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 29 U.S.C.).
20. Taft-Hartley Act, § 101, 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(3) (1982).
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tions.2 1 Thus, the courts were granted substantial authority to intervene
in labor-management disputes.
Arbitration, however, continued to be the preferred method of dis-
pute resolution. 2 2 In fact, Congress raised arbitration to the level of
national labor policy by enacting section 203(d) of the Taft-Hartley
Act.2 3 Congress stated: "Final adjustment by a method agreed upon by
the parties is hereby declared to be the desirable method for settlement
of grievance disputes arising over the application or interpretation of an
existing collective bargaining agreement." '24 Thus, Congress appeared
to state a national policy of deference to and enforcement of arbitration
settlements.
The Supreme Court formally recognized settlement by arbitration
as a national labor policy in Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills.25 The
decision followed a decade of attempts by various circuit courts to inter-
pret section 301 of the Taft-Hartley Act.26 Lincoln Mills involved an em-
ployer's refusal to honor a collectively bargained grievance procedure
providing for arbitration of union grievances. The Court held that sec-
21. 1 C. MORRIs, THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW 875 (1983).
22. See generally Siwica, supra note 6.
23. 29 U.S.C. § 173(d) (1982).
24. Id.
25. 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
26. 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1982). Section 301 of the Taft-Hartley Act provides in relevant
part:
Suits by and against labor organizations.
(a) Venue, amount and citizenship. Suits for violation of contracts between
an employer and a labor organization representing employees in an industry af-
fecting commerce as defined in this Act, or between any such labor organizations,
may be brought in any district court of the United States having jurisdiction of the
parties, without respect to the amount in controversy or without regard to the
citizenship of the parties.
(b) Responsibility for acts of agent-entity for purposes of suit- enforcement
of money judgments. Any labor organization which represents employees in an
industry affecting commerce as defined in this Act and any employer whose activi-
ties affect commerce as defined in this Act shall be bound by the acts of its agents.
Any such labor organization may sue or be sued as an entity and in behalf of the
employees whom it represents in the courts of the United States. Any money
judgment against a labor organization in a district court of the United States shall
be enforceable only against the organization as an entity and against its assets,
and shall not be enforceable against any individual member or his assets.
(c) Jurisdiction. For the purposes of actions and proceedings by or against
labor organizations in the district courts of the United States, district courts shall
be deemed to have jurisdiction of a labor organization (1) in the district in which
such organization maintains its principal office, or (2) in any district in which its
duly authorized officers or agents are engaged in representing or acting for em-
ployee members.
For pre-Lincoln Mills circuit court opinions construing § 301, see United Steelworkers of
Am. v. Galland-Henning Mfg. Co., 241 F.2d 323 (7th Cir., rev'd per curiam, 354 U.S. 906
(1957)); Signal-Stat Corp. v. Local 475, United Elec., Radio & Mach. Workers of Am., 235
F.2d 298 (2d Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 354 U.S. 911 (1957); ILGWO v.Jay-Ann Co., 228 F.2d
632 (5th Cir. 1956); See also Association of Westinghouse Salaried Employees v. Westing-
house Elec. Corp., 210 F.2d 623 (3d Cir. 1954), affidon other grounds, 348 U.S. 437 (1955);
United Elec., Radio & Mach. Workers v. Oliver Corp., 205 F.2d 376 (8th Cir. 1953); Milk &
Ice Cream Drivers v. Gillespie Milk Prod. Corp., 203 F.2d 650 (6th Cir. 1953); Textile
Workers of Am. v. Arista Mills Co., 193 F.2d 529 (4th Cir. 1951); Mercury Oil Ref. Co. v.
Oil Workers Union, 187 F.2d 980 (10th Cir. 1951); Schatte v. International Alliance of
Theatrical Stage Employees, 182 F.2d 158 (9th Cir., cert. denied, 340 U.S. 827 (1950).
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tion 301 granted the federal courts jurisdiction to fashion a body of fed-
eral law which would enforce arbitration provisions contained in
collective bargaining agreements.2 7 Grievance arbitration was declared
to be the "quid pro quo for an agreement not to strike."128 Citing the
legislative history behind section 301 of the Act, the Court stated that
-iI]t seems . . . clear to us that Congress adopted a policy which placed
sanctions behind agreements to arbitrate grievance disputes."'2 9 There-
fore, the Court interpreted section 301 as authorizing federal court en-
forcement of arbitration agreements. As one method of enforcement,
the Court recognized federal courts as having the power to decree spe-
cific performance of contract arbitration clauses.
3 0
Lincoln Mills, however, was not a decision made in a vacuum. Prior
to Lincoln Mills, the law surrounding arbitration was based primarily on
state court applications of common law concepts. 31 Common law was
more restrictive as to the duty of arbitrate and the enforcement of arbi-
tration awards. Under the common law, either party to a submission
could withdraw at any time prior to the rendering of an award. Even if
an award was rendered, a party could extricate itself by claiming that the
award was unenforceable due to fraud, partiality or mistake by the arbi-
trator, misconduct on the part of the arbitrator, or procedural irregulari-
ties.3 2 The courts accepted these common law principles as an
invitation to intervene in the arbitration process and replace the arbitra-
tor's judgment with their own.
33
Lincoln Mills cancelled that invitation. Justice Douglas concluded
that "the substantive law to apply in suits under [section] 301(a) is fed-
eral law, which the courts must fashion from the policy of our national
labor laws."' 3 4 Thus, courts could no longer use the old common law
tenets as a means to veto the decision of the arbitrator.
Lincoln Mills, however, was only the opening round in the fight over
arbitrability3 5 and enforcement of arbitration awards. Three years after
27. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. at 456.
28. Id. at 455. Use in this context quidpro quo means, "one necessitates the other."
29. Id. at 456.
30. Id. at 458.
31. Morris, Twenty Years ofTrilogy, supra note 11, at 336.
32. Id. (citing Jones,Judicial Review of Arbitral Awards-Common Law Confusion and Statu-
tory Clarification, 31 S. CAL. L. REV. 1 (1957)). See generally, St. Antoine, Judicial Review of
Labor Arbitration Awards: A Second Look at Enterprise Wheel and Its Progency. in ARBITRA-
TION-1977, PROCEEDINGS OF THE THIRTIETH ANNUAL MEETING, NATIONAL ACADEMY OF
ARBITRATORS, 29 (B.D. Dennis & G.C. Somers eds. 1978).
33. Morris, Twenty Years of Trilogy, supra note 11, at 336.
34. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. at 456. Justice Douglas found the necessary jurisdictional
prerequisite in § 301 (a) which provides that agreements between employers and labor or-
ganizations are enforceable in "any district court of the United States having jurisdiction
of the parties. ... See supra note 26. The Court reaffirmed this position in Local 174,
Teamsters v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95 (1962) (holding that a state court must apply
federal substantive law when called upon to enforce a union contract in a business affect-
ing interstate commerce). Also, the Court has declared that federal and state courts have
concurrent jurisdiction. Charles Dowd Box Co. v. Courtney, 368 U.S. 502 (1962).
35. Arbitrability addresses the question of whether the issue in dispute is one which
the parties, via the collective bargaining agreement, have voluntarily conferred to the juris-
diction of the arbitrator. An issue may not be arbitrable for one of a number of reasons;
1985]
DENVER UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW
the Lincoln Mills decision Justice Douglas authored the Trilogy decisions.
These decisions directly addressed the question of what standard of ju-
dicial review the courts should apply to arbitral awards. Moreover, they
further defined the scope of the collective bargaining agreement and the
arbitrator's authority inherent in such agreements.
II. THE STEELWORKERS TRILOGY
The three Supreme Court decisions which constitute the TrilogyM
6
established the fundamentals of the federal common law governing the
arbitrability of labor-management disputes. The first of these, United
Steelworkers of America v. American Mfg. Co. ,7 involved the discharge of an
employee following the settlement of a workmen's compensation action
against his employer. In response, the union filed a grievance charging
that the employee was entitled to return to his job by virtue of the sen-
iority provision of the collective bargaining agreement. Based upon a
3tatement by the employee's physician which concluded that the em-
ployee was "permanently partially disabled," the employer contended
that the employee was unable to work and therefore refused to reinstate
him or to arbitrate the grievance.
38
The union filed suit in federal district court to compel arbitration of
the grievance.3 9 The district court granted summary judgment for the
employer holding that, because he had accepted the worker's compensa-
tion settlement on the basis of permanent partial disability, the em-
ployee was estopped to claim any employment rights. 40 On a different
basis the appellate court affirmed, holding that the grievance was " 'a
frivolous, patently baseless one, not subject to arbitration under the col-
lective bargaining agreement.' ",41 The Supreme Court reversed the
lower courts, rejected the frivolous grievance analysis of the appellate
court, and ordered arbitration. This decision specifically rejected New
York's Cutler-Hammer4 2 doctrine which had been applied by courts in de-
nying arbitrability.
In overruling this doctrine, Justice Douglas noted the "crippling ef-
fect" of the lower court's "preoccupation with ordinary contract law."
4 3
for instance, the issue in dispute may not involve any of the types of disputes defined in the
contract's grievance or arbitration clause, or the necessary conditions precedent to arbitra-
tion may not have been met.
36. See supra note 9.
37. 363 U.S. 564 (1960).
38. Id.
39. Id. at 566.
40. Id.
41. Id. (quoting American Mfg., 264 F.2d 624, 628 (6th Cir. 1959).
42. International Ass'n of Machinists Local No. 402 v. Cutler-Hammer, Inc., 271 A.D.
917, 67 N.Y.S.2d 317, afrd 297 N.Y. 519, 74 N.E.2d 464 (1947). The Cutler-Hammer doc-
trine held that "[i]f the meaning of the provision of the contract sought to be arbitrated is
beyond dispute, there cannot be anything to arbitrate and the contract cannot be said to
provide for arbitration." Cutler-Hammer, 271 A.D. at 918, 67 N.Y.S.2d at 318. The holding
of this case has since been repudiated by statutory amendment. See N.Y. Civ. PRAc. LAw
§ 7501 (McKinney 1980).
43. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. at 566-67.
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According to Justice Douglas, where the agreement provides for arbitra-
tion, questions of contract interpretation are for the arbitrator, not the
courts. "The moving party should not be deprived of the arbitrator's
judgment, when it was his judgment and all that it connotes that was
bargained for."
4 4
Instead, Justice Douglas deemed the function of the court to be a
limited one:
confined to ascertaining whether the party seeking arbitration
is making a claim which on its face is governed by the contract
. . . .The courts. . . have no business weighing the merits of
the grievance . . . . The processing of even frivolous claims
may have therapeutic values of which those who are not a part
of the plant environment may be quite unaware.
4 5
Thus, it was not the function of courts to construe a collective bargain-
ing provision that was subject to arbitration. While American Manufactur-
ing represented a significant departure from the established judicial
doctrine of Cutler-Hammer, the scope of its holding was in fact rather lim-
ited. American Manufacturing stands primarily for the proposition that if a
union's complaint constitutes a grievance as defined in the collective
agreement, that grievance must be heard on its merits by an arbitrator.
United Steelworkers of America v. Warrior and Gulf Navigation Co. ,46 the
second Trilogy case, served to broaden the applicability of the American
Manufacturing decision. Warrior and Gulf concerned the arbitrability of a
union grievance over a company's contracting-out work. The employer
challenged the grievance on the ground that contracting-out was strictly
a management function and therefore non-arbitrable under a provision
in the collective bargaining agreement exempting management func-
tions from the arbitration process. 4 7 The Supreme Court held that the
grievance was arbitrable on the ground that the provision's exclusionary
language covered only management functions generally and not con-
tracting-out specifically.
48
In reaching its holding, the Court laid down three important princi-
ples to be applied by the courts when determining the arbitrability of a
grievance:
(1) An order to arbitrate the particular grievance shall not be
denied unless it can be said with positive assurance that the ar-
bitration clause is not susceptible of an interpretation that cov-
ers the asserted dispute.
4 9
(2) Doubts [regarding the coverage of the arbitration provi-
sion] should be resolved in favor of coverage. 50
(3) Apart from matters that the parties specifically exclude, all
of the questions on which the parties disagree must therefore
44. Id. at 568.
45. Id.
46. 363 U.S. 574 (1960).
47. Id. at 576.
48. Id. at 584-85.
49. Id. at 582-83.
50. Id. at 583.
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come within the scope of the grievance and arbitration provi-
sions of the collective agreement. 51
These three principles supplied the guidelines which courts should ap-
ply in implementing the rule established in American Manufacturing re-
garding substantive arbitrability-a dispute is arbitrable if it falls within
the grievance definition of the collective bargaining agreement. Thus,
the Court established the mechanisms for giving full effect to the con-
gressional preference for arbitration as stated in section 203(d) of the
Taft-Hartley Act.
52
A second important effect of the Warrior and Gulfdecision was that it
significantly enhanced the role of the arbitrator and diminished the role
of the court in interpreting collective bargaining agreements.53 Justice
Douglas believed that the collective agreement constituted "a system of
industrial self-government" with the grievance procedure at the very
heart of that system. 5 4 Justice Douglas stressed that the arbitrator's role
in the collective bargaining process was both creative and interpretive:
Arbitration is the means of solving the unforeseeable by mold-
ing a system of private law for all the problems which may arise
and to provide for their solution in a way which will generally
accord with the variant needs and desires of the parties. The
processing of disputes through the grievance machinery is actu-
ally a vehicle by which meaning and content are given to the
collective bargaining agreement.
55
This dual role of the arbitrator was reinforced in the Alexander v. Gardner-
Denver Co. 56 decision where the Court said:
As the proctor of the bargain, the arbitrator's task is to effectu-
ate the intent of the parties. His source of authority is the col-
lective bargaining agreement, and he must interpret and apply
that agreement in accordance with the 'industrial common law
of the shop' and the various needs and desires of the parties.
5 7
Thus, the arbitrator's expertise and the conditions under which he oper-
ates are to be recognized and deferred to in arbitration enforcement
cases. As Justice Douglas concluded in Warrior and Guf. "[t]he ablest
judge cannot be expected to bring the same experience and competence
to bear upon the determination of a grievance, because he cannot be
similarly informed."
'58
The last of the Trilogy cases, Enterprise Wheel, 5 9 established general
guidelines for the enforcement and review of arbitral awards. Enterprise
completed the explicative focus of the Trilogy by defining the collective
51. Id. at 581.
52. 29 U.S.C. § 173(d) (1982).
53. Morris, Twenty Years of Trilogy, supra note 11, at 346.
54. Warrior and Gulf, 363 U.S. at 580.
55. Id. at 581.
56. 415 U.S. 36 (1974) (holding that submission of a grievance claim to final arbitra-
tion did not foreclose the discharged employee's right to trial de novo under the Civil
Rights Act).
57. Id. at 53.
58. Warrior and Gulf, 363 U.S. at 582.
59. 363 U.S. 593 (1960).
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agreement, by identifying the limits of arbitral authority, and by deter-
mining the standard which courts are to apply in reviewing arbitration
awards. However, because Enterprise requires that the arbitrator draw
the "essence" of the award from the collective agreement, 60 the deci-
sion has been the center of continuing controversy and has fostered
much subsequent litigation.
In Enterprise Wheel, the union sued for the enforcement of an arbitra-
tor's award which ordered reinstatement of several discharged employ-
ees who had walked off their jobs to protest the discharge of a fellow
employee. A union official had advised the employees to return to work,
but the company took the position that the employees were no longer
employed "until this thing was settled one way or the other." 6 1 A griev-
ance was filed and arbitration was held under a district court order. Af-
ter the employees' discharge, but before rendering of the arbitrator's
award, the collective bargaining agreement expired. 6 2 The arbitrator
found that although the work stoppage was improper, the discharges
were not justified. Rejecting the contention that expiration of the agree-
ment barred reinstatement, the arbitrator held that the agreement im-
posed an unconditional obligation on the employer to abide by the
arbitrator's determination. 63 He ordered ten day suspensions and rein-
statement with back pay. The company refused to comply with the
award.
The district court directed the employer to comply, but the court of
appeals reversed, holding that an award of reinstatement with back pay
granted subsequent to the termination of a collective bargaining agree-
ment could not be enforced.64 The Supreme Court reversed, sustaining
the arbitrator's award, with some modifications in the back pay provi-
sions, stating that "the courts have no business overruling [the arbitra-
tor] because their interpretation of the contract is different from his."
'6 5
By sustaining the award, the Court reinforced the role of the arbitrator
as interpreter of the collective agreement and strengthened the enforce-
ability of arbitral awards.
Anticipating that the courts continually would be asked to review
arbitral decisions, Enterprise also delineated the standards for reviewing
an award. The Court defined the limitations of an arbitration award as
follows:
[A]n arbitrator is confined to interpretation and application of
60. Id. at 597.
61. Id. at 595.
62. Id.
63. Id. The specific provision cited by the arbitrator stated that:
Should it be determined by the Company or by an arbitrator in accordance with
the grievance procedure that the employee has been suspended unjustly or dis-
charged in violation of the provisions of this Agreement, the Company shall rein-
state the employee and pay full compensation at the employee's regular rate of
pay for the time lost.
Id. at 594.
64. United Steelworkers of Am. v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 269 F.2d 327, 331
(4th Cir. 1959).
65. 363 U.S. at 599.
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the collective bargaining agreement; he does not sit to dispense
his own brand of industrial justice. He may of course look for
guidance from many sources, yet his award is legitimate only so
long as it draws its essence from the collective bargaining
agreement. When the arbitrator's words manifest an infidelity
to this obligation, courts have no choice but to refuse enforce-
ment of the award.
66
Implicitly this standard requires that the award must relate to the agree-
ment. This standard is based on the recognition by the Court that "[i]t
is the arbitrator's construction which was bargained for.''67
However, awards are challenged, and the courts are asked to review
them. The task of review has been difficult because "the word 'essence'
is not a word of precision, especially when read with the Court's numer-
ous references to the multiple sources to which an arbitrator might look
in order to determine the proper meaning of the agreement with regard
to the issue in dispute."'6 8 It therefore has been argued that the so-
called "essence" standard of Enterprise Wheel and its avoidance of the
conventional standards of judicial review does not provide courts with
sufficient direction. 69 However, Justice Douglas apparently anticipated
such arguments in his concluding rationale for the "essence" standard.
Expressly rejecting a wide scope of judicial review and endeavoring to
keep the concept of the collective agreement as described in Warrior and
Gulf uppermost in the mind of the reviewer, Justice Douglas stated:
It is the arbitrator's construction which was bargained for; and
so far as the arbitrator's decision concerns construction of the
contract, the courts have no business overruling him because
their interpretation of the contract is different from his.
70
Thus, Justice Douglas allowed the arbitrator wide latitude in interpret-
ing the parties' collective bargaining agreement. Judicial intervention
was proper only in the limited instance where the arbitrator strays from
the "essence" of the agreement.
The questions left unanswered by the decision are, when and to
what degree arbitrators will be allowed to stray. In light of the Supreme
Court's reluctance to further define the guidelines provided in the Tril-
ogy and, more specifically, Enterprise Wheel, the circuit courts of appeals
have been left to posit their own answers. The cases below represent a
survey of decisions from the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals which ad-
dressed questions concerning arbitral interpretation and application of
the Enterprise standard. In addition, they raise legitimate concerns that
the Tenth Circuit's standards for enforcement of arbitral awards may be
beginning to stray from the dictates of Enterprise Wheel, allowing the
court to substitute its judgment for that of the arbitrator.
66. Id. at 597.
67. Id. at 599.
68. Morris, Twenty Years of Trilogy, supra note 11, at 352.
69. Id. at 353. For a review of the conventional standards ofjudicial review in arbitra-
tion cases, see Jones, supra note 32, at 16.
70. Enterprise Wheel, 363 U.S. at 599.
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III. JUDICIAL REVIEW IN THE TENTH CIRCUIT 7 1
A survey of Tenth Circuit cases reveals that the Enterprise Wheel stan-
dard of limited judicial review has been generally accepted and applied.
In more recent cases, however, the court has broadened somewhat its
standard of review, exhibiting a reluctance to abide by the Supreme
Court's "hands off" review policy. However, even with these decisions,
the Tenth Circuit is not viewed as having gone as far afield as the Sixth
Circuit with regard to allowing greater court intervention. 7 2 The Sixth
Circuit's position will be discussed in more depth following this survey
of Tenth Circuit cases.
Included in this survey are three United States District Court cases
from Colorado. Although district courts look to their immediate appel-
late courts for guidance, these cases are of particular value because they
reflect the impact that varying circuit court decisions have on the lower
courts. Because the Supreme Court has held that state courts have con-
current jurisdiction to enforce section 30173 and that they must apply
that law fashioned by the federal courts, 74 no state court cases are in-
cluded in this survey.
Before beginning the survey it is important to note why some ex-
perts believe "the case law regarding enforcement of the Enterprise stan-
dard in the Tenth Circuit is troubling."' 75 There are two troubling
aspects associated with the case law. First, in some of the decisions the
court substitutes its own judgment for that of the arbitrator, reflecting a
failure by the court to strictly abide by the Trilogy. In essence, some of
the cases represent the court "second guessing" the arbitrator. Second,
by enlarging upon Enterprise the court may be inundated with arbitration
review cases. If this should occur, the court will have taken a significant
step toward preventing arbitration from being the final and binding de-
termination that the Supreme Court intended. 76 Thus, it is necessary to
view the following cases from two perspectives: one, to note what as-
pects of the Trilogy, and especially Enterprise, have been retained; the
other, to what extent has judicial intervention been expanded.
Following Enterprise Wheel, the Tenth Circuit accepted the Supreme
Court's direction and adopted a standard of limited judicial review in
arbitration cases. In Amalgamated Butcher Workmen Local 641 v. Capitol
Packing Co. 77 the Tenth Circuit narrowly defined its scope of review by
holding that "[it is settled law that an award of an arbitrator under an
71. For a survey of arbitration cases from each circuit, see Morris, Twenty Years of
Trilogy, supra note 11, at 355-72.
72. Morris, Twenty Years of Trilogy, supra note 11, at 367-72.
73. Labor-Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act, 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1982). For the
text of section 301, see note 26 supra.
74. See Charles Dowd Box v. Courtney, 368 U.S. 502 (1962); Local 174, Teamsters v.
Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95 (1962). See also note 34 and text therein.
75. Morris, Twenty Years of Trilogy, supra note 11, at 365.
76. The concept that arbitration is final and binding, if the parties have so intended, is
found throughout the Trilogy decisions. See supra notes 22-29 and accompanying text.
77. 413 F.2d 668 (10th Cir. 1969) (hereinafter cited as Capitol Packing Co.).
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arbitration provision in a collective bargaining agreement, which pro-
vides the arbitrator's decision shall be final and binding on the parties, is
not open to review on the merits." 7 8 In this case the company had laid
off all of its employees and subsequently notified them that the plant was
closed with no plans to reopen. The union filed grievances seeking pro-
rata vacation benefits. The arbitrator ordered payment of the pro-rata
benefits, despite the fact that the collective bargaining agreement did
not contain a provision requiring such payments. The arbitrator sup-
ported his decision by finding that the parties' bargaining history evi-
denced an intent to treat vacation benefits as a form of deferred
earnings. The court, after reviewing the arbitrator's findings, held that
case law had settled the issue of the finality of an arbitrator's award and
that its finding was in accord with the express policy of Congress.
79
Retail Store Employees Union Local 782 v. Sav-On Groceries,80 decided in
1975, represents the first case in which the Tenth Circuit appears to
stray slightly from the Enterprise Wheel standard. In this case the parties'
submitted the following issue to the arbitrator: "Did the Company exer-
cise fairness in judging the qualifications of [the employee] by not al-
lowing her to displace less senior employees who engage in stocking and
checking duties?" 8' The arbitrator ordered reinstatement with back pay
and prohibited the company from assigning the grievant "impossible
heavy tasks."18 2 The court determined that Enterprise was "not control-
ling"8 3 because the question of back pay was not submitted as an issue
and the assignment order was a per se violation of Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act.84 The court adopted the rule of Warrior and Gulf that "arbi-
tration is a matter of contract and a party cannot be required to submit
to arbitration any dispute which he has not agreed so to submit.''85
Hence, the arbitrator was restricted to determining only the issue sub-
mitted and, in this case, was without authority to make an award of back
pay. It is interesting to note that the court did not apply Enterprise Wheel
but did rely on Warrior and Gulf as the basis for its decision.
8 6
78. Id. at 672.
79. Id. at 672-73. The congressional policy referred to by the court was that ex-
pressed in § 203(d) of the Labor Management Relations (Tafi-Hartley) Act, 29 U.S.C.
§ 173(d) (1982) which states:
Functions of the Service.
(d) Final adjustment by a method agreed upon by the parties is hereby declared
to be the desirable method for settlement of grievance disputes arising over the
application or interpretation of an existing collective bargaining agreement. The
Service is directed to make its conciliation and mediation services available in the
settlement of such grievance disputes only as a last resort and in exceptional
cases.
80. 508 F.2d 500 (10th Cir. 1975).
81. Id. at 501.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 503.
84. Id. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1982).
85. Id. at 502 (quoting Warrior and Gutf, 363 U.S. 574, 582-83 (1960)).
86. One reason this omission is important is that the cases in the Trilogy are not ap-
plied independently when questions of arbitrability and scope of arbitration are raised.
They are intertwined sufficiently that the three cases must be viewed together to obtain
their full import. Morris. Twenty Years of Trilogy, supra note 11, at 342-55.
[Vol. 62:2
ENFORCEMENT OF ARBITRATION
In another 1975 case, Local 2-477 Oil, Chemical and Atomic Workers v.
Continental Oil Co.,87 the court again held that an arbitrator exceeded his
authority. The issue in this case concerned the consolidation of two sep-
arate grievances into the same hearing, even though only one case had
been formally submitted to the arbitrator. The court, citing Save-On Gro-
ceries, disallowed the award for the second grievance. 8 8 The court found
that the submission had not been properly made under the terms of the
collective agreement, thus the arbitrator was in error for hearing the
grievance over the protests of the company.8 9
By relying on Sav-On Groceries and, thus by inference, Warrior and
Gulf, the Tenth Circuit, for the second time, applied isolated principles
of the Steelworkers Trilogy to find that a "defect ofjurisdictional nature" 90
would evidence an abuse of arbitral authority sufficient to deny enforce-
ment of an arbitrator's award. The court essentially was applying the
common law rubric of "want of jurisdiction" 9 1 as a means of reversing
the arbitrator's determination on the merits. Although language in War-
rior and Gulf supports the proposition that parties cannot be required to
submit an issue to arbitration, 9 2 it is important to remember that Enter-
prise Wheel is generally held to be the basis for judicial review of arbitra-
tion awards and, per Warrior and Gulf, "doubts [as to arbitrability] should
be resolved in favor of [arbitration]." 93 In holding that the arbitrator
lacked jurisdiction, the court appears to have misconstrued the clear im-
port of Warrior and Gulf.
The Tenth Circuit Court employed the Enterprise standard in decid-
ing Campo Machining Co. v. Local Lodge 1926, International Ass 'n of Machin-
ists.9 4 In this case the collective bargaining agreement required "good
and sufficient cause" for imposing discharge or other discipline.
9 5
Under this provision the company discharged the grievant for leaving
the plant without permission following a heated discussion with a super-
visor. Although the company rules expressly made such an action a dis-
chargeable offense, the arbitrator decided that the circumstances
surrounding the incident did not justify discharge. He ordered rein-
statement with back pay and allowed the company to retain the right to
suspend the grievant for one month. The court reviewed Enterprise and
found that "the arbitrator's decision records that he did confine himself
to interpreting and applying the collective bargaining agreement" 9 6 and
affirmed the award. The court's holding demonstrated that deference
would be given an award which draws its "essence" from the collective
87. 524 F.2d 1048 (10th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 936 (1976).
88. Id. at 524 F.2d at 1050.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. 6 C.J.S. Arbitration § 150 (1975).
92. Warrior and Gutf, 363 U.S. at 582.
93. Id. at 583.
94. 536 F.2d 330 (10th Cir. 1976).
95. Id. at 331.
96. Id. at 332-33.
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agreement regardless of the express nature of a company's rules.9 7
Within one year, however, the Tenth Circuit decided a case which
has been construed as enlarging the scope ofjudicial review beyond the
limited review standard of Enterprise Wheel. 98 In Mistletoe Express Serv. v.
Motor Expressmen's Union,99 the court refused to enforce an award which
it saw as contravening an express provision of the parties' collective bar-
gaining agreement. The court stated that the arbitrator is not at liberty
to substitute "his views of proper industrial relationships for the provi-
sions of the contract."' 0 0 Because Mistletoe is the seminal case for the
Tenth Circuit standard for judicial review of arbitration awards, it is ap-
propriate to explore it in more depth.
The case involved an employee's violation of a company rule requir-
ing collection of cash or a cashier's check for C.O.D. shipments and a
subsequent violation of a collective bargaining agreement provision
which expressly provided that "failure to settle bills and funds collected
for the company within twenty-four (24) hours" was just cause for dis-
charge. 10 1 The arbitrator determined that, although the grievant had
broken both rules, he had corrected his error and did not cause the com-
pany any monetary loss. Further, the arbitrator found that there had not
been previous uniform enforcement of the company rule. He then con-
cluded that there was sufficient just cause for discipline but not for dis-
charge and ordered reinstatement with a suspension. The court, after
reviewing the Steelworkers Trilogy and Campo Machining Co., looked to the
Third Circuit's test expressed in Ludwig Honold Mfg. Co. v. Fletcher10 2 and
decided that "[t]he award does not draw its essence from the agreement
if 'viewed in the light of its language, its context, and any other indicia of
the parties intention'; it is without rationale support."' 0 3 The court, fo-
cusing upon the contract provision, observed that "[e]mployees may be
discharged for just cause" 10 4 and determined that the arbitrator had
erred in his interpretation of the ambiguity presented by the word
"may". The court decided that, based upon its review of the case, the
provision gave the employer the option to discharge or not to discharge
and that the employer had exercised that option by discharging the
grievant. Thus, the Tenth Circuit "implie[d] that arbitral notions of
'justness' must yield to contract language which is apparently clear and
97. Id. at 333.
98. Morris, Twenty Years of Trilogy, supra note 11, at 366.
99. 566 F.2d 692 (10th Cir. 1977).
100. Id. at 695.
101. Id. at 694.
102. 405 F.2d 1123 (3d Cir. 1969). The court in Ludwig held that the arbitrator had
considered the contract as a whole and, although an express provision existed which re-
stricted eligibility for promotions to persons not promoted within a six month period, the
arbitrator's interpretation "gave a reasonable and effective meaning to the manifestations
of intention of the parties considered against the backdrop of practices of industry and the
shop." Id. at 1132-33.
103. Mistletoe, 566 F.2d at 694 (quoting Ludwig Honold Mfg. Co. v. Fletcher, 405 F.2d
1123, 1128 (3d Cir. 1969)).
104. Mistletoe, 566 F.2d at 694 (emphasis added).
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proscribes certain conduct of an employee." 10 5
Initially this standard does not appear to run counter to Enterprise
Wheel. However, the Enterprise standard clearly is premised on the as-
sumption that the parties contracted for the arbitrator's interpretation
of their collective agreement and that the courts have no business im-
posing their interpretation of the contract on the parties simply because
it differs for the arbitrator's.' 0 6 Given these arguments, the question
becomes, did the court merely replace the arbitrator's interpretation
with its own. The court's holding says, in essence that "if the arbitrator
finds as a fact that the employee committed the alleged act and that act is
contractually deemed 'sufficient' to warrant discipline, all determina-
tions relative to 'justness' are within the company's discretion."'
10 7
By this holding the court restricts the arbitrator to adjudicating only
whether the act was committed. Hence, the arbitrator is not to "inter-
pret and apply the contract in accordance with the . . . various needs
and desires of the parties"' 0 8 or to bring to bear his expertise and com-
petence.10 9 Thus, the court evidences the first of two troubling aspects
present in the Tenth Circuit's case law. The court seems to "second
guess' the arbitrator by not relying on his expertise or interpretation of
the facts presented to him and thereby substitutes its judgment for the
arbitrator's.
The court appeared to modify the position taken in Mistletoe when,
in 1978, it stated, "we are obliged to give great deference to any award
given" when the arbitrator interprets and applies the collective agree-
ment "so that his award is rooted in the agreement."1 10 In International
Brotherhood of Electrical Workers v. Professional Hole Drilling, Inc., I'' an arbi-
tration committee found that the company's joint venture with non-sig-
natories to the collective bargaining agreement did not preclude the
committee from exercising its jurisdiction. The committee found the
agreement wholly applicable to employees of the joint venture and also
found that the salaries paid those employees were based on a lesser
scale than the agreement called for, thus violating the contract. The
court determined that the award was not open to review. In doing so it
applied the "positive assurances" test stated in Local 1912, Int'l Ass'n of
Machinists v. United States Potash. 112 In Professional Hole Drilling the Tenth
105. Hogler, Industrial Due Process and Judicial Review of Arbitration Awards, 31 LAB. L.J.
570, 571-72 (1980).
106. See supra notes 66-70 and accompanying text.
107. Hogler, supra note 105, at 574.
108. Alexander v. Gardner-Denver, 415 U.S. 36, 53 (1974). See also supra note 56.
109. Warrior and Gulf, 363 U.S. at 582.
110. International Bhd. of Electrical Workers v. Professional Hole Drilling, Inc., 574
F.2d 497, 503 (10th Cir. 1978).
111. Id. at 497.
112. 270 F.2d 496 (10th Cir. 1959) (where the court, in a pre-Ttilogy case, held that the
contract left room for interpretation regarding the applicability of an arbitration clause to
a subcontracting dispute although no specific provision concerning such disputes existed
in the contract. The court cited the inconsistency in existing court decisions on the issue
of subcontracting as the basis for this being a legitimate issue for an arbitrator to make a
determination).
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Circuit Court stated that "where there is a broad arbitration provision in
the contract, as in this case, we will not interfere with an arbitrator's
decision unless it can be said with positive assurance that the contract is
not susceptible of the arbitrator's interpretation."' 1 3 Thus, the case
would appear to have strengthened the concept of deferring to the arbi-
trator's authority and expertise.
In upholding the award, however, the court relied on the fact that
the arbitration committee restricted itself to deciding the union's sub-
mitted dispute and that the union's allegations were confined to specific
wage and benefit provisions in the contract.114 Further, the committee's
decision was applicable only to the signatories of the collective agree-
ment and did not adversely affect the rights of the joint venture."
15
Thus, Professional Hole Drilling may be distinguished from Mistletoe where
the arbitrator interpreted the meaning of a provision rather than directly
applying the sanction prescribed in the contract. Therefore, the court
did not really alter its position taken in Mistletoe.
The United States District Court in Colorado applied the Tenth
Circuit's "express provision" rule in deciding Litvak Packing Co. v. Amal-
gamated Butcher Workmen Local 641116 in 1978. In this case the contract
provision provided, in pertinent part, that "[nlo employee covered by
this Agreement shall be suspended, demoted or dismissed without just
and sufficient cause. Sufficient cause for discharge shall include, among
other reasons . . . insubordination." ' 1 7 Following an exchange be-
tween the grievant and his supervisor, the grievant refused to obey the
supervisor's order to recommence work and the grievant was discharged
for insubordination. The arbitrator found that there was no question
the grievant was insubordinate. However, he also determined that the
offense was minor, at least partially provoked by the supervisor, and that
the harsh penalty was at least in part motivated by personal dislike for
the grievant. 118 The arbitrator further found that there was evidence of
past practice where lesser penalties were imposed under like circum-
stances. Therefore, he converted the discharge to a two month suspen-
sion without pay and ordered reinstatement. On appeal, the District
Court cited United States Potash as well as Mistletoe and found that the
latter "dictates the outcome of this litigation." ' 1 9 Thus, the court held
that the contract's clear language restricted the arbitrator to "not re-
write the labor contract,"' 120 and in such situations the courts have the
right to intervene.
The district court's decision, following the Tenth Circuit Court's
lead, presents the second troubling aspect present in the Tenth Circuit's
113. Professional Hole Drilling, 574 F.2d at 503.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. 455 F. Supp. 1180 (D.C. Colo. 1978).
117. Id.
118. Id. at 1180-81.
119. Id. at 1181-82.
120. Id. at 1180.
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case law. That is, arbitration will not serve as the final and binding de-
termination of bargaining agreement disputes as envisioned by the
Supreme Court in the Trilogy. Instead, arbitration may once again be-
come simply the first step on the way to the courthouse, as under the
common law.
The Tenth Circuit did distinguish Mistletoe when it decided Fabricut,
Inc. v. Tulsa General Drivers Local 523121 in 1979. In this case an arbitra-
tor found that several employees violated the collective bargaining
agreement when they left the plant and ignored an overtime assignment.
The arbitrator also stated that while some discipline was appropriate,
there was not just cause for discharge because the agreement was not
clear about whether discharge was required in these circumstances. On
review, the court found that the labor contract was "not a model of clar-
ity or consistency" and affirmed the arbitrator's award.12 2 It also agreed
that there was no express penalty stated in the agreement which would
limit the arbitrator's remedial authority. Thus, the court held that the
arbitrator was within his authority to fashion a remedy which he deemed
reasonable.123 By so holding, the court apparently remains willing to
defer to the arbitrator when ambiguous contract language needs to be
interpreted by the arbitrator and there are no facts requiring an applica-
tion of the Mistletoe "express provision" rule.
The court continued its reliance on Mistletoe when it decided Union
of Operating Engineers Local 670 v. Kerr-McGee Refining Corp. 124 in 1980.
Here, the court found that the arbitrator had "substituted his views for
the express provisions of the contract, added a provision not in the
agreement not bargained for, and in doing so 'violated the essence of
the agreement'."' 125 In this case the arbitrator had found that the com-
pany's discharge letter contained two charges and determined that "[i]f
the evidence supporting either of these charges is not sufficient, then the
discharge was not for just cause."1 26 The grievant, who had a recorded
high rate of absenteeism, had submitted a "sick note" for days ill. After
checking the authenticity of the note, the company learned that the
grievant had not been to see the doctor as the note stated. The collec-
tive agreement provided, "[a]ny . . . false statements made to obtain
benefits [for sick leave] will be cause for discharge."' 12 7 The company
discharged the grievant for making false statements and for excessive
absenteeism. The arbitrator found that the company had not proved the
latter charge and ordered reinstatement with a five day suspension for
making false statements.1
28
The Tenth Circuit, while clearly stating that it was not reviewing the
121. 597 F.2d 227 (10th Cir. 1979).
122. Id. at 229.
123. Id. at 230.
124. 618 F.2d 657 (10th Cir. 1980).
125. Id. at 660.
126. Id. at 658.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 659.
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merits of the award, held that the arbitrator had ignored the express
provisions of the contract and vacated the award.' 29 The court stated,
as it had in Fabricut, that "the award may not be contrary to the express
language of the agreement, and must have rational support.' 130 It de-
termined, per Mistletoe, that discharge was expressly provided for once
the grievant was found to have violated the contract; accordingly, by
making false statements to obtain a benefit, discharge should have been
imposed.' 3 ' Thus, the Tenth Circuit reinforced the broader judicial in-
tervention begun in Mistletoe, namely, that it will intrevene when express
contract language exists and when the arbitrator's decision does not
draw its rational "essence" from the agreement.
Two United States District Court cases decided in 1980 distin-
guished Mistletoe on differing grounds. In Griess v. Climax Molybdenum
Co. 132 an employee had returned to work, subject to a probationary pe-
riod, under a settlement agreement for an earlier discharge. Upon com-
pletion of the probationary period, the employee was found by the
employer to have preformed unsatisfactorily and was again discharged.
The arbitrator affirmed the discharge, citing express language in the col-
lective agreement allowing the company to discharge probationary em-
ployees at will. The district court upheld the arbitrator's award,
however, the court did not rely on Mistletoe for its decision. Instead, it
cited Capitol Packing Co. '33 and Campo Machining Co. 134 stating that
"courts give utmost deference to the arbitrator's decision where the col-
lective bargaining agreement provides that such decisions shall be final
and binding upon the parties."'
135
The other 1980 district court case distinguishing Mistletoe was Food
and Commercial Workers Local 634 v. Gold Star Sausage Co. 136 This case in-
volved an employee who was discharged for fighting in violation of a
generally understood, but unwritten, rule which allowed the company to
fire any employee, whether aggressor or defender, who was involved in a
fight on company premises. 13 7 The arbitrator found that the grievant
was not the aggressor and that the grievant had been fired without just
cause. Finding that the terms of the collective agreement implied a just
cause provision, the arbitrator ordered reinstatement with back pay.'
38
The company challenged the award on the basis that it did not draw
its essence from the contract and that the arbitrator had exceeded his
authority by finding an implied just cause requirement for discharges.
The district court found the case to be distinguishable from Mistletoe on
129. Id. at 659-60.
130. Id. at 659 (quoting Fabricut, 597 F.2d at 229).
131. Id. at 660.
132. 488 F. Supp. 484 (D.C. Colo. 1980).
133. 413 F.2d 668 (10th Cir. 1969). See text accompanying note 81 supra.
134. 536 F.2d 330 (10th Cir. 1976). See text accompanying note 94 supra.
135. Griess, 488 F. Supp. at 488.
136. 487 F. Supp. 596 (D.C. Colo. 1980).




the basis that the arbitrator did not modify an express provision' 39 and
the court could not say with positive assurance that the award did not
draw its essence from the agreement. 140 It also found that, although the
contract did not contain any direct reference to the company having the
power to discharge with or without just cause, the arbitrator was within
his authority to interpret the contract and infer that the parties had con-
templated that any discharge would be for cause based upon other pro-
visions of the contract.141 Therefore, the court affirmed the award and
in so doing reaffirmed Mistletoe's "express provision" rule as the stan-
dard for judicial review.
The preceeding survey demonstrates that the Tenth Circuit has in-
deed stretched the principles stated in the Steelworkers Trilogy and, in par-
ticular, Enterprise Wheel regarding judicial intervention in arbitration
enforcement cases. The case law indicates that the practitioner is faced
with varying tasks depending upon which side of the issue he sits. The
union's advocate, when attempting to have an award enforced, must
prove that the challenged contract language is ambiguous and that the
arbitrator merely interpreted that ambiguous language. Likewise, the
company's advocate must argue that the language is express and unam-
biguous and that the arbitrator has exceeded his authority by modifying
that express language. However, these positions are nearly the exact
reverse of the parties' positions when the contract was originally bar-
gained. Normally it is the union which presses for more explicit lan-
guage in the contract in order to narrow the day-to-day flexibilty of
management while it is the company which seeks more ambiguous lan-
guage in order to allow itself room to exercise management flexibility
and prerogative.
More important than the above paradox is the fact that Mistletoe rep-
resents a willingness on the part of the Tenth Circuit to second guess
the arbitrator's thought process. The court's position is troubling be-
cause it can allow a disgruntled party to circumvent a contractual agree-
ment that arbitration will be final and binding. As the following section
will reveal, continued adherence to the Mistletoe doctrine may inundate
the court with arbitration review cases.
IV. JUDICIAL REVIEW IN THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
Ev, idence of how far a doctrine such as Mistletoe may take a court can
be found in the decisions of the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals. Detroit
Coil Co. v. International Ass 'n of Machinists14 2 is a leading case demonstrat-
ing the Sixth Circuit's refusal to abide by the Supreme Court's admoni-
tion in the Steelworkers Trilogy. This case, decided in 1979, involved a
contract provision which provided that, unless the union notified the
company "within eight (8) working days from the date" when the union
139. Id. at 599 n.2.
140. Id. at 600.
141. Id.
142. 594 F.2d 575 (6th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 840 (1979).
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made the decision to arbitrate, "the grievance or grievances shall be
considered settled."143 The union decided to arbitrate on April 6, 1977
and notified the company by letter dated April 15, which was not re-
ceived until April 30. The company maintained that it considered the
grievance settled but, nevertheless, agreed to submit to arbitration the
question whether the union's request for arbitration was timely. The
arbitrator ruled that the case should be heard on its merits, despite the
union's failure to meet the specific notification requirements in the con-
tract. He identified several factors in support of his ruling, 14 4 including
taking note of the existing good relations between the parties, and ex-
pressed his opinion that a denial of arbitrability would result in a deteri-
oration of that relationship. The court concluded that the arbitrator's
reliance on the parties' relationship amounted to "dispensing his own
brand of industrial justice"' 45 and vacated the award.
By this decision the Sixth Circuit Court ignored the morale factor
stated in Warrior and Gulf1 4 6 as a proper item for arbitral consideration
when arbitrability was an issue presented. Thus, the court was willing to
expand the Enterprise standard but not apply the overriding rational
presented in American Manufacturing and Warrior and Gulf which sup-
ported the Supreme Court's "hands off" posture.
In another 1979 decision, Storer Broadcasting v. American Federation of
Television and Radio Artists, 14 7 the Sixth Circuit further expanded the lim-
ited scope of review standard laid down in the Trilogy. Central to the
court's decision was its conclusion that there was "absolutely no eviden-
tiary support" for the arbitrator's decision.14 8 This conclusion allowed
the court to substitute its interpretations of fact and contract language
for the arbitrator's. The court then proceeded to announce two excep-
tions to the Supreme Court's "hands off' policy towards judicial review
of the merits of an arbitrator's award:
First, 'the arbitrator is confined to the interpretation and appli-
cation of the collective bargaining agreement, and although he
may construe ambiguous contract language, he is without au-
143. Id. at 577.
144. The arbitrator also identified the following factors as arguments supporting a de-
cision to hear the case on its merits: 1) the notification letter was dated, although not
mailed, within the eight day period; 2) there was no evidence that the union considered the
grievance settled; 3) there was no past practice of using untimely notification as a basis to
deny a grievance; 4) the union had not demanded a company response within forty-eight
hours as the agreement provided; and, 5) the union waived a time requirement at an ear-
lier stage of the grievance procedure in order to allow the company owner time to re-
spond. Detroit Coil, 594 F.2d at 578. The arbitrator felt that these factors evidenced the
good relationship between the parties and their desire to peaceably resolve existing dis-
putes. Id. at 579.
145. Detroit Coil, 594 F.2d at 581 (citing Enterprise Wheel, 363 U.S. at 597).
146. "The parties expect that [the arbitrator's] judgment of a particular grievance will
reflect not only what the contract says, but, insofar as the collective bargaining agreement
permits such factors as . . . its consequence to the morale of the shop, his judgment
whether tensions will be heightened or diminished." Warrior & Gulf, 363 U.S. at 582
(emphasis added).
147. 600 F.2d 45 (6th Cir. 1979).
148. Id. at 48.
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thority to disregard or modify plain and unambiguous provi-
sions'. . . . Second, 'although a court is precluded from
overturning an award for errors in the determination of factual
issues, "[n]evertheless, if an examination of the record before
the arbitrator reveals no support whatever for his determina-
tion, his award must be vacated." '149
Thus, the court imposed a rigid "plain meaning" rule for the review of
arbitration awards. The question then becomes who shall be the final
decision maker-the arbitrator, who the parties agreed would issue a
final and binding award, or the courts. If it is the courts, then they risk
defeating the very purpose of arbitration and perhaps more importantly,
they risk inundating themselves with arbitration review cases.
V. CONCLUSION
The Steelworkers Trilogy decisions delineated the scope ofjudicial re-
view in section 301 suits under the Taft-Hartley Act. In these decisions
the Supreme Court held that a court is not to overturn an arbitration
award merely because it disagreed with the arbitrator's interpretation of
the labor contract. Rather, courts are to defer to the arbitrator on ques-
tions of interpretation and application of the labor contract. While em-
bracing the arbitrator as interpretor of labor contract rights, the Court
did allow that an award could be set aside if the arbitrator did not draw
the "essence" of the award from the collective bargaining agreement.
However, the Court left the determination of the substantive fed-
eral common law called for in Lincoln Mills to the lower federal courts.
This failure to provide more concrete direction for interpreting the Tril-
ogy and, in particular, Enterprise Wheel has created a split of opinion in the
lower federal courts. In some instances the lower federal courts have
strayed from the "hands off' standard outlined in the Trilogy, develop-
ing instead more expansive standards of judicial review which may pre-
vent arbitration from being the final and binding determinor of labor
contract disputes.
A survey of Tenth Circuit arbitration decisions reveals that, while
generally in accord with the Enterprise standard of review, the court will
allow judicial intervention if it believes the arbitrator has modified ex-
press provisions in the labor contract. This position reflects a trend in
the lower federal courts towards a more interventionist philosophy re-
garding judicial review of arbitration awards. Whether this trend con-
tinues and standards such as those adopted in the Sixth Circuit become
the norm, is an unanswered question. The very fact that the arbitration
process works as a voluntary dispute resolution mechanism will mitigate
against adoption of such standards on a broader scale. Further, there is
a strong public policy, recognized by both Congress and the Supreme
Court, favoring arbitration.
Clearly, the Sixth Circuit position expressed in Storer opens the
149. Id. at 47.
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courthouse doors to numerous cases by parties seeking judicial review
of arbitration awards. Should this actually occur, arbitration will be-
come merely the initial step along a broad path to the courts rather than
the final determination provision agreed to by the parties in good faith.
It is also evident that, although the Tenth Circuit has expanded the
Supreme Court's standard for judicial review of arbitration awards, it
has not gone as far as the Sixth Circuit. However, given the right set of
circumstances, the Tenth Circuit could decide to loosen the limited re-
view strictures of Enterprise Wheel even further. The answer will only
come in time from the Tenth Circuit, and the other circuits, as the
Supreme Court has been reluctant to provide further direction for inter-
preting the Steelworkers Trilogy and Enterprise in particular.
Craig Russell
LEGAL DEVELOPMENTS SINCE NLRB V. BILDISCO:
PARTIAL RESOLUTION OF PROBLEMS




This article will analyze the critically important Bankruptcy Amend-
ments of 19841 which partially overruled the Supreme Court's contro-
versial decision in NLRB v. Bildisco.2 The decision was issued on
February 22, 1984 and the legislation was enacted July 10, 1984.
Among the most significant elements of the Bildisco opinion were the
Court's affirmation of the power of the debtor-in-possession3 in bank-
ruptcy proceedings4 to unilaterally abrogate a collective bargaining
* Associate Professor of Law, St.John's University Law School; LL.M., Yale Univer-
sity Law School; J.D., University of Detroit, M.B.A., Wayne State University; B.A., Catholic
University of America.
1. Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353,
98 Stat. 333-392 (codified in scattered sections of 11 and 28 U.S.C.).
2. 104 S. Ct. 1188 (1984); see generally Gregory, Labor Contract Rejection in Bankruptcy:
The Supreme Court's Attack on Labor in NLRB v. Bildisco, 25 B.C.L. REv. 539 (1984) [herein-
after cited as Gregory, The Supreme Court's Attack on Labor].
3. "Debtor-in-possession" normally refers to an employer who has filed for reorgan-
ization pursuant to the Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code of 1978. 11 U.S.C. § 1101(1)
(1982). Although there are some technical distinctions, the debtor-in-possession generally
has the powers of a trustee. 11 U.S.C. § 1107(a).
Section 1104 provides for appointment of a trustee, but this provision is not ordina-
rily invoked.
The norm, under section 1104, is to leave the debtor in possession unless a party
in interest requests appointment of a trustee or examiner. Upon such request,
after notice and hearing the court shall appoint a trustee if one of two conditions
is found to exist: (1) fraud, dishonesty, incompetence or gross mismanagement,
or (2) a trustee would be in the best interest of creditors, and equity security
holders, and other interests, regardless of number of holders of securities or the
amount of assets or liabilities.
Herzog & King, COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY (pamphlet ed. 1983), 463 (comments on § 1104).
Unless otherwise noted, this article will use the terms debtor-in-possession, trustee, and
employer interchangeably.
4. Labor contract rejection is normally sought in Chapter 11 reorganizations, rather
than in Chapter 7 liquidations. In the latter, the business will not resurface. Therefore, it
is largely academic whether the labor contract is rejected. Congress has expressly empha-
sized this distinction between the nature and purpose of Chapter 11 reorganization and
Chapter 7 liquidation proceedings:
The purpose of a business reorganization case, unlike a liquidation case, is to
restructure a business's [sic] finances so that it may continue to operate, provide
its employees with jobs, pay its creditors, and produce a return for its stockhold-
ers. The premise of a business reorganization is that assets that are used for
production in the industry for which they were designed are more valuable than
those same assets sold for scrap. Often, the return on assets that a business can
produce is inadequate to compensate those who have invested in the business.
Cash flow problems may develop, and require creditors of the business, both
trade creditors and long-term lenders, to wait for payment of their claims. If the
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agreement without first engaging in good faith bargaining with the
union 5 and without committing an unfair labor practice under sections
8(d) and 8(a)(5) of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA or Act)
when rejection occurs prior to bankruptcy court approval. 6 After four
months of intensive congressional lobbying by organized labor, these
crucial elements of Bildisco were legislatively overruled in the broader
context of the Bankruptcy Amendments of 1984. 7 After closely analyz-
ing this legislation, the pertinent cases decided subsequent to Bildisco
will also be briefly reviewed, since the new statutes have only prospec-
tive application. Finally, some of the most important policy implications
of both Bildisco and the new legislation will be discussed.
I. THE SUPREME COURT'S DECISION IN NLRB v. BILDISCO
Affirming the decision of the Third Circuit,8 the Court unanimously
held that collective bargaining agreements could be abrogated by the
debtor-in-possession without prior bargaining with the union.9 The
business can extend or reduce its debts, it often can be returned to a viable state.
It is more economically efficient to reorganize than to liquidate, because it pre-
serves jobs and assets.
H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 220, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 5787, 5963, 6179. For further discussion of the distinctions between reorganization
and liquidation, see, Note, Collective Bargaining Agreements and the Bankruptcy Reform Act: What
Test Should the Bankruptcy Court Use in Deciding Whether to Allow a Debtor to Reject a Collective
Bargaining Agreement?, 51 U. CIN. L. REV. 862, 868 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Note, What
Test Should the Bankruptcy Court Use]; Note, The Bankruptcy Law's Effect on Collective Bargaining
Agreements, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 391, 392 (1981).
5. 104 S. Ct. at 1197.
6. Id. at 1201; 28 U.S.C. §§ 158(a)(d).
7. The 1984 legislation was the product of a much broader two year struggle by
Congress to rectify the unconstitutionality of the bankruptcy courts, since the Supreme
Court's decision in Northern Pipeline Const. v. Marathon Pipeline Co., 458 U.S. 50
(1982). In Marathon, the Court held that the 1978 Bankruptcy Code violated article III of
the Constitution. The judicial power of the United States must be vested only in courts
whose judges enjoy Article III life tenure and protection against salary diminution during
their term of office. As the Court ruled in Marathon:
Article III bars Congress from establishing legislative courts to exercise jurisdic-
tion over all matters related to those arising under the bankruptcy laws. The
establishment of such courts does not fall within any of the historically recognized
situations in which the general principle of independent adjudication com-
manded by Art. III does not apply.
Id. at 76. This article will not discuss the broad constitutional considerations surrounding
the bankruptcy courts. For further commentary regarding the broader constitutional con-
tours of the Marathon decision, see articles cited in Gregory, The Supreme Courts Attack on
Labor, 25 B.C.L. Rev. 539, 548 n.48 (1984).
8. In re Bildisco, 682 F.2d 72 (3d Cir. 1982). For earlier commentary on the Third
Circuit's decision, see Bordewieck & Countryman, The Rejection of Collective Bargaining Agree-
ments by Chapter 11 Debtors, 57 AM. BANKR. L.J. 293 (1983); Pulliam, The Rejection of Collective
Bargaining Agreements Under Section 365 of the Bankruptcy Code, 58 AM. BANK. L.J. 1 (1984);
Note, What Test Should The Bankruptcy Court Use?, supra note 4.
9. 104 S. Ct. at 1197, 1200. The Court expressly relieved the debtor-in-possession
from any prior duty to bargain to impasse, and explicitly stated that complex labor deter-
minations were beyond the province of the bankruptcy court's expertise.
Whether impasse has been reached generally is a judgment call for the Board to
make; imposing such a requirement as a condition precedent to rejection of the
labor contract will simply divert the Bankruptcy Court from its customary area of
expertise into a field in which it presumably has little or none.
Id. at 1200.
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Court did, however, recommend that the employer undergoing reorgan-
ization and the union representatives first engage in reasonable efforts
to negotiate contract concessions and modifications.' 0 Before interven-
ing, the bankruptcy court must be satisfied that these negotiations "are
not likely to produce a prompt and satisfactory solution."" I Since prior
good faith bargaining was not mandated, there was no requirement that
the parties bargain to impasse before the debtor-in-possession unilater-
ally abrogate the labor contract. Over a vitriolic dissent to the third part
of an otherwise unanimous decision, 12 a bare majority further held that
the debtor-in-possession would not commit an unfair labor practice' 3 by
"unilaterally rejecting or modifying a collective bargaining agreement
before [obtaining authorization for] formal rejection by the Bankruptcy
Court.'
1 4
After unilateral rejection by the debtor-in-possession, the bank-
ruptcy court would determine whether rejection was appropriate by as-
sessing the equities. 15 Deferring to the special nature of the collective
bargaining agreement,' 6 the Court deemed that the standard for labor
contract rejection should be "stricter than the traditional 'business judg-
ment' standard applied by the courts to authorize rejection of the ordi-
nary executory contract."' 7  The Court rejected the stricter test for
labor contract rejection adopted by the Second Circuit, which required
the debtor-in-possession to show that liquidation would occur absent
contract rejection.' 8 After assessing the legislative intent behind section
10. Id. at 1196.
11. Id.
12. Justice Brennan filed a dissent to Part III of the opinion, joined by Justices White,
Marshall, and Blackmun.
13. Section 8(a) of the National Labor Relations Act, 28 U.S.C. § 158(a) (1982),
states, in part:
(a) it shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer-
(5) to refuse to bargain collectively with the representatives of his employees.
14. 104 S. Ct. at 1197.
15. Id.
16. The Court stated: "because of the special nature of a collective bargaining con-
tract, and the consequent 'law of the shop' which it creates, a somewhat stricter standard
should govern." (citations omitted) Id. at 1195.
17. Id.
18. The Second Circuit's stricter test for whether labor contract rejection was war-
ranted is illustrated in Brotherhood of Ry. Clerks v. REA Express, Inc., 523 F.2d 164 (2nd
Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1017 (1975). REA Express substantially tightened the standards
enunciated one month earlier by the Second Circuit in Shopman's Local Union 455 v.
Kevin Steel Prod., inc., 519 F.2d 698 (2nd Cir. 1975). Essentially, the REA Express test was
that labor contract rejection "should be authorized only where it clearly appears to be the
lesser of two evils and that, unless the agreement is rejected, the carrier [employer] will
collapse and the employees will no longer have their jobs." 523 F.2d at 172.
Rejecting the REA Express strict test as the "illegitimate progeny" of Kevin Steel, the
Third Circuit in Bildisco explained:
We reject this more stringent test for two discrete but related reasons: first, for
the pr-agniatic reason that it may be impossible to predict the success vel non of a
reorguanization until very late in the arrangement proceedings; and second, for
the prudential consideration of whether the employees will continue to have jobs
lit Ill. . ..
We also reject the more stringent test because it could work to the detriment of
the workers it seeks to protect. By erecting an excessive evidentiary barrier to
rejection of labor contracts, the REA Express - Alan Wood Steel formulation would
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365(a) of the Bankruptcy Code' 9 the Court concluded that the Second
Circuit's stricter test for labor contract rejection was inimical to the fun-
damental policies of bankruptcy law and to the practical likelihood of
successful business reorganization. 20 The Court adopted the less strict
Third Circuit test as the appropriate standard to determine whether la-
bor contract rejection was warranted. 2 ' The standard required bank-
ruptcy courts to determine whether the labor contract burdened the
estate and whether the concerned parties as a whole would ultimately
benefit from the rejection.
22
The Court vested a private employer with the unilateral power to
rewrite its labor contract governing the hours, wages, and terms and
conditions of employment. This unilateral action was subject only to an
after-the-fact review by the bankruptcy court based on a supposed care-
ful scrutiny of all the equities. Because the Court had already relieved
the employer of its duty to comply with any of the bargaining require-
ments, the union was deprived of any viable role. If the bankruptcy
court determined the prior unilateral rejection was not warranted, it
could vitiate the prior rejection. However, the likelihood of such court
action would be remote. The bankruptcy courts have traditionally mani-
fested indifference and often hostility to the interests of labor. The
bankruptcy courts view their primary responsibility as the revitalization
of imperiled enterprises. Labor interests, perceived as potentially con-
trary to business interests, are often viewed with disfavor by the
courts.
2 3
make it likely that numerous businesses attempting to reorganize will in fact be
forced over the line into liquidation. Adherence to a collective bargaining agree-
ment together with a successful reorganization is surely the best of possible
worlds; but given the inevitable potential for conflict between these goals we
think it preferable that jobs be preserved through rejection of a labor contract
than that they be lost because of its acceptance.
682 F.2d at 80.
19. 104 S. Ct. at 1196.
20. Id. "The standard which we think Congress intended is a higher one than that of
the 'business judgment' rule, but a lesser one than that embodied in the REA Express
opinion."
21. The Third Circuit summarized the test as follows:
We believe that the debtor-in-possession must first demonstrate that the continu-
ation of the collective bargaining agreement would be burdensome to the estate;
that once this threshold determination has been made the debtor-in-possession
must make a factual presentation sufficient to permit the bankruptcy court to
weigh the competing equities; that the polestar is to do equity between claims
which arise under the labor contract and other claims against the debtor; that, in
this, the court must consider the rights of covered employees as supported by the
national labor policy as well as the possible 'sacrifices which other creditors are
making' in the effort to bring about a successful reorganization and that the court
must make a reasoned determination that the rejection of the labor contract will
assist the debtor-in-possession or the trustees to achieve a satisfactory reorganiza-
tion. (citation omitted)
In re Bildisco, 682 F.2d at 81. Between the Third Circuit's decision and the affirmance by
the Supreme Court, the Eleventh Circuit reiterated the Bildisco test in In re Brada Miller
Freight System, Inc., 702 F.2d 890 (11 th Cir. 1983). Brada Miller is fully consonant with
the Third Circuit test in Bildisco.
22. Id. 104 S. Ct. 1196-97.
23. For further discussion of the pro-business institutional bias of the bankruptcy
courts, see Gregory, The Supreme Court's Attack On Labor, supra note 4.
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The Bildisco decision would have furthered this predicament. The
Court's endorsement of a "careful scrutiny" formula was compromised
because the Court failed to provide any coherent structure to guide this
allegedly "careful" review. The employer was relieved of its duties to
bargain in good faith with the union and to secure court approval before
rejecting the labor contract. The Bildisco opinion merely enumerated
the general equities for bankruptcy courts to consider in determining
whether the prior unilateral contract rejection was warranted. 24 Fur-
thermore, the bankruptcy court was accorded wide discretion in assess-
ing these equities and was strongly influenced by its overriding objective
of expediting successful business reorganization. 25 Absent egregious
bad faith by the employer, the court's pro-business bias virtually guar-
anteed that the interests of labor would be subordinated to those of the
debtor-in-possession and the creditors. The courts' decisions favored
the philosophy that a job at reduced wages was better than the alterna-
tive of loss of employment. By preventing unemployment, troublesome
employee and labor equities would be deemed sufficiently considered,
and the primary task of business reorganization could proceed.2 6 The
loose equities test administered by bankruptcy courts subsequent to
contract rejection was devastating to employee and labor interests.
If the Bildisco decision had not been partially remedied by legisla-
tion, it would have had an irreparable impact on effective collective bar-
gaining and on realistic prospects for achieving coherent labor law
jurisprudence. The article will now examine the key statutory provisions
of the 1984 Bankruptcy Amendments which corrected the Bildisco
decision.
II. LEGISLATIVE RECTIFICATION OF BILDISCo
The Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984
added section 1113 to the comprehensive Bankruptcy Code of 1978 and
substantially remedied Bildisco.2 7 These new provisions afford some
meaningful protections for unionized employees and establish workable
guidelines and chronologies for labor contract rejection, but the pri-
mary goal of the Bankruptcy Code, to successfully reorganize business,
is still preserved at the heart of the Code. Hopefully, the effect of sec-
tion 1113 will be that when collective bargaining agreement rejection is
24. 104 S. Ct. at 1197.
25. [T]he Bankruptcy Court must focus on the ultimate goal of Chapter II when
considering these equities. The Bankruptcy Code does not authorize free-wheel-
ing consideration of every conceivable equity, but rather only how the equities
relate to the success of the reorganization. The Bankruptcy court's inquiry is of
necessity speculative and it must have great latitude to consider any type of evi-
dence relevant to this issue.
Id. at 1197.
26. For examples of courts applying this analysis, see Bordewieck & Countryman, The
Rejection of Collective Bargaining Agreements by Chapter 11 Debtors, 57 Am. Bankr. L.J. 293
(1983).
27. Pub. L. No. 98-353, § 1113, 98 Stat. 390-91 (1984) (to be codified at 11 U.S.C.
§ 1113).
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authorized by the bankruptcy court, all parties will better understand
why rejection was approved and why alternatives to rejection were not
viable.
Under section 1113, after filing a petition for reorganization and
prior to filing an application for rejection of the collective bargaining
agreement, the trustee2 8 must comply with several provisions. The
trustee must propose modifications to the union of contractual terms
and conditions of employment which "are necessary to permit the reor-
ganization of the debtor and [assure] that all creditors, the debtor and
all of affected parties are treated fairly and equitably."'29 Further, the
trustee must provide the union with "such relevant information as is
necessary to evaluate the proposal."' 30 Until the bankruptcy court con-
ducts a hearing on the contract modification proposal, "the trustee shall
meet, at reasonable times, with the authorized representative [of the
union] to confer in good faith in attempting to reach mutually satisfac-
tory modifications of such agreement."''  This prior good faith bargain-
ing requirement imposed on the debtor-in-possession thus overrules
one of the two most devastating aspects of Bildisco. The second major
element of Bildisco was likewise vitiated by requiring formal court ap-
proval prior to labor contract rejection. 3 2 The bankruptcy court is no
longer accorded broad discretion in assessing the general equities of
each case. In addition to insuring that "the balance of the equities
clearly favors rejection," 33 the bankruptcy court must be satisfied that
the debtor-in-possession first complied with the good faith bargaining
requirements prior to the hearing 34 and the union "refused to accept
such proposal without good cause."'3 5 Unlike Bildisco, the new prior bar-
gaining requirement makes subsequent judicial assessment of all the eq-
uities structured and meaningful.
While creating substantial safeguards for the contractual rights of
unionized employees, the new legislation failed to incorporate the
strong labor protections proposed in H.R. 5174,36 passed by the House
of Representatives on March 22, 1984. The original House bill would
have also provided express judicial consideration not only for the "suc-
cessful . . . reorganization of the debtor" but also for "preservation of
the jobs covered by such agreement."' 37 Under the House bill, the bank-
ruptcy court could have approved rejection of the labor contract only if
the parties had engaged in prior unsuccessful good faith bargaining and
28. The amendments refer to "trustee" to include debtor-in-possession; see supra note
3.
29. 11 U.S.C. § 11 13(b)(l)(A); see supra note 27.
30. 11 U.S.C. § 1113(b)(l)(B). However, protective orders are also available to pre-
vent union disclosure of the debtor's information to industry competitors. 1 I U.S.C.
§ 1113(d)(3); see supra note 27.
31. 11 U.S.C. § 1113(b)(2); see supra note 27.
32. 11 U.S.C. § l113(c); see supra note 27.
33. 11 U.S.C. § 11 13(c)(3); see supra note 27.
34. 11 U.S.C. § 1 1 13(c)(1); see supra note 27.
35. 11 U.S.C. § 1 1 13(c)(2); see supra note 27.
36. H.R. 5174, 98th Cong., 2d Sess., 130 CONG. REC. H1806 (daily ed. Mar. 21, 1984).
37. Id.
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"absent rejection of such agreement, the jobs covered by such agree-
ment will be lost and any financial reorganization of the debtor will
fail. 1 3 8 Unfortunately, the final legislation fails to recognize these inter-
ests and to provide express protections for preserving jobs. Instead,
concern for jobs is subsumed into the balance of the equities 39 the court
will consider.
The new legislation also permits the court, after notice and hearing,
to authorize the trustee to implement interim changes in the terms, con-
ditions, wages, benefits, or workrules provided by the collective bargain-
ing agreement "if essential to the continuation of the debtor's business,
or in order to avoid irreparable damage to the estate.''40 This provision
is designed to afford interim relief, but does not affect the application
for rejection nor the final hearing on the application.
4 1
The hearing on the rejection application is also expedited. All in-
terested parties must be notified at least ten days prior to the hearing
and may testify at the hearing.4 2 Normally, the hearing will be held
within fourteen days after the trustee files the application for rejection of
the collective bargaining agreement. 4 3 The court will normally issue its
decision on the rejection application within thirty days of the com-
mencement of the hearing.44 If the decision is not rendered within the
time limits, "the trustee may terminate or alter any provisions of the
collective bargaining agreement pending the ruling of the court on such
application."' 4 5 Although the power of the debtor-in-possession to im-
pose interim modifications with court approval4 6 and to terminate or
alter the contract if a court decision is not timely rendered4 7 is poten-
tially significant, no unilateral alteration or termination of a labor con-
tract can be effected without compliance with the new statutory
provisions.
48
III. POST-BILDISCO CASE LAw
Since the bankruptcy amendment is prospectively effective and does
not apply to litigation commenced prior to its enactment, no significant
case law has yet developed under the new legislation. 49 However, the
38. Id.
39. 11 U.S.C. § 11 13(c)(3); see supra note 27.
40. 11 U.S.C. § I I 13(e); see supra note 27. In its original form, H.R. 5174 contained
no analagous provision.
41. 11 U.S.C. § 11 13(f); see supra note 27.
42. 11 U.S.C. § 1113(d)(1); see supra note 27.
43. Id.
44. 1I U.S.C. § 11 13(d)(2); see supra note 27. In its original form, H.R. 5174 provided
for completion of the hearing within fourteen days of its commencement, but contained no
time limit provision for rendering a decision.
45. 11 U.S.C. § 11 13(d)(2); see supra note 27. In its original form, H.R. 5174 con-
tained no analagous provision.
46. 1I U.S.C. § 1113(e); see supra note 27.
47. I1 U.S.C. § I I 13(d)(2); see supra note 27.
48. I1 U.S.C. § 1113(f); see supra note 27.
49. Virtually all of the post-Bildisco case law involves judicial scrutiny of the facts of
each case to insure the labor contract rejection process comports with either the judicial,
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new statutory provisions do substantially overrule much of the Bildisco
decision. A brief survey of the post-Bildisco pre-statutory case law will
emphasize the drastic ramifications of the Bildisco decision and highlight
improvements resulting from subsequent legislation.
It quickly became obvious from the few pertinent post-Bildisco deci-
sions, that Bildisco did not serve as carte blanche for employer preroga-
tives. Contract rejection was not allowed if the solvent employer acted
in bad faith by engaging in only a pretext of reorganization to break the
union.50 Although Bildisco did not expressly mention the parties' mo-
tives, one bankruptcy court found them to be a "proper factor to be
considered when balancing the equities."'" Because the record was re-
plete with direct evidence of the employer's overt anti-union animus as
the motive for seeking labor contract rejection, the motion to reject the
contract was denied.
52
Termination of operations will not necessarily permit contract re-
jection.5 3 When business operations have ceased, the business interests
of successful reorganization are no longer the court's paramount con-
cern and labor interests become an equal concern. It would be more
advantageous for the employer to maintain operations to benefit from
the statutory and judicial concern for effecting viable reorganization. Fi-
nancial savings resulting from cessation of operations will not automati-
cally make labor contract rejection appropriate.
Cessation of business operations is distinguishable from the normal
expiration of the labor contract. In the latter situation, the contract's
effective term has lapsed and it is no longer an executory contract.
54
The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals recently held an employer's peti-
tion to reject mooted by the contract's expiration. 55 The employer un-
successfully argued that the court should have applied the relation-back
doctrine to render the contract executory and permit its rejection de-
spite its expiration.
56
or now statutory, provisions and insures careful assessment of all the equities. The post-
Bildisco decisions show significantly heightened judicial sensitivity to union and employee
interests. See In re Pesce Baking Co. Inc., 43 Bankr. 949 (Bankr., N.D. Ohio 1984); In re
Schuld Mfg. Co. Inc., 43 Bankr. 535 (Bankr. W.D. Wisc. 1984); Wally Elec. Supply Co.,
270 N.L.R.B. No. 165, 1984-85 NLRB Dec. (CCH) 16,563 (1984); Earle Equip. Co., 270
N.L.R.B. No. 121, 1984-85 NLRB Dec. (CCH) 16,375 (1984).
50. In re C & W Mining Co., 38 Bankr. 496, (Bankr., N.D. Ohio 1984).
51. Id. at 502.
52. Neither C. & W. nor William Catlett have been honest with the Union. Cat-
lett threatened the Union, missed scheduled meetings, and delayed in giving re-
quested financial information. For the most part, Catlett's testimony before this
court was self-serving and less than credible. His surprising candor in admitting
his anti-union bias upon cross examination only serves to underscore his bad
faith.
Id. at 503-4.
53. In re Total Transp. Serv. Inc., 37 Bankr. 904 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1984).
54. Countryman, Executory Contracts in Bankruptcy: Part 1, 57 MINN. L. REV. 439, 450-62
(1973).
55. Gloria Mfg. Corp. v. ILGWU, 730 F.2d 1020 (4th Cir. 1984).
56. Id. at 1022. The Fourth Circuit distinguished Gloria Mfg. from Bildisco. "Bildisco is
not applicable to this case because the collective bargaining agreement . ..had expired
and was therefore no longer executory." Id. at 1021 n.1. Since the expired contract was
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Other than these examples of bad faith and business liquidation,
Bildisco was designed to promote expeditious labor contract rejection to
effect the ultimate objective of successful business reorganization. This
purpose remained the central policy focus of the subsequent legislation.
Approval of labor contract rejection is equally likely under Bildisco or
under the new section 1113 when the employer is not solvent, despite
union concessions, employer good faith and austerity measures.
5 7
IV. PROGNOSIS-CAuTIOUS OPTIMISM
An unremedied Bildisco decision could have wreaked havoc on labor
relations. Of course, solvent corporations did not rush en masse into
the rigors of reorganization merely to abrogate their labor contracts.
The strictures of reorganization are unpalatable enough, and even
Bildisco would not have condoned bad faith pretextual manipulation of
the bankruptcy law by solvent employers solely to destroy the union.
Large solvent multinational corporations would be least likely to use
Bildisco for such an illegitimate purpose. For the most part, these corpo-
rations have mature, established labor relations histories with large un-
ions. The real dangers posed by Bildisco were at the smaller end of the
corporate spectrum, which is still the bedrock of American enterprise.
Smaller marginal businesses operating in unstable, highly competitive
markets 58 without the resources or the inclination to retain informed
labor counsel were more likely to enter into reorganization proceedings
seeking labor contract rejection. This could have resulted in the hasty
abrogation of a collective bargaining agreement which, upon reflection,
the employer may have wished to preserve with some modifications. Af-
ter reorganization, the union is likely to remain as the employee's exclu-
sive bargaining representative. Even if labor contract rejection is
approved, the reorganized employer will still have to bargain with the
union. The first item on the agenda will usually be the negotiation of a
new collective bargaining agreement. The prior bargaining require-
ment may prevent potential hostility in negotiations otherwise likely to
have been engendered by spontaneous unilateral labor contract abroga-
tion. Without prior bargaining, labor misunderstanding and hostility
could have thoroughly poisoned post-reorganization labor relations.
Recent labor relations developments have repeatedly demonstrated
the wisdom of pursuing good faith concession bargaining. For the most
part, unions have responsibly demonstrated willingness to make often
significant contract concessions to assist truly financially imperiled
not executory, the rejection of the contract could not relate back to the day preceding the
filing of the employer's petition to reject the contract.
57. In re Briggs Transp. Co., 39 Bankr. 343, (Bankr. D. Minn. 1984).
58. Bildisco & Bildisco, a general partnership, can be characterized in this way. When
Bildisco filed for bankruptcy, eighteen of its employees, representing 40-45% of its work
force, were covered by the labor contract in question. 104 S. Ct. at 102. By the date of the
rejection hearing, only three employees remained who were covered by the agreement.
682 F.2d at 75.
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employers. 59
The new legislation is not failsafe. It remains doubtful whether
bankruptcy courts possess sufficient labor law expertise to determine
whether the prior bargaining was good faith but ultimately unsuccessful
hard bargaining or whether it was bad faith, proforma surface bargaining.
Even for the labor law expert, determining the nature of bargaining is
often a frustrating task of evaluating action according to intangible stan-
dards. Bankruptcy courts have previously demonstrated only sporadic
appreciation of labor law considerations. Leaving these bargaining de-
terminations to the bankruptcy courts alone may prove unwise. The
better course would be to vest the bankruptcy courts and the National
Labor Relations Board with joint supervision of these cases, leaving all
labor law determinations, such as those regarding the nature of the prior
bargaining, to the expertise of the NLRB.
Requiring prior court approval to reject the labor contract should
prior bargaining be unsuccessful was the other major correction of
Bildisco effected via the new legislation. The judicial hearing under an
expedited time frame, with a decision normally rendered within thirty
days of the commencement of the hearing, will be palatable to all par-
ties. If the court is unable to render a timely decision, the employer may
effect interim unilateral modifications. While this power is potentially
ominous, it is only an interim relief measure. Any unilateral contract
changes implemented without union consent are subject to later vitia-
tion by the court if deemed unwarranted. While no significant case law
has yet developed, this scenario may be rendered academic. It is contin-
gent upon the bankruptcy courts issuing decisions in a timely fashion, as
provided by the statute. Judicial administrative diligence should pre-
clude employers from resorting to contingent, interim relief through
unilateral contract termination which the statute was designed to pre-
vent. If the courts are not punctilious, this unilateral interim relief pro-
vision could become a troublesome, unwise loophole in an otherwise
sound statute.
59. For recent examples of significant union concessions, see, Lone Star Steelworkers
Wage Concession Contract, 114 LAB. REL. REP. (BNA) 41 (Sept. 19, 1983) (members of the
United Steelworkers Union accept "one of the steepest pay cuts negotiated in the current
round of contract concessions - an across-the-board reduction of $2.80 per hour"); Conces-
sions for Meatpackers, 113 LAB. REL. REP. 188 (BNA) (July 4, 1983) (members of United
Food and Commerical Workers vote to accept concessions significantly reducing wages
and benefits after employer filed for bankruptcy); Contract Approvals in Airline Indusy, 112
LAB. REL. REP. 202 (BNA) (Mar. 14, 1983) (concessions agreed to by transport workers
union include elimination of paid meal periods, "increased deductibles under a compre-
hensive medical insurance plan and slower procession schedules to top rates for new
hires"); Wage, Benefit Cuts For Steel Employees 112 LAB. REL. REP. 22 (BNA) (Jan. 10, 1983)
(Steelworkers approve new contract cutting wages, benefits, vacations and holidays); Wil-
liams, Wilson Food Fights Back, N.Y. Times, Dec. 3, 1983, at L31, Col.2 (The corporation
originally sought wage reductions from $10.69 to $6.50 an hour, in its bankruptcy peti-
tions filed in April, 1983 which precipitated strikes by 5,000 employees at seven plants.
However, the last of the striking unions has agreed to a wage reduction to $8 per hour,
plus similar reductions in fringe benefits); Serrin, How Deregulation Allowed Greyhound to Win
Concessions From Strikers, N.Y. Times, Dec. 7, 1983, at A22, col.2 ; Holusha, Unions May Wait
to Make Up for Lost Time, N.Y. Times, Dec. 11, 1983, at E5, col.2 .
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V. CONCLUSION
The new legislation provides significant rectification of the radical
Bildisco decision. While labor interests remain subordinated to those of
ownership in the new legislation, they are now an express part of the
general equation. By requiring concession bargaining and court ap-
proval prior to rejection of a collective bargaining agreement, both em-
ployers and bankruptcy courts are forced to recognize labor interests. If
history is a reliable guide,60 most concession bargaining will be success-
ful and no judicial intervention will be required. If prior bargaining is
unsuccessful, the statute provides safeguards for labor through an expe-
dited participatory hearing. Unfortunately, the judicial balancing of all
the equities to determine whether labor contract rejection is warranted
remains a largely unstructured exercise, with serious potential abuse by
bankruptcy courts reflecting pro-enterprise institutional bias. By avoid-
ing overt displays of anti-union tactics and prejudices, the clever em-
ployer may still severely handicap the union while simultaneously
effecting business reorganization.
This analysis assumes a "worst possible case" scenario of ulterior
employer objectives. In most instances, financially imperiled employers
will responsibly seek reorganization without anti-union animus. Busi-
ness has every right to pursue this legitimate avenue in highly competi-
tive world markets. Abuses of the bankruptcy laws, whether pre-or post-
Bildisco, are relatively rare and the new legislation makes it less likely that
abuses will succeed.
The legislation prevented a return to the often overtly hostile labor
relations climate that existed prior to the passage of the National Labor
Relations Act in 1935. In addition to increased strike activity and labor
violence, an unremedied Bildisco decision would have compelled a labor
strategy of agreeing only to one year collective bargaining agreements.
Three year labor contracts could have been suicidal, except with the
most solvent large corporations. Labor would have had every tactical,
preventive reason to avoid longer contracts that could have been sum-
marily and unilaterally abrogated by employers unexpectedly entering
into reorganization. In addition to increasing employer labor relations
costs, one year contracts would have seriously destabilized and debili-
tated labor-management relations.
In the short term, the remedial legislation saved federal labor policy
from possible disintegration. However, the prospects for achieving full
labor management equilibrium are still not assured because labor can-
not match the power of multinational corporations. While a great deal
of work remains, the Bankruptcy Amendments of 1984 represent a
small, incremental step toward achieving a responsible labor law juris-
prudence. Perhaps Congress will yet reconsider the merits of compre-
hensive labor law reform.
6 1
60. See examples cited supra note 59.
61. Prospects for comprehensive labor law reform legislation in the foreseeable future
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are remote. The Democratic Senate was unable to pass reform legislation during the
Carter presidency despite the strong support of the administration and organized labor. It
is unlikely that any meaningful reform legislation will be entertained during the Reagan
administration with a Republican Senate. Nevertheless, proposals for future labor law leg-
islative reforms have been resurrected and forcefully advanced in recent prominent stud-
ies. See RICHARD B. FREEMAN &JAMES L. MEDOFF, WHAT Do UNIONS Do? (1984); WILLIAM
B. GOULD, JAPAN'S RESHAPING OF AMERICAN LABOR LAw (1984).
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CASES UNDER SECTION 301
INTRODUCTION
The duty of fair representation (DFR) is a court-created doctrine
designed to protect employees from the very organizations entrusted
with their representation: labor unions.' In applying the doctrine,
courts aspire to strike a balance between the discretion of the union to
determine who should benefit from their representation, how that repre-
sentation is effected, and the individual interests and rights of the em-
ployee. Complicating this balancing test is Congress' goal reflected in
the Wagner Act,2 to provide an exclusive means for settlement of labor
disputes outside of the courts that would be final and binding on the
parties involved.
Accordingly, the Supreme Court exercised great discretion before it
created the duty of fair representation as a means for judicial interven-
tion in the arena of labor dispute settlements. The seminal case in-
volved racial discrimination by a labor organization certified under the
Railway Labor Act (RLA) 3 in negotiating a collective bargaining agree-
ment. Currently, in light of an increasing judicial concern to safeguard
employees' rights vis a vis their bargaining representatives, the doctrine
has been expanded to cover every aspect of union representation, from
contract negotiation 4 to contract administration. 5 Remedies have been
provided for union conduct amounting to little more than mere
negligence. 6
This expansion by the courts was not accomplished easily. In 1962,
the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB or Board) recognized a
union's duty to represent its members fairly in Miranda Fuel Co. 7 By la-
belling the breach an unfair labor practice under section 8 of the Na-
tional Labor Relations Act (NLRA or Act), 8 the Board assumed
exclusive jurisdiction over DFR claims. In 1962, in Smith v. Evening News
Association,9 the Supreme Court used section 301 of the Taft-Hartley
1. As exclusive bargaining representative under § 9(a) of the National Labor Rela-
tions Act (NLRA or Act), 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1982), a union is entrusted with an obliga-
tion to represent those within a craft equally "without hostility to any." Cf Ford Motor
Co. v. Huffman, 345 U.S. 330 (1952).
2. Ch. 372, 49 Stat. 449 (1935) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-168
(1982)).
3. 45 U.S.C. § 151 (1982). The case was Steele v. Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co.,
323 U.S. 192 (1944).
4. Steele, 323 U.S. 192 (1944).
5. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957).
6. Ruggirello v. Ford Motor Co., 411 F. Supp. 758, 760 (E.D. Mich. 1976).
7. Miranda Fuel Co. 140 N.L.R.B. 181 (1962) (holding that a union's breach of the
duty of fair representation constituted an unfair labor practice, violating § 8(b)(l)(a), 29
U.S.C. § 158(b)(l)(a), and § 8(b)(2), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(2) of the Act.
8. 29 U.S.C. § 158 (1982).
9. 371 U.S. 195 (1962).
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Act'0 to assume concurrent jurisdiction with the NLRB over unfair labor
practice claims when a breach of contract is alleged by an employee
against his employer. Following Smith, the Court assumed jurisdiction
over DFR suits brought under section 301 in Humphrey v. Moore."I
Frequently, section 301 DFR claims name both a union and an em-
ployer as defendants, charging the union with a breach of its duty of fair
representation, and the employer with breach of the collective bargain-
ing agreement. 12 Such suits are termed "hybrid" suits as a valid cause of
action against the union is a prerequisite to recovery from the employer
for breach of the collective bargaining agreement. 13 The court may
then fashion a remedy against both defendants.'
4
At one time the NLRB entertained hybrid DFR suits as unfair labor
practices under the NLRA, 15 but since 1980, this particular hybrid ac-
tion has apparently disappeared from the text of published decisions,16
while its frequency in the courts under section 301 has increased.1 7 One
reason for this trend is that the Board has unreviewable discretion to
hear cases. Another compelling reason is that unlike actions before the
Board, the courts can award damages under section 301.18 In both ju-
risdictions, an employee must exhaust his intra-union remedies before
he may bring a DFR claim, yet once a breach is found, the Board or
court may vacate an arbitrator's award.
This note will commence with an examination of the origins of the
duty of fair representation, including the expansion of DFR to contract
and grievance administration under section 301. A survey of the stan-
10. 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1982) allows actions for breach of a collective bargaining con-
tract to be brought in federal court.
11. 375 U.S. 335 (1964).
12. Breach of contract is a required allegation in any § 301 suit. An employer cannot
be charged with a breach of the duty of fair representation in the absence of a showing of
impermissable conduct. American Postal Workers Union Local 6885 v. American Postal
Workers Union, 665 F.2d 1096 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
13. See Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 186 (1967).
14. Id. at 187-88.
15. Generally these suits require some form of cooperative activity between the union
and the employer. Mere compliance with a union demand rather than actual collusion was
sufficient to state a cause of action in Strick Corp. 241 N.L.R.B. 210 (1979) (collective
bargaining agreement between union and employer nullified remedies provided to dis-
charged employees by an arbitrator's award; complaint dismissed due to failure to show
arbitrary, invidious, or discriminatory conduct). See also ITT Arctic Services, Inc., 238
N.L.R.B. 116 (1978) (employee's dual role as supervisor and sole union steward ruled an
unfair labor practice; failure of union to process grievance of employee whose recall was
prevented by same union steward ruled a breach of DFR); Alcoa Constr. Sys. Inc., 212
N.L.R.B. 452 (1974) (union causing discharge of employee for failure to pay union dues
held a violation of DFR; employer's compliance with union demand held an unfair labor
practice).
16. The National Labor Relations Board has curtailed entertainment of hybrid DFR
suits. The current Reagan-appointed majority has used its unreviewable discretion to hear
only DFR suits solely against a union.
17. The Supreme Court had to first knock down various procedural barriers. See infra
notes 51-62 & note 231 and accompanying text.
18. Damages are awarded under § 301 when tied to a § 303 damages action, 29
U.S.C. § 187. For a discussion of the scope of a damage award, see Bowen v. United States
Postal Service, 459 U.S. 212 (1983); infra notes 160-184 and accompanying text.
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dards applied by the Supreme Court preceeds a survey of standards ap-
plied by the circuit courts of appeal and district courts. The
prerequisites to a section 301 DFR action, exhaustion of internal union
and contractual remedies, will be addressed as they represent affirmative
defenses for an employer in a hybrid suit. The final section will address
the issue of damages in section 301 actions, recently addressed by the
Supreme Court. Throughout this note, section 301 actions will be em-
phasized as a more fruitful avenue of relief for the wrongfully dis-
charged and inadequately represented employee, as section 301 affords
each claimant his "day in court" and offers greater remedial relief than
complaints instituted before the Board.
I. ORIGINS OF THE DuTy OF FAIR REPRESENTATION
A. Contract Negotiations
In 1935, the American labor movement received significant impetus
when Congress passed the Wagner Act, 19 which recognized:
that protection by law of the right of employees to organize and
bargain collectively safeguards commerce from injury . . . by
encouraging practices fundamental to the friendly adjustment
of industrial disputes arising out of differences as to wages,
hours, working conditions, and by restoring equality of bar-
gaining power between employers and employees.
20
To achieve this end, the Act authorized the information of labor organi-
zations to represent employees' interests vis a vis their employers.
2 1
Labor organizations presented a strong, united front, wielding the
collective power of all the employees of a particular craft. As exclusive
collective bargaining agent, 22 the union represented the collective inter-
est, necessarily at the expense of individual employees whose views or
positions did not coincide with the majority. The duty of fair represen-
tation emerged as a judicially-created doctrine, imposing the statutory
obligation of fair representation.
23
The Supreme Court first articulated the duty in the seminal case of
Steele v. Louisville & Nashville R. R. Co. 24 Arising under the Railway Labor
Act, 2 5 Steele involved black employees who, excluded from a union's
membership because of their race, were nevertheless forced to accept
19. Ch. 372, 49 Star. 449 (1935) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-168
(1982)).
20. 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1982).
21. Section 7 of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1982), guarantees workers the rights to
join, form or assist a union, to bargain collectively, and to engage in concerted activities.
22. Id. § 159(a).
23. Steele, 323 U.S. at 202.
24. Id. at 192.
25. Ch. 347, 44 Stat. 577 (1962) (codified as amended at 45 U.S.C. § 151 (1982)).
Supreme Court cases involving racial discrimination under the RLA and considering the
duty of fair representation include Conley, 355 U.S. 41; Graham v. Bhd. of Locomotive
Firemen & Engineermen, 323 U.S. 210 (1944); Bhd. of R.R. Trainmen v. Howard, 343
U.S. 768 (1952). Cf Syres v. Oil Workers, Local 23, 350 U.S. 892 (1955) (per curiam)
(DFR arising under the NLRA).
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the union as exclusive bargaining representative, because the majority in
their craft were white. 26 The "Brotherhood" negotiated a seniority
agreement with several railroads "amend[ing] the existing bargaining
agreement in such manner as ultimately to exclude all negro fireman
from the service."' 2 7 The Supreme Court, in an opinion by ChiefJustice
Stone, announced the substance of a union's duty by first comparing it
with a legislature. "The representative is clothed with power not unlike
that of a legislature which is subject to constitutional limitations on its
power to deny, restrict, destroy or discriminate against the rights of
those for whom it legislates, and is under an affirmative constitutional
duty to protect those rights."'2 8 Then interpreting the congressional in-
tent underlying the RLA, the Court went on to set the standard of con-
duct, "a bargaining labor organization . . . [must] represent non-union
or minority union members of the craft without hostile discrimination,
fairly, impartially, and in good faith."' 29 Yet acknowledging that it was
engaged in a balancing of interests, the Court added: "This does not
mean a statutory representative of a craft is barred from making con-
tracts which may have unfavorable effects on some members of the craft
represented." '30 This latter statement served as a prudential caveat, mit-
igating the effects of a precedent that could have opened the doors to
hasty and widespread judicial intervention in the settlement of labor
disputes.
The Steele decision, arising in the context of the RLA, reflects the
thrust of most early DFR cases; to impose an obligation on unions to
represent minorities fairly. 3 1 Yet, on the very same day that Steele was
decided, the Court extended DFR to cases not involving racial discrimi-
nation, and to unions certified under the NLRA. Wallace v. NLRB 3 2 in-
volved a labor dispute in which two labor organizations were vying for a
position as exclusive bargaining representative at a particular company
plant. Following a consent election (as provided in the agreement ap-
proved by the NLRB), labor organization "A" emerged as sole bargain-
ing representative. "A" signed a closed shop agreement with the intent
to refuse membership to union "B's" members, thus effecting their dis-
charge. 33 In an unfair labor practice proceeding3 4 before the Board, the
26. Steele, 323 U.S. at 194-95.
27. Id. at 195.
28. Id. at 198.
29. Id. at 204.
30. Id. at 203.
31. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
32. 323 U.S. 248 (1944).
33. Id. at 250.
34. When the breach of a union's duty of fair representation amounts to an unfair
labor practice under § 8 of the NLRA, the Supreme Court at one time held that the doc-
trine of preemption vests exclusive jurisdiction of the controversy in the NLRB. San Di-
ego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 244-45 (1959). But see Vaca v. Sipes,
386 U.S. 171, 180 (1967) (Garmon's broad preemption doctrine does not divest federal
courts ofjurisdiction where it could not fairly be inferred that Congress intended exclusive
jurisdiction to lie with the Board); Smith v. Evening News Ass'n, 371 U.S. 195 (1962) (suit
brought under § 301 which is also an unfair labor practice under § 8 can be heard by a
state court and is not preempted by Garmon).
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NLRB found that the company had a hand in formation of union "A" to
frustrate union "B's" attempts to unionize the plant, and further that the
union-shop agreement was implemented to facilitate the discharge of
"B's" employees.3 5 The Board ordered disestablishment of union "A",
nullification of the union-shop contract, and reinstatement with back pay
for forty-three employees.3 6 In affirming the Board's order, the
Supreme Court held that as exclusive bargaining representative, the la-
bor organization is the agent of all the employees, not just the group
members "charged with the responsibility of representing their interests
fairly and impartially."
37
Although the language in Wallace was sufficiently analogous to Steele
to convey the Supreme Court's intent, the specific standard articulated
in Steele was not applied to a union certified under the NLRA until Ford
Motor Co. v. Huffman.3 8 In Huffman, union members whose seniority was
affected attacked the provisions of a collective bargaining agreement
that enabled the employer to credit to an employee's seniority any pre-
employment military service.3 9 In addressing the Steele standard, 40 the
Court further defined the parameters of its application: "A wide range
of reasonableness must be allowed a statutory bargaining representative
in serving the unit it represents, subject always to good faith and hon-
esty of purpose in the exercise of its discretion." '4 ' The Court went on
to hold that the union was within its reasonable discretion and authority
to negotiate such an agreement, and that such a provision was further
supported by considerations of public policy and industrial stability.
4 2
B. Contract Administration
Seizing the rule announced by the Supreme Court in Steele, the Fifth
Circuit quickly extended the duty of fair representation beyond the mere
negotiation of a collective bargaining agreement. In Hughes Tool v.
NLRB, 43 the circuit court noted the distinction between a union's role in
negotiating a contract and that in processing a grievance, interpreting
the NLRA as not granting the union the exclusive right to process an
employee's grievance; the employee could present the grievance him-
self.44 However, the basis of the union's DFR in Hughes was somewhat
35. Wallace, 323 U.S. at 250.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 255.
38. 345 U.S. 330 (1953).
39. Id. at 331. A credit for post-employment military service was statutory. Selective
Training and Service Act of 1940, ch. 720, 54 Stat. 885, 890 (1940). A similar provision is
now codified at 38 U.S.C. 2024 (1982).
40. 345 U.S. at 337.
41. Id. at 338.
42. Id. at 338-43.
43. 147 F.2d 69 (5th Cir. 1945) ([A] union certified as exclusive bargaining represen-
tative brought a complaint to the Board seeking enforcement of its role in light of an
employer's concurrent deduction of union dues from the salaries of another union's mem-
bers. The Board issued a cease and desist order to the employer and the case came before
the circuit court for enforcement of the order.).
44. Id. at 72-73. Note however, that through a collective bargaining agreement, a
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questionable. The Court maintained that by certifying the union as bar-
gaining representative a "trust" was created from which the duty could
be imposed.
4 5
Twelve years later, the Supreme Court, in Conley v. Gibson4 6 (a case
arising under the RLA), elaborated on the Fifth Circuit's formulation,
eliminating the potentially suspect reliance on the word "trust", and in-
stead attributing the source of the duty to a continuing obligation ema-
nating from the collective bargaining agreement: "The bargaining
representative's duty. . . does not come to an abrupt end . . . with the
making of an agreement between union and employer. Collective bar-
gaining is a continuous process."
4 7
Although the Supreme Court affirmed that a union's DFR is a con-
tinuing obligation by extending its application to grievance administra-
tion, Professor Cox noted that the role the Court was assuming,
evaluation of the merits of a grievance, was within the exclusive jurisdic-
tion of the Railroad Adjustment Board.48 Yet effective enforcement of
the duty seemingly compelled the Court's intrusion into the administra-
tive process. Acknowledgement of the need for judicial intervention
prompted the creation of a new DFR remedy, the section 301 hybrid
suit.
4 9
II. GRIEVANCE ADMINISTRATION AND SECTION 301
Section 301 requires a breach of contract for any claim brought
under its auspices to be heard. 50 Usually, breach of the collective bar-
gaining agreement is the underlying allegation.
Initially, the major obstacle to DFR claims arising under section 301
was the doctrine of preemption. 5 1 Essentially, preemption divested state
and federal courts of jurisdiction over DFR claims, because they fell
under the heading of "unfair labor practices" under the NLRA, and con-
sequently, were subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of the NLRB. 5 2 Yet,
union can be certified as exclusive bargaining representative of the employee in grievance
proceedings, 29 U.S.C. 159(a) (1982).
45. Id. at 74 (dictum).
46. 355 U.S. 41 (1957) (involving the wrongful discharge of black railroad employees
and the union's failure to protect them from wrongful, allegedly discriminatory discharge
as provided in the collective bargaining agreement).
47. Id. at 46.
48. Cox, Labor Decisions of the Supreme Court at the October Term, 1957, 44 VA. L. REV.
1057, 1088 (1958).
49. See supra notes 12-18 and accompanying text.
50. See 29 U.S.C. § 185(a), (b) (1982).
51. In Miranda Fuel, 140 N.L.R.B. 181 (1962), enforcement denied, 326 F.2d 172 (2nd
Cir. 1963), the Board, over a vigorous dissent, held that a breach of the duty of fair repre-
sentation amounted to an unfair labor practice under § 8(b)(2) and 8(b)(3) of the NLRA.
The Supreme Court had applied preemption to cases "arguably" constituting unfair labor
practices under § 8, deferring to the jurisdiction of the Board. See Garmon, 359 U.S. 236;
Weber v. Anheuser Busch, 348 U.S. 468 (1955); Garner v. Teamsters Union, 346 U.S. 485
(1953). However, the Supreme Court refused to divest the courts of their jurisdiction over
DFR claims, and consequently, using § 301, established concurrent jurisdiction with the
Board over such claims. Vaca, 386 U.S. at 179.
52. 29 U.S.C. § 160(a) (1982).
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in a series of cases, the Supreme Court gradually relaxed the rigid con-
struction of the doctrine to suits arising in contract under section 301.53
In this context of increased judicial intervention to protect the
rights of individual employees, the Supreme Court considered a union's
duty of fair representation in the context of hybrid section 301 suit for
the first time. Humphrey v. Moore54 involved two companies whose em-
ployees were represented by one union. 55 The two companies were en-
gaged in the transportation of new automobiles from a Ford Motor
Company plant in Kentucky, but a decline in business reduced the need
to only one. 5 6 The ensuing agreement between the two transport com-
panies provided that only one firm was to assume Ford's business, creat-
ing a precarious situation for the employees of the other firm.5 7 The
worried employees filed a grievance claiming the two firms should be
"sandwiched" to reflect the seniority enjoyed by the employees at their
respective firms. 58 As provided in the collective bargaining agreement,
the grievance was settled by a joint conference committee which sand-
wiched the seniority lists, but since one company was younger than the
other, the younger company's employees lost seniority.
59
In the Kentucky state court, employee Moore and others sought an
unjunction to prevent implementation of the committee's decision.
60
Citing Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman and Wallace Corp. v. NLRB, the Supreme
Court found no breach of the union's statutory duty, finding that the
decision to dovetail the lists was made "honestly, in good faith and with-
out hostility or arbitrary discrimination," affording the union "a wide
range of reasonableness in the exercise of its discretion." 6 1 Accordingly
relief was denied.
The Court, without reducing the rule to words, laid a procedural
foundation in Humphrey v. Moore for subsequent DFR hybrid suits under
section 301 which required a plaintiff to prove a breach of the union's
duty as a prerequisite to any award suit against an employer for breach
of contract. The procedural requirement derived from Humphrey struck
a reasonable balance of interests in section 301 suits alleging a union
breach of DFR and an employer's breach of contract. By requiring an
employee to prove a breach of his representative's duty of fair represen-
53. The Supreme Court first ensured that § 301 claims could be heard in state courts,
see Smith, 371 U.S. 195; Local 174, Teamsters v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95 (1962);
Dowd Box v. Courtney, 368 U.S. 502 (1962). In Vaca, 386 U.S. at 182-83. the Court inter-
preted the congressional intent underlying the Taft-Hartley Act as emphasizing the rights
of the wronged employee over and above the preservation of the statutory dispute resolu-
tion mechanism: "The existence of even a small group of cases in which the Board would
be unwilling or unable to remedy a union's breach of duty would frustrate the basic pur-
poses underlying the duty of fair representation doctrine."
54. 375 U.S. 335 (1964).
55. Id. at 336.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 337.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 337-39.
60. Id at 340-42.
61. Id. at 350.
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tation, the federal labor policy providing for a final and binding in-
dependent system of dispute resolution is preserved in that dissatisfied
employees cannot directly attack the resolution of their arbitrated claim.
On the other hand, employees who present legitimate grievances to ar-
bitration but find themselves without relief because of union misconduct
have access to an independent tribunal as recourse.
Yet despite Humphrey's accommodation of competing interests in a
section 301 hybrid suit, the viability of a DFR claim under section 301
remained an open question. Three years later, in the landmark case of
Vaca v. Sipes,62 the Supreme Court established the section 301 hybrid
suit as an avenue of relief, affording an employee review of a claim
against an employer and a union by an independent and unbiased
tribunal.
III. STANDARDS
A union's duty to represent a craft fairly extends, as previously
noted from contract negotiation to contract administration.63 However,
although the duty extends uniformly throughout the representative pro-
cess, the standards applied by the courts do not. Clearly, a different set
of standards is applied to determine the occurrence of a breach of the
duty of fair representation in the context of contract administration than
contract negotiation. 64
When negotiating a contract, a union is accorded "a wide range of
reasonableness . . . subject always to good faith and honesty in the ex-
ercise of its discretion." 65 Such is the case, because necessarily, when
negotiating a contract, certain members of a craft not in the majority
must have their interests subjugated for the sake of a strong united
front. However, a wrongfully discharged employee must rely on the
union's exclusive representation and advocacy of his claim as generally
provided for in the collective bargaining agreement. In contract admin-
istration via the grievance procedure, the courts found it necessary to
curb the discretion afforded the union in contract negotiation, because
the union's role is considerably more ministerial than discretionary in
the administration of a grievance. Therefore, in this context, a union
breaches the duty of fair representation when its conduct is "arbi-
trary. ' 66 This pronouncement of the standard in Vaca v. SipeS67 has
spawned much litigation and confusion. The section following will ad-
62. 386 U.S. 171 (1967).
63. See supra notes 19-49 and accompanying text.
64. The distinction was first recognized by the court in Hughes Tool v. NLRB, 147
F.2d 69 (5th Cir. 1945). Humphrey, 375 U.S. 335 established an objective component to
the standard announced in Steele supra note 28. For a discussion of this distinction see Lef-
tier, Piercing the Duty of Fair Representation: The Dichotomy Between Negotiations and Grievance
Handling, 1979 U. ILL. L.F. 35 (1979); Note, The Duty of Fair Representation: The Emerging
Standard of the Union's Duty in the Context of Negligent, Arbitrary or Perfunctory Grievance Adminis-
tration, 46 Mo. L. REV. 142 (1981).
65. Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, 345 U.S. 330, 338 (1953).
66. Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 190 (1967).
67. Id.
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dress the few Supreme Court decisions regarding standards in the con-
text of grievance administration, which will be followed by a summary of
the current struggle of the lower courts to arrive at some uniformity of
interpretation.
A. The Supreme Court and a Standard for Union Conduct in Contract
Administration
The Supreme Court has done little to remedy the confusion created
by Vaca v. Sipes.6 8 Many trees have consequently been sacrificed to ac-
commodate the literature devoted to identifying a standard by which
union conduct should be judged.6 9 Nevertheless, all of the standards
applied can trace their origins to Steele v. Louisville and Nashville R.R.
Co. 70 Steele imposed on unions a duty to represent their craft "without
hostile discrimination, fairly, impartially, and in good faith." 7 1 Applying
this formulation to contract administration (Steele involved the negotia-
tion of a collective bargaining agreement), courts would find no breach
of a union's duty to represent fairly as long as the representation was
carried out in good faith. 7 2 This standard, as applied, involved a subjec-
tive determination of what constituted good faith. The focus of the in-
quiry changed with the Supreme Court's opinion in Humphrey v. Moore.
73
Justice White, in dictum, addressed as a relevant consideration that "the
union took its position honestly, in good faith and without hostility or
arbitrary discrimination." 74 The introduction of the word "arbitrary"
hinted that the Court saw fit to initiate a new area of inquiry when evalu-
ating a union's decision of whether to process a grievance. More signifi-
cantly, this new area of inquiry suggested that in addition to the
prevalent subjective standard of good faith, within which a union must
exercise its discretion, a new standard, that of arbitrariness, was emerg-
ing as a judicial criterion of a union's duty of fair representation when
processing a grievance.
The "hint" turned into law in 1967 when the Supreme Court de-
cided Vaca v. Sipes. 7 5 In Vaca, an employee of a meat packing plant was
discharged because of poor health. 76 A grievance was filed and
68. Id. See infra notes 75-87 and accompanying text.
69. For example, in addition to numerous court opinions, see, Vandervelde, A Fair
Process Model for the Union's Fair Representation Duty, 67 MINN. L. REV. 1079 (1983); Note, The
Duty of Fair Representation After Hoffman v. Lonza: In Search of a Proper Standard for Reviewing
Union Representation in the Grievance Process, 1983 Wis. L REV. 1505 (1983); Note, The Emerg-
ing Standard of the Union's Duty in the Context of Negligent Arbitrary or Perfunctory Grievance Admin-
istration, 46 Mo. L. REv. 142 (1981); Steinhauer, IBEW v. Foust: A Hint of Negligence in the
Duty of Fair Representation, 32 HASTINGS L.J. 1041 (1981); Leffler, Piercing the Duty of Fair
Representation: The Dichotomy Between Negotiations and Grievance Handling, 1979 U. ILL. L.F. 35
(1979).
70. 323 U.S. 192 (1944).
71. Id. at 204.
72. See Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957).
73. 375 U.S. 335 (1964). For a discussion of the facts of this case see supra notes 55-
62 and accompanying text.
74. Id. at 350 (emphasis added).
75. 386 U.S. 171.
76. Id. at 174-175.
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processed through the third and fourth steps as provided in the collec-
tive bargaining agreement. 77 When the union tried to obtain better
medical evidence by sending the employee to another doctor, the exami-
nation proved futile to support the employee's position, and the union
did not take the grievance to arbitration. 78 The employee then brought
a hybrid section 301 suit in a Missouri trial court. 79 The Supreme
Court, in reviewing the union's conduct, applied the following standard:
"A breach of the statutory duty of fair representation occurs only when a
union's conduct toward a member of the collective bargaining unit is
arbitrary, discriminatory, or in bad faith." 8 0
The standard, as the Court noted,8 ' struck a balance between an
employee's right to have a grievance submitted to arbitration, and a
union's discretion to determine what grievances will go to arbitration.
The primary concern is to preserve an individual employee's rights and
dignity while insuring the smooth and proper functioning of the griev-
ance machinery as provided in the statutory scheme and the collective
bargaining agreement. As the Court observed in Vaca, it is important to
preserve union discretion regarding the decision to process a grievance,
because "the employer's [ensuing lack of] confidence in the union's au-
thority [would return] . . . the individual grievant to the vagaries of in-
dependent and unsystematic negotiation.' '82
In Vaca, the Supreme Court gave few indications as to what consti-
tuted arbitrary conduct. It was however clear that an employee did not
have an absolute right to have a grievance submitted to arbitration, 3
and if a union settles a grievance short of arbitration, it has not necessar-
ily breached its DFR. 8 4 Additionally, a finding by a court that a particu-
lar grievance had merit would not necessarily disturb a union's good
faith determination that it was not meritorious.8 5 However, a perfunc-
tory decision not to process the grievance or the union's disregard of an
employee's complaint would establish a breach of DFR. 86
The standard promulgated by Vaca became known as the three-pro-
nged standard.8 7 It is the subject of frequent citation and interpreta-
77. Id. at 175.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 176. State courts as well as federal can entertain § 301 suits, see Smith, 371
U.S. 195.
80. 386 U.S. at 190 (citing Humphrey v. Moore, 375 U.S. 335; and Ford Motor Co. v.
Huffman, 345 U.S. 330.
81. 386 U.S. at 190-191.
82. Id. at 191.
83. Id. at 191-192.
84. Id. at 192.
85. Id. at 193, 195. See also infra note 102 and accompanying text.
86. Id. at 194. This guideline from Vaca has evolved into the rational decision making
standard. See infra notes 104-112 and accompanying text.
87. Ruzicka v. General Motors Corp., 523 F.2d 306, 309-310 (6th Cir. 1975) (citing
Griffin v. Int'l Union of United Auto. Workers, 469 F.2d 181, 183 (4th Cir. 1974)).
A union must conform its behavior to each of these three separate standards.
First it must treat all factions and segments of its membership without hostility or
discrimination. Next, the broad discretion of the union in asserting the rights of
its individual members must be exercised in complete good faith and honesty.
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tion, spurning a legacy of litigation in lower courts striving for
homogeny. Despite several other Supreme Court decisions addressing
the standard, uniformity as yet, has not been realized, suggesting an in-
tention of the Court to delegate to the circuit courts the task of deter-
mining their own standards derived from general Supreme Court
guidelines.
Vaca had seemingly laid down a liberal path for courts to follow.
Yet, in Motor Coach Employees v. Lockridge,8 8 the Court qualified Vaca's
pronouncement of the arbitrariness standard by asserting that "[tihere
must be 'substantial evidence of fraud, deceitful action or dishonest con-
duct.' -89 Placing a greater burden on an employee alleging a breach of
a union's DFR, the Court added that the plaintiff would to show "sub-
stantial evidence of discrimination that is intentional, severe, and unre-
lated to legitimate union objectives" to prevail on such a claim. Lockridge
represents one extreme of the interpretation of the Vaca standard; how-
ever, in terms of the Supreme Court's view, Lockridge proved anomalous.
In Hines v. Anchor Motor Freight, Inc. ,90 the Court returned to the
Vaca standard absent Lockridge's evidentiary requirement of union mal-
ice, "in Vaca 'we accept[ed] the proposition that a union may not arbi-
trarily ignore a meritorious grievance or process it in a perfunctory
fashion.' "91 In so doing the Supreme Court certified the anomalous
character of Lockridge. Yet still the Lockridge standard lives on today in
the Seventh Circuit.
92
In further support of the Vaca-Hines formulation of the standard, the
Supreme Court in Electrical Workers v. Foust9 3 cited Vaca, Hines and
Humphrey when alluding to the proposition stated above in Hines, omitting
reference to Lockridge.94 Accordingly, in Del Costello v. International Broth-
erhood of Teamsters,95 the omission was again repeated.
9 6
The Supreme Court has left little doubt that arbitrary or perfunc-
tory handling of a grievance is a breach of a union's DFR, but what con-
stitutes "arbitrary" or "perfunctory" conduct? The subject of much
litigation, this determination has been left to the various lower courts
that entertain DFR claims. The following is a summary of the current
Finally, the union must avoid arbitrary conduct. Each of these requirements rep-
resents a distinct and separate obligation, the breach of which may constitute the
basis of a civil action.
The Ruzicka court concluded that arbitrary conduct need not be motivated by bad faith,
and pioneered the application of a negligence standard to the union's DFR in grievance
administration. 523 F.2d 306 (6th Cir. 1975).
88. 403 U.S. 274 (1970).
89. Id. at 299 (quoting Humphrey v. Moore, 375 U.S. 335, 348 (1964)).
90. 424 U.S. 554 (1975).
91. Id. at 568-69 (quoting Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 191 (1967)).
92. See Hoffman v. Lonza, Inc., 658 F.2d 519, 520-22 (7th Cir. 1981), Rupe v. Spector
Freight Sys. Inc., 679 F.2d 685, 691-92 (7th Cir. 1982); Superczynski v. P.T.O. Services,
Inc., 706 F.2d 200, 203 (7th Cir. 1983); Dober v. Roadway Express, Inc., 707 F.2d 292,
294-95 (7th Cir. 1983).
93. 442 U.S. 42 (1978).
94. Id. at 47.
95. 103 S. Ct. 2281 (1983).
96. Id. at 2290.
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state of the law in section 301 actions occurring in the wake of the Vaca
formulation of the standard for the breach of a union's DFR in the con-
text of grievance administration.
B. Current Standards
It is entirely possible that the courts are unequal to the task
of striking the proper balance between these many interests
and their infinite permutations and combinations.
9 7
Three trends have emerged in the various lower court's interpreta-
tion of the Vaca standard. The first and most prevalent will be referred
to as the adequate procedure standard.9 8 The second trend can be at-
tributed to reliance on Motor Coach Employees v. Lockridge,99 and is charac-
terized by an evidentiary showing of intentional, invidious or bad faith
conduct. The third trend is best described as a negligence standard (for
want of a better term) which constitutes a breach of DFR when negligent
conduct is compounded with a particular pressing circumstance to
render the conduct so negligent as to be arbitrary.
1. The Adequate Procedure Standard
The adequate procedure standard, in addition to being the most
prevalent approach in the courts to date, is probably the fairest standard
applied by the courts to determine a breach of a union's DFR. It pre-
serves efficiency and good faith union discretion, while affording the em-
ployee a reasonable representation. Its fairness is a function of its
flexibility, and consequently, it is difficult to isolate a single, all-encom-
passing standard of conduct.
Initially, following the language of Vaca, 10 0 a union must make a
good faith determination of a grievance's merit, thereby preserving the
97. Fourteen years after Vaca, Circuit Judge Cudahy arrived at this hardly startling
insight. Baker v. Amstead Industries, Inc., 656 F.2d 1245, 1252 (7th Cir. 1981).
98. For a theoretical discussion of an analogous model, see Vandervelde, A Fair Process
Model for a Union's Fair Representation Duty, 67 MINN. L. REV. 1079 (1983). At this juncture,
it would be beneficial to address the recent standards applied by the Board. The NLRB
has refrained from hearing "hybrid" DFR claims as unfair labor practices since 1980. See
supra notes 15-16 and accompanying text. However, many DFR suits brought solely
against a union are heard under § 8(b)(I)(A) of the Act. See Southern N.Y. Area Local
American Postal Workers Union, 266 N.L.R.B. 317 (1983) (refusal to process a grievance
because an employee is not a member of the local is an arbitrary decision and a breach of
DFR under § 8(b)(l)(A)); Clerks and Lumber Handlers Local 939, 269 N.L.R.B. No. 71,
1983-84 NLRB Dec. (CCH) 16,229 (1984) (having obtained legal advice and relying on
an interpretation of the collective bargaining agreement, a union's decision not to process
a grievance is not arbitrary); Office and Professional Employees Local 2, 268 N.L.R.B. No.
207, 1983-84 NLRB Dec. (CCH) 16,136 (1984) (looking to totality of the circumstances
to determine if failure to notify member of decision not to process is arbitrary; negligence
alone does not constitute arbitrary conduct); San Francisco Web Pressman and
Platemakers Union, 267 N.L.R.B. 451 (1983) (failure to investigate was a departure of past
union practice that amounted to a breach of DFR under § 8(b)(l)(A)); Local 282 Team-
sters, 267 NLRB 1130 (1983) (failure to notify employees of changes in seniority require-
ments was an allirmiative decision without rational basis, therefore arbitrary and a breach
of DFR).
99. See supa notes 88-89 and accompanying text.
100. "[AJ unuion must, in good faith and in a non-arbitrary manner, make decisions as
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expediency of the process by weeding out those grievances that are not
meritorious.' 0 ' However, the fact that a grievance may later be found
by a court to be meritorious does not establish a breach of DFR. 10 2 A
union's decision not to process a grievance, cannot be based on consid-
erations other than merit, for instance, seniority.
10 3
It follows that to make a good faith determination of the merit of a
grievance, a union cannot base that determination on arbitrary factors;
consequently, some courts have held that a union's decision not to pro-
ceed with a grievance must have a rational basis. 10 4 In Robesky v. Qantas
Empire Airways, Ltd., 1 5 the Ninth Circuit laid a precedent which estab-
lished various components of the adequate process standard that have
been subsequently adopted by other circuits.
Robesky involved the discharge of a reservation sales agent for inade-
quate performance. 10 6 After the grievance procedure was exhausted,
the union decided not to take her grievance to arbitration, then failed to
inform Robesky of the decision. 10 7 Robesky's ignorance led her to re-
ject an offer of settlement she would have otherwise accepted.' 0 8 The
court dismissed the claim against the company, holding that she was dis-
charged for cause, without a breach of the collective bargaining con-
tract. 10 9 However, as against the union, the court held that because
Robesky's company had made her an offer of settlement, the failure to
inform her of the decision not to go to arbitration was without rational
basis.I' 0 In addition, the Ninth Circuit ruled that unintentional acts or
omissions "may be arbitrary if [1] 'they reflect reckless disregard for the
rights of the individual employee . . . [2] they severely prejudice the
to the merits of particular grievances." 386 U.S. at 194 (citing Humphrey v. Moore, 375
U.S. at 349-50, and Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, 345 U.S. at 337-39).
101. "[Flrivolous grievances are ended prior to the most costly and time-consuming
step in the grievance procedures." 386 U.S. at 191.
102. 386 U.S. at 193; Sanders v. Youthcraft Coats, Inc., 700 F.2d 1226, 1229 (8th Cir.
1983); Seymour v. Olin Corp., 666 F.2d 202, 208 (5th Cir. 1982); Findley v. Jones Motor
Freight, 639 F.2d 953, 958 (3d Cir. 1981); Turner v. Air Transp. Dispatchers' Ass'n, 468
F.2d 297, 299 (5th Cir. 1972); Bazarte v. United Transp. Union, 429 F.2d 868, 872 (3d Cir.
1970). Compare Gregg v. Chauffeurs, Teamsters and Helpers Union Local 150, 699 F.2d
10"15, 1016 (9th Cir. 1983) ("The more important and meritorious the grievance, the more
substantial the reason must be to justify abandoning it"); Robesky v. Qantas Empire Air-
ways, Ltd., 573 F.2d 1082, 1092 (6th Cir. 1978) ("In determining whether a union's han-
dling of a grievance is arbitrary or perfunctory, the trial court should consider whether the
grievance lacked merit.") (Kennedy, J., concurring); Harrison v. United Transp. Union,
530 F.2d 558, 561 (4th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 958 (1976) (proofofa grievance's
merit is circumstantial evidence that a failure to process claim constituted bad faith).
103. Smith v. Hussmann Refrigerator Co., 619 F.2d 1229, 1239 (10th Cir. 1980), cert.
denied sub noma. United Steelworkers v. Smith, 449 U.S. 839 (1980).
104. Gregg v. Chauffeurs, Teamsters and Helpers Union Local 150, 699 F.2d 1015,
1016 (9th Cir. 1983) (decision lacking rational basis is arbitrary); Robesky v. Qantas Em-
pire Airways, Ltd., 573 F.2d 1082, 1089 (6th Cir. 1978); Matos v. Aeronaves de Mexico,
S.A., 548 F. Supp. 933, 938-39 (E.D.N.Y. 1982); Stephens v. Teamsters Local 2707, Air-
line, Aerospace and Allied Employees, 504 F. Supp. 332, 334-35 (W.D. Wash. 1980).
105. 573 F.2d 1082 (9th Cir. 1978).
106. Id. at 1084.
107. Id. at 1085.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 1091. See supra note 104 for cases addressing this rule.
1985] 639
DENVER UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW
injured employee . . . and [3] the policies underlying the duty of fair
representation will not be served by shielding the union from liability in
the circumstance of the particular case.' "'II
Focusing on whether the union's failure to inform Robesky was
made rationally, the court simply decided whether "the procedures fol-
lowed in the handling of the grievance were adequate."'12 Essentially,
for the purposes of review, the court refrained from granting union dis-
cretion its usual deference, saying that a union is subject to "the kind of
scrutiny we use whenever we review a determination by an individual or
body entrusted with discretionary power."' 113 Such statements epito-
mize the role of the courts in applying the adequate procedure standard.
In Robesky, a failure to give notice constituted a breach of the
union's DFR. However, a failure to notify an employee of a union deci-
sion is not always a breach of the duty. The determinative factor in most
cases is whether the union's failure to notify the employee significantly
affected the employee's situation. For instance, in Warehouse Union Local
860, International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. NLRB, 1 14 the court held that a
union's failure to advise membership of prior threats of job loss if de-
manded wage increases were granted, amounted to a breach of the
union's duty.' 15 Accordingly, a failure to notify an employee of the
scheduled date of an arbitration hearing is also a breach of DFR. 1 16 But
where a grievance was abandoned because an employee was rightfully
discharged, the failure to notify the employee did not constitute a
breach of DFR. 117 In a recent questionable ruling, a union's conduct
was not considered arbitrary when the union made a conscious decision
not to inform employees of a forthcoming plant closing. The court in
Abbington v. Dayton Malleable, Inc.,i 18 concluded that to notify employees
of an uncertain plant closing would "needlessly worry" employees and
therefore was "well-founded." 19
Finally, some failure to notify decisions turn on whether the con-
duct was intentional. In Harrison v. United Transportation Union,120 a case
arising under the RLA, a union's willful decision not to notify Harrison
of the abandonment of his grievance, allowing a time period to expire,
foreclosed his individual pursuit of the claim. 12 l In addition, since the
111. Id. at 1090.
112. Id. at 1092 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
113. Id.
114. 652 F.2d 1022 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
115. Id. at 1025.
116. Smith v. Hussmann Refrigerator Co., 619 F.2d 1229, 1241 (8th Cir. 1980).
117. Bazarte v. United Transp. Union, 429 F.2d 868, 872 (3d Cir. 1970).
118. 561 F. Supp. 1290 (S.D. Ohio 1983).
119. Id. at 1300.
120. 530 F.2d 558 (4th Cir. 1975).
121. Harrison's employer offered to reinstate another employer whose grievance was
pending if the union did not proceed with Harrison's grievance. 530 F.2d at 560. Such a
"trading" of grievances does not amount to a breach of DFR if the trade was an exercise of
good faith union discretion. However, "trading" grievances might constitute a breach if
concerted, discriminatory conduct is shown.
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union was obliged by its bylaws, a breach of DFR was found. 122 Con-
versely, in Hoffman v. Lonza, Inc. 123 a union that failed to give timely no-
tice because it "forgot" was relieved of liability because the employer
failed to show intentional invidious conduct that was directed at the em-
ployee. 124 Notwithstanding the evidentiary requirement of the Seventh
Circuit, courts have consistently found a breach of DFR when, in the
words of Robesky, union procedures "severely prejudice the injured em-
ployee" or "reflect reckless disregard for the rights of the individual
employee."1
2 5
Another frequently litigated aspect of the adequate procedure stan-
dard is the duty to investigate. This duty is intimately connected with an
informed, "rational" decision on the merits of a grievance discussed
above. In De Arroyo v. Sindicato de Trabajadores Packinghouse, 126 the failure
to investigate led the court to conclude that the union's judgment on the
merits of a grievance was arbitrary.12 7 Any court that applies a rational
decisionmaking standard is likely to find a breach of DFR when a union
fails to investigate the merits of a grievance.
Several other areas within the adequate procedure model require
discussion. A union has been found not to have breached its duty of fair
representation for merely misunderstanding a legal burden of proof, 128
or for a failure to raise an argument or call a witness when representing
an employee. 129 Similarly, a union's failure to provide a transcript or
lawyer to an employee has been held to not be a cause for a breach of
the duty. 130 However, when a union engages in needless correspon-
dence to ascertain whether a lawyer had received authorization from an
employee, thereby allowing the deadline for filing a grievance to expire,
a breach of DFR was found. 13 1 A union has been absolved of DFR lia-
bility when its conduct might have constituted a breach, but conformed
to the union's past prevailing practice.1
32
2. The Seventh Circuit's Standard
The Seventh Circuit, seemingly satisfied with the evidentiary re-
quirement of intentional, invidious or bad faith conduct espoused by
Lockridge,133 has never acknowledged Lockridge's omission from citations
122. Id. at 561-562.
123. 658 F.2d 519 (7th Cir. 1981).
124. Id. at 520-522.
125. Robeshy, 573 F.2d at 1090.
126. 425 F.2d 281 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 877 (1970).
127. Id. at 284. See also Freeman v. O'Neal Steel, Inc., 609 F.2d 1123, 1128 (5th Cir.
1980) (dictum), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 883 (1980); Turner v. Air Transp. Dispatchers' Ass'n,
468 F.2d 297, 299 (5th Cir. 1972).
128. Poole v. Budd Co., 706 F.2d 181, 185 (6th Cir. 1983).
129. Findley v. Jones Motor Freight, 639 F.2d 953, 958-960 (3d Cir. 1981).
130. Grovner v. Georgia-Pacific Corp., 625 F.2d 1289, 1291 (5th Cir. 1980).
131. Foust v. Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 572 F.2d 710, 715 (10th Cir. 1978), modified,
442 U.S. 42 (1978) (modified as to damage award).
132. Ruzicka v. General Motors Corp., 649 F.2d 1207, 1212 (6th Cir.), af'd, 707 F.2d
259 (6th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 1281 (1983).
133. See supra notes 88-89 and accompanying text.
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in subsequent Supreme Court DFR decisions. By refraining from ex-
pressly overruling Lockridge, the Supreme Court has essentially con-
doned the Seventh Circuit's interpretation.
In Hoffman v. Lonza, Inc. ,134 an employee filed a DFR suit under sec-
tion 301 of the Act because his union forgot to file a timely notice of
appeal, resulting in the dismissal of his grievance.' 3 5 The court held
that more than a mere showing of a failure to properly process a griev-
ance is required to establish a breach of DFR. 136 Quoting Lockridge, the
court added the evidentiary requirement to the plaintiffs burden of
proof mandating he show "substantial evidence of discrimination that is
intentional, severe, and unrelated to legitimate union objectives."' 1
3 7
The rationale for application of the standard was to minimize the possi-
bility of union-employee collusion in the recovery of damages. 13 8 Ap-
parently, the court believes that collusive DFR suits are more prevalent
than legitimate claims, and that the discovery of collusion outweighs the
need for retribution of individual employees. Clearly, the new burden
frustrates the underlying purpose of the doctrine.
Hoffman v. Lonza, Inc. has been followed by the Seventh Circuit in
several subsequent decisions. 139 In Superczynski v. P. T. 0. Services, Inc., 14 0
the court finally acknowledged the severe burden they imposed on an
employee, and graciously deferred jurisdiction falling below their stan-
dard to the NLRB. "Complaints about conduct that is not deliberately
discriminatory or arbitrary, or in bad faith are within the jurisdiction of
the National Labor Relations Board."' 14 1 Considering that section 301
breach of contract actions are not always "unfair labor practices", this
alternative is not, in every instance, viable. In addition, the NLRB is
more limited in terms of damage awards. 142 Finally, if the Board's deci-
sion is unfavorable to the employee, he can only appeal the Board's de-
cision to the local circuit court."1 4 3 In the Seventh Circuit such appeals
apparently would be futile. One redemming aspect of the Seventh Cir-
cuit's approach is that the interests of finality and exclusivity of the
grievance machinery are truly preserved.
3. The Negligence Standard
An overwhelming number of courts require more than negligent
conduct to establish a breach of DFR. 14 4 Application of such a lenient
134. 658 F.2d 519 (7th Cir. 1981).
135. Id. at 520.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 522.
138. Id.
139. See supra note 92.
140. 706 F.2d 200 (7th Cir. 1983).
141. Id. at 203.
142. See infra notes 155-184 and accompanying text.
143. 29 U.S.C. § 160() (1982).
144. See Rupe v. Spector Freight Systems, 679 F.2d 685, 691-692 (7th Cir. 1982);
Farmer v. ARA Services, Inc., 660 F.2d 1096, 1103 (6th Cir. 1981); Wyatt v. Interstate &
Ocean Transp. Co., 623 F.2d 888, 890 (4th Cir. 1980); Larry v. Penn Truck Aids, Inc., 567
F. Supp. 1410, 1413-1414 (E.D. Pa. 1983); Monroe v. Int'l. Union UAW, 540 F. Supp. 249,
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standard would enable the courts to intrude excessively into the dispute
resolution machinery. However, some courts have nevertheless found
that negligent conduct can be arbitrary or perfunctory. For example, in
Ruzicka v. General Motors Corp.,1 45 the Sixth Circuit found that a union's
inexplicable neglect in not taking an employee's grievance to a third
stage of processing combined with a subsequent failure to notify the em-
ployee and the company of its inaction was "negligent handling.., un-
related . . . to the merits . . . of the case . . . (constituting) a clear
example of arbitrary and perfunctory handling of a grievance." 146 Ulti-
mately however, in a sequence of litigation that spanned eight years Ru-
zicka's relief was denied, 14 7 and in so doing, the court rejected its
original formulation of the negligence standard of union conduct.
1 48
Nevertheless, the negligence standard still lives. All courts now
agree that simple negligence does not amount to a breach of a union's
duty, yet when combined with compelling circumstances, a breach of
DFR has been found. ' 49 In Dutrisac v. Caterpillar Tractor Co. ,150 the court
held, "where there has been a determination that a grievance is merito-
rious and the union negligently misses a time limit resulting in depriving
the employee of access to the mandatory grievance dispute process, the
union acted arbitrarily and so has breached its duty of fair representa-
tion." 15 1 Consider also Brown v. International Union, United Auto, Aerospace
and Agricultural Implement Workers of America,15 2 in which the court found
that a union's negligent failure to monitor a pension fund amounted to a
breach of its duty of fair representation,15 3 but because the deficit in the
pension fund was not connected with the union's failure to monitor the
fund, the claim was dismissed.
154
As with all cases alleging negligence, the existence of a duty is a
prerequisite to a finding that conduct was negligent. In the few recent
cases establishing negligent conduct as arbitrary, and therefore a breach
of DFR, the circumstance must give rise to an augmented duty that com-
pounds the negligence for liability to be assessed. Still, the prospects
for recovery under this standard are both isolated and remote.
253 (W.D. Ohio 1982), aff'd, 723 F.2d 22 (1983); Nunn v. Nat'l Fresh Fruit and Vegetable
Co., Inc., 541 F. Supp. 469, 477 (S.D. Tex. 1982).
145. 523 F.2d 306 (6th Cir.), reh'gdenied, 528 F.2d 912 (6th Cir. 1975), vacated, 649 F.2d
1207 (6th Cir. 1981), afd, 707 F.2d 259 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 424 (1983).
146. 523 F.2d at 310.
147. 707 F.2d 259 (6th Cir. 1983).
148. 649 F.2d 1207, 1212 (6th Cir. 1981) (failure to file grievance statement was based
on reliance on past prevailing practice and therefore conduct was merely simple negli-
gence, which does not constitute a breach of DFR). Compare 523 F.2d 306 (6th Cir. 1975).
149. Dutrisac v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 511 F. Supp. 719 (N.D. Cal. 1981); Brown v.
Int'l Union, United Auto, Aerospace and Agricultural Implement Workers of Am., 512 F.
Supp. 1337 (W.D. Mich. 1981), aff'd, 689 F.2d 69 (1982).
150. 511 F. Supp. 719 (N.D. Cal. 1981).
151. Id. at 727 (however, if the decision was rationally based, the action was not
arbitrary).
152. 512 F. Supp. 1337 (W.D. Mich. 1981), aff'd, 689 F.2d 69, 71-72 (6th Cir. 1982) (no
opinion as to negligence standard).
153. 512 F. Supp. at 1359-60.
154. id. at 1361.
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IV. RELIEF
A. The NLRB
In unfair labor practice proceedings brought before the NLRB, the
Board can award any loss of earnings necessary to return the employee
to his former status. Generally this consists of reinstatement with back
pay. 15 5 In any suit brought as a hybrid claim against the union and em-
ployer, the Board will apportion liability according to the fault of
each.1 56 Yet, if the conduct of an employer does not amount to an un-
fair labor practice, but did constitute a breach of contract, the Board is
powerless to order the employer to furnish any compensation. 15 7 This
has left the union with the weight of compensating the employee for
losses arising from the union's failure to process a grievance. 158 The
Board has also awarded attorney's fees for an independent counsel used
at arbitration. 159
B. The Courts
The scope of a damage award in hybrid DFR suits in the courts was
established in Vaca v. Sipes. 160 "If a breach of the duty by the union and
a breach of contract by the employer are proven, the court must fashion
an appropriate remedy."' 6 1 Vaca left the question open to a certain ex-
tent by asserting that "[the appropriate remedy] must vary with the cir-
cumstance of the particular breach."162 The Court maintained that the
employer should be liable for damages resulting from the breach of con-
tract, and that the union's liability is determined by increases in those
damages resulting from a failure to process the claim. 1
63
The scope of the award available in the courts under section 301
has proved more versatile and fruitful for plaintiffs than that awarded by
the NLRB. Although the Supreme Court has determined that punitive
damages are not recoverable in DFR suits, 1 64 the Sixth Circuit has re-
155. Back pay is computed with interest. A 12% interest rate award made by the NLRB
was upheld as representing the current borrowing rate in North Cambria Fuel Co., Inc. v.
NLRB, 645 F.2d 177 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1123 (1981).
156. NLRB v. Pac. Coast Util. Serv., Inc., 638 F.2d 73 (9th Cir. 1980) (per curiam)
(company's wrongful discharge of employee, plus inadequate union representation re-
sulted in joint and several liability).
157. Elec. Workers (IUE) Local 485, Int'l Union of Elec., Radio & Mach. Workers, 170
N.L.R.B. 1234 (1968),supplemented, 183 N.L.R.B. 1286 (1970), enforced in part, 454 F.2d 17
(2d Cir. 1972).
158. 417 UAW, 245 N.L.R.B. 527 (1979).
159. Glass Bottle Bowers Ass'n Local No. 106, 240 N.L.R.B. 324 (1979).
160. 386 U.S. 171 (1967).
161. Id. at 187.
162. Id. at 195.
163. Id. at 197-98. Note that the Court in Vaca distinguished this rule from incidents
when the union affirmatively caused the employer to breach the contract, in which case it is
likely that joint and several liability would be assessed (citing Imparato Stevedoring Corp.,
113 N.L.R.B. 883 (1955); Squirt Distrib. Co., 92 N.L.R.B. 1667 (1975); H.M. Newman, 85
N.L.R.B. 725 (1949)).
164. Elec. Workers v. Foust, 442 U.S. 42, 46-52 (1979) (offsetting the potential for
deterrence of unfair representation was the "possibility that punitive awards could impair
the financial stability of unions," at 48).
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cently upheld an award of damages for mental and emotional dis-
tress.165 Akin to the remedial authority of the Board, attorney's fees1
6 6
and reinstatement' 6 7 have also been granted by the courts. In addition,
damages for future losses have been determined an appropriate form of
relief. 168
Since the Vaca court announced the standard for apportionment in
hybrid DFR suits, 169 the Supreme Court has considered the question of
apportionment of damages four times, 170 finally arriving at a new stan-
dard in Bowen v. United States Postal Service.171
In Czosek v. O'Mara,' 72 the Court affirmed the standard announced
in Vaca by asserting that a party is only liable for those damages flowing
from his conduct. 173 Therefore, "damages against the union for loss of
employment are unrecoverable except to the extent that its refusal to
handle the grievances added to the difficulty and expense of collecting
from the employer."1
74
Hines v. Anchor Motor Freight, Inc. 175 reified the rulings of Vaca and
Czosek, but ruled that an arbitration award can be vacated if a breach of a
union's DFR is shown, 1 76 affording the employee a new order from the
court apportioning damages between union and employer based on the
foregoing principles.
While precluding an award of punitive damages for a breach of
DFR, the Court in Electrical Workers v. Foust,177 cited Vaca as precedent
for an award of damages in a DFR suit. 178 But the Vaca standard did not
last.
In Bowen v. United States Postal Service,179 the Supreme Court greatly
increased a union's liability in hybrid section 301 DFR suits. The Court,
claiming consistency with prior decisions, held that a union is responsi-
ble for all damages accruing from the time when it halted processing of a
165. Farmer v. ARA Services, Inc., 660 F.2d 1096, 1107 (6th Cir. 1981).
166. Del Casal v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 634 F.2d 295, 301 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 454
U.S. 892 (1981) (reimbursement by union for employee's independently retained
attorney).
167. De Arroyo v. Sindicato de Travajadores Packinghouse, 425 F.2d 281, 291 (1st
Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 877 (1970) (the remedy of reinstatement in § 301 suit not barred
by § 4(a) of the Norris- Laguardia Act).
168. Smith v. Hussmann Refrigerator Co., 619 F.2d 1229, 1246 (8th Cir.), cert. denied,
449 U.S. 839 (1980) ("j]ury entitled to take into account the continuing nature of the
injury sustained by plaintiffs.")
169. See supra note 163 and accompanying text.
170. Bowen v. United States Postal Serv., 459 U.S. 212 (1983); Elec. Workers v. Foust,
442 U.S. 42 (1979); Hines v. Anchor Motor Freight, Inc., 424 U.S. 554 (1976); Czosek v.
O'Mara, 397 U.S. 25 (1970).
171. 459 U.S. 212 (1983).
172. 397 U.S. 25 (1969).
173. Id. at 29.
174. Id. (as long as the union had no hand in causing the discharge).
175. 424 U.S. 554 (1975).
176. Id. at 569-571.
177. 442 U.S. 42 (1979) ("[Rlelief should be fashioned to make the employee whole,"
citing Steele, 323 U.S. at 207).
178. Id. at 49-50.
179. 459 U.S. 212 (1983).
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grievance, if that cessation was a breach of DFR.180 The Bowen Court, in
support of its position, alluded to Vaca's statement that increases in
damages are attributable to the union.1 81 This formulation of appor-
tionment will result in findings of union liability for all back pay from the
time of its refusal until the controversy is resolved in the courts; a poten-
tially crippling sum when one considers the span of some controver-
sies. 18 2 Increasing the union's liability in DFR suits is in recognition of
the employer's reliance on the union's decision not to process a griev-
ance, according to the Court.' 83 Although this consideration seems
slight in light of such a drastic penalty, the Court was certainly correct
when it stated its rule on apportionment would "provide additional in-
centives for the union to process its member's claims where war-
ranted."' 18 4 Whether lower courts will adhere to such an imposing
penalty on union conduct will be revealed in time.
V. EXHAUSTION
An employee's failure to exhaust remedies provided in the collec-
tive bargaining agreement and in the union's constitution and by-laws is
a defense for the union and employer in DFR suits. Like most rules,
though, there are exceptions to this procedural prerequisite to DFR
actions.
A. Internal Union Remedies
The Supreme Court resolved another part of the section 301 DFR
puzzle in Clayton v. Automobile Workers,' 8 5 a section 301 hybrid suit
brought by an employee discharged for violation of a plant rule prohib-
iting "defined misbehavior."' 1 6 After pursuing the employee's griev-
ance through three steps of the grievance procedure, the union
withdrew a timely request for arbitration.' 8 7 The UAW's constitution
required exhaustion of internal union appeals before commencing an
action outside the union; this, employee Clayton did not do.' 8 8 Instead
he filed suit under section 301 in the Northern District of California.' 8 9
Both union and employer raised the defense of failure to exhaust. 190 In
allowing Clayton's claims to proceed, the court addressed three factors
as relevant:
[F]irst, whether union officials are so hostile to the employee
that he could not hope to obtain a fair hearing on his claim;
second, whether the internal union appeal procedures would
180. Id. at 223.
181. Id. at 223-24.
182. Consider the eight-year legacy of Ruzicka, supra note 145.
183. 459 U.S. at 226.
184. Id. at 227.
185. 451 U.S. 679 (1981).
186. Id. at 682.
187. Id.
188. Id. at 682-83.
189. Id. at 683.
190. Id. at 683-84.
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be inadequate either to reactivate the employee's grievance or
to award him the full relief he seeks under § 301; and third,
whether exhaustion of internal [union] procedures would un-
reasonably delay the employee's opportunity to obtain a judi-
cial hearing on the merits of his claim.' 9 1
The Court concluded that even if an appeal by Clayton were re-
ceived favorably by the union, it was foreclosed from demanding arbitra-
tion, because the time limit for filing an appeal had expired.' 9 2 Thus,
the Supreme Court established the "futility exception" to the require-
ment of exhaustion of internal union remedies. Clayton has been cited in
many circuits without disfavor.'
9 3
Another possible exception to the failure to exhaust internal reme-
dies defense is the claim of ignorance, yet the courts are split on the
propriety of this exception. In Fristoe v. Reynolds Metals Co. ,'94 the Court
affirmed a trial court ruling that exhaustion barred a claim despite the
fact that the employee was never informed of the requirement by his
union. 19 5 But when a union actively mislead the employee as to its ex-
haustion requirements, exhaustion by the employee was excused. 19 6
Accordingly, vague and uncertain by-laws,' 9 7 and the failure to provide
a spanish speaking employee with a translator' 9 8 have also precluded
assertion of the defense. Despite the apparent frequency of successful
counteractions to the defense, the requirement of exhaustion of internal
union procedures is still quite a viable defense as it fosters the preserva-
tion of the internal dispute resolution machinery. 199
B. Contractual Remedies
Unlike most every other area of section 301 litigation, the require-
ment that an employee exhaust the contractual remedies provided in the
191. Id. at 689 ("If any of these factors are found to exist, the court may properly
excuse the employee's failure to exhaust.").
192. Id. at 691-692.
193. Majewski v. B'nai B'rith Int'l, 721 F.2d 823, 824 (D.C. Cir. 1983); Local 644 Int'l
Photographers v. IATSE, 563 F. Supp. 1334, 1337 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (exhaustion of internal
union remedies unnecessary where union demonstrates unwillingness to hear local's
claim); Scott v. Local 863, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 725 F.2d 226, 229 (3rd Cir. 1984)
(citing Clayton as establishing case-by-case factual standard to ascertain futility); Doby v.
Safeway Stores, Inc., 523 F. Supp. 1162, 1167 (E.D. Va. 1981) (exhaustion not required
even when relief against one of the parties could be had); Haynes v. Bhd. of Ry. and Air-
line Clerks/Allied Serv. Div., 734 F.2d 219, 221 (5th Cir. 1984) (per curiam) (exhaustion
required where employee alleges hostility of union representing employee, and not union
officials who were to hear appeal); Monroe v. Int'l Union, UAW, 723 F.2d 22, 24 (6th Cir.
1983) (failure to exhaust precludes suit against union and employer); Schultz v. Owens
Illinois, Inc., 696 F.2d 505, 513 (7th Cir. 1982) (exhaustion not required because time
limit had expired); Rader v. United Transp. Union, 718 F.2d 1012, 1014 (11 th Cir. 1983).
194. 615 F.2d 1209 (9th Cir. 1980) (per curiam).
195. Id. at 1214.
196. Ruggirello v. Ford Motor Co., 411 F. Supp. 758, 762 (E.D. Mich. 1976) (union
estopped from asserting exhaustion of internal remedies defense when employee's attor-
ney's ignorance was a result of union misrepresentation).
197. Robinson v. Marsh Plating Corp., 443 F.Supp. 811, 813-814 (E.D. Mich. 1978).
198. Retana v. Apartment, Motel, Hotel & Elevator Operators Local 14,453 F.2d 1018,
1027 (9th Cir. 1972).
199. Clayton, 451 U.S. at 694-95.
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collective bargaining agreement between union and employer was not
established in Vaca v. Sipes, but two years earlier in Republic Steel Corp. v.
Maddox.200 In Maddox, an employee laid off by his company brought suit
to recover severence pay as required in the collective bargaining agree-
ment.20 ' Employee Maddox failed to utilize the three-step grievance
and arbitration procedure before he brought suit in Alabama state court
alleging breach of contract. The Supreme Court held that "individual
employees wishing to assert contract grievances must attempt use of the
contract grievance procedure agreed upon by employer and union as a
mode of redress." '20 2 The Court justified its holding alluding to con-
gressional intent as preferring deference to the grievance machinery as
provided in the contract.
20 3
Vaca v. Sipes20 4 proceeded to carve out two exceptions to the Maddox
doctrine. First, if an employee can prove a breach of a union's DFR in
processing the grievance, exhaustion of contractual remedies is no de-
fense to union or employer.20 5 Second, if the conduct of the employer
amounts to a repudiation of the contractual procedures, exhaustion
again becomes an ineffective defense.
20 6
In Glover v. St. Louis-San Francisco Railway Co.,207 a case decided
shortly after Vaca, the Supreme Court established a "futility" exception
to the exhaustion of contractual remedies requirement. Stating that
pursuit of contractual remedies would have proved "absolutely futile,"
the Court attributed creation of the exception to cover situations in
which "application of the exhaustion rule would defeat the overall pur-
poses of federal labor relations policy."
20 8
The Supreme Court apparently felt a need to firmly establish excep-
tions to the requirement of exhaustion to afford the employee relief
when no other was available. The courts were essentially opening the
door to judicial review of a claim after the employee had tried all the
others in the hallway to no avail.
VI. STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS
Although Congress provided federal statutory rights of redress
under the NLRA, Congress failed to provide a statutory limitations pe-
riod. When faced with this situation, federal courts have traditionally
adopted the limitations period of an analogous state statute.
20 9
Problems arose in the context of the hybrid action because courts lacked
200. 379 U.S. 650 (1965).
201. Id. at 650-651.
202. Id. at 652.
203. Id. at 653.
204. 386 U.S. 171 (1967).
205. Id. at 186. See also Miller v. Gateway Transp. Co., Inc., 616 F.2d 272, 274-275
(7th Cir. 1980) (DFR breach plus a showing that grievance was meritorious required to
establish exception to defense of failure to exhaust contractual remedies).
206. 386 U.S. at 185.
207. 393 U.S. 324 (1969).
208. Id. at 329-31.
209. Campbell v. Hauerhill, 155 U.S. 610 (1895); McCluny v. Silliman, 28 U.S. 270
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uniformity in their characterization of the underlying claim.210
Since unfair representation actions are frequently brought in con-
junction with section 301 actions, characterization of a claim as one in
contract, rather than tort, greatly extends the statute of limitations pe-
riod.2 11 The courts' only guideline in choosing the proper limitations
period is to best effectuate the underlying federal policy. 2 12 The court
in Abrams v. Carrier Corp.2 13 found the claims against the union to be so
intimately related to the claims against the employer that the six year
statute of limitations was applied to both the employer and the union,
greatly increasing the length of the union's vulnerability.
2 14
The United States Supreme Court faced the problem of choosing
the most appropriate state statute of limitations period in United Parcel
Service v. Mitchell.2 15 Mitchell was discharged by his employer for alleged
dishonest acts. A grievance was filed by the union and submitted to a
joint employer-union grievance panel pursuant to the terms of the col-
lective bargaining agreement. The panel upheld the discharge. Seven-
teen months later Mitchell filed a complaint in the federal district court
against the union and employer under Section 301 (a) alleging the union
breached its duty of fair representation and the employer had dis-
charged him without reason.
2 16
Both the union and employer moved for summary judgment on the
ground that the ninety-day statute of limitations for vacation of arbitra-
tion awards barred this action. The district court granted the motion,
but it was vacated by the Second Circuit, which held the proper statute
of limitations as the six-year contract statute.
2 17
The Supreme Court found that the district court made the proper
choice given the two state law alternatives and the undesirable effect of
having the results of the arbitration process suspended in limbo for long
periods of time. 2 18 Justices Blackmun and Brennan, while concurring
with the majority, felt that the six-month statute of section 10(b) of the
Act should be used as the appropriate limitation.
2 19
(1830). This traditional rule was applied in the context of a § 301 suit in United Auto
Workers v. Hoosier Cardinal Corp., 383 U.S. 696, 704-05 (1966).
210. Tuma v. Am. Can Co., 367 F. Supp. 1178 (D.N.J. 1973). "[Tihe determinations
by various courts of how to classify the unfair representation claim in order to determine
what particular state statute of limitations to apply have been anything but uniform." Id. at
1183.
21 1. States commonly have a six year statute of limitations for contract actions,
whereas the typical statute of limitations period in tort is one year.
212. United Auto Workers v. Hoosier Cardinal Corp., 383 U.S. 696 (1966).
213. 434 F.2d 1234 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied sub nom. United Steelworkers v. Abrams,
401 U.S. 1009 (1971).
214. Id.
215. 451 U.S. 56 (1981).
216. Id. at 58-59.
217. Mitchell v. United Parcel Serv., 624 F.2d 293 (2d Cir. 1980).
218. 451 U.S. 56 (1981).
219. Id. at 64-65 (BlackmunJ., concurring); Id. at 65-71 (Stewart,J., concurring). Sec-
tion 10(b) of the NLRA is found at 29 U.S.C. § 160(b) and provides in pertinent part:
Whenever it is charged that any person has engaged in or is engaging in any such
unfair labor practice, the Board, or any agent or agency designated by the Board
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The Court had the opportunity to address the applicability of Sec-
tion 10(b) in the context of a hybrid suit in Del Costello v. International
Bortherhood of Teamsters.22 0 Del Costello, employed as a truck driver,
either quit or was fired for refusing to drive a tractor trailer which he
found to be unsafe. The union, unsuccessful in its attempt to reinstate
Del Costello, brought a formal grievance pursuant to the terms of the
collective bargaining agreement. A hearing was held before a regional
union-management committee which concluded the grievance was with-
out merit.
22 1
Approximately six months later Del Costello filed an action in fed-
eral district court alleging wrongful discharge in violation of the collec-
tive bargaining agreement against the employer and breach of the duty
of fair representation against the union. The defendants asserted that
the state thirty-day statute of limitations of actions to vacate arbitration
awards barred Del Costello's claims. The district court originally dis-
agreed, holding the state statute of limitations for contract actions was
the proper limitations period. 2 22 On reconsideration the court granted
the summary judgment motion, holding the Mitchell decision compels
application of the thirty day limitations period for both the union and
the employer. 2 23 This decision was affirmed by the Fourth Circuit Court
of Appeals.
22 4
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider Del
Costello and the companion case of Flowers v. Local 2602, United Steelwork-
ers of America22 5 in light of Mitchell. The Court noted that the hybrid suit
has no close analogy in ordinary state law and the analogies suggested in
Mitchell suffer from serious legal and practical flaws. Quoting from Jus-
tice Stewart's concurring opinion in Mitchell, the Court held:
In § 10(b) of the NLRA, Congress established a limitations pe-
riod attuned to what is viewed as the proper balance between
bargaining relationships and finality of private settlements, and
an employee's interest in setting aside what he views as an un-
just settlement under the collective bargaining system ....
Accordingly, '[t]he need for uniformity' among procedures fol-
lowed for similar claims, ... as well as the clear congressional
indication of the proper balance between the interests at stake
counsels the adoption of § 10(b) of the NLRA as the appropri-
ate limitations period for lawsuits such as this.
2 2 6
of such purposes, shall have power to issue and cause to serve upon such person
a complaint . . . no complaint shall issue based upon any unfair labor practice
occurring more than six months prior to the filing of the charge.
220. 103 S. Ct. 2281 (1983).
221. Id. at 2285-86.
222. Del Costello v. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 510 F. Supp. 716 (D. Md. 1981).
223. Del Costello v. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 524 F. Supp. 721 (D. Md. 1981).
224. Del Costello v. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 679 F.2d 879 (4th Cir. 1982) (mem.).
225. 622 F.2d 573 (2d Cir. 1980) (mem.) (Flowers was also a hybrid suit which was dis-
missed for failure to file a complaint within New York's 90 day statute of limitations for
actions to vacate arbitration awards).
226. 103 S. Ct. at 2294, quoting United Parcel Serv. v. Mitchell, 451 U.S. 56, 70-71
(1981) (Stewart, J., concurring).
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In Barnett v. United Air Lines, Inc.22 7 the Tenth Circuit applied the
section 10(b) six-month statute to a hybrid section 301 case brought
under the RLA. The RLA provides a two-year statute in provisions gov-
erning practice before the National Railway Adjustment Board
(NRAB). 2 28 In arriving at the holding, the Tenth Circuit rejected appli-
cation of the two-year RLA statute, finding a hybrid DFR cause of action
under the RLA more akin to hybrid suits under the NLRA than to prac-
tice before the NRAB.2 29 The court placed a great deal of reliance on
Del Costello's statements regarding the congressional intent of uniform
enforcement under the federal laws.
230
VII. CONCLUSION
In recent years the Supreme Court has resolved many of the proce-
dural controversies facing DFR suits brought under section 301 of the
Taft-Hartley Act.23 1 The only areas which remain unresolved are the
right to jury trial23 2 and the standard to be applied when determining
whether arbitrary union conduct is a breach of DFR. The Court has ap-
parently allocated the latter determination to the lower courts because
fact patterns are bound to be so varied that a single pronouncement of
the standard would not accommodate the interests of all those involved.
The Supreme Court, in rendering final determinations in areas of proce-
dural controversy in section 301 DFR suits, has determined that this
cause of action has finally come of age. This trend can be interpreted as
an effort to iron out the wrinkles in DFR procedure, paving an avenue of
relief in the courts for the wronged employee. The Court's actions have
firmly established that the labor dispute mechanisms evisioned by Con-
gress in 1935 are insufficient without the buttress of judicial
intervention.
233
Certain factors mitigate the desirability of a section 301 suit as op-
posed to an unfair labor practice proceeding brought before the Board.
As with most judicial proceedings, much time generally passes before a
claim is heard. Whereas unfair labor practice proceedings brought
before the Board are given priority over all other claims. 23 4 Addition-
227. 738 F.2d 358 (10th Cir.), vacating Barnett v. United Air Lines, Inc., 729 F.2d 693
(10th Cir. 1984).
228. 45 U.S.C. § 153 First(r) (1982).
229. 738 F.2d at 363.
230. Id., citing Del Costello, 103 S. Ct. at 2289.
231. Statute of limitations, Del Costello v. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 103 S. Ct. 2281
(1983); scope of damage award, Bowen v. United States Postal Serv., 459 U.S. 212 (1983);
Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers v. Foust, 442 U.S. 42 (1979); Vaca v. Sipes, 386, U.S. 171
(1967); exhaustion of internal union remedies, Clayton v. Auto. Workers, 451 U.S. 679
(1980); exhaustion of contractual remedies, Republic Steel Corp. v. Maddox, 379 U.S. 650
(1965); preemption, Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171 (1967).
232. ABA SEC. OF LAB. AND EMPL. I THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAw, 1306 (C.J. Morris
ed., 2d ed. 1983).
233. As recently as 1978, one author noted, "If one theme is apparent, it is the continu-
ing uncertainty over the final contours of the doctrine [DFR] and the constant state of flux
in the Board and the courts." T.J. BOYCE, FAIR REPRESENTATION, THE NLRB AND THE
Cotrs 119 (1978). Since 1978, many of the "contours" have achieved final shape.
234. 29 U.S.C. 160(m) (1982).
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ally, it can be assumed that the Board is more familiar with labor issues
and disputes than most judicial forums. Finally, in unfair labor practice
proceedings, no breach of contract need be proved.
Nevertheless, when weighing the relative advantages of suits
brought before the NLRB and those in the courts under section 301, the
latter emerges as the preferential route. Consider these advantages: the
courts can award damages, even for harms as intangible as mental dis-
tress;2 3 5 the NLRB, a politically appointed body, has unreviewable dis-
cretion to hear cases, while an employee who brings a section 301 suit is
assured of his "day in court"; lastly, in section 301 DFR suits, the court
entertains claims against both union and employer, 23 6 enhancing the
prospect of full recovery for the employee, as opposed to the NLRB
which has recently refrained from entertaining "hybrid" suits.
23 7
This note has covered the origins and current standards applied by
lower courts toward the duty of fair representation. Additionally, the
procedural barriers that at one time inhibited and obscured the judici-
ary's role in DFR claims have also been examined. With the assistance
of the Supreme Court, the section 301 DFR suit has evolved into a
nearly finished judicial product. In the fifty years since the passage of
the Wagner Act, labor organizations have become somewhat independ-
ent political bodies, disassociated from their membership. Conse-
quently, the unions' interests may, for reasons intolerable to the judicial
system, deviate from those of individual employees who entrust the un-
ions with their representation. The maturation of the section 301 DFR
suit marks a return to recognition of the original purpose of the Ameri-
can labor movement: the establishment and preservation of individual
employee's rights.
Jonathan S. Willett
235. Farmer v. ARA Services, 660 F.2d 1096, 1106 (6th Cir. 1981).
236. See supra note 161 and accompanying text.
237. See supra notes 15-16 and accompanying text.
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The establishment of industrial peace in the United States had been
an overriding governmental concern in the twentieth century. Modifica-
tions of the system have been necessary as government has attempted to
organize an equitable and efficient system of industrial relations to re-
solve employer-employee disputes. To rectify perceived abuses of labor
unions and to promote democratic processes within these unions, Con-
gress enacted the Labor-Management Report and Disclosure Act
(LMRDA) in 1959.1
Edward Sadlowski challenged the concept of democracy in labor
unions by running for the office international president of the United
Steelworkers of America in 1977.2 Sadlowski raised campaign funds by
soliciting non-union members for contributions. 3 After Sadlowski's de-
feat in the union election, the Steelworkers union amended its constitu-
tion by adding a provision prohibiting the future solicitation of
campaign contributions from "outsiders," those not members of the
union.4 Sadlowski challenged the constitutional amendment of the
union by commencing a legal action. 5 Although the district and appel-
late courts invalidated the union amendment, the Supreme Court held
that the "outsider" rule was a valid exercise of union authority.
6
This article discusses the LMRDA and its provisions for fair union
elections and individual member rights in the union and describes the
series of events that led to the Sadlowski litigation, summarizing the
three court opinions involved. It concludes with a critique of the
Supreme Court's decision which deviates from the Court's political
spending doctrine and provides a barrier to the promotion of union
democracy.
* Associate Professor of Business Law, College of Business Administration, Univer-
sity of Iowa.
.. Associate, Baker & Hostetler; Cleveland, Ohio.
1. Pub. L. No. 86-257, 73 Stat. 519 (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 153, 158-60, 187, 401-
531 (1982)).
2. Sadlowski v. United Steelworkers, 645 F.2d 1114, 1115 (D.C. Cir. 1981) [hereinaf-
ter cited as Sadlowski II].
3. Id. at 1116.
4. Id.
5. Sadlowski v. United Steelworkers, 507 F. Supp. 623 (D.D.C. 1981) [hereinafter
cited as Sadlowski 1].
6. United Steelworkers v. Sadlowski, 457 U.S. 102 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Sad-
lowski III], revg 645 F.2d 1114 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
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I. THE LABOR-MANAGEMENT REPORTING AND DISCLOSURE ACT OF 1959
In 1957 the Senate Select Committee on Improper Activities in the
Labor-Management Field, popularly called the McClelland Committee,
began extensive investigation of union abuses. 7 "For months the com-
mittee paraded across the public stage a series of sordid spectacles of
union corruption and oppression."'8 In fact, the McClelland Committee
heard over 1,500 witnesses, took over 46,000 pages of testimony, and
summarized its findings in three reports.9 The committee's work
culminated in the passage of the Labor-Management Reporting and Dis-
closure Act of 1959,10 also known as the Landrum-Griffin Act."
The LMRDA was Congress' attempt to eliminate crime and corrup-
tion within unions12 and to ensure union democracy.13 The Senate re-
port states that "(wihat is required is the opportunity to influence policy
and leadership by free and periodic elections."1 4 Congress nevertheless
did not want to interfere with union autonomy. 15 Although the initial
drafts of the LMRDA focused upon reporting and disclosure require-
ments, the final version contained a "bill of rights" in Title I and proce-
dures for fair and honest elections in Title IV. 16 The most relevant
provisions of Titles I and IV are briefly described below.
A. The LMRDA Bill of Rights
The first provision of the union member bill of rights is the equal
rights provision contained in LMRDA section 101(a)(1). The provision
states:
Every member of a labor organization shall have equal rights
and privileges within such organizations to nominate candi-
dates, to vote in elections or referendums of the labor organi-
zation, to attend membership meetings, and to participate in
the deliberations and voting upon the business of such meet-
ings, subject to reasonable rules and regulations in such organ-
7. Note, Restrictions on "Outsider" Participation in Union Politics, 55 CHI. [-]KENT L. REV.
769, 774-75 (1979).
8. Summers, American Legislation for Union Democracy, 25 MOD. L. REV. 273 (1962).
9. Id. at 273, n.l.
10. 29 U.S.C. §§ 153, 158-60, 187, 401-531 (1982); supra note 1.
11. Summers, supra note 8.
12. S. REP. No. 187, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 1-5 (1959) reprinted in I N.L.R.B., LEGISLA-
TIVE HISTORY OF THE LABOR-MANAGEMENT REPORTING AND DISCLOSURE ACT OF 1959, at
397-401 (1959).
13. In Trbovich v. United Mine Workers, 404 U.S. 528 (1972), the United States
Supreme Court described the role of the LMRDA as follows:
The LMRDA was the first major attempt of Congress to regulate the internal
affairs of labor unions. Having conferred substantial power on labor organiza-
tions, Congress began to be concerned about the danger that union leaders
would abuse that power, to the detriment of the rank-and-file members. Con-
gress saw the principle of union democracy as one of the most important safe-
guards against such abuse, and accordingly included in the LMRDA a
comprehensive scheme for the regulation of union elections.
Id. at 530-31.
14. Supra note 12, at 6-7, reprinted in 1 NLRB, supra note 5, at 402-03.
15. Id.
16. Summers, supra note 8, at 274.
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ization's constitution and bylaws. 17
The provision was enacted to prohibit unions from discriminating
against certain members by classifying them as "junior" members,
thereby denying them full membership rights. 18
While the provision guarantees every member the right to nominate
candidates and vote in elections, the Supreme Court has held that the
provision does not guarantee a member the right to be a candidate. Un-
ions may establish reasonable eligibility requirements for union officers
pursuant to Title IV of the Act. 19 Furthermore, the Court held that
Title IV rather than Title I is the appropriate vehicle for challenging
union elections.2 0 Nevertheless, the equal rights provision still serves
an important role in ensuring union democracy.
A second provision of the bill of rights is the freedom of speech and
assembly provision contained in LMRDA section 101(a)2). The provi-
sion states:
Every member of any labor organization shall have the right to
meet and assemble freely with other members; and to express
any views, arguments, or opinions; and to express at meetings
of the labor organization his views . . . upon any business
properly before the meeting, subject to the organization's es-
tablished and reasonable rules pertaining to the conduct of
such meetings.
2 '
The purpose of this provision is to allow union members to speak out
without fear of reprisal on important union matters.2 2 Pursuant to this
provision, a union member is protected from union disciplinary pro-
ceedings when he publishes an article that is critical of union officers,2 3
even when he slanders a union official.2 4 The member's freedom of
speech and association is limited, however, by the union's right "to
adopt and enforce reasonable rules as to the responsibility of every
member toward the organization as an institution and to his refraining
from conduct that would interfere with its performance of its legal or
contractual obligations."
2 5
. A third provision of the bill of rights is the protection of the right to
sue which states:
No labor organization shall limit the right of any member
thereof to institute an action in any court, or in a proceeding
before any administrative agency, irrespective of whether or
not the labor organization or its officers are named as defend-
ants or respondents in such action or proceeding, or the right
17. 29 U.S.C. § 411(a)(1) (1982).
18. Summers, supra note 8, at 284-86.
19. Calhoon v. Harvey, 379 U.S. 134, 140 (1964).
20. Id. at 138-41.
21. 29 U.S.C. § 411(a)(2) (1982).
22. See, e.g., NLRB v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 175, 194-95 (1967); Mallick v.
Int'l Brh. of Elec. Workers, 644 F.2d 228, 235 (3d Cir. 1981).
23. Sheridan v. Liquor Salesmen's Union Local 2, 303 F. Supp. 999 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
24. Keefe Bros. v. Teamsters Local 592, 562 F.2d 298 (4th Cir. 1977); Marshall v.
Local 815, United Textile Workers, 479 F. Supp. 613 (E.D. Tenn. 1979).
25. 29 U.S.C. § 411 (a)(2) (1982).
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of any member of a labor organization to appear as a witness in
any judicial, administrative, or legislative proceeding, or to pe-
tition any legislature or to communicate with any legislator:
Provided, That any such member may be required to exhaust
reasonable hearing procedures (but not to exceed a four-
month lapse of time) within such organization, before institut-
ing legal or administrative proceedings against such organiza-
tions or any officer thereof: And provided further, That no
interested employer or employee association shall directly or
indirectly finance, encourage, or participate in, except as a
party, any such action, proceedings, appearance, or petition.
2 6
The provision fosters union democracy by allowing a member to enforce
his rights in a legal proceeding without fear of reprisal or barriers by the
union. Thus, a union may not expel a member because he sued the
union.
2 7
A fourth provision protects members from increases in union mem-
bership fees without a vote. 28 A fifth provision protects members
against improper disciplinary actions by granting members procedural
due process rights.
29
B. Title IV Procedures for Fair Elections
Title IV of the LMRDA is an attempt by Congress to provide fair
procedures for union elections. Subsections 401(a) and (b) state the
minimum period within which elections must be held. The section also
mandates secret balloting. 30 Subsection 401 (c) requires the labor union
to mail any bona fide candidate's campaign materials at the candidate's
expense. In addition, a candidate is allowed to inspect the membershp
list once within thirty days of the election. A candidate also has the right
to have an observer present at the polls when the votes are counted. 3i
A major provision of Title IV is subsection 401(g), which provides:
No moneys received by any labor organization by way of dues,
assessment, or similar levy, and no moneys of an employer shall
be contributed or applied to promote the candidacy of any per-
son in an election subject to the provisions of this title. Such
moneys of a labor organization may be utilized for notices, fac-
tual statements of issues not involving candidates, and other
expenses necessary for the holding of an election.
3 2
Under subsection 402(a), an aggrieved union member who has ex-
hausted his union remedies or has not received a final decision within
three months can file a complaint with the Secretary of Labor. 33 Under
subsection 402(b), the Secretary is directed to investigate complaints
26. 29 U.S.C. § 411 (a)(4) (1982).
27. Carroll v. Assoc. Musicians, Local 802, 235 F. Supp. 161, 172 (S.D.N.Y. 1963).
28. 29 U.S.C. § 41 l(a)(3) (1982).
29. 29 U.S.C. § 411 (a)(5) (1982).
30. 29 U.S.C. §§ 481(a),(b) (1982).
31. 29 U.S.C. § 481(c) (1982).
32. 29 U.S.C. § 481(g) (1982).
33. 29 U.S.C. § 482(a) (1982).
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and file a civil suit to set aside an election if he finds probable cause to
believe the election violated Title IV of the LMRDA. 34 The district
court may declare an election void and order a new election under the
supervision of the Secretary of Labor.
3 5
II. THE LITIGATION
A. Prelude to the Litigation
In 1973, Edward Sadlowski, Jr. ran for the directorship of the larg-
est union district of the United Steelworkers of America (Union).3 6 The
Union declared that Sadlowski's opponent, who was supported by the
incumbents, had won the election. Sadlowski requested that the Secre-
tary of Labor institute a suit to invalidate the election. After the Secre-
tary filed suit, the Union agreed to hold a new election. The Labor
Department supervised the new election, and Sadlowski won by a sub-
stantial majority.
37
In 1977, I.W. Abel, the international president of the Union, an-
nounced his retirement. In a heated campaign for the position vacated
by Abel, Sadlowski ran against Lloyd McBride, who was supported by
the Union hierarchy.38 McBridge financed his campaign predominantly
with funds donated by the union staff; Sadlowski financed his campaign
with substantial contributions from nonmembers. 39 During the cam-
paign, the union membership debated whether candidates should be al-
lowed to receive funds from outside the Union. 40 In the election,
McBride received 328,861 votes and Sadlowski received 249,281.41 The
Secretary of Labor refused Sadlowski's request to file suit to invalidate
the election for alleged LMRDA violations and was upheld by the dis-
trict court.
4 2
The debate over outside election financing continued after the 1977
election. In 1978, the Union held its biennial convention which was at-
tended by approximately 5,000 delegates elected from the local districts.
At the convention, the delegates adopted Article V, section 27, as an
amendment to its constitution by a ten-to-one margin. The amendment,
known as "the outsider rule," prohibited candidates for high offices
4 3
from accepting or soliciting financial support, including direct and indi-
rect support, from any non-member.4 4 The outsider rule also provided
34. 29 U.S.C. § 482(b) (1982).
35. 29 U.S.C. § 482(c) (1982).
36. Sadlowski I1, 645 F.2d at 1115.
37. Sadlowski 1, 507 F. Supp. at 623-24.
38. Id.
39. Sadlowski 11, 645 F.2d at 1115-16.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 1116.
42. Sadlowski I11, 457 U.S. at 105.
43. Sadlowski 11, 645 F.2d at 116.
44. The positions subject to the rule are the International President, International
Secretary, International Treasurer, International Vice-President (Administration), Interna-
tional Vice President (Human Affairs), and the national director of Canada, and one dis-
trict director for each district. USWA CONST., art. IV, § 1 (1976). The Union's
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that the Union could promulgate regulations under that rule and could
establish a three-person Campaign Contribution Administrative Com-
mittee (Committee) to administer the rule. Anyone who violated the
rule could be disqualified from the election 4 5 and subjected to discipli-
nary action. 4 6 After the promulgation of the outsider rule, Sadlowski
sued the Union to prevent it from enforcing the rule. 4 7 The Union's
lawyers requested an advisory opinion from the newly created Commit-
tee stating that the outsider rule did not apply to election-related litiga-
tion expenses. The Committee obliged the Union lawyers by narrowly
construing the outsider rule, stating:
An intention to limit one's access to the judicial system, a prov-
ince which is so fundamental the structure of government, can-
not be inferred. It would have to be established by clear and
convincing expressions of intent. This is not the case
here. . . . This opinion is, of course, confined to services
which are in fact legal services customarily performed by law-
yers. The Committee recognizes the possibility that any ruling
which it makes in general terms and in response to a broad in-
quiry may be misconstrued or distorted in an attempt to ration-
alize political activities as "legal services." It will deal with
those questions whenever they arise on a case-by-case basis.
48
The Committee further advised that it would examine on a case-by-case
basis whether a lawsuit instituted by a candidate was a bona fide suit to
enforce legal rights or a charade to secure political gains.4 9
International Executive Board is comprised of the officers subject to the rule. Id. art. IV,
§ 18.
45. The relevant language of the rule is as follows:
No candidate (including a prospective candidate) for any position set forth in
Article IV, Section 1, and supporter of a candidate may solicit or accept financial
support, or any other direct or indirect support of any kind (except an individ-
ual's own volunteered personal time) from any non-member. For purposes of
this Section, the term non-member means any person who is either not eligible
for membership under Article III or not in good standing or any foundation,
corporation or other entity whose funds are derived in whole or in part from any
person not eligible for membership under Article III or not in good standing.
Sadlowski H, 645 F.2d at 1126-27.
46. The relevant language of the rule is as follows:
The International Executive Board shall adopt regulations, for incorporation into
the International Union Elections Manual, as necessary to implement this provi-
sion and to assure conformity with the obligations prescribed in this Section.
Such regulations shall include requirements for reporting by candidates and their
supporters of information pertinent to administration of and compliance with this
Section, with such frequency, not to exceed weekly, as the International Board
deems appropriate.
There is hereby created a Campaign Contribution Administration Committee to
administer and enforce this Section.
The Committee shall have the following powers:
(d) In the event that a candidate, or a supporter of a candidate with that candi-
date's knowledge or acquiescence, willfully and substantially breaches the
obligations prescribed in this Section, . . . the Committee shall . . . have
the power to declare such candidate disqualified . . ..
Sadlowski 11, 645 F.2d at 1126-27.
47. USWA CoNsT. art. XII; 645 F.2d at 1123.
48. Sadlowski I1, 457 U.S. at 106.
49. Sadlowski/ , 645 F.2d at 1117-18.
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B. The District Court Opinion
Sadlowski challenged the outsider rule claiming that it violated:
(1) the first amendment rights of members and nonmembers;
(2) the National Labor Relations Act;
(3) subsection 101(a)(4) of the LMRDA; and
(4) subsection 401(g) of the LMRDA.
50
The District Court for the District of Columbia invalidated the outsider
rule and permanently enjoined the Union from enforcing the rule.
5 1
The court stated that subsection 101 (a)(4) of the LMRDA protected
a member's right to sue his union and any curtailment of that right was
prohibited. 52 The court went on to hold that the outsider rule, even as
narrowed in scope by the Committee's advisory opinion, violated the
right to sue protected by subsection 101 (a)(4). It invalidated the rule in
its entirety because it found that the remainder of the rule prohibiting
contributions from non-members, could not be separated from the un-
lawful provisions and the rule as a whole would have a chilling effect
upon a member's right to sue. 53 The court, exercising its power under
section 102 of the LMRDA, 54 ordered the Union to announce the invali-
dation of the rule to the Union membership by publishing a notice in
Steel Worker magazine for three consecutive months. 5 5 The court dis-
missed the first amendment claims finding there was no state action
involved.
5 6
C. The Court of Appeals Opinion
The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia affirmed and
modified the district court's decision. 5 7 The appellate court had "no
difficulty in ruling that the outsider rule on its face violates th[e] right to
sue provision."'58 The court stated that the rule would prohibit a union
candidate from raising outside funds to finance election-related litiga-
tion or accepting legal services free of change if the lawyer's secretary
were to work on the case (presumably because the lawyer would have to
pay the secretary for his or her time). The court intimated that the
Union passed the rule to prevent candidates from filing suits during
campaigns, as Sadlowski did before, during, and after his bid for the
Union presidency.
59
The Union claimed that the advisory opinion issued by the Commit-
tee sufficiently narrowed the reach of the outsider rule to remove it from
50. Id. at 1118.
51. d. at 1116.
52. Sadlowski 1, 507 F. Supp. at 626-27.
53. Id. at 625.
54. Id.
55. Section 102 of the LMRDA authorizes a court to grant "such relief (including
injunctions) as may be appropriate." 29 U.S.C. § 412 (1982).
56. Sadlowski 1, 507 F. Supp. at 626-27.
57. Sadlowski H, 645 F.2d at 1125-26.
58. Id. at 1117.
59. d.
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the scope of the right to sue provision. The court disagreed. Although
the main part of the Committee's advisory opinion stated that the rule
did not apply to legal services, another part of the opinion warned that if
the legal claim was not bona fide, but rather an attempt to promote the
candidate's campaign, the Committee would apply the rule after exam-
ining the facts of the particular case. 60 The appellate court was as con-
cerned about that section of the advisory opinion as was the district
court. The appellate court, however, was more concerned about a regu-
lation under the rule that was adopted after the district court opinion.
6 1
That regulation restated the union's position that legal services can be
funded with outside resources, but warned that legal proceedings
"designed to extract political gain" were not exempt from the operation
of the rule. 62 The court of appeals held that the regulation violated the
right to sue provision because legal suits filed during union elections
would normally be initiated to advance political gains. 63 Since the out-
sider rule, on its face, violated the right to sue provision and the at-
tempts to narrow the rule's reach were unsuccessful, the court held that
the rule was invalid.6 4
In an attempt to limit the scope of the remedy prescribed by the
district court, the Union argued that if the outsider rule violated subsec-
tion 101(a)(4), then the Union only should be enjoined from applying
the rule to litigation expenses. Although the court rejected the district
court's nonseparability argument, 6 5 it nevertheless invalidated the rule
in its entirety, because it found that the remainder of the rule violated
the freedom of speech provisions of subsection 101(a)(2) of the
LMRDA.
66
The Union contended that the appellate court could not rely upon
the freedom of speech provision because it was not raised at the trial
court level. 6 7 The appellate court noted that Sadlowski's complaint con-
tained two first amendment causes of action. The court also noted that
the freedom of speech provision contained within the LMRDA6 8 had the
same reach as the first amendment would have if it were to supply to
unions. Therefore, the court reasoned that the Union had briefed this
issue to the court and had the opportunity to defend itself against the
first amendment claims. Thus, the court felt justified in relying upon the
LMRDA freedom of speech provision for its decision. 6 9
60. Id.
61. See supra notes 43-49 and accompanying text.
62. Sadlowski I1, 645 F.2d at 1118.
63. Id.
64. "One would go a fair distance to find any lawsuit brought during the heat of a
campaign that was not designed to extract political gain." Id. at 1119.
65. Id. at 1118-19.
66. The district court stated: "[tihe unlawful effects of the rule cannot be separated
from the rule as a whole. Because the application of the rule to litigation support is not
'functionally independent' from the balance of the rule . . . the entire rule must be de-
clared invalid and of no force and effect. ... 507 F. Supp. at 625.
67. Sadlowski 1I, 645 F.2d at 1119.
68. Id.
69. 29 U.S.C. § 411(a)(2) (1982).
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The court stated that the freedom of speech provision was modeled
after the first amendment, 70 and embodied freedom of association
rights as well. The court next turned to the underlying rationale of the
LMRDA for guidance in interpreting the freedom of speech and associa-
tion provisions. It found that the underlying rationale for the LMRDA is
the promotion of union democracy and since challengers face substan-
tial barriers in a union election, the outsider rule hampers union democ-
racy and violates the freedom of speech provision.
7 1
The court, quoting from Buckley v. Valeo, 72 described the freedom of
speech provision and its impact upon union elections as analogous to
the first amendment and its impact upon federal elections. Since the
Buckley opinion protects campaign contributions and expenditures as
first amendment exercises, the court held that campaign contributions
and expenditures in a union election should be similarly protected
under the LMRDA.
7 3
While the court recognized that the Union had a legitimate interest
in protecting itself from nefarious outside influences, the outsider rule
went too far. 74 The court also rejected the Union's argument that the
rule was valid under the statute as a "reasonable" measure to protect its
internal affairs. Rather, the court held that the total ban on outside fi-
nancing was not a reasonable exercise of the Union's power to safeguard
union affairs and members' responsibilities to the Union.
75
The court bolstered its analysis be referring to subsection 401 (g).
7 6
This subsection prohibits the use of union and employer funds to fi-
nance union elections. The court concluded that Congress did not in-
tend to exclude financing from outside the union. 77 The congressional
hearings and reports preceding the enactment of the LMRDA demon-
strated that the unions were fraught with corruption. The court rea-
soned that Congress must have realized that union democracy could
only be restored, and corrupt influences purged, if honest candidates
could use outside financing to replace the corrupt, incumbent union
staff.
78
The court thus invalidated the outsider rule, with the exception of
one narrow provision, which allows the Union's executive committee to
delegate any other authority derived from other parts of the Union con-
stitution, holding that part of the rule was valid as long as the Union did
70. Sadlowski H, 645 F.2d at 1120.
71. Id. at 1120-21.
72. 424 U.S. 1, 19 (1976).
73. Sadlowski If, 645 F.2d at 1122.
74. Id. at 1122-23.
75. Id. at 1123-24.
76. 29 U.S.C. § 481(g) (1982).
77. The court noted that, although Congress had not completely preempted the field
of union financing, it simply could not have meant to allow the absolute prohibition advo-
cated by the union. "Such construction would leave union members practically at the
mercy of every entrenched group of incumbents." Sadlowski I, 645 F.2d at 1125.
78. Id. at 1124-25.
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not delegate powers that purported to restrict election financing. 79
D. The Supreme Court Opinion
1. The Majority Opinion
The majority opinion, authored by Justice Marshall, rejected Sad-
lowski's argument that the freedom of speech and association rights
conferred upon union members by the LMRDA were analogous to the
same first amendment rights that the Constitution confers upon citi-
zens.8 0 Relying upon the legislative history of the freedom of speech
provision, 8 1 the Court concluded that Congress intended to provide
union members with rights similar to those granted in the first amend-
ment, but did not make those rights absolute. The members' free
speech rights could be impinged by a union rule which reasonably pro-
tects union interests.8 2 The court next examined the facts of the Sadlow-
ski case and balanced Sadlowski's free speech rights against the Union's
interest in preventing outside influences on its affairs. It found that the
outsider rule does impinge upon rights that the LMRDA was enacted to
protect; for example, a member's rights to criticize the union without
reprisal and to run for union office. 83 The Court concluded, however,
that the rule does not substantially restrict those protected rights8 4 since
outsider rule serves a legitimate interest of the union, and that union
interest is one that Congress intended to protect under the LMRDA. It
further noted that the legislative history indicated congressional con-
cern with outsiders (racketeers) controlling the unions, and the outsider
rule helps to prevent that evil. 8 5
The Court rejected Sadlowski's argument that the rule was not rea-
sonable because there were less restrictive means available, such as
union adoption of a ceiling on contributions by outsiders. It found that
the Union attempted to prevent even the aggregation of numerous small
contributions by outsiders.8 6 Additionally, the Court rejected Sadlow-
ski's claim that the rule was unreasonable because it prohibited contri-
butions by family members and relatives.
8 7
The Court also found that the outsider rule did not violate the right
to sue provision. Specifically, the rule makes no mention of election-
related litigation; thus, those events are not covered. Additionally, the
79. Id. at 1125-26.
80. Sadlowski 111, 457 U.S. at 104.
81. Id. at 108-09.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 108-10.
84. Id. at 113-14.
85. Id. at 116-17 (citing 105 CONG. REC. S6470-71 (1959) (Statement by Sen.
McClellan)).
86. Id. at 118.
87. Id. The Court found that the USWA [United Steelworkers of America] had a rea-
sonable basis for its decision to impose a broad ban because "[a]n exception for family
members and friends might have created a loophole that would have made the rule unen-




Court accepted the Campaign Contribution Administration Commit-
tee's advisory opinion and the regulation thereunder as evidence that
the rule does not apply to election-related litigation.8 8
2. The Dissent
Justice White filed a dissenting opinion in which Chief Justice Bur-
ger and Justices Brennan and Blackmun joined.89 The dissent stated
that the LMRDA was enacted to promote union democracy through fair
and open elections modeled after federal political elections.9 0 The dis-
sent found the outsider rule to be a drastic restriction of the members'
right to free speech and right to run for office. 9 ' Quoting Buckley v.
Valeo,9 2 the dissenters noted that the challenger running for office would
have severe limitations placed upon him if he were restricted in his cam-
paign financing.9 3 They felt that a limit on outsider contributions along
with a disclosure requirement would serve the Union's interest in
preventing outside influences without overly burdening the insurgent's
ability to wage an effective campaign against the incumbent.
9 4
III. DEFINING A REASONABLE UNION CAMPAIGN SPENDING DOCTRINE
The Sadlowski Court failed to follow essential principles of campaign
spending jurisprudence in its determination of the nature of the rights
infringed by the Union's contribution ban and the reasonableness of
that infringement. The Court also failed to look beyond the analysis
employed in Buckley v. Valeo to determine the nature of the union mem-
bers' protected rights and totally omitted discussion of the "right to
hear" doctrine of First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti.9 5 The Court's
decision that union bans of outside contributions are permissible is dia-
metrically opposed to the concept of freedom of speech in a democratic
election that the Court has espoused in other recent cases. This opinion
also illustrated the Court's increasing deference to contributions as pro-
tected speech in its political spending doctrine.
96
A. The Interests Protected by the Statutory Bill of Rights
Since unions are private associations, they are not subject to the
first amendment. Subsection 101(a)(2) of the LMRDA, however, con-
88. Id. at 119-20.
89. Id. at 121.
90. Id. at 122-24.
91. Id. at 123-27.
92. 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam).
93. Sadlowski I11, 457 U.S. at 127.
94. Id. at 127-28.
95. 435 U.S. 756 (1978).
96. Citizens Against Rent Control v. City of Berkeley, 454 U.S. 290 (1981) (the
Court's most recent exposition of its political spending doctrine.) For a complete discus-
sion of the changing status of contributions and expenditures in political campaigns, see
Lansing & Sherman, The "Evolution" of the Supreme Court's Political Spending Doctrine: Restrict-
ing Corporate Contributions to Ballot Measure Campaigns after Citizens Against Rent Control v.
City of Berkeley, 8J. CORP. L. 104-08 (1982).
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fers freedom of speech and assembly rights upon union members.
Those rights are subject to the union's right to adopt "reasonable rules
as to the responsibility of every member toward the organization as an
institution and to his refraining from conduct that would interfere with
its performance of its legal or contractual obligations. ' 9 7 The Court
adopted a two-part test: first, does a union rule interfere with a right
within the statutory protection of the union bill of rights; and second, is
such invasion reasonable?
98
It should be noted that the Court's two-pronged test does not deny
that first amendment interests are within the statutory ambit of subsection
101(a)(2). The difference in the standard first amendment analysis lies
in the validity of the restrictions on those interests. The analysis stops at
the mere recognition that protected interests are affected by a complete
ban on outside contributions to a candidate in a union election. The
Court's failure to discuss the nature of the protected rights is important,
as that should be crucial in determining what constitutes a reasonable
infringement on the rights of free speech and assembly conferred upon
union members by the LMRDA.
The majority's exploration of the application of political spending
precedent is limited to a footnote in which it attempts to distinguish the
applicability of that body of law by stating:
In several First Amendment cases, we have protected contribu-
tion and solicitation of the financial support necessary to fur-
ther effective advocacy (citations omitted). These cases are not
directly analogous, however. Contribution limitations poten-
tially infringe the First Amendment rights of contributors as
well as candidates (cite omitted). Here, the nonmember contrib-
utors have no right of expression protected by the statute. 99
The Court's cursory examination of its campaign spending doctrine
leaves room for a more detailed examination of the rights at issue. The
most significant omission was the fact that the first amendment rights of
candidates and contributors were not the exclusive issue because the
rights of union members are directly affected when outside contribu-
tions are prohibited. The development of the Court's political spending
doctrine, as enunciated in Buckley v. Valeo,1 00 is instructive in this regard.
In Buckley, the Court decided that constitutionality of the 1974
amendments to the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971.101 This
Act, as amended, set dollar limits on both direct and campaign expendi-
tures and contributions to a candidate's campaign.10 2 As a general prin-
97. 29 U.S.C. § 411 (a)(2) (1982).
98. Sadlowski I11, 457 U.S. at I1!1.
99. Id. at 113, n. 6.
100. 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam).
101. Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-225, 86 Stat. 3, amended by
the Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-443, 88 Stat.
1263 (codified, as amended, in scattered subsections of §§ 2, 4, 5, 18, 26, and 47 U.S.C.)
(1982).
102. The statutes at issue contain the following provisions: (a) individual political con-
tributions are limited to $1,000 to any single candidate per election, with an overall annual
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ciple, the Court decided that political spending restrictions limit
effective communication and have the negative effect of limiting the in-
terchange of ideas in the community, a result contrary to the purposes
of the first amendment.1 0 3 Expenditure ceilings were found to directly
restrain the ability of candidates, citizens, and associations to engage in
protected speech.10 4 It distinguished contribution ceilings from expen-
diture ceilings in that contribution ceilings only marginally restrict the
contributor's ability to communicate and the contributor maintains his
individual freedom of expression.' 0 5 Also, contribution limitations only
marginally infringe upon first amendment freedom of association, since
groups can make direct expenditures to effectively amplify their collec-
tive voice. 
106
The government restraints on the expenditures and contributions
in Buckley were also distinguishable by the nature of the interests served
in the reduction of each. The Buckley Court found that there is a con-
stituionally sufficient government interest in avoiding the appearance of
corruption in the political process, a result clearly possible in the con-
text of a quid pro quo relationship between a contributor and a candi-
date. 10 7 It thus upheld the contribution ceilings because they served a
compelling state interest and only marginally infringed upon protected
first amendment rights. 1
0 8
If the campaign spending analysis were to end here, the Court's
holding in Sadlowski would be unobjectionable as judged by its own first
amendment principles. Although the Buckley case did not legitimize a
total ban on political contributions, at issue in that case were first
amendment rights subject to a strict scrutiny test. The statutory rights
subject to a lesser standard of scrutiny in the Sadlowski case could rea-
sonably justify a complete ban on outside contributions. Furthermore,
as the Buckley Court noted, the non-member contributors at issue in Sad-
lowski were not within the statutory freedom of speech protections
granted by the LMRDA. 10 9
Although the Sadlowski Court cited political spending cases, it did
not venture to explain their impact. The Court declined to discuss their
limitation of $25,000 by any contributor; independent expenditures by individuals and
groups "relative to a clearly identified candidate" are limited to $1,000 a year; campaign
spending by candidates for various federal offices and spending for national conventions
by political parties are subject to prescribed limits: (b) contributions and expenditures
above certain threshold levels must be reported and publicly disclosed; (c) a system for
public funding of Presidential campaign activities is established by subtitle H of the Inter-
nal Revenue Code; and (d) a Federal Election Commission is established to administer and
enforce the legislation. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 7 (footnote omitted).
103. Id. at 19. "Being free to engage in unlimited political expression subject to a
ruling on expenditures is like being free to drive an automobile as far and as often as one
desires on a single tank of gasoline." Id. at 19, n. 18.
104. Id. at 23.
105. Id. at 28-29.
106. Id. at 21-22.
107. Id. at 26-27.
108. Id.
109. Sadlowski 111, 457 U.S. at 113, n. 6.
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findings in First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti. I 10 The Bellotti case in-
volved a Massachusetts statute prohibiting corporate spending in ballot
measure (non-candidate) campaigns.II' The Court framed the issue as
whether the state statute abridged expression that was properly within
the ambit of first amendment protection.' 2 Thus, the identity of the
contributor became irrelevant; the key was the first amendment right of
the electorate to hear all arguments without the hinderance of state
spending restraints.' 13 The Court stressed the importance of the mar-
ketplace of ideas in the democratic system."
l 4
After identifying the nature of the first amendment interests in-
volved, the Bellotti Court's analysis next determined if the contribution
ban served a compelling government interest in the least restrictive
manner. 1 5 The Court found that the interest compelling contribution
ceilings in Buckley was not present in the ballot measure context." 6 The
only viable government interest that could be served in restraining cor-
porate spending was "preserving the integrity of the electoral pro-
cess. . ,,"17 That standard would be violated only if corporate
spending overwhelmed the electorate and threatened the confidence of
the citizenry in the government."' 8 The Bellotti Court found that the
record revealed no overwhelming or even significant corporate influ-
ence, hence, the contribution ban could not survive strict first amend-
ment scrutiny. 119
In Sadlowski, the Court indicated that the Bellotti case, along with the
other campaign spending cases cited, was not directly analogous be-
cause the statute failed to protect the expression of non-member con-
tributors. 120 The rationale of the Bellotti holding revealed that it is the
danger of infringing upon the rights of the union members that is most
pressing, not the rights of the non-member contributors who are with-
out the statutory protections.'
2 '
The rights at issue can also be expanded by the Court's decision in
110. 435 U.S. 765 (1978).
111. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 55, § 8 (West 1977) (ruled unconstitutional in 1978).
See MASS. ANN. LAws ch. 55 § 8 (Michie/Law. Co-op. Supp. 1984)
112. Bettotti, 435 U.S. at 776.
113. Id. at 776-77.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 786. Although first amendment rights are absolute, they may be curtailed by
government interests of vital importance. Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347 (1976). Thus, the
first amendment permits reasonable regulation of speech connected activities in carefully
restricted circumstances. NAACP v. Clairborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886 (1982);
Young v. American Mini-Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50 (1976); Pell v. Prownier, 417 U.S. 817
(1974). However, free expression cannot be abridged or denied in the guise of regulation.
Grayned v. Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 (1971).
116. Id. at 789-91.
117. Id. at 788-89.
118. Id. at 789-90.
119. Id. at 784. A constitutionally permissible time, place or manner restriction may
not be based on either the content or the subject matter of the speech. Consolidated
Edison Co. v. Public Serv. Co., 447 U.S. 530 (1980); Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507
(1976).
120. Sadlowski 111, 457 U.S. at 113, n. 6.
121. Beltotti, 435 U.S. at 425-6.
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Citizens Against Rent Control v. City of Berkeley12 2 (CARC). There, the Court
found unconstitutional an ordinance that placed a two hundred and fifty
dollar ceiling on contributions to ballot measure campaigns. 12 3 Chief
Justice Burger's majority opinion expressed the belief that campaign
contributions are entitled to the strictest first amendment protec-
tions. 124 This view is consistent with the Chief Justice's concurring
opinion in Buckley, in which he stated that "contributions and expendi-
tures are two sides of the same first amendment coin." 1 2 5 It is different,
however, from the lesser status accorded contributions in Buckley, which
was a per curiam opinion of the court. The CARC Court found that the
contribution ceiling could not stand because there was "no significant
state or public interest in curtailing debate and discussion of a ballot
measure."1
2 6
The importance of the CARC decision for Sadlowski is twofold. First,
it reveals a breakdown of the former constitutional distinctions between
contributions and expenditures, which can be read as consistent with the
Bellotti analysis in which distinctions between contributor and contribu-
tions were eliminated. The CARC Court reasoned that "[t]he contribu-
tion limit thus automatically affects expenditures and limits on
expenditures operate as a direct restraint on freedom of expression of a
group or committee desiring to engage in political dialogue . . . ,,127
The shift in the Court's attitude makes it reasonable to infer that the
outside contributions at issue in Sadlowski have a sufficient nexus to the
candidate's expression to warrant statutory protection. The CARC
Court's emphasis on the importance of contributions in election cam-
paigns should justifiably carry over to the microcosm of union
democracy.
The second impacting factor from the CARC decision was the
Court's refusal to allow even the most minimal restriction on contribu-
tions to survive when less restrictive alternatives were available. The
Court found that "the public interest allegedly advanced by [the contri-
bution ceiling]-identifying the sources of support for and opposition to
ballot measures-is insubstantial because voters may identify those
sources under the [disclosure] provisions .... ,,128 This aspect of the
CARC opinion is useful in determining the reasonableness of limitations
in a union election campaign.
B. Reasonable Limitations
Under traditional first amendment analysis, government limitations
on campaign spending must serve a compelling government interest in
122. 454 U.S. at 290 (1981).
123. Berkeley Election Reform Act of 1974, Berkeley, Cal. Ord. No. 4700-N.S. § 602
(June 4, 1974).
124. CARC, 454 U.S. at 298.
125. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 241.
126. CARC, 454 U.S. at 299.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 298-99.
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the least restrictive manner. 12 9 The Sadlowski Court held that union lim-
itations on campaign spending need only-be rationally related to a legiti-
mate union interest.' 30 The legitimate union interest at issue was the
reduction of outsider interference with union affairs. 13 1 Thus, the
threshold analytical question concerned the rationality of the union limi-
tation on the freedom of speech interests protected by the LMRDA.
132
The Court accepted the legitimacy of the union's fear "that officers
who received campaign contributions from non-members might be be-
holden to those individuals and might allow their decisions to be influ-
enced by considerations other than the best interests of the union."'
3 3
In the Court's political spending cases, that problem was referred to as
the danger of the quid pro quo relationship between contributor and can-
didate. 13 4 In the context of strict scrutiny under the first amendment,
avoiding even the appearance of a quid pro quo is justifiable as a compel-
ling government interest. 135 In the context of reduced scrutiny under
the LMRDA, the same interest seems to justify the union restrictions in
Sadlowski. Large outside contributions could establish the appearance of
a quid pro quo between union leaders and outside contributor.
If, however, a less restrictive alternative also satisfies the union in-
terest, then the union rule is arguably overbroad and unreasonably
strict. The Court apparently accepted that position by choosing to re-
fute the visibility of Sadlowski's suggested less restrictive alternatives
that ostensibly satisfied the same union interests.'
36
Sadlowski argued that a less restrictive alternative would only allow
the union to place contribution ceilings on outside contributions, rather
than the complete ban actually imposed. 137 The Court reasoned that:
USWA [United Steelworkers of America] feared not only that a
few individual nonmembers would make large contributions,
but that outsiders would solicit many like-minded persons for
small contributions which, when pooled, would have a substan-
tial impact on the election. This fear appears to have been rea-
sonable. In the 1977 election, Sadlowski received a significant
percentage of his campaign funds from individuals who made
contributions after receiving mail solicitations signed by promi-
nent nonmembers. 1
3 8
The Court's analysis directly contradicts its political spending doc-
129. Sadlowski Il1, 457 U.S. at 111; Brown v. Hartlage, 456 U.S. 45, 53-54 (1982). For a
discussion of State regulation of political contributions and expenditures by private indi-
viduals, see Annot., 94 A.L.R. 3d 944 (1979). See generally, Campaign Financing of Internal
Union Elections, 128 U. PA. L. REV. 1094 (1980).
130. Sadlowshi I1, 457 U.S. at 111-12.
131. See Note, supra note 7.
132. See generally Annot. 26 A.L.R. Fed. 806 (1976) (discussing construction of the free-
dom of speech and assembly provisions of LMRDA § 101 (a)(2)).
133. Id. at 115.
134. Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 790-91; Buckley, 424 U.S. at 26-27.
135. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 26-27.
136. Sadlowski 111, 457 U.S. at 118.




trine. The Court was concerned by the alleged danger from outside in-
fluence arising from a number of small contributions that allow a
candidate for high union office to mount an effective campaign. In the
past, the courts recognized the danger that an official would be person-
ally indebted to a large-scale contributor. Although it only requires
common sense to recognize that the quantum of campaign funds could
have an impact on the outcome of an election,' 3 9 the Court's political
spending doctrine could not be more explicit in its opposition to limit-
ing spending because of fear that the resulting message will influence
the outcome of an election. 140 When considering the advantage of
wealth in campaign, the Buckley Court stated that "the concept that gov-
ernment may restrict the speech of some elements of our society in or-
der to enhance the relative voice of others is wholly foreign to the First
Amendment." 14'
If contribution ceilings were in effect, the only danger from outside
contributions is posed by the influence of the different ideas espoused
by a union candidate. In Bellotti, the Court stated that "the people in our
democracy are entrusted with the responsibility forjudging and evaluat-
ing the relative merits of conflicting arguments."' 4 2 The Bellotti Court
further stated that: "[t]o be sure, corporate advertising may influence
the outcome of the vote; this would be its purpose. But the fact that
advocacy may persuade the electorate is hardly a reason to suppress it:
The Constitution 'protects expression which is eloquent no less than
that which is unconvincing.' ,,143 It reasoned that contributions were
"the type of speech indispensible to decisionmaking in a democracy." 1 44
Indeed, the essential right at issue in Bellotti, the electorate's right to
hear all the arguments without interference, 14 5 was not mentioned in
Sadlowski. Because of the nature of the infringed interest, the restraint at
issue in Sadlowski, when viewed in conjunction with the less restrictive
alternative of contribution ceilings, should have been examined under a
different test.
Under strict first amendment scrutiny, the compelling state interest
in Bellotti was that of "preserving the integrity of the electoral process,
preventing corruption, and 'sustain[ing] the active, alert responsibility
of the individual citizen in a democracy for the wise conduct of govern-
ment'....146 Corruption could be considered to occur if the demo-
cratic process was undermined by overwhelming the electorate and
139. For a discussion of the impact of corporate spending on the democratic election
system, see Lansing & Sherman, supra note 96, at 89-95.
140. See, e.g., Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 788-92.
141. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 48-49; CARC, 454 U.S. at 297 (citing Buckley 424 U.S. at 48-49
(citations omitted).
142. Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 791.
143. Id. at 790 (quoting Kingsley Int'l Pictures Corp. v. Regents, 360 U.S. 684, 689
(1959)).
144. Id. at 777 (citation omitted).
145. Id. at 776-78.
146. Id. at 788-89 (citing Buckley, 424 U.S. at 11); United States v. Automobile Workers,
352 U.S. 567. 570 (1957): United States v. C.I.O., 335 U.S. 106, 139 (1948) (Rutledge,J..
concurring); Burroughs v. United States, 290 U.S. 534 (1934).
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threatening the confidence of the citizenry in the government. 14 7
Although first amendment analysis is not to be directly incorporated
into the union bill of rights, a similar test should apply if the same gen-
eral principles are to serve as guidelines. The Bellotti test should be
modified for the context of union elections. Under the Sadlowski Court's
reduced scrutiny, a union spending restriction should be justifiable if
there is a significant outside influence that threatens the confidence of the
union's members in their democratic election system. That is a much
lower standard than the overwhelming influence required by the Bellotti
Court. 148
The union restrictions in Sadlowski would not survive the modified
Bellotti test. The Bellotti Court analyzed the undue influence only in
terms of the amount of money contributed, which allowed an effective
campaign and more complete dissemination of ideas. 149 Such spending
encourages active participation in the decisionmaking process and al-
lows the electorate to make better informed decisions. The CARC Court
found that disclosure provisions were sufficient protection against influ-
ence from unknown sources in ballot measure campaigns.150 When dis-
closure requirements are coupled with a contribution ceiling, the
rationality of a complete ban on outside spending must fail the modified
Bellotti test for improper influence on a union election campaign.
It is puzzling that the lower degree of scrutiny imposed by the rea-
sonable provision lead the Sadlowski Court to conclude that the essential
principles of political spending did not apply to union democracy. The
Court has repeatedly stressed the importance of the marketplace of
ideas for realizing the ideals of the first amendment. To conclude that
elimination of outside contributions is justifiable because outside ideas
may be influential is an assumption of the paternalistic attitude the
Court has vehemently rejected. If first amendment guidelines are to be
applied at all to the statutory freedom of speech, then it goes beyond
reason to understand why any number of small contributions present a
danger that can be reasonably restricted consistent with any notion of
the meaning of union democracy.
IV. DEVELOPING PROCEDURES FOR DEMOCRATIC UNION ELECTIONS
The Court's decision in Sadlowski is a major setback for union de-
mocracy. A prerequisite to union democracy is free and open elections
preceded by vigorous discussion of the campaign issues and the candi-
date's positions on those issues. 15 1 The Court has sanctioned a union
147. Id. at 789.
148. Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 1424-26.
149. See, e.g., CARC, 454 U.S. at 299 ("no significant state or public interest in curtailing
debate and discussion of a ballot measure.") Id.
150. Id. at 298-89. "[T]here is no risk that the Berkeley voters will be in doubt as to the
identity of those whose money supports or opposes a given ballot measure since contribu-
tors must make their identities known under . . . the ordinance, which requires publica-
tion of lists of contributors in advance of the voting." Id. at 298.
151. Congress has recognized the key role of elections in the process of union self-
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rule that reduces the amount of money spent on elections and therefore
limits the discussion of the issues.
In a union election, the incumbent has many advantages over his
challengers. The incumbent has access to information regarding union
officers, members, work sites, polling places, and nomination dates and
places. 152 Additionally, the incumbent can use the union's staff, news-
paper, and legal counsel. 15 3 Finally, the incumbent, as a union officer,
comes into contact with a large percentage of the union's membership
as a part of his job, whereas the challenger must continue to work at his
specific job, restricting his exposure to a relatively small percentage of
the union's membership.1
54
The incumbent's job brings him into contact with the union mem-
bers on a daily basis. This may not be a great advantage in a small local
union election, but as the size of the union electorate increases, the ad-
vantage becomes significant. The incumbent is known, at least in name,
by the members. The challenger, however, must establish himself as a
serious contender for office by communicating his position to the mem-
bers. While personal contact is best in local elections, written communi-
cations are necessary in larger elections. 155 Communications between
the members and the challenger are hampered because of the incum-
bent's control of membership lists and other vital information. 1
56
The incumbent is under no duty to release to the challenger the
lists of union members, officers, work sites, polling places, and nomina-
tion meetings and places. Under the LMRDA, the insurgent is entitled
to see the membership list once within thirty days of the election and to
have his mailings sent to the members at his own expense. 15 7 A general
mailing to the members by the challenger may be cost-prohibitive. If
the challenger does not know the officers and members, he will have to
waste valuable time and resources attempting to discover that informa-
tion. Also, if the nomination dates and places, and polling places are
withheld from the challenger, he will have difficulty even getting nomi-
nated. These shortcomings of the LMRDA are inexcusable. The
LMRDA should be amended to require unions to make available the list
of members and officers, polling places and dates and nomination places
government and, therefore, has surrounded it with many safeguards to provide for fair
elections adhering to democratic principles and guaranteeing membership protection.
N.LR.B. v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. !75 (1967): American Fed'n of Musicians v.
Wittstein, 379 U.S. 171 (1964).
152. James, Union Democracy and the LMRDA: Autocracy and Insurgency In National Union
Elections, 13 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 247, 272-76 (1978).
153. Id. at 276-80.
154. Note, Union Elections and the LMRDA: Thirteen )"ears of Use and Abuse, 81 YALE L.J.
407, 461-62 (1972).
155. Id. at 461.
156. Compare challengers' rights, contained in 29 U.S.C. § 481(c) (1982) with those
rights afforded the incumbent through his position as an officer of the union.
157. 29 U.S.C. § 481(c) (1982). See Marshall v. Pipeliners Local 798, 488 F. Supp. 847
(D. Okla. 1980) (holding that when union officer candidates had access to union member-
ship list off union office premises and a similar right was denied the challenger, the union
was guilty of discrimination in favor of the incumbents).
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and dates to the challenger in sufficient time before nominations and
elections are held. Violations of this amendment should result in an ex-
tension of the period for nominations and elections. A second violation
of the amendment should be punishable by severe fines or
imprisonment.
The incumbent can use the union newspaper for his own advantage
by favorably covering his current activities in the newsletter. 15 8 While
the LMRDA prohibits the union from using union funds and facilities
for campaigning, 159 it is a simple task to compose ostensibly neutral sto-
ries that accomplish the same purpose as a direct campaign advertise-
ment in the paper.
To remedy this situation the LMRDA should be amended to require
the union to use its newspaper for election coverage. A debate page
could be created, open to any qualified candidate. The members would
thereby receive exposure to all candidates and their positions. Since un-
ions already have newspapers, the cost of creating a debate page would
be minimal. Furthermore, the debate page would provide a challenger a
forum to communicate his message to the union membership without
reliance on outside funds. Since union newspapers are currently mis-
used by incumbents, in violation of the LMRDA, the proposed amend-
ment to the LMRDA would merely equalize the opportunities for
challengers.
The incumbent has other advantages over the challenger. The in-
cumbent has access to the union's legal counsel when the inevitable
legal battles in the context of the election arise. The challenger, on the
other hand, must rely on his limited campaign funds to finance election
litigation. One commentator has recommended a two-pronged ap-
proach to correct this problem. First, the incumbent should be held
personally liable when maintaining an abusive or harassing litigation.
Second, the challenger should be awarded attorney fees when he de-
fends such an action. 160 Those reforms would have a salutary effect
upon union democracy.
The incumbent can rely on his staff for contributions of money and
time, since the jobs are jeopardized by an unfavorable election out-
come. 161 The challenger, on the other hand, will have difficulties solicit-
ing funds from members because he is probably unknown among the
158. For cases limiting such use of a union newspaper by an incumbent, see Donovan v.
National Alliance of Postal and Federal Employees, 566 F. Supp. 529 (D.D.C. 1983); Cam-
arata v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 478 F. Supp. 321 (D.D.C. 1979); New Water-Dog
Comm. v. New York City Taxi Drivers Union Local 3036, 438 F. Supp. 1242 (S.D.N.Y.
1977).
159. 29 U.S.C. § 481(g) (1982), see supra text accompanying note 32.
160. James, supra note 152, at 289-90.
161. However union dues may not be used to promote a candidate. See e.g., Usery v.
Stove, Furnace and Allied Appliance Workers, 547 F.2d 1043 (10th Cir. 1977); Donovan v.
Local 719, 561 F. Supp. 54 (N.D. Ill. 1982). Additionally, an employer is prohibited from
contributing money to a union candidate's election fund. See Marshall v. Local Union 20,
611 F.2d 645 (6th Cir. 1979). See also Annot., 53 A.L.R. FED. 585 (1981) (discussing prohi-
bition against employer contributions to promote candidates in union elections).
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rank-and-file. Additionally, union members may hesitate to donate
funds to a challenger if economic conditions are difficult. The chal-
lenger's likely supporters are his relatives and friends. In the Sadlowski-
McBride campaign, Sadlowski received funds from his wife and father, a
retired steelworker receiving a pension negotiated by the union. There
does not seem to be any compelling reason why a challenger should not
be allowed to finance his election with contributions from non-members
who have the union's or the challenger's interest at heart.
The outsider rule does not prohibit donations of time to a candi-
date's campaign. The purported reason for this concession is that peo-
ple who donate their time to the union must have the interest of the
union at heart and not other purposes. The incumbent generally will
receive help from the union staff, again because their jobs are in jeop-
ardy. While the union staff is not supposed to work for the incumbent
on union time, it is difficult to police this restriction.
The limitation on outside financing is problematic in light of the
one-party nature of unions. Contrary to political elections, where there
are two established parties supporting candidates and platforms, in
union elections, the challenger must establish his election organization
each election. Unless he has run before, the challenger will have to ex-
pend much time and money before the union members consider him a
serious candidate. The incumbent, however, is well-known. The
Court's decision will hamper, if not preclude, the establishment of
multi-party union elections.
There are two methods which would foster union democracy with-
out subjecting the union to adverse outside influence. The first, contri-
bution limitations, was rejected summarily by the Court. There does not
seem to be any reason why contribution limitations along with disclo-
sure of the contribution source would be adverse to the union. This
system works well in federal political elections in which the threat of
adverse influences is equally evident. As long as the contributions are
limited to a reasonable amount, no one person could have a controlling
influence on the candidate. Therefore, the candidate would not be obli-
gated to the contributor and the contributor would not be in a position
to force his will upon victorious candidate. Furthermore, the disclosure
requirement would alert the members to the source of the contribu-
tions, and if the source did not have a legitimate concern for the well-
being of the union, the disclosure would be a red flag to the members to
carefully judge the challenger's platform and credibility. There can be
no harm to a democratic union from the airing of ideas. Thus, the out-
sider rule unnecessarily hampers union democracy.
The second method to foster democratic elections would be alloca-
tion of union campaign funds to the candidates which would elminate all
outside influence. The use of union funds for union elections is cur-
rently illegal under subsection 401(g) of the LMRDA. 162 Additionally,
162. 29 U.S.C. § 481(g)(1 9 8 2 ).
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unions and their members may be reluctant to use their funds for elec-
tions since those funds are part of the union's strike fund. Because the
second method may be impractical, the first method should be adopted
by a statutory reversal of the outsider rule.
V. CONCLUSION
The Sadlowski decision is a departure from the Court's general polit-
ical spending doctrine and a setback for union democracy. If unions are
to remain a vital force in American society, union democracy must be
encouraged. The LMRDA must be amended so that challengers will
have an equal opportunity in the election challenge.
LOCAL No. 82 FURNITURE MOVERS V. CROWLEY'
TITLE I RELIEF WHEN TITLE IV CLAIMS ARE AT
ISSUE UNDER THE LMRDA
INTRODUCTION
Congress enacted the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclo-
sure Act of 1959' (LMRDA) to eliminate improprieties on the part of
labor union management 2 , and to provide rank and file union members
the opportunity to participate meaningfully in union activities and deci-
sions.3 Toward this end, title I of the LMRDA sets forth a "Bill of
Rights," which, among other things, guarantees union members' equal
rights in electing union officials as well as the right to assemble and
speak out on candidates. 4 Title IV of the LMRDA also addresses the
topic of elections, although its requirements are more specific. 5 The
remedies provided in each, however, are not consistent6 and the overlap
created by these titles has resulted in diverse lower court
interpretations.7
Local No. 82, Furniture and Piano Moving, Furniture Store Drivers, Help-
ers, Warehousemen and Packers v. Crowley 8 is the Supreme Court's latest
attempt to clarify the LMRDA title I-title IV overlap problem. The
Court held in Crowley that the invalidation of a union election, to protect
rights guaranteed by title I, while the election is being conducted, is not
an "appropriate" remedy under title I. 9 Setting aside an election, the
Court ruled, is a remedy available only under title IV of the LMRDA.10
The impact of Crowley upon the circuit courts will vary depending on
their respective treatments of this "overlap" problem. This comment
will show that the Crowley decision, in all likelihood, will have a minimal
effect on the future decisions of the lower courts as they decide whether
1. Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, Pub. L. No. 86-257, 73
Stat. 519, 29 U.S.C. §§ 153, 158-60, 186, 401-531 (1982), [hereinafter cited as LMRDA].
2. 29 U.S.C. § 401(c).
3. American Federation of Musicians v. Wittstein, 379 U.S. 171, 182-83 (1964).
4. LMRDA § 101, 29 U.S.C. § 411 (1982).
5. LMRDA § 401(e), 29 U.S.C. § 481 (1982).
6. Compare LMRDA § 102, 29 U.S.C. § 412 (1982) with LMRDA § 402, 29 U.S.C.
§ 482 (1982). Section 102 provides that actions against labor union management may be
initiated in federal district court by any person whose rights have been violated under title
I. Section 402, on the other hand, requires that complaints be filed with the Secretary of
Labor, who in turn may then decide whether filing a civil action is appropriate under the
circumstances.
7. See generally, Note, Pre-Election Remedies Under the Landrum-Griffin Act: The "Twilight
Zone" Between Election Rights Under Title IV and The Guarantees of Titles I and V, 74 COLUM. L.
REV. 1105, 1124-35 (1974). This comment, although not specifically focusing on the di-
versity of lower court interpretations, nonetheless discusses the various tests developed by
the courts in trying to deal with the overlap problem.
8. 104 S. Ct. 2557 (1984).
9. Id. at 2568.
10. Id. at 2571.
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title I relief can be sought when title IV claims also are at issue. If any-
thing, in some circuits at least, the Crowley decision may make it easier
for individual union members to obtain title I relief.
I. BACKGROUND
The LMRDA, originally introduced as the Kennedy-Ives Bill" , was
enacted after a committee headed by Senator McClellan 12 discovered
abuses by labor union leadership which often resulted in a lack of demo-
cratic practices by the unions.' 3 The Kennedy-Ives Bill was rejected in
1958 but was reintroduced in 1959 as the Kennedy-Ervin Bill. 14 Its
election procedures provisions appear in the final version of title IV.
The remedy of relying upon the Secretary of Labor to take action after
an election, currently found in title IV, was the exclusive remedy then
suggested for relief under the LMRDA from all election abuses. 15 The
reason for relying upon the Secretary of Labor, as opposed to permit-
ting individual lawsuits by aggrieved union members, was to allow un-
ions maximum flexibility in resolving internal disputes without the fear
of frivolous suits being brought during the election.
16
Members of Congress, however, were concerned from the bill's in-
ception about the adequacy of the relief afforded by reliance on the Sec-
retary of Labor. Senators Goldwater and Dirksen objected, when the
bill was introduced, to the lack of protection of individual union mem-
bers' rights 17 and introduced a bill, ultimately rejected by the Senate,
which would have provided more protection under title IV. 18 The alter-
native of private enforcement under title IV appeared in the House ver-
sion of the bill 19 , although this provision was eliminated when the bill
went to the Joint Conference Committee.
20
Title I was added as an amendment by Senator McClellan to pro-
vide more protection for individual union members' rights. 2 1 This
amendment added a "Bill of Rights" but still required that suits be
brought by the Secretary of Labor. 22 The amendment passed by a one
vote margin. 23 Two days after the McClellan amendment was passed,
Senator Kuchel introduced a new "Bill of Rights" which gave individual
!1. S. 3974, 85th Cong., 2d Sess., 104 CONG. REC. 10,615 (1958).
12. The Select Committee on Improper Activities in the Labor Management Field.
13. S. REP. No. 187, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 5-6 (1959), reprinted in I NLRB, LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY OF THE LABOR MANAGEMENT REPORTING AND DISCLOSURE ACT OF 1959 at 401-02
(1959) [hereinafter cited as NLRB Legislative History].
14. S. 505, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. (1959).
15. Id. at §§ 302-03.
16. Calhoon v. Harvey, 379 U.S. 134, 140 (1964).
17. S. REP. No. 187, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 70-71 (minority views).
18. 105 CONG. REC. 1259, 1272-84 (1959).
19. H.R. 8342, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. § 402 (1959), reprinted in 1 NLRB Legislative
History, supra note 12, at 727.
20. H.R. REP. No. 1147, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 35 (1959) (joint conference committee
report on S. 1555).
21. 105 CONG. REC. 6475-76 (1959).
22. 105 CONG. REC. 6476 (1959) (§ 103).
23. 105 CONG. REC. 6492-93 (1959).
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union members standing to sue under title 1.24 This amendment was
overwhelmingly approved and replaced the earlier McClellan amend-
ment, ultimately becoming title I of the LMRDA.
25
Title I relief, therefore, is now enforced by individual suit brought
in federal district court.2 6 Title IV relief, on the other hand, requires
that an aggrieved union member file a complaint with the Secretary of
Labor, who has the discretion and exclusive authority to sue to remedy
any violation under title IV. 27 There is very little legislative history to
indicate which relief provision to use, that of either title I or title IV,
when the relief sought overlaps both provisions. In particular, Congress
gave no clear direction as to whether individual union members have
standing to sue when abusive election procedures, addressed in title IV,
also violate the rights granted in title I of the same act.
28
The Supreme Court's decision in Calhoon v. Harvey29 marked the
first time the Court addressed the title I-title IV overlap problem.
Therein, the Court held, in essence, that any complaint by individual
union members alleging title I violations may not stand if those allega-
tions are, in substance, violations under title IV.30 The Court noted that
challenges to nomination eligibility rules are fundamentally title IV
claims. 3 ' The district court, therefore, had no jurisdiction to hear the
case because title IV provides that the Secretary of Labor is the only
party with standing to sue under this title.3 2 The Court, however, did
not hold in Calhoon that individual members were not entitled to bring
suit, even during an election, where the claims are substantially based
upon title I.
Eight years later, the Court once again discussed the extent to
which an individual member has standing to sue when title IV claims are
at issue. Although not specifically addressing the title I-title IV contro-
versy, the Court ruled in Trbovich v. United Mine Workers 33 that an indi-
vidual member could intervene in an action already brought by the
Secretary of Labor under title IV. Though the Court reiterated that the
administrative remedy is exclusive, it went on to state that, under certain
circumstances, title IV does not bar an individual member from inter-
24. S. 1555, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. '§ 102 (as amended), 105 CONG. REC. 6720 (1959).
25. 105 CONG. REC. 6727 (1959).
26. LMRDA § 102, 29 U.S.C. § 412 (1982).
27. LMRDA § 402, 29 U.S.C. § 482 (1982).
28. Crowley, 104 S. Ct. at 2566-67; see also Comment, Titles I & IV of the LMRDA: A
Resolution ofth Conflict of Remedies, 42 U. CHI. L. REV. 166, 175 (1974) (commentator asserts
that the legislative history indicates that Congress was barely aware of the existence of the
overlap problem).
29. 379 U.S. 134 (1964) (plaintiffs brought suit to enjoin the union from conducting
an election, alleging that the union by-laws deprived members of certain rights in the nom-
ination procedure).
30. Id. at 138-41.
31. Id. at 138.
32. Id. at 140.
33. 404 U.S. 528 (1972).
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vening in a title IV proceeding brought by the Secretary.34 In so doing,
the Court recognized that union members may have rights which the
Secretary cannot adequately protect.
3 5
The circuit courts' treatment of the LMRDA title I-title IV overlap
problem in light of the Supreme Court's decisions has varied. It ap-
pears, therefore, that the Court's early decisions have left considerable
discretion to the lower courts to determine when a title I individual
member suit could be brought when title IV claims were also at issue.
This diversity is shown by a review of some of the circuit court's title I-
title IV overlap cases before Crowley.
The Second Circuit in Schonfeld v. Penza36 ruled that, consistent with
Calhoon, there is no title I jurisdiction where election eligibility is being
challenged. Claims must be made first to the Secretary of Labor.3 7 The
court did go on to hold, though, that where substantive violations under
title I are asserted, no appeal to the Secretary is necessary.3 8 The test
adopted by the Schonfeld court to deal with the title I-title IV overlap
problem limited title I actions to cases in which the union has an estab-
lished history or articulated policy of deliberate suppression of
dissent.
39
In Depew v. Edmiston40 , the Third Circuit narrowly construed Calhoon
and developed another test to deal with the overlap problem. The court
held that when discrimination in the nominating and voting rights of the
members is the "core of the controversy," the complaint has sufficiently
alleged a title I claim. 4 1 The court distinguished the case at hand from
Calhoon, stating that the plaintiffs in this case alleged discrimination in
the election process; they did not challenge the eligibility requirements
which were at issue in Calhoon.4 2 The Third Circuit, therefore, reversed
the district court's holding that the lower court did not have jurisdiction
to hear the title I claim. 4 3 The DePew decision was discussed in a subse-
quent Third Circuit case, Amalgamated Clothing Workers Rank and File v.
Amalgamated Clothing Workers, Joint Board.4 4 The court stated, in dictum,
that merely because actions by union management may constitute viola-
tions of both title I and title IV, pre-election suits by individual members
are not precluded. 4 5 The Calhoon decision does not prohibit title I suits
34. Id. at 536-37 (the intervention must be limited to claims which are consistent with
claims already asserted by the Secretary of Labor).
35. Id. at 538-39. See also, Pre-Election Remedies Under the Landrum-Griffin Act, supra, note
7, at 1121 (This Note includes a discussion on the limitations of title IV relief.).
36. 477 F.2d 899 (2d Cir. 1973).
37. Id. at 902.
38. Id. at 903 (allegations raised the question of whether free speech and association
rights were infringed).
39. Id. at 904.
40. 386 F.2d 710 (3d Cir. 1967).
41. Id. at 712-13. The Third Circuit was relying upon the equal rights provision of
title I. LMRDA § 101(a)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 411(a)(1) (1982).
42. 386 F.2d at 710.
43. Id. at 715.
44. 473 F.2d 1303 (3d Cir. 1973).
45. Id. at 1306.
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simply because they are related to election matters. 4 6
The Sixth Circuit, in McGuire v. Grand International Division of the
Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers 47, seemed to suggest a broader, more
prohibitive test than the Second Circuit based upon Calhoon. The Mc-
Guire court, citing Calhoon, held that the individual union member's com-
plaint, as in Calhoon, asserted claims which were substantively title IV
claims and were, therefore, barred by title IV.4 8 In so holding, however,
the court suggested that title I relief may never be available when title IV
violations are at issue.
4 9
The Seventh Circuit approach to the title I-title IV overlap problem
is similar to that taken by the Sixth Circuit. In Driscoll v. International
Union of Operating Engineers, Local 139 50, the court held that disputes re-
lating to eligibility requirements fall exclusively within title IV, even
when the eligibility requirement appeared to be a direct restraint on
plaintiffs free speech rights protected by title I. 5 ' The Driscoll court
stated that only "one exception to the broad mandate of Calhoon" ex-
isted:5 2 where the union management had established a history of sup-
pression so as to constitute a title I violation. 53 The court in Driscoll
stated such a history did not exist in this case.
54
McNail v. Amalgamated Meat Cutters and Butcher Workmen5 5 set forth
the Eight Circuit's approach to the title I-title IV overlap problem. The
court relied upon Calhoon, ruling that the mere assertion of title I viola-
tions cannot invoke title I jurisdiction if they are essentially title IV
claims. 56 But the court seemed to suggest a more lenient analysis for
dealing with the overlap problem more consistent with the Second and
Third Circuits. In ruling that the title I claims were substantially title IV
claims, the Eight Circuit, citing the Second Circuits's Schonfeld deci-
sion 5 7 , noted that the district court dismissed the title I claims only after
evidence was presented which failed to establish discrimination pro-
scribed by title 1.58
46. Id.
47. 426 F.2d 504 (6th Cir. 1970) (union member complained that his candidacy for
office was prevented by irregularities in the election process).
48. Id. at 507.
49. Id. at 508 ("Insofar as McGuire alleges election violations specifically dealt with in
Title IV, we hold that the procedures of Title IV must be invoked, notwithstanding a possibe
concurrent offense under Title I.") (emphasis added).
50. 484 F.2d 682 (7th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 960 (1974) (candidates and
members were required to execute a non-communist affidavit as a condition to eligibility).
51. Id. at 686. The union's non-communist affidavit requirement appears to at least
suggest a colorable claim under title I which guarantees that every union member "...
shall have the right ... to express any views, arguments, or opinions. . . ." LMRDA
§ 101(a)(2), 29 U.S.C. § 411 (a)(2) (1982). See also infra note 139.
52. 484 F.2d at 687.
53. Schonfeld v. Penza, 477 F.2d 899 (2d Cir. 1973). See supra text accompanying notes
36-39.
54. 484 F.2d at 688.
55. 549 F.2d 538 (8th Cir. 1977).
56. Id. at 540.
57. Id. The court relied expressly on Schonfeld v. Penza, 477 F.2d 899 (2d Cir. 1973).
58. 549 F.2d at 540-41.
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The Ninth Circuit, in dealing with the title I-title IV overlap prob-
lem, also concentrates on whether discrimination in the election process
exists before a title I claim can be made.5 9 The test in this circuit is that
Calhoon is the law in the case of eligibility requirements, but where dis-
criminatory application of eligibility rules occur, such a violation falls
directly within the scope of title 1.60
The various circuits have adopted seemingly different tests to deal
with the overlap problem because of the uncertainty caused by the in-
definiteness of Calhoon, and the dearth of legislative history on the title I-
title IV overlap problem. This is the legislative and judicial context in
which Crowley was decided.
II. THE CROWLEY CASE
Plaintiff, Crowley, and others were denied admission at a meeting
set for nomination of candidates for union office in Local No. 82, Furni-
ture and Piano Moving, Furniture Store Drivers, Helpers, Warehouse-
men and Packers. The reason given by the union was plaintiffs' failure
to produce computerized dues receipts. 6 1 The district court found that
admission had not been denied for such a failure in earlier union meet-
ings. 62 In the two months prior to the November meeting, plaintiff Rob-
ert Lunnin demanded that the union hold the elections by open ballot
rather than by the previously used mail-in method. 63 When the union
refused, several members, including plaintiff John Lynch, announced
their intention to run for union office. 6 4 This announcement apparently
led the union to deny plaintiffs admission to the meeting. The district
court found that officers of the Executive Board were admitted without
producing any receipts for dues.
65
After the meeting was called to order, nominations for officers were
the first order of business. 66 Defendant Harris listed the names of mem-
bers who were eligible for election to local union office and also those
members who could not be nominated for failure to comply with the
union's "24 month rule."' 6 7 The plaintiffs were successful, despite these
obstacles, in nominating Lynch for secretary-treasurer. When the nomi-
nations were concluded, however, defendant Griffith, the then-current
59. E.g., Kupau v. Yamamoto, 622 F.2d 449, 453 (9th Cir. 1980).
60. Id. at 454. See also Rollison v. Hotel, Motel, Restaurant and Construction Camp
Employees, Local 879, 677 F.2d 741 (9th Cir. 1982). In Rollison, the Ninth Circuit seemed
to suggest that the existence of the title IV issues can never affect jurisdiction so long as a
substantial title I claim is also made. Id. at 745.
61. Crowley v. Local No. 82, Furniture and Piano Moving, Furniture Store Drivers,
Helpers, Warehousemen and Packers, 521 F. Supp. 614, 625 (D. Mass. 1981), afjd, 679
F.2d 978 (lst Cir. 1982), rev'd, 104 S. Ct. 2557 (1984).
62. Id.
63. Id. at 624.
64. Id. at 625.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 626.
67. Id at 617 n.3. (Article II of the union constitution requires that a member must
be in good standing for the 24 months prior to the election. Good standing includes
payment of dues for each of those 24 months.).
680 [Vol. 62:2
UNION ELECTIONS: CROWLEY
secretary-treasurer, read Lynch's name as a nominee for president, and
announced his own reelection running unopposed. 6 8 Based on these
events, the plaintiff, Crowley, and several other members of the local
union initiated an action alleging violations of title I and title IV of the
LMRDA.
69
The district court found that the plaintiffs were deliberately denied
their right to attend meetings, nominate candidates, and participate in
union decisions as well as their right to free assembly and expression
protected by title I of the LMRDA. 70 The court concluded that it had no
jurisdiction to hear the title IV claim, wherein the plaintiffs alleged that
the "24 month rule" imposed unreasonable restrictions. 7 1 The district
court acknowledged that title IV claims could be brought only by the
procedure prescribed within that title and ruled that title IV claims
could not be heard with title I claims.
7 2
As for the claims asserting the denial of rights guaranteed by title I,
the trial court agreed with the plaintiffs. It determined that title I estab-
lished a remedy that can be used whenever violations of title I occur,
regardless of the possible existence of title IV claims. 73 Accordingly, it
invalidated the ongoing election and issued a preliminary injunction
which established very specific procedures for a new election.
74
The First Circuit affirmed the order of the district court. 7 5  It
agreed that the district court had jurisdiction to hear title I claims during
the ongoing election. It also agreed that the mere existence of title IV
claims does not preclude a title I individual member suit whenever title I
rights are violated.
76
The court of appeals concentrated much of its opinion on the issue
of whether the election was "concluded" at the time the action was
brought.7 7 The district court ordered that the mailed-in ballots remain
unopened. 7 8 Based on that order the circuit court concluded that the
election had not yet "concluded," and aggrieved members could, there-
fore, assert their title I claims requesting invalidation of the election.7 9
68. Id. at 626.
69. Id. at 617-18.
70. Id. at 626.
71. Id. at 622.
72. Id. (the district court reasoned that Calhoon precluded jurisdiction of title IV
claims even when title I claims are sufficiently alleged).
73. Id. at 623.
74. Id. at 636-37.
75. Crowley v. Local No. 82, Furniture and Piano Moving, Furniture Store Drivers,
Helpers, Warehousemen and Packers, 679 F.2d 978 (1st Cir. 1982), revd, 104 S. Ct. 2557
(1984).
76. Id. at 989-90.
77. Id. at 991-94.
78. Crowley, 521 F. Supp. at 614.
79. Crowley, 679 F.2d at 993.
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III. THE COURT'S OPINIONS
A. Overview
Relying on the exclusivity language in title IV 80 and the "appropri-
ateness" language in title 181, the majority held that the district court's
invalidation of an ongoing election was "inappropriate" relief under ti-
tle 1.82 In so doing, the majority seemingly broadened the application of
the title IV remedy while limiting the private right of action under title I.
Justice Stevens, the sole dissenter, believed that congressional intent
shows a strong presumption for enforcing title I rights through private




The majority opinion, delivered by Justice Brennan, began its analy-
sis by reiterating its earlier holding in Steelworkers v. Sadlowski 84 that title
I protections do in fact extend to union members during union elec-
tions.8 5 After a short discussion on the legislative history of section 102
of title 186, the Court then turned its focus to the language of that sec-
tion. The Court emphasized the wording of the statute which entitles
persons whose title I rights have been infringed only to relief which is
appropriate under the circumstances8 7 or to that which is appropriate to
any given situation.
88
The Court also reasoned that title I cannot be read in isolation from
other sections of the LMRDA, particularly in light of the subject matter
covered by title IV of the LMRDA.8 9 Title IV establishes specific re-
quirements for union elections9" and provides its own procedure for en-
forcing these requirements. 9 1
The important policy question remaining for the Court to address
was exactly what title I remedies are available to union members while
an election is being conducted?9 2 Two certainties exist: title IV pro-
vides the exclusive remedy for challenging an election that already has
been conducted 9 3 , and, as stated earlier, union members are entitled to
80. LMRDA § 403, 29 U.S.C. § 483 (1982).
81. LMRDA § 102, 29 U.S.C. § 412 (1982).
82. Crowley, 104 S. Ct. at 2571.
83. Id. at 2575-76 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
84. 457 U.S. 102 (1982).
85. Crowley, 104 S. Ct. at 2564.
86. Id.
87. LMRDA § 102, 29 U.S.C. § 412 (1982).
88. Crowley, 104 S. Ct. at 2564 (citing Hall v. Cole, 412 U.S. 1, 10-11 (1973)).
89. 104 S. Ct. at 2565.
90. LMRDA § 401, 29 U.S.C. § 481 (1982).
91. LMRDA § 402, 29 U.S.C. § 482 (1982).
92. Id. at 2564. See also id. at 2566 (Court also notes that the "full panoply of Title I
rights are available to individual union members 'prior to the conduct' of a union
election").
93. LMRDA § 403, 29 U.S.C. § 483 (1982).
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title I protections during the course of the election.9 4 Given this con-
text, the Court restated its position of Wertz v. Bottle Blowers Association9 5 ,
that construction of legislation requires a look into the intent and objec-
tives of Congress.9 6 The Court recognized that Congress apparently
did not anticipate the potential for a protracted election process9 7 , but
still gave great weight to the legislative intent placing responsibility for
regulating union elections primarily with the Secretary of Labor.
9 8
Nothing in the legislative history of title I indicates an intent by Con-
gress to permit individuals to preempt this authority to regulate elec-
tions granted exclusively to the Secretary of Labor.9 9 In light of this
history, the Court concluded that invalidation is not an appropriate rem-
edy under a title I action.10 0 Union members, therefore, may allege title
I violations during elections only if the relief requested is "appropriate,"
that is, the plaintiffs are not requesting invalidation or supervision of the
election by the courts.01
In summary, the majority ruled that title I actions may be brought
during the course of an election requesting remedies short of invalida-
tion, but if the relief sought is court invalidation and supervision, ag-
grieved members are required to pursue the remedy provided pursuant
to title IV and may not use title I for such relief.10 2 It should be noted
that the Supreme Court spent little time discussing the issue of whether
the election had concluded or was ongoing, the basis of the First Cir-
cuit's analysis. 10 3 This issue was not in any way ultimately dispositive of
the case.
C. The Dissent
Justice Stevens cited Hall v. Cole10 4 for the proposition that section
102 of title I was intended to make available a panoply of remedies.
10 5
He asserted that permitting individual members to seek only limited in-
junctive relief will allow union officials to commit serious violations of
title I while members have no adequate remedy to correct the situa-
tion.' 0 6 This result, according to Justice Stevens, is not consistent with
the purpose of title I. Title I was enacted to promote union democ-
racy. 10 7 The holding by the majority, he asserted, undermines this
94. 104 S. Ct. at 2566.
95. 389 U.S. 463, 468 (1968) (citing National Woodwork Manufacturers Association
v. NLRB, 386 U.S. 612, 619 (1967)).
96. 104 S. Ct. at 2566.




101. Id. at 2569.
102. Id. at 2571.
103. See supra notes 77-79 and accompanying text.
104. 412 U.S. 1 (1973).
105. 104 S. Ct. at 2572.
106. Id.
107. Id. (citing Steelworkers v. Sadlowski, 457 U.S. 102, 112 (1982)).
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purpose. 108
Section 402 of title IV, according to justice Stevens, was introduced
only to limit the remedies available from state courts. 10 9 He asserted
that Congress did not intend that title I actions be limited by title IV,
which was part of the bill before title I was introduced. I 10 The legisla-
tive history reflects a concern over the relationship between federal and
state remedies, not as between private and public enforcement. I I
Justice Stevens stressed that title I was introduced subsequent to
title IV. Title I was added because Congress felt that individuals must
have the ability to enforce their rights through a private cause of ac-
tion."12 He quoted Senator Kuchel explaining his proposed amend-
ment, adding a private cause of action to title 1113, after members of
Congress expressed dissatisfaction with relying on the Secretary of La-
bor to enforce individual rights provided by title 1.114
Justice Stevens distinguished Calhoon' 15 , on which the majority re-
lied, by noting that in that case the Court simply held that title IV, not
title I, regulates eligibility standards of union members running for elec-
tive office.' 1 6  In the present case, individual union members stated
claims which the Court conceded fell within title I. Justice Stevens as-
serted that the majority's view that section 403 of title IV limited the
remedy under section 102 of title I "turns the statute and its legislative
history on their head."' 17 Concluding, Justice Stevens believed that the
district court did not abuse its discretion by ordering a new election and
that such relief was appropriate under the circumstances.' 18
IV. CROWLEY'S EFFECT
The Supreme Court's decision in Crowley does not necessarily invali-
date the current holdings of the various circuit courts. The approaches
taken by the circuits to resolve the title I-title IV overlap problem may,
therefore, not be altered by this decision in any significant way. Indeed
Crowley appears to do no more than add another factor for the courts to
consider in overlap situations, and may, in some instances, make it eas-
ier for individual union members to obtain title I relief when title IV
issues are also involved.
The Crowley opinion is the first among overlap cases basing its anal-
ysis on the "appropriateness" of the remedy being sought under section
102 of title I119, rather than solely on the exclusivity language in section
108. Id. at 2573.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 2574 (citing Trbovich v. United Mine Workers, 404 U.S. 528 (1972)).
112. Id. (citing Finnegan v. Lieu, 456 U.S. 431, 440 n.10 (1982)).
113. Id. (quoting 105 CONG. REC. 6617, 6620 (1959)).
114. Id. at 2575.
115. Calhoon v. Harvey, 379 U.S. 134 (1964).
116. 104 S. Ct. at 2575 (citing Calhoon, 379 U.S. at 138).
117. Id. at 2575-76.
118. Id.
119. LMRDA § 102, 29 U.S.C. § 412 (1982).
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403 of title IV. 120 The Crowley decision will not permit district courts to
interrupt on ongoing election, but it will allow them to fine tune an elec-
tion, so long as the relief sought is "appropriate."121
The majority in Crowley was justifiably convinced that Congress
clearly intended to consolidate all challenges to elections in the Secre-
tary of Labor. 12 2 Moreover, the Court implied that this is true even for
elections which are not yet concluded. 12 3 The Court made it clear, how-
ever, that it does not wish to preclude title I relief during the course of
an election.' 2 4 The Court even provided an example of an abuse which
may be redressed by a district court so long as the election is not
delayed or invalidated by the relief requested.1
2 5
The legislative history reveals that the primary point of contention
between the opposing points of view in Congress was the extent to
which protection of members' rights may be infringed in order to permit
the maximum amount of union independence.' 26 Title I's "Bill of
Rights" and the individual members standing-to-sue provision were ad-
ded to the LMRDA in response to the concern over the lack of protec-
tion afforded union members under title IV. 12 7 Given this history, and
what the Court said in Crowley, it can be assumed that a district court has
great latitude in providing title I relief short of invalidation. This will
protect member rights and concurrently prevent undue interference in
union elections.
To comply with the relevant Supreme Court decisions, the lower
federal courts must now be concerned with two tests in determining
when title Ijurisdiction is not available when title IV issues also are pres-
ent. First, do the claims made by the plaintiffs constitute allegations
which are in substance title IV claims? 12 8 Second, does the relief re-
quested substantially delay an on-going election, require setting aside
an election, or seek court supervision of a new election? 129 Aside from
these restrictions on the scope of title Ijurisdiction, the circuits still have
primary responsibility for determining whether the title I relief sought is
"appropriate" in a given case.
- Crowley does not appear to substantially alter the Schonfeld excep-
tion, that is, the "articulated policy of suppression" requirement estab-
lished by the Second Circuit.
1 30 Circuits following Schonfeld'
3 1 will
merely need to determine, in addition to whether there is an articulated
120. LMRDA § 403, 29 U.S.C. § 483 (1982).
121. See Crowley, 104 S. Ct. at 2568-69.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 2568.
124. Id. at 2568-69.
125. Id. at 2569.
126. Note, Election Remedies Under the Labor-Aanagement Reporting and Disclosure Act, 78
HARV. L. REV. 1617, 1623 (1965).
127. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
128. Thereby coming squarely under the analysis ofCalhoon v. Harvey, 379 U.S. 134
(1964).
129. Thereby coming squarely under the holding of Crowley.
130. Schonfeld v. Penza, 477 F.2d at 899, 904 (2d Cir. 1973). See also supra notes 36-39
and accompanying text.
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policy or history of suppression by the union leadership, the question of
whether the title I relief sought is "appropriate."
Likewise, the Third Circuit approach applied in DePew'3 2 is still via-
ble after Crowley. The Third Circuit, along with the Ninth Circuit,'
3 3
grants title I jurisdiction so long as discrimination is shown in the nomi-
nating and voting of officers. 134 These circuits, according to their read-
ing of Calhoon, first determine whether the violations constitute
discrimination, thereby giving rise to title I claims.' 3 5 If the violations,
however, are challenges to eligibility rules, they are considered title IV
claims. 13 6 Once again, Crowley has little effect, so long as individual
union members request relief which is "appropriate."
The circuits wherein Crowley may make it easier for individual mem-
bers to seek title I relief are those which seem to preclude title I relief
whenever concurrent title IV claims exist. 13 7 Crowley makes it clear that
title I relief may be granted in some cases involving title IV. 13 8 These
circuits now will have to face the title I-title IV overlap problem that they
avoided when they seemingly decided that title I relief was automatically
precluded whenever title IV claims also exist.1
39
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court in Crowley again has addressed the title I-title
131. E.g., Driscoll v. International Union of Operating Engineers, Local 139, 484 F.2d
682, 687 (7th Cir. 1973).
132. Depew v. Edmiston, 386 F.2d 710 (3d Cir. 1967). See supra text accompanying
notes 40-46.
133. See Kupau v. Yamamoto, 622 F.2d 449, 453 (9th Cir. 1980).
134. Depew, 386 F.2d at 712-13.
135. Id. at 712.
136. Id.
137. E.g., McGuire v. Grand International Division of the Brotherhood of Locomotive
Engineers, 426 F.2d 504 (6th Cir. 1970); Driscoll v. International Union of Operating En-
gineers, Local 139, 484 F.2d 682 (7th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 960 (1974). See also
supra notes 47-54 and accompanying text.
138. Crowley, 104 S. Ct. at 2564.
139. Crowley certainly will force a reevaluation in the Seventh Circuit. In Driscoll, 484
F.2d 682 (7th Cir. 1973), the Seventh Circuit considered a complaint challenging a union
requirement that all candidates for union office sign a non-communist affidavit. The plain-
tiff, a potential candidate who refused to sign the affidavit, charged that this requirement
violated his free speech rights. LMRDA § 101(a)(2), 29 U.S.C. § 411 (a)(2) (1982). The
court, giving Calhoon its strictest reading, stated that since plaintiff's "allegations 'basically
relate' to eligibility and charge 'in substance' that he has been denied the right to run for
office in his union, he is therefore stating a cause of action which can be enforced only
under the provisions of Title IV .... 484 F.2d at 686. Because the remedy in this in-
stance involved only eliminating the affidavit requirement, and would not disrupt the elec-
tion process, the Seventh Circuit's position, in light of Crowley, appears tenuous. As uned
by the Court in Crowley,
[t]he important congressional policies underlying enactment of Title I . . .coi-
pel us to conclude that appropriate relief under Title I may be awarded by a court
while an election is being conducted. Individual union members may propely
allege violations of Title I that are easily remediable under that title without sub-
stantially delaying or invalidating an ongoing election.
104 S. Ct. at 2568-69. Title I jurisdiction seems proper, in light of Crowley, because the
plaintiff in Driscoll merely requested limited, nondisruptive review of the eligibility require-
ment, which clearly appears to have infringed upon the plaintiff's free speech rights pro-
tected by title I.
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IV overlap problem. The Court chose not to establish uniform criteria
for evaluating when title I relief can be sought, but merely added an
additional factor to consider, whether the title I relief sought is "appro-
priate" under the circumstances. It can be assumed, therefore, that the
Court is content to permit the various circuits to work out their own
solutions. The Circuits can continue, for the most part, to rely on their
own case law, although a few circuits may find themselves permitting
more title I actions than they would have were it not for the Supreme
Court's refusal to establish uniform criteria in the Crowley decision.
David E. Doran

LORETTO HEIGHTS COLLEGE: A College
"Unlike Yeshiva"
INTRODUCTION
In March 1984, the Tenth Circuit heard oral arguments in the case
of Loretto Heights College v. NLRB. I The appellant, Loretto Heights Col-
lege, argued that, contrary to the decision of the National Labor Rela-
tions Board (NLRB or Board), its faculty members were managerial
employees and, thus, were excluded from the protective coverage of the
National Labor Relations Act (NLRA or Act). 2 The NLRB argued to
uphold the Board's decision that the faculty members were not manag-
ers but employees, entitled to collective bargaining rights. 3 As an Inter-
venor, the Loretto Heights faculty, through its current bargaining agent,
the Faculty Education Association (FEA or Union), argued to uphold the
opinion of the Board.4 On September 4, 1984, the Tenth Circuit found
for the NLRB.
5
Loretto Heights has potential importance to the academic community.
It is the first appellate consideration of the Supreme Court's decision in
NLRB v. Yeshiva University,6 concerning the status of faculty members as
either employees or managers. 7 The Court could have reversed the
NLRB decision and held that Loretto Heights faculty were managers be-
cause they existed in an environment "like Yeshiva". 8 Instead the Court
affirmed the decision of the NLRB, largely out of deference to the
1. 742 F.2d 1245 (1984).
2. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151 etseq. (1982).
3. Loretto Heights College, 264 N.L.R.B. 1107 (1982). Pursuant to § 3(b) of the
National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), the decision was made by a three-member panel.
29 U.S.C.§ 153(b) (1982).
4. The case originated with the filing of a complaint by the FEA alleging that Loretto
Heights College violated §§ 8(a)(l) and (5) of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1), (5)
(1982). The College refused to negotiate a successor agreement. 264 N.L.R.B. at 1107.
5. 742 F.2d at 1246.
6. 444 U.S. 672 (1980).
7. Managerial employees are not covered by the National Labor Relations Act.
NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267, 289 (1974). Section 14(a) of the Act, 29 U.S.C.
§ 164(a) (1982), provides that employers need not recognize supervisors (defined in
§ 2(11), 29 U.S.C. § 152(11) (1982)) as members of a bargaining unit. The Court in Bell
defined "managerial employees" as those who "formulate and effectuate management pol-
icies by expressing and making operative the decisions of their employer." 416 U.S. at
288.
In Yeshiva, managerial employees are described as employees "who are involved in
developing and enforcing employer policy"; as employees who "must exercise discretion
within, or even independently of established employer policy and must be aligned with
management"; and as those who "represent management interests by taking or recom-
mending discretionary actions that effectively control or implement employer policy." 444
U.S. at 682-83.
8. The Supreme Court makes clear that its decision in Yeshiva applies not only to
Yeshiva University but to other universities "like Yeshiva". 444 U.S. at 688. How "alike"
the institution must be is the issue that has consumed considerable time and effort on the
part of attorneys for the universities and for the faculties.
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Board. Nevertheless, it did provide some indication of how the princi-
ples first laid down in Yeshiva would be applied.
This note will discuss the Supreme Court's Yeshiva decision and the
events leading up to that decision. It will also discuss the NLRB's analy-
ses and practices following that decision as reflected in its internal docu-
ments and its decisions. Finally, the note will discuss Loretto Heights, the
arguments and briefs presented to the Tenth Circuit, and the resulting
opinion and the lessons it contains.
I. NLRB AND INSTITUTIONS OF HIGHER EDUCATION PRIOR TO YESHIVA
As the Supreme Court pointed out in Yeshiva, Congress never spe-
cifically addressed whether college or university faculties were eligible to
organize under the NLRA. 9 It was originally thought that Congress did
not have power over such faculties because they were employed by non-
profit institutions which did not affect interstate commerce.' 0 But in
1970, the Board asserted jurisdiction over private higher education.'' A
year later, the Board approved the formation of bargaining units com-
posed of faculty members, 12 reasoning that faculty members were pro-
fessionals and entitled to the coverage of the Act. They rejected the
position that faculty members were supervisors or managers.'
3
The assertion of jurisdiction did not, however, eliminate the prob-
lem of reconciling the industrial model (to which the NLRA was primar-
ily addressed) with the educational environment. The Board concluded
that:
[The] industrial model cannot be imposed blindly on the aca-
demic world as though there was a one-to-one relationship.
The basis interests recognized by the [National Labor Rela-
tions] Act remain the same, but their interrelationship . . .
does not squarely fit the industrial model. . . . Rarely, if ever,
does industry present a situation where employee interests
outside the economic sphere assume major importance. 14
The Board then sought to develop a model which would "serve all
the legitimate interests of employees"' 15 and would provide a structure
for assessing which faculty members were employees and which were
managers. The Board's model had four criteria:
1) Is the individual a "professional" within the section
9. 444 U.S. at 679.
10. Id. at 679-80 (citing NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 440 U.S. 490, 504-05
(1979)). See also Sussman, University Governance Through a Rose-Colored Lens: NLRB v.
Yeshiva, 1980 SuP. CT. REV. 27, 30-31; Weiss, Yeshiva Revisited: The National Labor Relations
Board and Collective Bargaining at Private Universities, 10 W. ST. U.L.J. 23, 25-27 (1982).
11. Cornell University, 183 N.L.R.B. 329 (1970) (non-academic employees).
12. C.W. Post Center, 189 N.L.R.B. 904, 905 (1971).
13. Id. The Board continued with this approach up to the Supreme Court decision in
Yeshiva. See Fordham University, 193 N.L.R.B. 134 (1971); Adelphi University, 195
N.L.R.B. 639 (1972); University of Miami, 213 N.L.R.B. 634 (1975); Northeastern Univer-
sity, 218 N.L.R.B. 247 (1975); Fairleigh Dickinson University, 227 N.L.R.B. 239 (1976).





2) To the extent that the employee exercises authority which
in other contexts might be considered managerial, does
she excercise that authority collectively with her peers
rather than individually?
3) Does the employee, in exerting that authority, act in her
own interests rather than that of management?
4) Are the employee's decisions subject to reversal by a
higher authority? 17
Affirmative answers indicated that an employee was an appropriate
member of a bargaining unit. Negative responses indicated that faculty
members were probably managers and thereby excluded from the Act.
II. NLRB V. YESHIVA UNIVERSITY
In 1974, the union at Yeshiva University filed a petition for certifica-
tion of a bargaining unit consisting of full-time faculty members. Op-
posing that petition, the University argued that its faculty were
managerial personnel and not employees within the meaning of the Act.
The Board determined that the Yeshiva faculty were not managerial em-
ployees and were entitled to have a bargaining unit certified.18
After the election and certification of the unit, the University re-
fused to bargain, again raising objections to the propriety of the NLRB's
unit determination. The NLRB found the University to be in violation
of the Act in refusing to bargain with the union and entered summary
judgment against the University, ordering it to bargain. The Board ap-
plied to the Second Circuit for enforcement of this order. 19
The Second Circuit determined that the Yeshiva faculty were, in
fact and law, managerial employees. The court found that the faculty
were "in effect, substantially and pervasively operating the enter-
16. 29 U.S.C. § 152 (12) defines a professional employee as (a) any employee engaged
in work (i) predominantly intellectual and varied in character as opposed to routine
mental, manual, mechanical, or physical work; (ii) involving the consistent exercise of dis-
cretion and judgment in its performance; (iii) of such a character that the output produced
or the result accomplished cannot be standardized in relation to a given period of time;
(iv) requiring knowledge of an advanced type in a field of science or learning customarily
acquired by a prolonged course of instruction and study in an institution of higher learn-
ing or a hospital, as distinguished from a general academic education or from an appren-
tiveship or from training in the performance of routine mental, manual, or physical
processes; or (b) any employee, who (i) has completed the courses of specialized intellec-
tual instruction and study described in clause (iv) of paragraph (a), and is performing re-
lated work under the supervision of a professional person to qualify himself to become a
professional employee as defined in paragraph (a).
17. Although both the Second Circuit and the Supreme Court discussed the criteria
employed by the NLRB in determining whether a faculty's statutes was managerial or not,
582 F.2d at 697-702; 444 U.S. at 605, this particular description of the model employed by
the NLRB comes from Casey, Yeshiva University and the Definition of ",Managerial" 14 AKRON
L. REV. 591, 603 (1981). The development of those criteria have been traced in prior
articles. See Casenote, 28 CATH. U.L. REV. 663 (1979); Recent Developments, 47 FORDHAM
L. REV. 437 (1978); Recent Developments, 13 GA. L. REV. 313 (1978).
18. This short description of events is found in NLRB v. Yeshiva University, 582 F.2d
686, 688-89 (2d Cir. 1978). The Board's decision can be found at Yeshiva University, 221
N.L.R.B. 1053 (1975).
19. 582 F.2d at 689.
1985]
DENVER UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW
prise. ' ' 20 The Court held that the record established that there was "no
significant divergence between the interests of the faculty and those of
the administration."
2 1
The union appealed the Second Circuit opinion to the Supreme
Court. 2 2 The Supreme Court addressed the factors which the NLRB
had established to determine faculty members' status under the
NLRA. 23 Since the University did not contend that its faculty were not
professionals, 24 the first part of the test was answered in the affirmative
by concession. The Supreme Court focused its inquiry on the remaining
three criteria. The court treated these criteria, as had the Second Cir-
cuit, none too charitably. 25 It dismissed the "collective authority" and
"subjection to higher authority" criteria as being "unsupportable" and
"flatly inconsistent with the Board's own precedents."
2 6
After chastising the Board for a conclusory decision and its failure
to make specific findings of fact as to the Yeshiva situation, 27 the Court
concluded (on its own theoretical rather than factual basis) that "the
faculty's professional interests-as applied to governance at a university
like Yeshiva-cannot be separated from those of the institution."'2 8
Later, the Court observed that this inseparability of interests was an "in-
evitable characteristic of the governance structure adopted by universi-
ties like Yeshiva."
2 9
In so holding, the Court effectively refuted the one Board argument
it had considered worth raising. In elaborating on the inseparability of
interests concept, the Court held unjustified the Board's assumption
"that the professional interests of the faculty and the interests of the
institution are distinct, separable entities with which a faculty member
could not simultaneously be aligned.'"30 The Court continued:
In [a university like Yeshiva], the predominant policy normally
is to operate a quality institution of higher learning that will
accomplish broadly defined educational goals within the limits
of its financial resources. The "business" of a university is edu-
cation, and its vitality ultimately must depend on academic poli-
cies that largely are formulated and generally are implemented
by faculty governance decisions. . . . Faculty members en-
hance their own standing and fulfill their professional mission
by ensuring that the university's objectives are met. But there
can be no doubt that the quest for academic excellence and in-
stitutional distinction is a "policy" to which the administration
20. Id. at 698.
21. Id. at 701.
22. 444 U.S. 672.
23. These are the criteria found supra note 17 and accompanying text.
24. 444 U.S. at 681. See also 582 F.2d at 697.
25. 444 U.S. at 683-85; 582 F.2d at 698-702.
26. 444 U.S. at 685 & n.22. These factors were abandoned by the Board in the Yeshiva
case before the Supreme Court. Id.
27. 444 U.S. at 678.
28. Id. at 688.
29. Id. at 689 n.28.
30. Id. at 688 (emphasis added).
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expects the faculty to adhere, whether it be defined as a profes-
sional or an institutional goal. It is fruitless to ask whether an
employee is "expected to conform" to one goal or another
when the two are essentially the same.
3 1
The Court does not say that the motivating interest of the faculty and
the institution are identical. Rather, it says that the ultimate interest (or
goal) of the faculty, and institution is inseparable: the formulation and
implementation of academic politics that strive to produce academic ex-
cellence and an institution of distinction. Given a structure like
Yeshiva's, where the policies are formulated and implemented by faculty
governance decisions, the interests of the faculty and administration are
"simultaneously aligned."3 2
It is clear that the alignment of interests that the Court was discuss-
ing were those primarily related to academic politics (the "product to be
produced" by the institution whose "business" is education). 33 In that
area, the authority of the Yeshiva faculty was absolute. They effectively
decided who would be the beneficiaries of those policies ("the custom-
ers to be served"). Finally, they played a "predominant role in faculty
hiring, tenure, sabbaticals, termination and promotion" ("the terms
upon which [the product would] be offered").3 4 Because their profes-
sional expertise in those matters was indispensable to the formulation
and implementation of academic policy, 3 5 the university required their
participation in governance. 36 This participation by faculties and con-
comitant reliance by university administrations "is an inevitable charac-
teristic of the governance structure adopted by universities like
Yeshiva."
'3 7
Thus, in order to determine if any given faculty is governed by
Yeshiva, a preliminary inquiry must be made into whether it has a gov-
ernance structure "like Yeshiva."'3 8 Such a structure would seem to re-
quire, as a minimum threshold, effective control over academic policy
and programs. If a governance structure produces or allows this, a
faculty will generally have other effective controls, beginning with their
own personnel decisions but varying considerably beyond that point.
Yeshiva might have been correctly decided given its structure, but
31. Id. (footnote omitted, citation omitted).
32. This is not to say that there are not occasional differences in interests. The Court
seems to accept without debate that "faculty interests depart from those of the institution
with respect to salary and benefits," id. at 688 n.27, but finds such divergence insufficient
to remove the Yeshiva faculty from its "managerial" status. Indeed, the Court felt that this
is true of every managerial employee and probably less true in the academic environment
than elsewhere because the "nature and quality of a university depend so heavily on the
faculty attracted to the institution." Id. n.27.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 686 & n.23.
35. Id. at 689.
36. Id.
37. Id. at n.28.
38. At least one court and one author claim that being "like Yeshiva" requires an
institution to be a "mature private university". See Stephens Institute v. NLRB, 620 F.2d
720, 727 (1980) and Weiss, Yeshiva Revisited, supra note 10, at 23 n.2.
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the post-Yeshiva cases are plagued by confusion as to the extent of its
authority. It is clear that if an institution is found where the faculty does
nothing more than "determine the content of their own courses, evalu-
ate their own students, and supervise their own research,"13 9 its faculty is
not managerial. But if the faculty has "absolute" control over academic
matters (the product), and "effective control" over retention-but not
admission or tuition-of students (the customer), and a "predominant
role" over hiring but not sabbaticals (the terms upon which the product
will be offered), does it have managerial authority?
III. NLRB POSITION AFrER YESHIVA
Yeshiva clearly dismantled the Board's prior attempt to formulate
serviceable criteria for unit determination in higher education. What it
left in its place was pandemonium. Into the breach stepped the NLRB
General Counsel. In 1981, the General Counsel issued a memorandum
providing "Guidelines for Cases Arising Under Yeshiva". 40 He based
his analysis of faculty status after Yeshiva on a four-part test: First, did
faculty members "formulate, determine, or effectuate decisions of a
managerial character;" ' 4 1 second, even if such authority was exercised,
did "they do so in their own interest, rather than in the interest of the
employer; ' 4 2 third, even if they exercised managerial authority, to what
extent was the faculty "held 'accountable' from departures from institu-
tional policy"; 43 finally, the amount of time faculty invested in manage-
rial activities should be viewed to determine whether the conduct was
merely incidental to their "primary functions of teaching, research, and
writing."
44
To effectuate this test, the General Counsel further divided the in-
vestigation into four additional factors. 4 5 Only three of these four fac-
tors will be discussed here.46 The first factor involved "faculty
participation in decisionmaking". The Memorandum listed eighteen ar-
eas where Yeshiva found the faculty had made final decisions and effective
recommendations. 4 7 These were followed by nine "other areas in which
39. 444 U.S. at 690 n.31.
40. NLRB General Counsel Memorandum 81-19, Guidelines for Cases Arising Under
NLRB v. Yeshiva University (April 10, 1981) reprinted in 1981 LAB. REL. Y.B. (BNA) 304
[hereinafter cited as Memorandum]. Additional discussion regarding this Memorandum
can be found in Sheppard and Moran, The Future of Faculty Collective Bargaining at Private
Universities, 9 J.C.U.L. 41, 44-46 (1982-83).
41. Memorandum, supra note 40, at 307.
42. Id. This is reminiscent of one of the pre-Yeshiva criterion. See supra note 16 and
accompanying text. This consideration leads to an analysis of whether there is a diver-
gence of interests between faculty and administration.
43. Id. at 307.
44. Id. (footnotes omitted).
45. The difficulty of the task is probably subliminally evidenced by the fact that the
sections purport to be alphabetically divided from "A" to "E". Due either to the nature of
the task or to a later restructuring of the material, there are finally only four sections,
section D appearing not at all.
46. The fourth factor discusses "Supervisory Status". Because the Supreme Court
did not rule on this question in Yeshiva, that section is not discussed.
47. Memorandum, supra note 40, at 307 (footnote omitted). The areas listed were:
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the faculty's authority and influence should be considered."'48 The Gen-
eral Counsel cautioned that this list of twenty-seven factors was not
meant to be exhaustive.4 9 The Memorandum did not indicate what, if
any, relative weights these areas had in making a managerial versus em-
ployee determination. 50
The second factor asked, "[d]o faculty members act in the interest
of the employer?" 5 ' - In this section, the General Counsel began by not-
ing that "at Yeshiva, the professional interests of the faculty could not
be separated from those of the University. On the other hand, the Court
did not foreclose the possibility of a contrary conclusion on the basis of
a different structure and a different record."'5 2 The General Counsel
then described the faculty structure at Yeshiva as one where the "univer-
sity was compelled to rely on the faculty [because] it had no one else to
rely on." 5 3 He suggested that the Board look at a university's structure
to see whether there were administrators with the power to make the
decisions that were within the "absolute control" of the Yeshiva faculty.
He noted that "[a]t Yeshiva there [was] no substantial intermediate level
of administrators upon whom the Trustees and President [could] rely to
make informed decisions as to matters left to the faculty."
54
Thus, the Counsel contended that it was an absence of middle man-
agement that put the Yeshiva faculty in the position of having to make
management decisions and put the administration in a position where it
was required to rely on them. He saw the Yeshiva faculty stepping into
an academic-line organization vacuum. Therefore, where layers of ad-
ministration were present between the faculty and the President, 55 there
(1) curriculum (course content and course schedules, (2) teaching methods,
(3) grading policies, (4) matriculation standards, (5) admission policies, (6) reten-
tion policies, (7) graduation policies, (8) size of student body, (9) tuition, (10) lo-
cation of the school, (11) teaching loads, (12) student absence policies,
(13) enrollment levels, (14) faculty hiring, (15) tenure, (16) sabbaticals, (17) ter-
minations, and (18) promotions.
Id.
48. Id. at 307-08 (footnote omitted). The areas listed were: "(1) salaries, (2) budget,
(3) faculty evaluations, (4) faculty grievances, (5) research projects, (6) scholarships,
(7) honorary degrees, (8) leaves of absence, and (9) selection and/or evaluation of
chairpersons." Id.
49. Id. at 308 n.3.
50. Issues involving size of student body, tuition, location of school, student absence
policies, enrollment levels, and honorary degrees should have little, if any, weight. If a
faculty finds itself at a "selective college", it may well have something to say about student
admissions, size of student body, and tuition. If, on the other hand, the faculty is at a
"non-selective" institution, that policy is foregone. Implementation of managerial policies
are still required in the academic and personnel areas, however. This involvement would
be sufficient to find a faculty managerial under Yeshiva. The NLRB seems to have accepted
this analysis because it has stated that it does not consider "faculty involvement or lack of
[it] in these areas as vitally significant." Thiel College, 261 N.L.R.B. 580, 581 n.34 (1982).
This case is discussed infra note 68 and accompanying text.
51. Memorandum, supra note 40, at 309.
52. Id. (footnote omitted).
53. Id. at 308 n.24, 310.
54. Id. at 306 n.10.
55. Id. at 309. The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) in Loretto Heights accepted this
middle-management buffer theory. Loretto Heights College and Loretto Heights Col-
lege/Faculty Education Association, Case No. 27-CA-6667,JD-(SF)-I59-81 at 31 (June 8,
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was no vacuum to be filled.
The Supreme Court, however, never spoke of any "compulsion" by
the Yeshiva administration in the reliance on its faculty. It did say that:
The problem of divided loyalty is particularly acute for a uni-
versity like Yeshiva, which depends on the professional judgment of its
faculty to formulate and apply crucial policies constrained only
by necessarily general institutional goals. The university re-
quires faculty participation in governance because professional
expertise is indispensable to the formulation and implementa-
tion of academic policy.
56
The Supreme Court pointed out that the business of the university
was education and those persons who knew the most about the product
were the faculty members. Their participation in the formulation and
implementation of academic policies was necessary to produce the best
product. They were, in essence, the middle managers. Even where
there are layers of administration through which the faculty's formula-
tions and the administration's implementations are filtered, if the formu-
lations are almost always implemented, there exists a structure like
Yeshiva.
The third factor to be considered, according to the General Coun-
sel, was accountability. He advised that after Yeshiva it was important:
to ascertain whether faculty members are held accountable by
higher authority for their academic decisions and personnel
recommendations, or whether they are held accountable only
for their performance in the areas of teaching, research, and
publishing. A lack of accountability for what typically are man-
agerial functions would tend to indicate employee status. 5
7
Neither the Court in Yeshiva, nor the General Counsel, ever explained
what the test of accountability for academic or personnel decisions
should be.
IV. THE BOARD'S POST-YESHIVA DECISIONS
After the Yeshiva decision, the boards of directors of many institu-
tions sought to hitch their wagons to Yeshiva's star,58 and it was with
great anticipation that they and faculty unions looked to see what course
the NLRB would steer in its wake. Their wait ended in May, 1982, when
the Board announced five decisions. In three-Ithaca College, 59 Thiel Col-
lege60 and Duquesne University6 ' the faculty's authority rendered them
1981) [hereinafter cited as ALJ Op.]. The Tenth Circuit, likewise, accepted this analysis as
sound. 742 F.2d at 1254.
56. 444 U.S. at 689 (footnote omitted, emphasis added).
57. Memorandum, supra note 40, at 310 (footnote omitted).
58. The 1981 Labor Relations Yearbook lists five institutions which refused to bargain
initial contracts with certified unions and eleven institutions which refused to bargain
agreements upon the expiration of the initial ones. It is stated that "27 institutions have
exercised some type of Yeshiva claim." 1981 LAB. REL. Y.B. (BNA) 10-11.
59. 261 N.L.R.B. 577 (1982).
60. 261 N.L.R.B. 581 (1982).
61. 261 N.L.R.B. 587 (1982).
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managerial. Two others-Bradford Coleg62 and Montefiore Hospital and
Medical Center 6 3-had non-managerial faculties.64
All of the above cases were the result of challenges to initial unit
certification and administrators' decisions not to bargain initial contracts
based on their reading of Yeshiva. For example, the facts in Bradford
revealed that while existing school policies gave faculty the right to make
recommendations with regard to curriculum, admissions, tuition and
faculty salaries, the record showed that such recommendations were
often ignored by the President or Dean.6 5 It became apparent that the
Board would look at the constitution and bylaws of an institution and
would compare that "paper" to the actual practices in place. Where pa-
per and practice differed, the Board found the practice determinative.
66
The law school faculty at Duquesne, on the other hand, was deemed to
have managerial authority nearly identical to that possessed by the
Yeshiva faculty in critical academic matters such as curriculum, grading,
admission and matriculation standards. It also exercised authority in
nonacademic matters, including decisions regarding hiring and
tenure.
6 7
In terms of charting the Board's post-Yeshiva course, the most use-
ful indication came in a footnote in the Thiel College case:
There is no specific evidence concerning whether the Thiel
College teachers are involved in decisions regarding academic
calendars, student absence policies, enrollment levels, tuition,
and the location of a school . . . . [T]he faculties of only some
of the 10 schools of Yeshiva . . . effectively determined ques-
tions in these areas . . . . [W]e do not regard faculty involve-
ment or lack of involvement in these areas as vitally
significant.
6 8
The Board's indication that these areas were peripheral to its view of
Yeshiva provided some hope that more central areas were beginning to
emerge.
While Board harmony characterized the first set of decisions, when
the Board turned to cases where institutions had invoked Yeshiva in re-
fusing to bargain new agreements upon the expiration of the old ones,
6 9
that harmony quickly dissolved. Since Loretto Heights falls into this latter
category, these cases decided in 1982 will be examined more
thoroughly.
62. 261 N.L.R.B. 565 (1982).
63. 261 N.L.R.B. 569 (1982).
64. The cases cited in notes 59-63, supra, are discussed in Weiss, Yeshiva Revisited,
supra note 10, at 34-37.
65. 261 N.L.R.B. at 566-67.
66. Id. See also New York Medical College, 263 N.L.R.B. 124 (1982).
67. 261 N.L.R.B. at 589.
68. 261 N.L.R.B. at 581 n.34.
69. In so doing, the management of these institutions were arguably in violation of
§ 8(a)(5) of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5)(1982), which makes it an unfair labor prac-
tice for an employer to refuse to bargain collectively with duly certified representatives.
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In Florida Memorial College,70 the faculty was found to be
nonmanagerial in a full Board decision, with Chairman Van De Water
and Member Hunter dissenting. The majority found that the Florida
Memorial faculty committees were granted little authority, did not meet
regularly, were not comprised solely of faculty members, and were not
fully staffed. 7 1 The Board also found that the curriculum was not within
the faculty's absolute control, because the committee controlling course
offerings had administrators numbering about one half of its voting
membership. 7 2 Nor was there any real faculty authority with regard to
personnel matters such as hiring, tenure, promotions, grievances or
sabbaticals.
73
The dissenters argued that the faculty was managerial because they
determined teaching methods, course content and scheduling, student
evaluations, and the assignment of instructors to specific courses. 7 4 The
dissent claimed that the record showed extensive faculty participation in
virtually every aspect of the College's life. 7 5 In reading the record, the
majority deemed the faculty involvement as mere consultation, while the
dissenters saw it as effective recommendation.
7 6
In College of Osteopathic Medicine,7 7 the Florida Memorial dissenters,
Van De Water and Hunter, were members of a three member panel of
the Board which decided that the faculty there had "almost plenary au-
thority in academic matters and significant input into important nonaca-
demic matters." 78 The specifics cited in the decision include faculty
participation in the formulation of the basic academic philosophies and
polices of the College, the setting of admission policies, and the exercise
of considerable influence in faculty hiring.79 In addition, where faculty
did not have ultimate authority, the evidence revealed heavy administra-
tive reliance on faculty committee recommendations.8"
A notable aspect of this case was the union's contention that if the
faculty did have managerial authority, that authority was the direct result
of gains made through collective bargaining and that the unit should be
unable to "bargain itself out of the protections of the Act." 8' That posi-
70. 263 N.L.R.B. 1248 (1982).
71. Id. at 1252.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 1254.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 1255.
77. 265 N.L.R.B. 295 (1982).
78. Id. at 297.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id. The opinion indicates that this argument had also been made in Ithaca Col-
lege, supra note 59. The argument was also made in Farleigh Dickinson University, 227
N.L.R.B. 239 (1976), but the Board did nct address the issue. Counsel for the NLRB
General Counsel endorses this opinion. See Brief to the Administrative Law Judge on
Behalf of Counsel for the General Counsel at 24-26 and Answering Brief to the Board on
Behalf of Counsel for the General Counsel at 13-16 (Case No. 27-CA-6667). The ALJ
found that the Loretto faculty was non-managerial even with the authority it had secured
under the collective bargaining agreement. ALJ Op., supra note 55, at 29. Postured in this
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tion was rejected. Since the Yeshiva decision did not distinguish situa-
tions in which managerial authority was gained through collective
bargaining from situations in which such authority was more freely
granted, such a distinction was not found to be warranted by the Act.
82
The Board's decision that what must be determined in deciding
whether or not an institution is "like Yeshiva" is the extent of manage-
rial authority held by college faculties, regardless of how obtained,
8 3
coupled with the uncertain guidelines presented in Yeshiva, sounds an
ominous chord for faculty members whose units have gone unchal-
lenged, or even, as in Loretto Heights, where the unit has survived a chal-
lenge. Faculty unions may, out of a sense of self-preservation, seek to
preserve the non-managerial status quo and may thwart any creative at-
tempts at campus problem solving which may insinuate managerial
authority.
84
The extent of uncertainty that the Yeshiva Board holdings and col-
lective bargaining agreements formented is perhaps most evident in
Lewis University.85 There, in another three-to-two decision, the Board
found the faculty non-managerial. The majority's decision rests heavily
on the "master contract", the agreement which had been bargained for
in 1975, and cites in full the "management rights" provision of that con-
tract. The Board concluded that the limited authority granted to the
faculty in the master contract clearly demonstrated that they were not
intended to perform managerial functions or be considered managerial
employees. 8 6 To exemplify that limited authority, the majority noted
that unlike the faculty members at Yeshiva, the Lewis faculty did not
decide grading policies, matriculation standards, academic calendars, or
which students would be admitted, retained, or graduated. 8 7 Lewis'
faculty also did not determine the size of the student body, the tuition,
or the location of the school.
8 8
In dissent, Chairman Van De Water and Member Hunter were of
the opinion that the faculty members were managerial.8 9 The Board's
inability to agree on how Yeshiva should apply prompted separate
lengthy dissents best characterized by Member Hunter's statement that
way, the Tenth Circuit had no reason to address this matter as a discrete question of
authority.
82. 265 N.L.R.B. at 298.
83. Id.
84. For instance, at Loretto Heights, while awaiting the Tenth Circuit decision, union
members felt compelled to seek the advise of the union attorney as to whether any of its
members could serve on a special Presidential Committee on Long-Range Goals. Later,
even after the union had survived the court challenge, members expressed concern that a
proposed change in the faculty curriculum committee structure might run afoul of the
managerial exclusion. This information is known to the author first-hand as a faculty
member of Loretto Heights and a member of the Union Executive Committee.
85. 265 N.L.R.B. 1239 (1982).
86. d. at 1249.
87. Id.
88. Id. These are the very areas that the Board had announced in Thiel College as not
being "vitally significant". See supra note 68 and accompanying text.
89. 265 N.L.R.B. at 1252.
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an "examination of [the Chairman's] dissent as contrasted with the ma-
jority's decision might well cause one to question whether the Chairman
and the majority read the same record." 90 Member Hunter attempted to
provide some analytical basis for the differences of opinion. Where the
dissenters saw managerial authority, the majority saw either
"(a) authority with respect to mandatory subjects of bargaining embod-
ied in the parties' master contract, (b) mere exercise of professional
judgment, or (c) authority only to make nonbinding recommenda-
tions." 9 ' As to the first, Hunter repeated his position, first stated in Os-
teopathic Hospital,9 2 that the source of authority is irrelevant under both
the NLRA and Yeshiva. As to the second and third factors, Hunter felt
that the record, even as described by the majority, supported a finding
of managerial authority (rather than professional judgment) and effec-
tive (rather than nonbinding) recommendations.
9 3
V. NLRB AND LORETTO HEIGHTS COLLEGE
Loretto Heights College was one of the first institutions to follow
the Yeshiva banner. Loretto Heights faculty first certified its union on
September 21, 1972. 9 4 Nine days after Yeshiva was announced, the Col-
lege President informed the President of the faculty union (Faculty Edu-
cation Association or FEA) that as a result of Yeshiva some question had
been raised about whether the College should continue to negotiate
with the Union. After further correspondence, the College refused to
negotiate.9 5
An unfair labor practice charge was filed by the FEA on April 4,
1980 alleging violations of the NLRA. 96 On June 8, 1981, the Adminis-
trative Law Judge (ALJ) found against the College, stating that the
faculty were not managers but employees entitled to the protections of
the Act, and the College was required to bargain with them.
9 7
Both sides filed exceptions to the ALJ decision, and the matter was
90. Id. Compare, for instance, the majority's statements discussed in the text with the
Chairman's conclusion that the faculty "determines student admission requirements, what
programs shall be offered, and what degree will be awarded to whom. It decides grading
standards and graduation requirements. The faculty convened determines, in conjunction
with their department chairpersons, what courses shall be offered, to whom, and at what
time. The record reveals that the faculty . .. through the various standing committees
. . . has extensive authority to formulate and effectuate academic policies for the Univer-
sity." Id. at 1251.
91. Id. at 1252.
92. See supra notes 81-82 and accompanying text.
93. 265 N.L.R.B. at 1253-54.
94. ALJ Op., supra note 55, at 5.
95. Id. at 6-7. "When the Supreme Court handed down its ruling, 90 private colleges
and universities were engaged in collective bargaining. Today, 58 private four-year col-
leges and 11 private two-year colleges bargain. While some unions have disbanded ...
many have been decertified because of the Yeshiva decision .... A total of about 50
'Yeshiva claims' have been filed with the labor board. . . . About 20 have been settled by
board decisions, while another 10 have been withdrawn, settled in other ways, or
dropped." The Chronicle of Higher Education, June 6, 1984 at 20, col. 4-5.
96. Id. at 1.
97. Id. at 32-34.
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considered by the NLRB on the record without oral argument. 9 8 The
Board substantially adopted the ALJ's decision, 9 9 and the College filed
an appeal. Because the Board had adopted the ALJ's decision, the argu-
ments in the Tenth Circuit centered around the accuracy of that
decision.
The ALJ found that the union movement began at Loretto in 1971
primarily because faculty members were dissatisfied with the way the
College was being administered. They felt that their participation in
college governance had eroded from their earlier participation. °0 0 The
faculty had, however, achieved increased participation in governance
through its union.' 0 '
In analyzing the degree of faculty participation in college govern-
ance both before and after collective bargaining the ALJ found that:
The faculty did not run the university as the Yeshiva faculty did,
and the interests of the faculty were not at one with the inter-
ests of the University. . . . The faculty had nothing to do with
the admission or expulsion of students, establishment of tui-
tion, student financial aid, execution of contracts or leases of
property, or any other business or purely administrative func-
tions of [the College]. Final authority in every facet of [college]
governance rested with [the College]. It could not be stated
• . . that . . . [the] faculty was in a position wherein 'their au-
thority in academic matters is absolute.' ",102
Although finding some change in faculty status attendant to collective
bargaining under the union contract, the ALJ did not feel that the Col-
lege had demonstrated that the interests of the union and the College
were "now one and the same."'
0 3
The ALJ then analyzed whether faculty participation in governance
through organizations and committees was managerial in nature, or
whether such organizational participation was carried out by the faculty
as professionals applying their expertise to their daily work.' 0 4 Some
committees were found to be of a minor nature, even though the results
might affect the college in a substantial manner. Those committees in-
volved faculty personnel matters (sabbaticals, tenure, rank, faculty re-
view) and do not, in fact, seem minor either by nature or by Yeshiva
standards. By minor, the ALJ meant that the participation on those
committees did not take much faculty members' time. Service in this
part of faculty governance, therefore, was only incidental to the teach-
98. Appellant's Opening Brief at 1, Loretto Heights College v. NLRB, 742 F.2d 1245
(1984).
99. 264 N.L.R.B. 1107 (1982).
100. ALJ Op., supra note 55, at 5. This finding is in accord with the general position of
the dissent in Yeshiva which cited a Carnegie Commission Study for the proposition that
"[ulnionization for faculty is more ... an effort to preserve the status quo than to achieve
a new position of influence and affluence." 446 U.S. at 704 n.1 7.
101. ALJ Op., supra note 55, at 5.
102. Id. at 28-29.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 30.
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ers' primary research, writing, and instruction duties. 10 5
Other committees were found to have more weight, 10 6 due to the
presence of administrators on the committees. Ironically, that very pres-
ence was held to so dilute the committee's work that it could not be
considered managerial. v0 7 Although some of the faculty participation
on committees was of a policy-making nature, it was found to be essen-
tially advisory. 10 8 The ALJ concluded that ultimate control remained
with the College.109
The ALJ's third reason for finding the Loretto Heights faculty non-
managerial drew upon the size of the administrative staff. In Yeshiva, the
staff was "small, and there was no effective buffer between the faculty
and top management . . . . [T]he university was compelled to rely upon
the faculty for advice, recommendations, establishment of policies, and
implementation of policies."'"'1 In contrast, Loretto's Program Direc-
tors were found to provide "a very effective buffer between top manage-
ment and the lowest echelon" with their decisions carrying greater
weight than those of faculty members." '1 Also, the Academic Dean's of-
fice was a "powerful one" and he, rather than the faculty, was the mana-
gerial authority in academic matters.' 12
A. Arguments Before the Tenth Circuit
Since the Board substantially adopted the ALJ's findings that the
Loretto Heights faculty were non-managerial, the College, to prevail at
the Tenth Circuit, had to demonstrate that the Loretto Heights faculty
represented "management interests by taking or recommending discre-
tionary actions that effectively control or implement employer pol-
icy."' 13 The central issue on appeal before the Tenth Circuit was the
degree of authority that a faculty must possess in order to be considered
managerial. The Yeshiva Court had clearly rejected a requirement that a
faculty possess absolute or final authority and stressed that the "relevant
consideration is effective recommendation or control"."14 The Board
itself has affirmatively acknowledged that this is the controlling
105. Id. The focus on time spent on governance matters as an indicator of managerial
or employee status has its genesis, in part, in the General Counsel's Memorandum. See
Memorandum, supra note 40, at 307 n.18, 309 n.33.
106. ALJ Op., supra note 55, at 30.
107. Id. For another Board decision where the faculty committees were heavily popu-
lated with administrators (department chairman stipulated to be managerial and/or super-
visory), see New York Medical College, 263 N.L.R.B. 124 (1982) (faculty found non-
managerial).
108. ALJ Op., supra note 55, at 31.
109. Id.
110. Id. (emphasis added). Presumably, the ALJ accepted the "administrative vacuum"
analysis presented by the NLRB General Counsel. A discussion of this "layer of adminis-
tration" theory can be found supra notes 54-55 and accompanying text.
111. ALJ Op., supra note 55, at 31.
112. Id. at 31-32.
113. 444 U.S. at 683 (footnote omitted).




The College argued that the ALJ had ignored the record, which es-
tablished effective faculty control, as he was unable to cite to a single
instance where the faculty recommendations were rejected by the ad-
ministration.'16 The NLRB argued, inferentially, that this lack of rejec-
tion was the result of a committee structure so diluted by administrators
that the faculty's role was merely advisory.' 17
After weighing these arguments, the Tenth Circuit concluded that
while faculty members at Loretto Heights played a substantial role in
college governance, in most aspects of that governance their authority
was severely circumscribed and did not rise to the level of the "effective
recommendation and control" contemplated in Yeshiva.
18
The Court reasoned that the faculty played little if any role outside
the academic sphere.' 9 Their role was virtually nonexistent in business
affairs, as well as in admission, retention, and expulsion of students.
120
However, the Court deemed these matters of only limited signifi-
cance. 12 1 What was important to the Court was the faculty's role in aca-
demic affairs. 12 2  In that area, the Court found Loretto Heights'
committee structure pivotal. The mere existence of such a structure
made Loretto Heights "[u]nlike Yeshiva, where each school's faculty ap-
parently met and decided most academic matters as a collective
body[.]"' 23 Dissected, the committee structure revealed "minor" and
more weighty" committees. A committee was minor if it either (1) met
infrequently or (2) had little impact on College governance.
12 4
The Court's bifurcation may prove significant for other college
structures. While the assessment of a faculty committee's impact has an
obvious place in a managerial/non-managerial classification, it is easy to
see how such a measure could be at odds with frequency of meetings,
the measure proposed by the Court to indicate whether "faculty involve-
ment in the committees' work is so limited as to be 'only incidental to, or
in addition to, their primary functions of teaching, research and writing,'
rather than truly managerial in nature."1 2 5 A committee with significant
impact which works efficiently and, therefore, needs to meet only infre-
quently may "measure up" to a committee with precious little to do
which spends inordinate amounts of faculty time doing it. For faculty
members intent on preserving their union's status, the message might
be: meet frequently and for long periods of time.
115. College of Osteopathic Medicine, 265 N.L.R.B. 295 (1982).
116. Appellant's Opening Brief, supra note 98, at 20.
117. Respondent's Brief at 48, Loretto Heights College v. NLRB, 742 F.2d 1245
(1984).






124. Id. at 1252-53.
125. Id. at 1253.
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When the Court considered those organizations that carry more
weight in the College's academic structure, it found that the faculty
power was more theoretical than actual.' 2 6 The Court supported this
contention in two ways: (1) the committees had only a recommending
or advising function; and (2) the presence of administrators on commit-
tees and the "layers of administrative approval required for many deci-
sions" seriously diluted any raw faculty power.
127
The first factor has been seen before, and it rises again like Ban-
quo's ghost. Those who would exercise it, like Hunter and Van De
Water (and Loretto Heights' attorneys) invoke Yeshiva's footnote that the
relevant consideration in any Yeshiva analysis is "effective recommenda-
tion or control" rather than final authority. 12 8 So, their exorcism pro-
ceeds, if the College administration accepts faculty recommendations an
overwhelming majority of the time, these faculty recommendations be-
come, in fact and in law, "effective and controlling". This position has a
certain appeal: it is logical, seems consistent with Yeshiva, and lends it-
self to numerical analysis.
Perhaps to counter this appeal, the Tenth Circuit seems to more
heartily rely on its second factor, the presence of administrators on the
major committees, to reinforce its position. The Court classifies the ad-
ministrators' presence in three ways: (1) physical presence on critical
committees, at times resulting in administrators' numerical superiority;
(2) presence in terms of administrative layering, i.e., administrators
holding critical positions in college governance; and (3) the presence of
Program Directors both on committees and as liasons between upper
management and faculty. 12 9 Of course, these three criteria need not be
distinct, a single Program Director could on any given day maintain all
three presences.
An analysis of this omnipresent management postulate reveals that
the net effect of the first two factors, numerical superiority on critical
committees and layering of administration, so comingles managerial in-
fluence with faculty judgment that the final recommendations are not
truly faculty recommendations at all. This is especially true where the
administration either has an independent vote or the power to hand a
recommendation "down" to the faculty committee which, in turn, sends
a recommendation "up" to the administration. If the faculty commit-
tee's recommendation never differs from that which came "down" to it,
it can easily be described as a situation where the faculty never differs
from the administrative recommendation, rather than the reverse.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 1253-54.
128. 444 U.S. at 683 n.17.
129. 742 F.2d at 1254. In Loretto Heights, the Program Directors were stipulated to be
outside of the bargaining unit. ALJ Op., supra note 55, at 7. To the extent that it is possi-
ble to compare Program Directors with Department or Division Chairmen, it is unusual
that such "middle managers" are outside the bargaining unit (see New York Medical Col-
lege, 263 N.L.R.B. 124 (1982)), but not unusual that an employer claims that they should




Therefore, the number of times that faculty recommendations are
adopted or rejected is no real indication of faculty authority.
The third presence, that of Program Directors, is dealt with most
elaborately. The "buffer" theory the court induces from their presence
may be the most significant element in the Loretto Heights decision.'
3 0
This is what seems to lead the Court to distinguish Loretto Heights from
Yeshiva. Initially, the theory is conceived by a comparison of the relative
size of the administrative staff at Yeshiva and Loretto Heights. At
Yeshiva, the administrative staff was considered fairly small in relation to
the university's size. 13 1 Consequently, said the Tenth Circuit, Yeshiva
was "in effect, 'compelled to rely on the faculty for advice, recommenda-
tions, establishment of polices and implementation of policies' .... As
a result, the Yeshiva faculty was by necessity 'aligned with manage-
ment.' ",132 In essence, the Court concluded, Yeshiva's faculty were
aligned with management because management needed them to be. By
contrast, Loretto Heights' administration was found to be large in rela-
tion to the size of the college. 133 Thus, there was no compulsion to rely
on faculty for advice or policy establishment and implementation. In
essence, Loretto Heights' faculty was not aligned with management be-
cause management did not need them to be.
Even more significant than the numbers themselves is the fact that
among their number, Loretto Heights management had Program Direc-
tors who were found to form a very effective buffer between top man-
agement and faculty. 134 These Program Directors are part of the
administration but also teach courses as members of the faculty.' 3 5 Be-
cause they are so much like members of the faculty, the Tenth Circuit
found they "possess the 'professional expertise' that the [Yeshiva] Court
deemed 'indispensable' to the formulation and implementation of aca-
demic policy."1
3 6
130. 742 F.2d at 1254.
131. When the Second Circuit reviewed the record in Yeshiva, there were approxi-
mately 2,500 full and part-time students. The University was staffed by 209 full-time and
150 part-time faculty members. The Court does not break down the number of adminis-
trators but recites a number of them and makes references to deans and directors. Yeshiva
v. NLRB et al., 582 F.2d at 690. It would seem that there was some layer of administration
between the faculty and the President, undercutting the General Counsel's theory of
Yeshiva's compulsion to allow its faculty members to manage.
132. 742 F.2d at 1254. This theory of "compulsion" does not have its source in any
direct quote in Yeshiva. Rather, it comes to Laretto Heights by way of the General Counsel's
Memorandum (see supra notes 54-56 and accompanying text) and its acceptance by the ALJ
(see supra notes 110-11 and accompanying text).
133. 742 F.2d at 1254. At the time the record was made in Loretto Heights, there was "a
full-time faculty of approximately 60 to 65, and a part-time faculty of approximately 30 to
35". The administrative staff was stated to be 19 without counting the Program Directors
who were considered administrators. The student body was approximately 850. ALJ Op.,
supra note 55, at 3.
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B. Analyzing Loretto Heights
Thus, the Tenth Circuit confirmed Yeshiva's message that profes-
sional expertise is necessary to the formulation of academic policy, but
extended that principle to a holding that the locus of that expertise is
critical: "The availability of this expertise within the ranks of the admin-
istration obviates the College's need to rely extensively on the profes-
sional judgment of its faculty in determining and implementing
academic policy." 
13 7
Notwithstanding the fact that the "number of administrators" test
has some inherent problems of its own (does one count all professionals
who are non-unit members, e.g., the Director of Intramural Events,
Building and Grounds Supervisors, Office of Public Information Heads,
or does one count only those administrator-managers in the academic
area?), the ratio of administrators to faculty analysis propounded by the
Board in its brief in itself misleading? 13 8 Certain administrative func-
tions are practically fixed in any college or university whether it has a
student body of 500 or 50,000. Thus, in similar institution like Loretto
Heights, their numbers seem disproportionate to the number of stu-
dents and/or faculty than they would at a larger university like Yeshiva.
But more importantly, the numerical analysis seems to miss the mark
with regard to the Yeshiva analysis. Yeshiva required faculty participa-
tion in governance not because the administration was too small but be-
cause the faculty had the "indispensable" professional expertise needed
to formulate and implement the educational policy.
The "Program Director - buffer" argument merits more serious
consideration. Program Directors wear an administrative shoe on one
foot, a faculty shoe on the other. They administer their respective disci-
pline areas and represent that discipline both to the Academic Dean and
to faculty governance committees. For these functions, they have re-
duced teaching loads. Otherwise, they are like faculty members in that
they teach, serve on faculty governance committees, and have faculty
voting rights. The Board argued that their reduced teaching load ren-
dered them "the only persons who have the time and the authority to
run the department on a day-to-day basis". 13 9 This may be true, but it
should not be dispositive as to the status of the other faculty members.
The program director/department chairman question has been a
continuously perplexing one in higher education labor cases.
140
Neither the Board, nor apparently the Court, appreciates the distinction
between an academic-line organization (which provides vertical coordi-
nation through the dean, program director/department chairman, and
faculty members in a specific discipline) and a governance organization
(which cuts across discipline lines and reports sometimes to the Aca-
137. Id.
138. Respondent's Brief, supra note 117, at 28.
139. Id. at 30.
140. See the discussion in Berry Schools v. NLRB, 627 F.2d 692 (5th Cir. 1980).
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demic Dean, but just as often to the President of the College or the Dean
of Student Life, depending on the subject matter involved).
In the academic-line organization, the director/chairman functions
administratively both as a spokesman for his discipline and as an in-
dependent voter. However, in faculty governance, the direc-
tor/chairman serves as any other faculty member. It is not unusual for
an academic-line organization director/chairman, however appointed,
to simultaneously hold positions on, or even chair, faculty governance
committees to which they were elected by the faculty. This does not
necessarily dilute the power of the governance committee; rather it
could just as easily be viewed as an alignment of interests between
faculty and institution. In the former view, it would produce non-mana-
gerial employees; in the latter view, it would produce Yeshiva-like
employees. 14'
While the presence of Program Directors may indicate that they are
the only ones with the time to run the day-to-day affairs of the discipline
area, it is not indicative of any other faculty member's lack of participa-
tion in college governance. In adopting both the Board's "numbers ra-
tionale" and "program director-buffer rationale", the Tenth Circuit
further institutionalized an apparent judicial misunderstanding of
academia and made faculty managerial status more dependent than ever
on managerial needs.
Perhaps a more cogent measure of managerial status would be to
determine in what areas the control of the faculty is found. Had the
Tenth Circuit articulated a threshold criterion for determining whether
a university is "like Yeshiva", depending on whether its faculty exercises
absolute control over academic affairs, it would have been consistent
with the Yeshia holding and would have gone some distance to clarify
managerial status. Absolute control in academic affairs is consistent
with the Supreme Court's articulation of independent judgment exer-
cised by teaching professionals as vital to an institution being "like
Yeshiva".
In Yeshiva, the university conceded the professional academic status
of its faculty. The fact that the faculty exercised control extending to the
whole operation was the managerial determinant. Instead of courting
administrators and culling their resumes for evidence of faculty-like pro-
fessional expertise, the Board and the courts should delineate three
levels of faculty status under the NLRA: (1) faculty as employees - those
who do not exercise control over academic affairs; (2) faculty as profes-
sionals - those who do exercise absolute control over academic affairs;
and (3) faculty as managers - those who exercise absolute control over
academic affairs and effectively determine policy and resource allocation
throughout the university so as to substantially and pervasively operate
the enterprise. While exercise of academic judgment may be consonant
141. See 444 U.S. at 688. There the Court specifically finds unjustified the Board's as-
sumption that a faculty's interests and those of the institution cannot be simultaneously
aligned.
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with management policy, such exercise does not necessarily effectuate
that policy. The effectuation, and thus the managerial status, comes
only when the faculty has at least effective recommendation authority as
to the allocation of the institution's resources.
Under such a delineation, Loretto Heights faculty would still be
non-managerial. The ALJ found that Loretto Heights faculty members
had not participated in any budget preparation or decisions beyond cler-
ical tasks. 14 2 With its opinion the Tenth Circuit could have taken the
opportunity to point out that even if the faculty did meet the threshold
criterion of absolute control over academic affairs, its lack of responsibil-
ity and authority in controlling the financial resources used to effectuate
management policy rendered them non-managerial. Therefore, the
Loretto Heights faculty was unlike the faculty at Yeshiva.
VI. CONCLUSION
In Loretto Heights, the Tenth Circuit had an opportunity to provide
much needed clarification to the Supreme Court's Yeshiva ruling. That
opportunity was largely bypassed. Out of its decision, a new test may
have arisen, the "effective buffer test", which is but a perpetuation of the
General Counsel's misreading of Yeshiva. The endorsement of such a
test unnecessarily complicates administrative and judicial attempts at
dealing with Yeshiva and will most probably have a disparate impact on
smaller institutions.
John J. Krause
142. ALJ OP., supra note 55, at 7.
[Vol. 62:2
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KNIGHT: CONSTITUTIONAL PARAMETERS OF STATE
PUBLIC EMPLOYEE LABOR STATUTES
INTRODUCTION
In Minnesota State Board for Community Colleges v. Knight,' the United
States Supreme Court decided an issue which required consideration of
first amendment, labor and administrative law principles. The Court
confronted the question of whether a state may validly require public
employers to meet with employee union representatives to the exclusion
of nonunion employees, not only to negotiate contract terms such as
wages, but also to discuss broad issues of policy, such as budgetary plan-
ning and selection of administrators. 2 The Court answered the question
in the affirmative, upholding a statute which strengthens and extends
the relationship between employer and employee union-a relationship
which Congress and some state governments have supported consist-
ently by legislation throughout much of this century. 3 At the same time,
the decision shed new light on a rule of administrative law first enunci-
ated in 1915, which held that an individual does not have a due process
right to a hearing before governmental authorities when those authori-
ties are making policy decisions. 4 The holding also reinforced the rule
that, in the context of nonpublic forums, government officials may "pick
and choose" the speakers to whom they will listen-a rule which has
evolved from the Court's first amendment decisions.
5
I. FACTS OF THE CASE
In 1971, the Minnesota legislature passed the Public Employees La-
bor Relations Act (PELRA), which requires public employers 6 to negoti-
ate with their employees, through the employees' collective bargaining
representatives, on "terms and conditions of employment."' 7 The stat-
ute also requires public employers to "meet and confer" with profes-
1. 104 S. Ct. 1058 (1984).
2. Id. at 1060.
3. See, e.g., MICH. COMp. LAws ANN. §§ 423.215-.254 (West 1978); MINN. STAT. ANN.
§§ 1797.61-.776 (West Supp. 1984). See generally R. GORMAN, BASIC TEXT ON LABOR LAW
UNIONIZATION AND COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 4-6 (1976) (discussing federal labor laws).
4. Bi-Metallic Investment Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 239 U.S. 441 (1915).
5. 104 S. Ct. at 1068.
6. The employers covered by the statute include the state and its political subdivi-
sions, agencies and instrumentalities. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 179.63(4) (West Supp. 1984).
7. Id. §§ 179.61; 179.66(2). "Terms and conditions of employment" is defined as
hours, wages, fringe benefits except for retirement benefits, and personnel policies which
affect "working conditions." Id. § 179.63(18). Most state legislatures tended to adopt
wholesale the NLRA phrase "wages, hours, terms and conditions of employment" to de-
fine their scope of bargaining. Pisapia, W1hat's Negotiable in Public Education?, I GOV'T UNION
REV. 23, 25 (1980). Yet Minnesota did not. Minnesota has specifically enumerated a list of
mandatory bargaining subjects which reflects a determination to limit the scope of bar-
gaining. Id. However, Minnesota courts have stated there should be a "liberal" attitude
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sional employees on policy issues which are not terms and conditions of
employment.8 If employees have chosen a collective bargaining repre-
sentative, the statute requires that the employer meet and confer only
with that representative. 9
Since enactment of the statute, the Minnesota State Board for Com-
munity Colleges has negotiated successive employment contracts with
community college faculty members through the faculty's exclusive bar-
gaining representative, the Minnesota Community College Faculty Asso-
ciation (MCCFA).' 0 Pursuant to the statute, the State Board and
administrators of Minnesota's eighteen community colleges also have
met with MCCFA representatives in regularly scheduled sessions to
meet and confer on policy issues not covered by the bargaining agree-
ments." Administrators and MCCFA members participating in these
"meet and confer" sessions have discussed such issues as budgetary pol-
icy, curriculum selection, and the hiring of administrators. 12 Under the
statute's mandate, the MCCFA has had the exclusive right to choose
which faculty members will confer with administrators in the "meet and
confer" sessions. The MCCFA has chosen only union members to per-
form that task. 13 The Minnesota State Board considers the opinions ex-
pressed by the "meet and confer" committees to be the official view of
all faculty. '
4
In 1974, twenty nonunion faculty members challenged the statute
in federal district court claiming that, as applied to community colleges,
PELRA constitutes an invalid delegation of legislative authority and an
unconstitutional infringement on the speech and associational rights of
nonunion teachers as protected by the first and fourteenth amend-
ments.' 5 The district court upheld the statute's meet and negotiate pro-
visions, but struck down as a violation of the first amendment that part
of PELRA which permits only the MCCFA to choose faculty participants
for the "meet and confer" sessions.16 On February 21, 1984, the United
States Supreme Court reversed the district court's ruling and held that
PELRA's meet and confer provisions are constitutionally valid.
1 7
applied when construing "terms and conditions of employment." See City of Richfield v.
Local No. 1215, Int'l Ass'n of Firefighters, 276 N.W.2d 42, 49 (Minn. 1979).
8. Id. § 179.66(3). Under the statute, teachers are designated as professional em-
ployees. MINN. STAr. ANN. § 179.63(10)(1c) (West Supp. 1984).
9. Id. § 179.66(7).
10. 104 S. Ct. at 1061.
11. Id.
12. Id. at 1062.
13. Knight v. Minnesota Community College Faculty Ass'n, 571 F. Supp. 1, 10 (D.
Minn. 1982), rev'd sub nom. Minnesota State Bd. for Community Colleges v. Knight, 104 S.
Ct. 1058 (1984).
14. 104 S. Ct. at 1062.
15. 104 S. Ct. at 1063; Knight v. Minnesota Community College Faculty Ass'n, 571 F.
Supp. at 3, 5.
16. 571 F. Supp. at 12.
17. 104 S. Ct. at 1064.
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II. BACKGROUND OF THE LAW
A. Collective Bargaining
The creation of labor unions and collective bargaining agreements
has brought numerous constitutional challenges to the courts, including
challenges under the first and fourteenth amendments. Rules and regu-
lations adopted in public sector bargaining agreements must withstand
constitutional tests simply because the government is the employer.
18
To better understand the case law dealing with constitutional challenges
to labor union agreements and practices, it is necessary to consider the
history of collective bargaining in relation to the speech and associa-
tional rights which are protected by the first and fourteenth
amendments.
1. Public-Sector Bargaining
Collective bargaining is the process by which employees, through a
designated organizational representative, and employers meet to estab-
lish terms and conditions of employment. 19 Private sector collective
bargaining was given federal recognition with the passage of the Na-
tional Labor Relations Act of 1935 (NLRA),20 which rendered illegal
employers' resistance to employees' attempts to unionize in the private
labor sector.2 1 In the public sector, employee unionization has in-
creased rapidly since 1960.22 Many observers believe the initial impetus
for public sector bargaining was provided by President Kennedy's Exec-
utive Order 10988 which encouraged federal government employees to
join unions and bargain collectively. 23 Since then, federal courts have
stated that public employees have a constitutionally protected right to
join labor unions, founded in the first amendment.
2 4
Public sector bargaining is now widespread among state, local and
federal governments. In fact, in some states, collective bargaining in the
public sector is more prevalent than bargaining in the private sector.
25
18. Finkin, The Limits of Majority Rule in Collective Bargaining, 64 MINN. L. REV. 183, 247
(1980).
19. PORTRAIT OF A PROCESS--COLLECTIVE NEGOTIATIONS IN PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT XXV
(M. Gibbons, R. Helsby, J. Lefkowitz, B. Tener eds. 1979) [hereinafter cited as PORTRAIT
OF A PROCESS]. The National Labor Relations Act (N.L.R.A.), section 8(d) defines collec-
tive bargaining as "[Tihe performance of the mutual obligation of the employer and the
representative of the employees to meet at reasonable times and to confer in good faith
with respect to wages, hours and other terms and conditions of employment, or the nego-
tiation of an agreement . . . and the execution of a written contract . . . but such obliga-
tion does not compel either party to agree to a proposal or require the making of a
concession." 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1982) (emphasis added).
20. See C. GREGORY AND H. KATZ, LABOR AND THE LAW 224 (1979).
21. Id.
22. Gershenfeld, Public Employee Unionization-An Overview, in PORTRAIT OF A PROCESS,
supra note 19, at 7.
23. Troy, The Agenda of Public Sector Unions and Associations, 4 GOV'T UNION REVIEW 15
(1983).
24. See Norbeck v. Davenport Community School Dist., 545 F.2d 63, 67 (8th Cir.
1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 917 (1977); University of N.H. Chapter of the Am. Ass'n of
Univ. Professors v. Haselton, 397 F. Supp. 107, 108 (D.N.H. 1975).
25. Petro, Public-Sector Bargaining: An Assessment, 3 GOV'T UNION REV. 3 (1982).
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Twenty-seven states have passed public-sector collective bargaining leg-
islation applicable to public employees. Twelve other states have statu-
tory coverage for one or more of the categories of policemen, firemen,
teachers or transit workers and only eleven states have no state-man-
dated public sector bargaining statutes.
2 6
2. Collective Bargaining in Public Education
One of the most well-publicized developments in public-sector la-
bor relations has been the adoption of collective bargaining procedures
by teachers. Most of this country's public school teachers are employed
pursuant to a labor contract negotiated by their teachers' union.
27
There are three major national educational unions: the National Educa-
tion Association (NEA), the American Federation of Teachers
(AFT/AFL-CIO) and the American Association of University Professors
(AAUP).2 8 However, the key decision-makers in educational collective
bargaining are local union officers, state councils or officials of district
councils rather than national union officials. 2 9 Educational matters nor-
mally subject to bargaining are merit pay, length of school day and
school year, terms of dismissal, pay raises, 30 leaves, insurance and griev-
ance procedures.A' The scope of bargaining in public education is in
some respects narrower than that of the private sector because state ed-
ucation laws often preempt issues normally negotiated in collective bar-
gaining agreements.
3 2
On the college level, faculties historically have enjoyed the opportu-
nity to participate in the decision-making processes of their institutions.
Such participation is accomplished by means of faculty senates or coun-
cils that consist of elected representatives. 3 3 In recent years, faculties
have begun to perceive that their role in governing their institutions has
declined or has become non-existent; thus, there has been a strong
move toward collective bargaining in higher education.3 4 As of 1981,
26. See id. at 8-9. These figures reflect the 1983 enactments of public sector bargain-
ing statutes in Ohio and Illinois. 4 LAB. REL. REP. (BNA) (State Lab. Laws) 23:215 (Jan.
23, 1984) (Illinois' public employment labor relations act effective July 1, 1984); 4A LAB.
REL. REP. (BNA) (State Lab. Laws) 45:217 (Aug. 8, 1983) (Ohio's public employee labor
relations act effective April 1, 1984).
27. Lieberman, Educational Reform and Teacher Bargaining, 4 GOV'T UNION REV. 59
(1983) [hereinafter cited as Lieberman.
28. Stern, Unionism in the Public Sector, in PUBLIC-SECTOR BARGAINING 62-63 (B. Aaron,
J. Grodin, J. Stern eds. 1979).
29. Id. at 63.
30. Lieberman, supra note 27, at 59.
31. Doherty, Public Education, in COLLECTIVE BARGAINING: CONTEMPORARY AMERICAN
EXPERIENCE 529 (G. Somers ed. 1980).
32. Id. at 525.
33. Zeller, Why Faculties Organize, in COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IN HIGHER EDUCATION-
THE DEVELOPING LAw 81 (J. Vladeck and S. Vladeck eds. 1975) [hereinafter cited as COL-
LECTIVE BARGAINING IN HIGHER EDUCATION]. These representatives advise college admin-
istration on issues such as curriculum instruction, admission requirements, and grading
policies. Id.
34. Osborne, The AAUP Collective Bargaining, in COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IN HIGHER
EDUCATION, supra note 33, at 154. It should be noted that some observers believe faculty
senates and councils cannot survive collective bargaining in higher education. See, e.g.,
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thirty-one states provided for collective bargaining by faculty in higher
education. 35 State bargaining statutes such as Minnesota's PELRA rec-
ognize the importance of input by faculty members into policy decisions.
PELRA thus encourages a policy of close cooperation between public
employers and teachers due to the teachers' knowledge, expertise and
education that can be helpful and necessary to the quality of public
services.
36
As far as constitutional freedoms are concerned, the Supreme Court
has ruled that public school teachers do not lose their first amendment
rights as a result of their public employment status.3 7 A selected survey
of first amendment Supreme Court cases aids in understanding the
Court's position in cases challenging the constitutionality of collective
bargaining agreements.
B. Freedom of Speech
The first amendment to the United States Constitution, applicable
to the states through the fourteenth amendment, 38 provides that "Con-
gress shall make no law. . . abridging the freedom of speech. . . or the
right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Govern-
ment .... .9 It was not until the close of World War I that the
Supreme Court began to interpret and apply the first amendment.
40
But by 1940, the Court had attributed to the principles of free speech a
place of highest importance in the balancing of state and individual
interests.
4 I
Wollett, Self-Governance and Collective Bargaining for Higher Education Faculty: Can the Two Sur-
vive?, in COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IN HIGHER EDUCATION, supra note 33, at 15.
35. Henkel & Wood, The Power of State Legislatures in Public University Collective Bargain-
ing, 2 GOV'T UNION REV. 18-20 (1981). This figure does not reflect change since the enact-
ment of Ohio and Illinois public sector bargaining statutes in 1983. See supra note 26.
36. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 179.73(1) (West Supp. 1984).
37. See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506
(1969); Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968).
38. The Supreme Court on many occasions has held that the rights protected by the
first amendment are implicit in the fourteenth amendment and therefore apply to the
states as well as to the federal government. E.g., NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357
U.S. 449, 460 (1958); Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 324-25 (1937).
39. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
40. See, e.g., Debs v. United States, 249 U.S. 211 (1919); Frohwerk v. United States,
249 U.S. 204 (1919); Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919) (reprinted in part in
GUNTHER, supra note 38, at 1119-24).
41. SeeJ. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA &J. YOUNG, CONSTrrUtIONAL LAW 864-65 (2d ed. 1983)
(citing Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1939); Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147 (1939);
Herndon v. Lowry, 301 U.S. 242 (1937)). See also United States v. Carolene Products Co.,
304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938). ChiefJustice Stone noted, "[tihere may be narrower scope
for operation of the presumption of constitutionality when legislation appears on its face
to be within a specific prohibition of the Constitution, such as those of the first ten amend-
ments." 304 U.S. at 152 n.4.
It should be noted that only certain categories of speech are protected by the first
amendment. The Court has held that, "it is apparent that the unconditional phrasing of
the First Amendment was not intended to protect every (kind of) utterance." Roth v.
United States, 354 U.S. 476, 483 (1957). For example, obscenity, defamatory words, and
fighting words are not constitutionally protected. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973)
(obscenity); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (defamation); Chaplin-
sky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942) (fighting words). J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA &J.
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1. Content-based Regulations
The Supreme Court has consistently ruled that in order to achieve
self-realization and effective self-government, citizens must be able
openly to discuss or debate any topic, regardless of its content.42 For
that reason, governments may not pass laws or regulations which pro-
hibit or regulate speech because of its content or viewpoint unless the
content restriction is narrowly drawn and is necessary to achieve a com-
pelling state interest. 43 For instance, the government may not ban the
distribution of literature which urges citizens to resist the draft and op-
pose a war, unless that literature will clearly cause insurrection. 44 On
the other hand, governments may pass "time, place and manner" regu-
lations, the purposes of which are not to suppress a viewpoint, but are
necessary for the public convenience. Such regulations must be reason-
able, 4 5 must serve a valid governmental interest (but not necessarily a
compelling interest)46 and must leave open adequate alternative chan-
nels for communicating the information.
4 7
2. Public and Nonpublic Forums
In an early first amendment case, Hague v. CIO,48 the Court ruled
that the government is not only prohibited from regulating speech
based upon content, but in public forums it is prohibited from banning
speech altogether. 4 9 Regulations which curb constitutionally protected
speech in traditionally public places were held to be invalid, unless they
are narrowly drawn to provide for the public convenience. 50 The Court
YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAw, 943, 944, 954 (2d ed. 1983). The speech at issue in Knight
does not fall into any of these "unprotected" categories.
42. See West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943); Whitney v.
California, 274 U.S. 357 (1927); Masses Publishing Co. v. Patten, 244 F. 535 (S.D.N.Y.),
rev'd 246 F. 24 (2d Cir. 1917). See generally G. GUNTHER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CON-
STITUIONAL LAW 1106-10 (10th ed. 1980) [hereinafter cited as GUNTHERI (discussing free
speech values and judicial responsibility).
43. See Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45-49 (1983);
Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 461-62 (1980). GUNTHER, supra note 42, at 1197.
44. Masses Publishing Co. v. Patten, 244 F. 535 (S.D.N.Y.) rev'd, 246 F. 24 (2d Cir.
1917).
45. See generally Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 83 (1949) (a content-neutral local ordi-
nance against emission of loud noises on public street is reasonable); Cox v. New Hamp-
shire, 312 U.S. 569, 576 (1941) (a local ordinance forbidding street parades without a
license is reasonable).
46. See Virginia Pharmacy Bd. v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748,
771 (1976); Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108 (1972).
47. Virginia Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 771; Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Serv.
Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530, 535 (1980). In Heffron v. International Soc'y for Krishna Con-
sciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640 (1981), the Court held that the state could require ISKCON,
a religious organization desiring to distribute literature and solicit donations at a state fair,
to do so only at an assigned booth on the fairgrounds. Id. at 656. The Court determined
that the regulation was not content-based; served a substantial government interest be-
cause of the state's need to maintain orderly crowd movement; and allowed alternative
forums for the expression of ISKCON's protected speech outside the fairgrounds. Id. at
654-55.
48. 307 U.S. 496 (1939).
49. Id. at 515-16.
50. Id.
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later held that this rule applies not only to traditionally public places,
but also "where the state has opened a forum for direct citizen involve-
ment," such as school board meetings. 5 1 In the more recent case of Perry
Education Association v. Perry Local Educators' Association,5 2 the Court again
reiterated the rule that governmental authorities must show a valid and
compelling state interest in order to prohibit or regulate speech on the
basis of content in any public forum, whether that forum has been made
public by tradition or by "government fiat."15 3 Once the forum has been
made public, all speakers must have equal access to it.
5 4
However, in the last two decades, the Court has held that not all
publicly-owned places are public forums. 55 In Adderley v. Florida,56 the
Court ruled that the state of Florida did not violate the free speech
rights of student protesters in arresting members of the group for dem-
onstrating on the grounds of a county jailhouse. The Court reasoned
that the jailhouse and its grounds were reserved exclusively for "jail
uses," and thus did not constitute a public forum. Since the property
was not a public forum, the state could bar public access to it. 5 7 In Perry
Education Association, the Court concluded that in a nonpublic forum, the
state need only show that its speech-inhibiting regulation "rationally
furthers a legitimate state purpose."' 58 The Court ruled that the state
may choose among speakers in deciding who, if anyone, may use a gov-
ernment-owned nonpublic forum to air their views, as long as the choice
of speakers is related to the forum's purpose and to a valid state inter-
est.59 Perry Education Association was brought by a teacher's union which
had lost to a rival union in its bid to become the exclusive bargaining
representative for teachers district-wide. Plaintiff charged that the
school district had violated its members' first amendment rights by
agreeing to permit only the exclusive bargaining representative to com-
municate with teachers through school mailboxes.6 0 The Court rea-
soned that the bargaining representative's responsibility to
communicate with district teachers and the district's interest in support-
ing that responsibility, constituted a legitimate state interest to which
51. City of Madison Joint School Dist. No. 8 v. Wisconsin Employment Relations
Comm'n, 429 U.S. 167, 175 (1976). See infra note 89 and accompanying text.
52. 460 U.S. 37 (1983).
53. Id. at 45. See also Police Dep't v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972) (regulation on
picketing unconstitutional because it was content-based and did not further substantial
governmental interest); Consolidated Edison, inc. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530,
540 (1980) (prohibition on public utility bill inserts unconstitutional because it was con-
tent-based and did not serve a compelling state interest).
54. See City of Madison, 429 U.S. at 168.
55. "The Court has stated on several occasions that the first amendment does not
guarantee access to property simply because it is owned or controlled by the state." Com-
ment, Constitutional Law: First Amendment Restrictions Upon Nonpublic Forum Need Only Be Rea-
sonable and Without Discriminatory Intent, 23 WASHBURN L.J. 185, 189 n.41 (1983).
56. 385 U.S. 39 (1966).
57. Id. at 47-48.
58. Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. at 54.
59. Id. at 48-52.
60. Id. at 40-41.
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the exclusive access to mailboxes was rationally related. 6 1 Thus, the
Court has made clear that the strict scrutiny it has long used in review-
ing regulations which inhibit protected speech will not be used in re-
viewing cases involving a nonpublic forum. Instead, the Court will
uphold any government regulation in a nonpublic forum which results
in restricting communication, as long as the regulation is reasonable.
62
C. Associational Rights and Labor Unions
The first amendment protects both the individual's freedom to
speak and the individual's freedom to associate with others. 6 3 Included
in the latter constitutional protection is the right to associate with co-
employees in labor organizing efforts. For example, in Thomas v. Col-
lins,64 the Court struck down a Texas statute which required labor or-
ganizers to register with the state before making pro-union speeches.
The Court held that only if the labor activity presented a "clear and
present danger" to the welfare of the state could the state interfere with
organizing efforts. Unwarranted interference constituted a violation of
the organizer's speech and associational rights.6 5 The Court has also
ruled that individuals have a constitutional right not to speak or associ-
ate. These rights, referred to as "negative first amendment rights,"
'6 6
prohibit governments from compelling individuals to engage in speech
or to associate with anyone or with any idea. 67 In West Virginia State
Board of Education v. Barnette,68 teachers and students were required to
salute the flag and several Jehovah's Witness students refused to do so
on religious grounds. 69 The mandatory salutation to the flag was found
to be unconstitutional because it compelled citizens to express their
faith in politics, nationalism or religion.
70
The question of whether employees have a constitutional right not
to associate with labor unions was presented three decades later in Abood
v. Detroit Board of Education.7 1 In that decision, the Court upheld a Michi-
61. Id. at 50-51.
62. Another example of the Court's recent decisions involving nonpublic forums is
that of United States Postal Serv. v. Greenburgh Civic Ass'ns, 453 U.S. 114 (1981) (resi-
dential mailboxes held not to be a public forum).
63. "Our decisions establish with unmistakable clarity that the freedom of an individ-
ual to associate for the purpose of advancing beliefs and ideas is protected by the First and
Fourteenth Amendments." Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 233 (1977). See
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963).
64. 323 U.S. 516 (1945).
65. Id. at 530.
66. Gaebler, First Amendment Protection Against Government Compelled Expression and Associ-
ation, 23 B.C.L. REV. 995, 996 (1982).
67. Id. at 995.
68. 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
69. Id. at 626, 629.
70. Id. at 642. Compare Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977) (aJehovah's Witness
allowed to cover state motto: "Live Free or Die" on his license plate because the statute
requiring display of this motto infringed on negative first amendment freedoms) with
Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74 (1980) (negative first amendment
rights of shopping center owners not infringed by allowing visitors to engage in public
expression unrelated to the center's commercial purposes).
71. 431 U.S. 209 (1977).
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gan statute which allowed a public school teachers' union to require
nonunion teachers within the union's collective bargaining unit to pay
the union a service fee equal in amount to union dues. 7 2 The Court said
in Abood that fees extracted from nonunion teachers may be used only to
pay for expenses associated with collective bargaining and grievance
procedures; 73 such fees cannot be used against an employee's will to
support a union's political or ideological activities. 74 The Court found
that collection of dues for collective bargaining activities constituted an
"interference" with nonunion employees' associational rights, but rea-
soned that the interference was "justified" by the state's interest in labor
peace. 75 Labor peace in this context could only be secured by a union
assured of financial solvency through the collection of dues and fees
from members and nonmembers alike. 76 The collection of fees was fur-
ther justified by the fact that nonunion teachers benefitted from the
union's collective bargaining efforts. 77 The Court concluded however
that no state interest justified the collection of fees for ideological activi-
ties to which nonunion employees objected. 78 In this context, the bal-
ance between nonunion teachers' associational rights and the state
interest tipped in favor of the teachers. Thus, by the time the Court
turned to consider Minnesota State Board for Community Colleges v. Knight in
1984, it had long recognized the validity of strong state support for em-
ployee unions, but had also established some constitutional protection
for nonunion employees who felt coerced by that state support.
D. The Right to a Government Hearing
The question whether an individual has a right to speak to and be
heard by governmental authorities was answered by the Supreme Court
in Bi-Metallic Investment Co. v. State Board of Equalization79 in 1915. The
Court held that the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment 80
does not require governments to provide hearings unless they are mak-
ing decisions which involve specific, disputed facts which affect a small
number of persons on "individual grounds." 8 ' If the above circum-
stances are not present, the affected individual's recourse is not through
a hearing, but through the elective process. 8 2 The Court has not devi-
ated from this rule since it first was enunciated in Bi-Metallic Investment
Co., 83 even when the rule has been considered in light of the strong
72. Id. at 222-23.
73. Id. at 225-26.
74. Id. at 222.
75. Id. at 222-23.
76. Id. at 221-22.
77. Id. at 222.
78. Id. at 233-37.
79. 239 U.S. 441 (1915).
80. The fourteenth amendment provides that states may not "deprive any person of
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
81. 239 U.S. at 445-46.
82. Id. at 445.
83. See, e.g., O'Bannon v. Town Court Nursing Center, 447 U.S. 773, 800 (1980)
(nursing home residents have no right to a hearing when government decides to close the
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protection of expression offered by the first amendment. 84
E. Academic Freedom
Until fairly recent times, the concept of academic freedom in Ameri-
can universities and colleges was grounded in tradition rather than in
law. Legal protection of academic freedom began in the 1930's through
the concept of tenure which was viewed as a way of protecting faculty
members' rights of free speech and association. 85 "Academic freedom"
as a distinct legal concept was not strongly tested until the McCarthy
era's "Red Menace" cases.8 6 In those cases, the Supreme Court stated
that academic freedom is a "special concern of the First Amendment."
87
Teachers in higher education were free "to inquire, to study and to eval-
uate" 8 8 due to their specialized role as the educators and leaders of
society.
On the secondary-school level, the Court has ruled that public
school teachers in unionized districts have the right to speak in public
forums on any issue-including bargaining issues. In City of Madison
Joint School District v. Wisconsin Public Employment Relations Commission,8 9 a
nonunion teacher spoke to the Board of Education in a public meeting
concerning a topic of pending negotiation, namely, the payment of
union dues. The teacher's right to speak was upheld and the Court
stated that "teachers may not be compelled to relinquish the First
Amendment rights they would otherwise enjoy as citizens to comment
on matters of public interest in connection with the operation of the
public schools in which they work." 90 However, the Court noted that
this case dealt with a meeting of the Board of Education that was open to
the public9 ' and that individuals may not always have a constitutional
right to voice their views whenever, however, and wherever they
please. 92 In fact, the Court recognized that meetings of official bodies
"may be closed to the public without implicating any constitutional
nursing home); United States v. Florida E. Coast Ry., 410 U.S. 224, 245 (1973) (no right to
a hearing when governments set industry-wide rates for freightcar use); Bowles v. Willing-
ham, 321 U.S. 503, 519-20 (1944) (landlords have no right to a hearing when a govern-
ment agency imposes rent control); Rindge Co. v. County of Los Angeles, 262 U.S. 700,
708-09 (1923) (no hearing required when government determines whether an individual's
property is needed for public use); K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 12.2 (2d ed.
1979).
84. "(T)he First Amendment does not impose any affirmative obligation on the gov-
ernment to listen, (or) to respond (to the individual affected by government policymak-
ing)." Smith v. Arkansas State Highway Employees, Local 1315, 441 U.S. 463,465 (1979).
85. H. EDWARDS & V. NORDIN, HIGHER EDUCATION AND THE LAW 163 (1979).
86. Id. See infra note 119.
87. Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967). Some commentators
believe that academic freedom is vanishing in the United States in the wake of compulsory
collective bargaining in education. See, e.g., Kirk, Bargaining Away Academic Freedom, 2 GOV'T
UNION REV. 20 (1980).
88. Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 250 (1957).
89. 429 U.S. 167 (1976).
90. Id. at 175 (quoting Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968)).
91. Id. at 175.
92. Id. at 178 (Brennan, J., concurring) (quoting Adderly v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39, 48
(1966)).
718 [Vol. 62:2
COMMUNITY COLLEGES v. KNIGHT
rights whatever." 93 This could conceivably include the implied constitu-
tional right (if there be any) of academic freedom.
F. Equal Protection
The fourteenth amendment guarantees all persons "equal protec-
tion" under the law.9 4 In interpreting this clause, the Supreme Court
consistently has held that states may treat individuals differently under
social and economic legislation as long as the difference in treatment is a
rational way of achieving a valid governmental objective. For instance,
in Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 9 5 the Court held valid an Oklahoma stat-
ute which prohibited opticians from fitting lenses to the wearer's face
without a prescription written by an optometrist or opthalmologist, but
did not apply a similar prohibition to sellers of ready-to-wear eye-
glasses.9 6 However, the Court has held that when governments treat
individuals differently on the basis of race or violate an individual's fun-
damental right to interstate travel, to vote, or to appeal from criminal
convictions, the statute will be subject to strict scrutiny and will be up-
held only if the government can show a compelling state interest requir-
ing such legislation.9 7 Thus, in Brown v. Board of Education,9 8 Kansas,
South Carolina, Virginia and Delaware denied black students admission
to public schools under state laws that required or allowed segregation
according to race. The court found race to be a suspect class, applied
strict scrutiny to the state laws and found them to be unconstitutional as
a denial of equal protection of the laws.
99
Under these precedents, because PELRA involves neither a suspect
class nor a fundamental right protected by the equal protection clause,
the legislation challenged in Knight would violate the equal protection
clause only if it were irrational or if Minnesota's objective in fashioning
the legislation were to constitute an invalid state end.
93. Id. at 178 (Brennan, J., concurring) (quoting Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665,
684 (1972)).
94. The fourteenth amendment states in pertinent part:
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or im-
munities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of
life, liberty or property without due process of law; nor deny to any person within
its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
95. 348 U.S. 483 (1955) (also decided on due process grounds).
96. Id. See also Railway Express Agency v. New York, 336 U.S. 106 (1949).
97. See, e.g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969) (interstate travel); Harper v.
Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966) (voting); Douglas v. California, 372 U.S.
353 (1963) (criminal appeals); Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (race). See
generatty GUNTHER, supra note 42, at 671-72 (discussing the "two-tier approach" of the
Warren Court that triggered strict scrutiny in the area of equal protection, i.e. the pres-
ence of a suspect classification and an impact on fundamental rights).
98. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
99. Id. at 488-95.
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III. MiNNEsoTA STATE BOARD FOR COMMfUNITY COLLEGES V. KNIGHT
A. The Majority Opinion
1. Interpretation of the Statute
Section 179.66(7) of PELRA permits discussion of policy issues be-
tween any professional employee and his or her employer "when such
communication is a part of the employee's work assignment." 0 0 Sec-
tion 179.65(1) of the statute permits any employee to discuss with ad-
ministrators "view(s). . .or opinion(s) on any matter related to the
conditions or compensation of public employment or their better-
ment ... "101 The Court interpreted these provisions to permit com-
munication between nonunion faculty members and administrators on
all issues of policy-even those outside the scope of the employee's
work assignments-as long as such communication does not take place
in, or take the place of, "meet and confer" sessions.10 2 Apparently, the
Court viewed § 179.66(7) as offering only one example of the contexts
in which such communication could take place (i.e., by way of employee
work assignments), rather than as limiting such communication to the
context of work assignments alone.'
0 3
2. Public Forums and Government Hearings
The Court ruled that PELRA does not violate the nonunion mem-
bers' first and fourteenth amendment rights because they have no con-
stitutionally guaranteed right to speak in the particular context
prescribed by the statute.' 0 4 First, the Court made clear that the nonun-
ion members had not been banned from a public forum, because "meet
and confer" sessions are not open to the public either by tradition or by
"government designation," and therefore do not constitute a public fo-
rum.' 0 5 For that reason, the Court concluded, the case was distinguish-
able from City of Madison Joint School District v. Wisconsin Public Employment
Relations Commission, 10 6 in which the Court ruled that public school
teachers had a constitutional right to speak at school board meetings.
Unlike public school board meetings, PELRA's "meet and confer" ses-
sions were never intended to be open to the public for public
participation.1
0 7
However, rather than conclude that the nonunion members validly
could be excluded from "meet and confer" sessions because such ses-
sions were nonpublic forums, the Court distinguished Knight from non-
public forum cases decided thus far. Nonpublic forum cases such as
100. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 179.66(7) (West Supp. 1984).
101. Id. § 179.65(1).
102. 104 S. Ct. 1058, 1061-62 (1984).
103. See id.
104. 104 S. Ct. at 1064-70.
105. Id. at 1064.
106. 429 U.S. 167 (1976). See supra notes 90-92 and accompanying text.
107. 104 S. Ct. at 1064.
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Perry Education Association 10 8 were brought by persons who demanded ac-
cess to government property in order to speak to private individuals, the
Court said. In contrast, the nonunion members in the instant case de-
manded access to a government forum in order to speak to public offi-
cials. 10 9 They did not demand only a right to speak, but a right to speak
and to be listened to in a specific forum by governmental authorities-a
right which does not exist under the rule of Bi-Metallic Investment Co. v.
State Board of Equalization, ' 10 the Court concluded. 1 1 '
Nor did the Court find the state's refusal to listen to the nonunion
members while agreeing to listen to union members unconstitutional;
the Court reasoned that our system of government recognizes the free-
dom of public officials to choose to whom they will listen.'1 2 The Court
contended that any other rule would deprive all public officials, includ-
ing the nation's President, of the right to pick their advisors.'
13
3. Public Employee Unions
The Court next analyzed the case in light of the nonunion mem-
bers' status as public employees and concluded that they did not have a
right to a hearing by governmental authorities merely because those au-
thorities were also their employers.' 14 By way of analogy, the Court
compared the case with Smith v. Arkansas State Highway Employees, Local
13156. 115 In Smith, the Court upheld a public employer's refusal to con-
sider employee grievances when filed by the employee's union rather
than by the employee himself or herself." 6 The Court in Knight rea-
soned that Smith rested upon the principle that, when making policy de-
cisions, governments may choose which of its employees to listen to,
whether they speak as individuals or are represented by a group-a prin-
ciple which also supports Minnesota's decision to listen only to MCCFA
members in "meet and confer" sessions. 117
4. The First Amendment and Academe
The Court rejected the nonunion members' argument that the Con-
stitution guarantees the right of faculty members to confer with adminis-
trators on policy issues. The Court held that dialogue between faculty
and administration on a college or university level is a sound American
tradition, but not one which is protected by the Constitution." 8 Prior
Supreme Court cases which recognized the importance of first amend-
ment protection for teachers were distinguished as involving govern-
108. 460 U.S. 37 (1983).
109. 104 S. Ct. at 1064-65.
110. 239 U.S. 441 (1915). See supra notes 79-84 and accompanying text.
111. 104 S. Ct. at 1065-67.
112. Id. at 1066.
113. Id. at 1064, n.6.
114. Id. at 1067.
115. 441 U.S. 463 (1979).
116. Id.
117. 104 S. Ct. at 1067.
118. Id.
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mental suppression of communication between teachers and private
individuals, while the instant case involved suppression of communica-
tion between teachers and public officials, the Court reasoned.' 19
5. Equal Protection
The Court, citing Perry Education Association, dismissed the nonunion
members' claim that PELRA denied them equal protection. 120 The
Court reasoned that the equal protection clause did not prohibit a state
from permitting only union teachers to speak in a nonpublic forum, as
long as the practice is rationally related to a valid state end.' 2' Further,
it concluded that the state's interest in labor peace and efficient em-
ployee-employer relations is valid, and the "meet and confer" sessions
are a rational way of fulfilling that interest.
122
B. The Concurrence
Justice Marshall agreed with the outcome of the case, but disagreed
with the majority's blanket application of Bi-Metallic Investment Co., which
he asserted denied the nonunion members the right to be heard by col-
lege administrators in any context. 123 Justice Marshall argued that the
principles underlying Healy v. James 124 and other decisions involving in-
stitutions of higher education support a constitutional right to faculty-
administrator communication in some situations. The Court often had
recognized that a teacher's freedom to speak and associate could not be
abridged if students were to become well-educated individuals and ef-
fective citizens, he asserted. 12 5 Justice Marshall concluded, however,
that PELRA does not violate this freedom, for the statute permits com-
munication between faculty members and administrators outside the




Like Justice Marshall, Justice Brennan argued that faculty members
have a constitutional right to communicate with administrators-a right
119. Id. at 1067-68. The Court cited Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589
(1967), Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960), and Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S.
234 (1957). Each case involved teachers who refused to divulge their political party affilia-
tions to governmental authorities attempting to rout Communists.
120. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
121. 104 S. Ct. at 1069.
122. Id. at 1069-70.
123. Id. at 1070.
124. 408 U.S. 169 (1972). In Healy, the Court stated that denying official recognition
to student college organizations without adequate justification abridges first amendment
rights. Id. at 181.
125. 104 S. Ct. at 1070-71 (citing Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 479 (1957)).
126. Id. at 1071. As the majority opinion noted, the State Board and college adminis-
trators "solicit opinions" in college-wide meetings, and college administrators maintain an
"open-door" policy which permits all faculty members to meet with administrators indi-
vidually to discuss any topic of interest to the teacher. Id. at 1062, n.3.
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based upon the first amendment's "special concern" for academic free-
dom. 12 7 However, Brennan disagreed with Marshall's conclusion that
such right is satisfied by the contact which PELRA permits between non-
union faculty members and college administrators,' 2 8 and reasoned that
the communication allowed by PELRA is too "sporadic and informal" to
be meaningful. 1
2 9
Justice Brennan also concluded that the statute violates nonunion
teachers' associational rights. 130 "Meet and confer" sessions played so
central a role in developing academic policy that teachers who "want to
remain full members of the academic community" must participate in
them. 13 1 Thus, since only MCCFA members could participate in "meet
and confer" sessions, teachers who took their jobs seriously must join
the MCCFA even if they have "personal or ideological objections" to
the union.' 3 2 Justice Brennan concluded that the statute forced an ideo-
logical association unwanted by the individual which, under the rule of
Abood v. Detroit Board of Education, violates the individual's first amend-
ment right not to associate with others.'
3 3
2. Justice Stevens
Justice Stevens' dissent 134 was based on his conclusion that both
PELRA and the majority's holding prohibit any communication between
nonunion faculty members and administrators on any policy issues ex-
cept those directly affecting the teachers' academic specialty. '3 5 Unlike
the Court majority, Justice Stevens interpreted § 179.65(1) of the statute
as permitting communication between nonunion faculty members and
administrators only on issues related to collective bargaining. 136 In his
view, these limitations prohibit even willing college administrators from
listening to nonunion faculty members who want to speak about most
policy issues. 13 7 He thus concluded that the issue in the nonunion
members' case was not whether public officials could refuse to grant a
hearing to individuals, but whether the state could prohibit individuals
from competing for the attention of public officials who might be willing
to listen to them. '3 8 Justice Stevens argued that governments could not
prohibit such competition because to do so prevented the existence of
an "open marketplace of ideas" which is guaranteed by the first amend-
127. Id. at 1072.
128. Id. at 1072, n.1.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 1073.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 1073-74. See supra notes 71-78 and accompanying text.
134. Justice Brennanjoined in all but Part III ofJustice Stevens' dissent. Justice Powell
joined in all but Part II.
135. 104 S. Ct. at 1075-76 and n.1 (interpreting MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 179.65(l),
179.66(7) (West Supp. 1984)).
136. See supra notes 100-103 and accompanying text.
137. 104 S. Ct. at 1081-82.
138. Id.
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ment.' 3 9 By prohibiting any communication between nonunion teach-
ers and administrators on most policy issues, PELRA prohibited those
teachers from competing for the attention of administrators, thus violat-
ing the first amendment's "open marketplace" principle.
Justice Stevens' dissent also disagreed with the majority's conclu-
sion that "meet and confer" sessions were not public forums, arguing
that the sessions were public because they were held in public places and
open to public view. 140 Applying the rule of Police Department of Chicago
V. Mosley, 141 Justice Stevens concluded that the sessions constituted pub-
lic forums rather than nonpublic forums, and Minnesota could not allow
participation by one speaker while prohibiting participation by an-
other. 142 The opinion further reasoned that even if the "meet and con-
fer" sessions constituted a nonpublic forum, the majority erred in
applying the rule of Perry Education Association143 to uphold PELRA's un-
even treatment of union and nonunion teachers. 14 4 The discriminatory
treatment upheld in Perry Education Association was justified by the heavy
responsibilities the exclusive bargaining representative carried in com-
municating with district teachers and upon the labor unrest that might
result if both the exclusive representative and the minority union had
access to teachers' mailboxes. 14 5 Justice Stevens averred that neither
justification existed in the context of "meet and confer" sessions.
14 6
Finally, this dissent concluded that PELRA violated the rule of
Abood, which prohibited states from dealing exclusively with a union ex-
cept in the context of collective bargaining. Any extension of exclusivity
beyond that context violated the associational rights of nonunion em-
ployees. 14 7 Since "meet and confer" sessions were not connected with
collective bargaining activity, exclusive participation by the MCCFA vio-
lated the rule of Abood.'
4 8
IV. ANALYSIS
In light of Minnesota's academic tradition of strong faculty involve-
ment in administrative policymaking, to many minds PELRA is a terribly
unattractive law. However, as the Court correctly concluded, it is not an
unconstitutional one. It is the province of the Minnesota legislature, not
139. Id. at 1074-75, 1086. See generally Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630
(1919) (Holmes,J., dissenting) (ultimate good is obtained by "free trade in ideas" and the
best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the
market).
140. 104 S. Ct. at 1084.
141. 408 U.S. 92 (1972). In Mosley, the Court struck down an ordinance which permit-
ted only labor unions to picket near public school buildings during certain hours.
142. 104 S. Ct. at 1083-84.
143. See supra notes 120-122 and accompanying text.
144. Id. at 1085.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 1083.
148. Id.
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that of the Court, to modify or abandon PELRA's meet and confer pro-
visions if indeed the provisions should be modified or abandoned.
A. Interpretation of the Statute
The Court's holding that PELRA does not violate the free speech
rights of nonunion teachers is based upon the majority's conclusion that
PELRA permits nonunion teachers to discuss all policy issues with ad-
ministrators in a variety of settings outside "meet and confer" sessions,
and that Minnesota's community college administrators do in fact feel
free to engage in such discussions with nonunion teachers. 149
1. Section 179.65(1)
The Minnesota legislature made clear in § 179.65(1) that PELRA
was not to be construed "to limit, impair or affect the right of any public
employee or his representative to the expression or communication of a
view, grievance, complaint or opinion on any matter related to the con-
ditions or compensation of public employment" as long as the commu-
nication does not interfere with "the rights of the exclusive [collective
bargaining] representative."' 150 Justice Stevens, in his dissent, inter-
preted this section to allow communication between nonunion teachers
and administrators on collective bargaining issues only. 15 1 He interpreted
the phrase "conditions or compensation" used in § 179.65(1) to be the
equivalent of the phrase "terms and conditions of employment"-the
phrase used in PELRA to refer to collective bargaining issues. 15 2 How-
ever, a close reading of PELRA forces one to conclude, as the majority
correctly did, that if the Minnesota legislature had meant to limit
§ 179.65(1) to communications involving only collective bargaining is-
sues, it would have used the phrase "terms and conditions" in place of
the phrase "conditions and compensation" in that section. Throughout
PELRA, the legislature consistently referred to collective bargaining is-
sues as "terms and conditions" of employment.' 5 3 In fact, nowhere in
the statute are collective bargaining issues referred to in any way but as
"terms and conditions" of employment. Thus, if the language of
§ 179.65(1) is to be viewed as consistent with the language employed in
the rest of PELRA, it must be concluded that "conditions and compen-
sation" refers to something other than collective bargaining issues. It
must refer to all conditions of employment, whether they be hours and
fringe benefits to be discussed in collective bargaining sessions, or
broader policy issues which are the subjects of meet and confer sessions.
Even if § 179.65(1) is viewed as ambiguous, PELRA's self-stated
legislative purpose leads to the conclusion that § 179.65(1) encourages
discussion of both collective bargaining issues and broad policy issues.
149. 104 S. Ct. at 1062.
150. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 179.65(I) (West Supp. 1984).
151. 104 S. Ct. at 1075, n.1.
152. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 179.63(18) (West Supp. 1984).
153. See id. §§ 179.63(16); 179.63(18); 179.65(4); 179.66(2); 179.66(4).
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The statute recognizes, for instance, that "professional employees pos-
sess knowledge, experience and dedication which ... may assist public
employers in developing their policies."1 54 If § 179.65(1) were read to
prohibit discussion of broad policy issues (i.e., those not included in
"terms and conditions" of employment), that legislative purpose would
be frustrated.
Hence, since PELRA permits nonunion teachers and college admin-
istrators to discuss in other settings the kinds of broad policy issues dis-
cussed by MCCFA members in "meet and confer" sessions, the statute
does not inhibit the "marketplace of ideas" whichJustice Stevens argued
is assured by the first amendment.' 5 5 The marketplace exists on cam-
pus everywhere except within formal "meet and confer" and "meet and
negotiate" (i.e., collective bargaining) sessions. To insist that the mar-
ketplace must encompass even these formal sessions is to ignore the rule
of Bi-Metallic Investment Co. 156
2. Administrators' Interpretation of PELRA
The majority in Knight concluded not only that PELRA allows sig-
nificant communication between all faculty members and administra-
tors, but that administrators of Minnesota's community college system
have interpreted the statute to permit such communication.' 5 7 Justice
Stevens, in his dissent, argued that testimony at the trial court level
showed that administrators were afraid to communicate with nonunion
teachers for fear such communication would constitute a violation of
PELRA.' 58 However, the Court majority concluded that the trial record
showed that administrators' fears vanished after "an initial period of ad-
justment to PELRA."' 159 The district court's findings clearly showed
that most administrators had not been deterred from discussing policy
issues with nonunion teachers outside "meet and confer" sessions. 160
The majority's conclusion was buttressed by the district court's
finding that "[t]he plaintiffs have not demonstrated ... that any faculty
member's exercise of free speech has been impaired in practice by virtue
of this potential inhibition [on speech]."' 16 1  In fact, the evidence
showed that nonunion teachers had ample opportunity to express them-
selves on all policy issues, including those which were discussed by the
MCCFA at "meet and confer" sessions. The State Board for Commu-
nity Colleges met with teachers and other individuals for open discus-
sions before each of its on-campus Board meetings; college presidents
held "town meetings" on campus, attended faculty meetings and other-
154. Id. § 179.73.
155. See supra notes 134-139 and accompanying text.
156. See supra notes 79-84 and accompanying text.
157. 104 S. Ct. at 1062.
158. Id. at 1077.
159. Id. at 1062, n.4.
160. Id.
161. Id. at 1062, n.4.
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wise maintained an "open-door" policy. 16 2 One could assume that
since college presidents felt free to speak with all teachers, other admin-
istrators also communicated with all teachers. This being the case, it
could not be said that administrators had interpreted PELRA in a way
which had hampered that "marketplace of ideas" essential to free
speech.
3. Amplification of Union Voices
The Court did acknowledge the district court's finding that the
MCCFA's voice was amplified over that of nonunion teachers by virtue
of PELRA's "meet and confer" sessions. The sessions produced what
administrators perceived to be the official view of the faculty on policy
issues. 16 3 But the Court rightly concluded that Smith v. Arkansas State
Highway Employees, Local 1315 clearly held that such amplification does
not violate free speech rights. 16 4 "Amplification of the sort claimed is
inherent in government's freedom to choose advisors," the majority
noted. 16 5 That is, choosing to listen to just one of many speakers is the
equivalent of choosing to amplify the voice of that speaker, and to de-
emphasize the voices of others.
B. Public v. Nonpublic Forums
The Court's holding that "meet and confer" sessions were not pub-
lic forums rested squarely on a line of precedent beginning with Adderley
and continuing through Perry Education Association. 16 6 "Meet and confer"
sessions, like the jailhouse grounds in Adderley, were not traditionally
public places. Nor had they been opened by government for public par-
ticipation. Therefore, under the rule of Adderley, government officials
could ban individuals from "meet and confer" sessions. Perry Education
Association, moreover, held that government officials could admit some
individuals and ban others who want to speak in such nonpublic forums,
as long as the government did not base its choice of speakers on the
speaker's viewpoint, or the speech's content. 16 7 Officials may base the
choice of speaker on the speaker's status 168 (e.g., union members v. non-
union employees), 16 9 subject matter or category of speech' 70 (e.g., com-
mercial v. noncommercial speech), 17 1 or speaker identity 17 2 (e.g., the
President may choose who will advise him as Chief of Staff). Thus, if
Minnesota chose to let some teachers speak at "meet and confer" ses-
162. Id. at 1062, n.3.
163. Id. at 1062, 1068; See Knight v. Minnesota Community College Faculty Ass'n, 571
F. Supp. 1, 8 (D. Minn. 1982).
164. See supra notes 114-117 and accompanying text.
165. 104 S. Ct. at 1068.
166. See supra notes 55-62 and accompanying text.
167. Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37 at 46.
168. Id. at 49.
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298 (1974).
172. 460 U.S. 37 at 50.
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sions because they are representatives of the MCCFA, the choice was
valid because it was based on the speakers' union status. If, on the other
hand, a state choose only to listen to those teachers who favor a curricu-
lum based upon a certain political outlook, that choice would be invalid,
for it would be based upon those speakers' viewpoints. As Perry Educa-
tion Association held, a choice based upon speaker status is valid as long as
it rationally promotes a valid state end. 17 3 It is not correct to say, as
Justice Stevens does, 174 that once a government opens a forum to one
speaker, it must allow communication from all other speakers unless the
state has a compelling reason for not doing so. Minnesota's choosing to
permit only MCCFA teachers to speak at "meet and confer" sessions is a
rational way of achieving two valid state ends: maintaining a peaceful
relationship with public employees and better serving college communi-
ties by receiving guidance from professional teachers.
The Court distinguished the instant case from nonpublic forum
cases because the nonunion members in the instant case demanded to
speak to public officials rather than to private individuals.17 5 The Court
reasoned that analysis of nonpublic forum cases was therefore "irrele-
vant," since individuals can never demand a government audience when
a government is making a policy decision.17 6 Such reasoning, however,
goes too far in separating the rule governing "government hearings"
from that of public and nonpublic forums. Nonpublic forum analysis is
necessary in Knight because it answers the question whether government
officials may refuse to listen to one speaker while agreeing to listen to
another. Bi-Metallic Investment Co. and its progeny answer only the ques-
tion whether government officials acting in a policy-making capacity may
refuse to listen to all individuals. 17 7 Indeed, for this reason, the Court
in Knight found the nonpublic forum analysis of Perry Education Association
far from irrelevant in the Court's consideration of the nonunion teach-
ers' equal protection claim.1
78
C. Associational Rights
The nonunion teachers argued, and the dissenters agreed, that
PELRA violated their first amendment right to associate freely and to
refrain from associating with others. 17 9 They complained that they were
faced with the choice ofjoining the union or of being denied meaningful
communication with administrators, thereby losing their status as full
and effective members of the faculty. To be a full member of the faculty,
the dissenters reasoned, teachers were forced by PELRA to join a union
even though those teachers were ideologically opposed to unionism.
173. See supra notes 58-59 and accompanying text.
174. See 104 S. Ct. at 1084.
175. See supra notes 57-60 and accompanying text.
176. 104 S. Ct. at 1065.
177. See Bi-Metallic Investment Co. v. State Bd of Equalization, 239 U.S. 441 (1915).
See also supra notes 48-52 and accompanying text.
178. See 104 S. Ct. at 1069.
179. See supra notes 130-33, 147-48 and accompanying text.
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Such coercion, they argued, clearly violated the rule of Abood. 180
The majority's rejection of this argument is implicit in its conclu-
sion that nonunion faculty members have ample opportunity to discuss
policy issues with administrators. Nonunion faculty members who feel
that they must communicate with administrators on issues of policy in
order to maintain their status as full and effective members of the faculty
have many opportunities to do so. They may communicate with mem-
bers of the State Board before on-campus Board meetings, with the col-
lege president at town meetings and at discussion breakfasts, through
letters and personal contact with the system's chancellor or by visiting
the offices of other administrators.181 Thus, in light of the many oppor-
tunities nonunion teachers have to communicate with administrators on
broad policy issues, teachers need not join the MCCFA (and participate
in "meet and confer" sessions) in order to communicate meaningfully
with administrators.
D. The Academic Setting
The Court did not err in finding that nonunion faculty members
have no special right to a government audience by virtue of the aca-
demic setting in which they work. The Court has never indicated that
teachers have a greater right than does the general public to speak in
nonpublic forums, or to speak before public officials. 18 2 In fact, in Picker-
ing v. Board of Education' 8 3 the Court stated in dicta that the state may
restrict the speech of public school teachers in situations in which gov-
ernment would not be free to restrict the speech of other citizens. Pub-
lic school teachers may speak out only if the communication does not
"impede the teacher's proper performance. . . in the classroom or...
[interfere] with regular operation of the schools generally."'18 4 The dis-
trict court argued, ad did Justice Brennan in Knight that the first amend-
ment nevertheless offered enhanced protection to university-level
professors. 18 5 The argument stemmed from dicta found in a series of
cases spawned during the McCarthy era, in which the Court struck down
state statutes which required teachers to take loyalty oaths or otherwise
prove they were not affiliated with the Communist Party. 18 6 To deny
employment in universities on the basis of political party affiliation
would deny university students (and, therefore, the country's future
leaders) "that robust exchange of ideas which discovers truth 'out of a
multitude of tongues .... . '.187 As the Court in Knight pointed out,
these McCarthy era cases were clearly distinguishable from the case
180. See supra notes 130-33 and accompanying text.
181. 104 S. Ct. at 1062, n.3.
182. See supra notes 118-19 and accompanying text.
183. 391 U.S. 563 (1968).
184. Id. at 572-73.
185. 104 S. Ct. at 1072-73; Knight v. Minnesota Community College Faculty Ass'n, 571
F. Supp. at 9.
186. See stipra note 119.
187. Keyishian %-.Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589,603 (1967) (quoting United States v.
Associated Press, 52 F. Supp. 362, 372 (1943)).
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before them. The former cases involved statutes which prohibited
teachers from speaking and associating with Communists in private fo-
rums. The statute at issue in Knight prohibited teachers from speaking
to public officials in the context of one nonpublic forum ("meet and
confer" sessions).' 8 8 In fact, the dicta of the former cases could not be
applied to Knight without overruling Bi-Metallic Investment Co., Smith v.
Arkansas State Highway Employees, Local 1315, and other Supreme Court
decisions which upheld government's freedom to ignore speakers alto-
gether, or to choose to which speakers to listen. In fact, commentators
have urged that the special first amendment protection which the court
has espoused in dicta has actually been applied not to teachers but
rather to colleges and universities as institutions.
18 9
E. Government Hearings
The Court's holding is soundly supported by Bi-Metallic Investment
Co. Justice Stevens' assertion that the state may not prevent public offi-
cials from listening to individuals if those officials are potentially willing
listeners' 9 0 ignores the fact that the public officials involved in Knight are
the state, for they are agents of the state whose power is prescribed by
the legislature. 19 1 His argument also pales in light of the many opportu-




The Court has ruled consistently that a state, in developing social
and economic legislation, may treat individuals differently as long as it
can show a rational basis for the legislation. Only when the legislation
or regulation affects a "suspect class" of persons or involves voting, in-
terstate travel or criminal appeals-which PELRA does not-will the
Court require more.' 9 3 As the Court noted, Minnesota's interest in
"ensuring that its public employers hear one . . . voice presenting the
majority view of its professional employees on employment-related pol-
icy questions" is rational. 194 It therefore passed the minimal scrutiny
the Court has always applied in reviewing such legislation.
CONCLUSION
Minnesota State Board for Community Colleges v. Knight constituted a
synthesis of administrative, first amendment, and labor law and placed a
188. See supra notes 100-10 1 and accompanying text.
189. See Katz, The First Amendment's Protection of Expressive Activity in the University Class-
room: A Constitutional Myth, 16 U.C.D. L. REV. 857, 859, 863 (1983); Malin & Ladenson,
University Faculty Members' Right to Dissent: Toward a Unified Theory of Contractual and Constitu-
tional Protection, 16 U.C.D. L. REV. 933, 950-55 (1983).
190. See Bi-Metallic Investment Co., 239 U.S. at 445.
191. See B. SCHWARTZ, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 8 (1976).
192. See supra notes 110-15 and accompanying text.
193. See supra notes 94-99 and accompanying text.
194. 104 S. Ct. at 1069.
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limit upon the otherwise broad protection of speech and associational
rights offered by the first amendment. As the Court interprets the Con-
stitution, individuals do not have a right to be heard by public officials
making policy decisions in a nonpublic forum, regardless of the individ-
uals' status. In fact, those officials may choose which speakers to listen
to and may base their choice on the speakers' union status, even when
the policies or rules involved do not concern collective bargaining
issues.
The holding in Knight, being based upon the strong precedent set in
Bi-Metallic Investment Co. v. State Board of Equalization, reflects a long-held
belief by the Court that government will grind to a halt unless officials
who make rules and set policy are free to seek advice from whomever
they please.' 9 5 In this context, the individual's first amendment protec-
tion must bow to the needs of government as a whole.
Diana L. Insolio
Jill B. Nelson
195. See Bi-Metali Investment Co., 239 U.S. at 445.
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